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Sociological treatments of the reproduction of social inequality in South Africa largely focus on
its historical, political and economical aspects while references to popular culture are commonly
used to describe differences, often in combination with racial discourse, rather than explain
them. As a result much of South African cultural sociology, especially with regards to youth cul-
ture, is entailed in in-depth ethnographic descriptions of particular subcultures. Less common is
scholarly work dealing with the role of taste and cultural preferences in the reconfiguration of
common perceptions of ‘otherness’, both in class and race terms.
This dissertation shifts the focus towards the structural aspects of popular culture and, particu-
larly, youth culture. First, inspired by Bourdieu’s work on distinction, it explores the segregating
potential of contemporary youth culture in South Africa, especially where class and race con-
notations meet. It then follows this thread of adapting Bourdieu’s work to contemporary South
African youth by identifying the media as a crucial factor alongside family and school for the pre-
servation of racialised class characteristics. In a third step it takes the observations made in the
South African context and compares them to youth culture in Brazil in order to establish the ex-
istence of common structures of difference that exist in different countries as a result of
glocalization.
The thesis established in this dissertation is that the cultural preferences of youth often come
with class and race connotations. This interplay between class and race can be explained historic-
ally as well as structurally through media consumption, which plays a significant role in the way
young people learn to dress, speak, carry themselves and generally position themselves in relation
to others. Due to global cultural flows these processes do not remain purely local phenomena
but they find expression in localised forms as common structures of difference around the globe,
thus structurally undermining local efforts to build a non-racial, non-classist society.
These conclusions are based on primary research using a multi-method approach combining sur-
veys on taste and racial attitudes with school-going youth in South Africa (Cape Town, n=1196)
and Brazil (Belo Horizonte, n=860) with in-depth focus group interviews (only Cape Town). Us-
ing descriptive statistics and multiple regression analysis (survey data) combined with qualitative
data analysis (interviews) it was possible to demonstrate that there are clear differences in the cul-
tural and media preferences of South African youth along class and race lines, which are reflec-
ted, to a lesser extent, in the cultural and media preferences of Brazilian youth.
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At the FIFA World Cup 2010 the world saw a new South Africa. Visitors from home and afar
enjoyed the tournament in state-of-the-art stadiums, FIFA gave the country a near-perfect ‘9 out
of 10’ for hosting the event, the cities where matches were being held were shining and the roads
connecting them in a better shape than ever before. It was also a remarkably peaceful event in
spite of fear-mongering articles in foreign newspapers predicting a chaotic tournament marked
by crime and violence. But above all visitors remarked positively on the friendly atmosphere and
the hospitality of South Africans. Although the divisions of the past were still visible to those
who cared enough to venture outside the hotels, stadiums and bars, South Africa was portrayed
to be on the path of overcoming its divisive past and becoming a united nation. The other image
that was brought to fans in the stadiums and on the TV screens was that of a cosmopolitan and
open South Africa steeped in its African heritage.
The tone was set by the tournament’s opening concert: local bands and musicians shared the
stage with African and international, mostly American, big names such as Amadou and Mariam,
Black Eyed Peas and John Legend. The highlight was the rendition of the tournament’s hymn
Waka Waka (This Time for Africa), performed by Colombian Pop star Shakira together with local
Afropop outfit Freshlyground, known for its up-beat African sound. The images of black and
white South Africans performing on stage with Shakira in front of a world audience encapsulated
exactly how the organisers wanted the world to see the new South Africa: united, proud of its
heritage and open to the world.
It was a persuasive message and many South Africans started to believe in the possibility of a
new national identity as the glaring evidences of social inequality, the endless political debates
and allegations of corruption and the constant fear of crime moved to the background at least
for a little while and made place for a feeling of lightness and privilege of being part of this beau-
tiful nation. Of course the fuzzy warm feeling did not last and as soon as the circus left town old
routines and habits kicked back in. Nonetheless the experience of the World Cup served as the
reminder of an old belief: differences can be overcome when they are taken from the political
and existential to the trivial so they can be celebrated, cherished and even laughed about in good
humour. Accordingly, differences are no longer measured in socio-economic inequality or used
to discriminate others but are moved into the realm of taste and cultural preferences.
In South Africa this belief is often expressed in conjunction with a second one: while older
South Africans will probably always be marked by the experiences of the past and never really be
able to forget their suspicions of ‘the other’, young South Africans who grew up after the end of
apartheid are much more likely to just move on and ignore their differences as they are allowed
to attend the same schools, make friends with whomever they want to, watch the same things on
television and surf the same internet. The undeniable socio-economic inequality that affects
young South Africans as much as older generations is commonly explained through the injustices
of the past, the political blunders of the present or a combination of both but rarely are matters
of taste and cultural preferences taken into the equation.
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Taste and cultural preferences are thus at the intersection of the two narratives that many South
Africans employ when they project an optimistic future for their country. And as I found during
my research with adolescents they are also used to explain the continuance of perceived segrega-
tion; as I chatted with a group of kids during a break at one of my visits to a school in one of
Cape Town’s wealthier neighbourhoods I remarked on the fact that students clearly seemed to
group according to the colour of their skin. But the kids I was talking to were quick to explain:
“They just like different music and dress differently than us, but this has nothing to do with
race.”
This short anecdote points to the heart of what this thesis sets out to achieve. It aims to untangle
the common assumptions and beliefs surrounding the role of taste and cultural preferences and
unravel the divisive potential of popular culture by applying Bourdieu’s concept of distinction in
the context of South African school-going youth and, in a second step, test the universality of
the found patterns of distinction in a comparison with findings from research on youth in Brazil.
The motive behind the study stems from the observation that the role of popular culture contin-
ues to be underestimated in the debate on social inequality in South Africa. Currently this debate
is largely divided into two intertwining strands: socio-economic inequality and racial discourse,
which do not leave much space for a) the role of popular culture not only as a sign but also a
cause of social inequality and b) the impact of cultural globalisation on the imagery and fabric of
inequality in South Africa.
For a better understanding of how assumptions of the unifying force of popular culture some-
times clash with reality it is worth reading the following exchange from an interview with two
boys who consider themselves white. 
Interviewer: Let me ask more directly: do you think that there is a white and black
music taste?
Peter:1 Yes, definitely! I cannot spin a yarn about that, but there is a big
difference.
Tom: It is starting to whiten, a little bit, but generally, I mean, it’s…
Peter: No, the white is starting to darken. I mean I had Eminem on my list. If
we start listening to Rap, they start listening to classical music and stuff,
and eventually there is gonna be a grey area in the middle, where we all
come to.
Tom: Yes, white people listening to white rappers and black people listening
to black rockers.
Peter: Yes, black rockers and black composers. And eventually it’s everybody
listening to exactly the same stuff.
Peter’s surprise about his own choice of Eminem as one of his favourite musicians is under-
standable if one considers the other names (including Andrew Lloyd Webber, Beethoven and
1. The names of interviewees are colour-coded in terms of racial self-classification: African/black, coloured,




Johnny Cash) on his list of favourite musicians. But it becomes even more interesting in light of
his and his friend’s awareness of racialised differences in music taste such as the assertion that
classical music is essentially “a white thing”. Moreover, Peter makes the observation that “the
white is starting to darken”, citing his own fondness for Eminem as proof and implying a pro-
cess of homogenisation which would eventually result in the disappearance of distinctions alto-
gether and the emergence of a single universal taste. The deciding point here, which is not com-
pletely clear from the excerpt but from the interview in its entirety, is the disapproval and the
sense of loss expressed both by Tom and Peter in expectation of a post-racial (grey) future.
But this brief discussion between two schoolboys in Cape Town about what constitutes black
and white music goes beyond racial stereotypes as there is a clear hierarchy in the way Tom and
Peter differentiate between classical music, Rock and Rap that aligns with the classic notions of
‘highbrow’ and ‘lowbrow’ in cultural sociology. With reference to Bourdieu one could argue that
the exchange between Tom and Peter can be made sense of in terms of cultural capital and
habitus, one giving currency to taste and cultural preferences in the establishment of power rela-
tions in society alongside economic and social capital, the other reproducing the same establ-
ished structures of inequality over time. In the example above it is the apparent loss and trans-
formation of the established power structures and the loss of distinction between ‘low’ and ‘high’
that prompts the two boys to contemplate the supposed bleakness of a non-racial and egalitarian
society.
The exchange gains another dimension with the boys’ reference to Eminem. As arbitrary as the
example might seem, it is actually not. Eminem personifies the often unacknowledged racial fault
lines in popular culture exactly because he is seen to have crossed them so convincingly without
losing (street-)credibility.2 This can be, and indeed is by many, seen as proof that race, and with it
class and gender, is indeed losing currency in an increasingly postmodern society in which indi-
vidual choice (agency) is replacing systemic determinism (structure). Eminem’s special status sug-
gests that distinction, understood in a Bourdieuan sense, has not lost its meaning entirely; his
crossing of the line (quite literally, according to the movie 8 Mile) between white and black also
carries class connotations as he struggles (so the legend, or movie, goes) to gain credibility
among black rappers who, justifiably, stress the combined economic burden of being poor and
facing discrimination for being black, while the rest of society sees in him a hopeless trailer park
boy.
Beyond the question whether Bourdieu’s concept of distinction is still relevant in contemporary
society, the example of Eminem in the context of a conversation between two South African
2. Gary Taylor (2005: 347) dedicates the epilogue of his book Buying Whiteness to the racial conundrum that is
Eminem. Providing his interpretation of the name Eminem, he writes:
In racial slang, an “oreo” is someone “black on the outside, white on the inside,” an African
American who has internalized Anglo standards of behavior. (I once encountered a black man
wearing a satirical t-shirt that identified “OREO” as “America’s favorite cookie.”) By contrast,
whatever its glossy surface, an M&M is always chocolate – and therefore black – on the inside. A
white man internalizing black standards, Eminem turns the racial oreo inside out.
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teenagers also raises the matter of locality. The fact that Peter mentioned an American artist as
opposed to a South African can again be considered a coincidence, but given the pervasiveness
of global (largely American and European) popular culture in South Africa the transposition of
global mediascapes onto local contexts is a phenomenon that demands investigation. To make
the point more precise and contextualise it in the study’s comparison between Cape Town
(South Africa) and Belo Horizonte (Brazil): Would Tom and Peter’s conversation be possible,
and meaningful, between two schoolchildren in a similarly privileged setting in Belo Horizonte?
And if yes: Do school and family still occupy the primary role in the making of distinctions, as
maintained by Bourdieu, or have they been joined by the media as a socialising force?
The thesis established in this dissertation is that the cultural preferences of youth often come
with class and race connotations. This interplay between class and race can be explained historic-
ally as well as structurally through media consumption, which plays a significant role in the way
young people learn to dress, speak, carry themselves and generally position themselves in relation
to others. Due to global cultural flows these processes do not remain purely local phenomena
but they find expression in localised forms as common structures of difference around the globe.
What is the relevance of this thesis? It adds to our understanding of the challenges on the way
towards a non-racial, non-classist society in the presence of a wide-held conflation of race, class
and youth culture in the public perception, perpetuated by the media on a local and global scale.
Even when we slowly seem to move away from the crude racism of the past, race-thinking con-
tinues to exist in a way that benefits some and not others as the currency of cultural capital
depending on the colour of your skin:
Skin colour acts as a form of embodied capital that disrupts and lessens the
worth of the cultural capital held by black middle classes. They are perpetual
outsiders because of their race, irrespective of class status, and this contributes to
their hesitation about comfortably self-identifying as middle class. Again, it is
important to stress that the decisions and perceptions that lie behind these racial
stereotypes and low expectations are seldom explicitly named. (Rollock 2014:
248)
Although the thesis does not show the extent to which the interplay between race, class and
youth culture has an actual impact on young people’s life chances or reproduce social inequality,
it does provide a solid starting point for further research in this direction.
What is novel about this thesis is that it does not treat youth culture in the tradition of cultural
studies – focussing on the meaning of cultural consumption and expression of a particular sub-
culture or “tribe” – but from the vantage point of structuralism in a Bourdieuan tradition con-
cerned with how power relations and social order are maintained over generations. Within this
theoretical framework – which itself is not a popular one in South African cultural sociology –
the thesis diverts significantly from “classic” Bourdieu with its main subjects being youth and
race alongside class, requiring adjustments of some of the ideas found in Bourdieu’s conceptual
toolbox. The novelty of the theoretical framework is reflected in the research design, combining
qualitative focus group interviews and quantitative survey results, with the latter producing a
unique dataset of young people’s cultural preferences. Finally, the thesis is novel in terms of its
1. Introduction
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comparison of the attitudes of youth in Cape Town and Belo Horizonte, which is a more unusu-
al comparison than one might expect given the commonalities between South Africa and Brazil.
For the sake of coherency the thesis is broken down into three topics. The first concerns the re-
lationship between race, class and cultural preferences in the context of South African youth.
The second is about the role of the media in shaping the imagination, expectations and values of
youth in terms of class and race. The third deals with the phenomenon of “common structures
of differences” in different parts of the world, referring to the comparability of racialised and
class-based tastes and cultural preferences of youth in South Africa and Brazil. Together the
three topics, which are discussed in detail below, add a cultural facet to the study of social in-
equality in South Africa beyond political, economical, historical and anthropological aspects. The
result is a structural understanding of the role of culture in the reproduction of power relations
in contemporary society that makes sense of, but is not restricted to the South African case.
With its emphasis on race, this thesis also yields new insights into the ways modern society is
constantly re-racialised, which sometimes leads to the erosion of ideological and political notions
of race and othering, but also produces new barriers and divisions.
The relationship between class, race and cultural preferences of youth
Taste is commonly seen as a matter of personal choice, in the sense that someone’s liking or dis-
liking for a particular writer, piece of music, cuisine etc. is a fairly arbitrary decision based on her
or his inherent characteristics, in biological or cultural terms or a combination of both. Sociolo-
gical theory on the other hand has always pointed out the social origins of different priorities in
cultural consumption and activity, be it through Marxist interpretations of class consciousness,
Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony, Weber’s sociology of religion or Durkheim’s notion of
the “collective consciousness”. When it comes to questions regarding taste among adolescents in
Western societies, subcultural theory has been dominating the debate since its inception at Birm-
ingham in the 1970s at least in British and arguably also recent South African sociology, promot-
ing a neo-Marxist understanding of youth which portrays the tension between subcultures and
the dominant mainstream as a form of class struggle. During the 1990s poststructural elabora-
tions and critiques of subcultural theory have shifted the focus towards the agency of the indi-
vidual and put more emphasis on hybridity and multiplicity. In recent South African youth stud-
ies the influence of (post-)subcultural theory is evident in ethnographically rich descriptions of
particular youth subcultures (or “scenes” or “tribes”) such as Hip Hop, Punk or Kwaito as well
as rather celebratory accounts of South African youth supposedly overcoming racial and social-
economic barriers in favour of a shared South African identity (Gamble 2008).
However, recent work on taste and society suggests a ‘material’, or structural turn in cultural
sociology as well as youth studies. A large part of the relevant literature is directly or indirectly in-
spired by Bourdieu’s work on class distinction embodied through cultural consumption and
passed on in childhood through the habitus – Bourdieu’s term for the subconscious acquisition
of certain patterns of preferences, dispositions and taste as a consequence of someone’s position
in the social hierarchy. Bourdieu’s theoretical framework is appealing to social researchers who
are not prepared to either ignore structural constraints in the determination of cultural prefer-
1. Introduction
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ences or to reduce the complexity of class determinacy to a matter of rigid categorisation. Al-
though the theory in its original form has been criticized for its negligence of structural factors
other than class – e.g. gender and ethnicity – contemporary interpretations have proven to be
quite capable of accommodating such criticism, exemplified in the South African context by
Nadine Dolby’s (2001) groundbreaking work on race and taste at a mixed school in Durban.
This thesis is inspired by Bourdieu’s class distinction as it seeks to reveal and illuminate some of
the fundamental structural associations between taste and class among South African youth. It
also builds on Bourdieu’s work by shifting the focus to the deep racialisation of South Africa’s
class structure.
The decision to follow a Bourdieuan approach has repercussions on theoretical, conceptual and
methodological levels, each of which are explained in detail at different points in the thesis. The
first part of the literature review (pages 60 to 73) outlines the current state of South African
youth studies by separating the body of literature broadly into different strands, some firmly
steeped in the subcultural tradition of describing and interpreting youth culture, others geared to-
wards a Bourdieuan understanding of South African youth culture and those not touching on
matters of taste, or only peripherally, but dealing with the social stratification of South African
youth, and its impact on youth identities, more generally. The distinction between (post-)subcul-
tural and structural interpretations of youth culture is further accentuated in the first two sec-
tions of the theory chapter (pages 40 to 55) tracing the separate, if occasionally intersecting, de-
velopments of cultural studies (and subcultural theory) and cultural sociology. The discussion of
Bourdieu’s relevance in contemporary South Africa also brings to light some of the conceptual
and theoretical disharmonies which can arise due to a too literal application of Bourdieu in the
local context and the conceptual challenges of employing Bourdieu’s class distinction in the
realm of youth studies. On a methodological level, Bourdieu’s influence is visible in the contex-
tualisation of rich qualitative insights (in the form of interview data) in a quantitative framework
(in the form of survey data), which is further documented in the first part of the chapter on re-
search design (pages 10 to 12). The actual findings with respect to racialised class distinctions are
to be found in chapter 6 (pages 106 to 153) where some of the most fundamental notions of dif-
ference and othering among South African youth are traced.
The role of the media in maintaining distinction
Applying Bourdieu’s concept of class distinction in the contemporary South African setting
poses the challenge of accommodating and modifying some of the idiosyncrasies of Bourdieu’s
work, which are partly a result, or at least further accentuated, by historical developments, in-
cluding the intensification of media flows due to technological change. To Bourdieu the different
media forms merely constituted another set of fields (and as such they were autonomous entities,
each defined by its own rules and structures). And although they share a certain degree of homo-
logy (common patterns) between them and other fields related to taste, these interrelations, ac-
cording to Bourdieu, are not to be understood as causalities, as for Bourdieu the development of
dispositions towards specific taste preferences is first and foremost a function of the habitus. In-
1. Introduction
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deed, as Bennett et al (2009: 23) point out in their book on class and taste in contemporary Bri-
tain, Bourdieu’s Distinction preceded the rapid rise of radios and television sets in France’s living
room during the 1960s, and certainly the spread of digital media and communication over the
last two decades which are argued to have created and sustained transnational identities:
A particularly important aspect of this point concerns the way in which global
flows disrupt national boundaries, and unsettle what Bourdieu takes to be the
natural national boundaries that define cultural fields. This is especially true when
account is taken of global diasporas and, as a consequence of this, the multiple
ethnic differentiations of national populations and of their cultural practices.
Because of these developments, and also considering the fact that South Africa already had a
long history of media segmentation, the point is made that in contemporary societies the media
substitutes, or at least supplements, some of the functions of the habitus, in the sense that the
socialisation of children no longer occurs exclusively within the family, school or even broader
social environment but at least to some degree as a result of exposure to the media. Access to
media itself varies significantly depending on the parents’ position in the class hierarchy as cer-
tain media forms remain inaccessible to children in poor families while others become redundant
for the wealthier parts of society. Therefore, assuming that television, radio, internet, magazines
and other forms of media are arguably the principal access points to popular culture for the ma-
jority of adolescents, the argument is made that media segmentation is not just another form but
also a determinant of class distinction. This causal equation is reflected in the thesis structure: the
second section of the literature review (pages 73 to 77) outlines the history of media segmenta-
tion in South Africa in the context of colonialism and apartheid and, following the arguments of
Barnett (1998), maintains that economic imperatives are responsible for the reproduction of seg-
mentation in democratic South Africa. Chapter 7 (pages 154 to 184) then presents the survey
findings on differing media preferences in relation to racialised class distinctions and taste.
“Common structures of difference” in the cultural preferences of youth
Bourdieu’s description of France’s cultural setting in the 1960s depicts it as a relatively closed
system; this was before globalization became the buzzword it is today and the idea of global cul-
tural flows had no relevance in Distinction. Yet today any work involving taste and popular culture
without a reference to globalisation would be incomplete. In this thesis, the global understanding
of youth culture is represented by the notion of “common structures of difference”, coined by
Kjeldgaard and Askegaard (2006: 235) in an article on the similarities of young people’s con-
sumption patterns in Denmark and Greenland:
In summary, the concept of youth and youth culture is always constructed in
relation to local sociocultural conditions. Youth in the Western highly
industrialized world is shaped by the social conditions of late modernity. In other
cultural contexts, youth means something very different, depending on the
sociocultural historical development and its relation to modernity. Nevertheless,
these local youth cultural projects are structured by the global ideology of youth
encompassing identity, stylized consumption, and cultural innovation. The global
youth segment therefore emerges as a transnational market ideology through the
dialectical process of glocalization. The empirical part of the study analyzes the
1. Introduction
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different discursive manifestations of the ideology of youth. These manifestations
are organized by key structures of common differences but as they are articulated
in different cultural contexts.
An example of “common structures of difference” would be Greenlandic Rock, as Kjeldgaard
and Askegaard found locally produced Rock to be at the same time an important aspect of
young Greenlanders’ sense of national identity, a form of self-expression (of the experience to be
young) as well as a global identity marker being “(...) a key characteristic in the history of West-
ern youth culture” (Kjeldgaard and Askegaard 2006: 243). Accordingly, local Rock scenes, as in
South African and Brazil, might sound, look and feel considerably different from each other, yet
they fulfill very similar functions in their respective contexts and also in relation with other styles
and groups as they are rooted in a shared of experience of global capitalism and (late) modernity.
The conceptual tool of “common structures of difference” which can be found in separate loca-
tions is also useful because it summarises some of the main points of the globalisation debate in
recent years. This debate is defined by two almost antagonistic ideas: homogeneity and hybridity.
The first, commonly mentioned in the same breath with “Americanisation” or “McDonaldisa-
tion”, implies that globalisation is leading to a global state of sameness. The other, often in asso-
ciation with the notion of “glocalisation”, maintains that globalisation acts as a catalyst for indi-
vidualism, and global cultural flows are tapped into by individuals by choice as the idea of a
singular identity is replaced by fluid, multiple identities. On a broader level it also means that
global cultural flows are always adapted to local conditions (hence the term “glocalisation”). The
idea of “common structures of difference” acknowledges the specificity of locality but at the
same time does not ignore the underlying, fundamental structures of global capitalism producing,
among other things, comparable notions of racialised class distinction around the globe. Here
the idea of common structures of difference links to the role of the media in maintaining distinc-
tion as it is through the media that local trends become globalised and global trends localised,
while the media channels themselves are becoming increasingly fragmented, thus reinforcing pre-
existing notions of difference.
This hypothesis is tested in the comparative part of the thesis which takes the findings from the
analysis of young Capetonians’ taste and media preferences and contrasts them with those of a
sample of school-going teenagers from Belo Horizonte, Brazil. The comparison is valid and
meaningful given the structural commonalities between the two countries and research sites
which are marked by extraordinary diversity and inequality due to their colonial past as well as
their own historical particularities, especially in terms of two markedly different histories of race
relations. These are outlined in the third section of the literature review (pages 77 to 85), while
the theoretical aspects of cultural glocalization are further discussed in the last section of the the-
ory chapter (pages 55 to 59). The actual comparison of findings on taste and media preferences
takes place in chapter 8 (pages 186 to 214).
Overall, the presentation of the empirical data becomes increasingly abstract as it begins with
strongly localised discourses of difference and othering and ends with the structural-comparative
aspects of cultural globalisation. The empirical evidence presented in chapters 6 to 8, supported
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by secondary literature, is enough to answer all three research questions affirmatively: cultural
capital creates divisions among South African youth, media consumption affects the habitus of
young people and the relationships between taste, class and race observed in South Africa are, to
varying degrees, also valid in Brazil. More specifically, the South African data shows that white,
coloured and black respondents have differing preferences in terms of role models and music
taste. These differences only partly follow the highbrow/lowbrow distinction and are mostly
within the realm of popular culture. However, these differences become more nuanced if one
takes locality into account – coloured and especially white survey participants demonstrate a
higher interest in global (mostly American) popular culture and a lower interest in South African
popular culture than their African/black peers. Simultaneously, white students are in the majority
at the most prestigious (in terms of school fees) schools in the sample and a certain level of as-
similation (not to be understood as emulation though) can be observed among non-white stu-
dents at those schools, suggesting a correlation between institutional cultural capital (schooling)
and embodied cultural capital (tastes, cultural preferences) that leads to the recognition of white
tastes as legitimate culture, and consequently, the reproduction of racialised hierarchies of priv-
ilege. A side-effect of these findings is the need for a re-evaluation of the concepts of cosmopol-
itanism and cultural omnivorousness which are commonly associated with middle- and upper-
class. The results show that (mostly white) middle- and upper-class survey participants indeed
open toward foreign influences but only at the expense of familiarity of local trends and cultural
knowledge. The media consumption of South African youth reflects and, as it is the argument
here, helps to produce this sort of racialised class distinctions. On a purely socio-economic level
lower-class youth are largely excluded from certain types of media, including online media and
satellite television, and their arguably more ‘global’ content. On top of that, the mediascape in
South Africa is extremely fragmented with television and radio stations targetting narrowly de-
fined audiences. As a result, young South Africans tap into very different ‘cultural flows’ depend-
ing on their position in society, further supporting the habitus argument.
Very similar observations, in their own frame of reference in terms of racial classification, can be
made in Belo Horizonte. Even though examples of racialised class distinction as well as media
consumtpion are less obvious, arguably due to a generally level of cultural homeogeneity includ-
ing the same language, the same trends can be noticed: better-off, mostly white respondents at
better schools have a very selective taste when it comes to local cultural productions and are gen-
erally more interested in global (American) popular culture. The similarity of the findings in the
research settings suggest a more universal association between whiteness and middle-class which
is worth investigating as racialised forms of social inequality often continue to persist in coun-
tries with levels of ethnic and racial diversity.
The research for this thesis included the use of primary data collected through a survey at six
schools in Cape Town and a series of face-to-face interviews in 2007 and 2008. The findings
from this data are contrasted with those obtained during a second fieldwork period 2008 and
2009 in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, in order to establish the universality of found structures of taste





Inspired by Bourdieu’s Distinction, this study aims to reveal the structures underlying the differen-
tiation of taste patterns among young Capetonians, to contextualise them within racialised no-
tions of difference, and to compare the found structures of difference with findings from a sur-
vey and interviews conducted in Belo Horizonte. This requires a methodological framework
which can combine the abstraction necessary for structural analysis with a qualitative approach in
order to contextualise the structural patterns. In order to ensure a certain degree of comparability
it was decided to use a rather straightforward and ultimately workable research design in the
form of surveys and semi-structured focus group interviews which would allow for meaningful
comparisons between the two research sites.
As much as the methodology was guided by Bourdieu’s work, special attention was paid to ad-
justing his framework to the study’s specific requirements and the conditions in which it was car-
ried out. A useful guideline in this respect is Douglas B. Holt’s (1997) article Distinction in Amer-
ica? Recovering Bourdieu’s theory of tastes from its critics which provides valuable advice for applying
Bourdieu’s theoretical framework in a contemporary setting:
(1) Measure cultural objects at a level of specificity that allows for inferences regarding embodied
tastes. (Holt 1997: 117)
A disregard for this rule is evident in the typical music taste question found in some market and
social research surveys (“What types of music do you like?”) followed by a list of broad music
genres. The problem with this question is that it often conflates sub-genres which can have dis-
tinct audiences. A good example is Hip Hop, which could be divided into a whole plethora of
sub-genres. For the purpose of this study it is at least necessary to distinguish between local
“conscious” Hip Hop and American commercial Hip Hop.
In order to achieve this sort of refined categorisation in the survey the questionnaires included a
number of questions which asked respondents to rate a large number of cultural objects (such as
music artists or television shows) which were then grouped into broader categories according to
the ratings and the specific context in which the survey was conducted. Another way was to ask
open-ended questions about the respondents’ favourite brands, idols and sports teams, and to
create categories according to the answers to these questions, in some instances by using factor
analysis.
The subsequent interview sessions provided a further opportunity to validate the resulting cat-
egories by means of triangulation as they were frequently employed by both the interviewer and
the interviewees in narrative accounts and re-examinations of the topics covered in the surveys.
(2) Ascribe object meanings only with respect to interpretive communities. (Holt 1997: 118)
Again, this is a rule which is often overlooked in secondary analyses of data on cultural prefer-
ences and taste where inferences are drawn without any deeper inquiry into the socio-cultural
frame of reference in which the study has been conducted. For example: a white teenager from
one of Cape Town’s affluent suburbs who is listening to Driemanskap, a Hip Hop group from
Gugulethu, poses a different analytical challenge than a black kid from that very township. Once
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more it is the qualitative component of the study as well as diligent background research through
literature surveys, discussions with experts and observations on site which ensure an appropriate
contextualisation of the generalised survey results and enable a more meaningful interpretation
than the simple presentation of tables, figures and numbers could provide.
(3) Triangulate across consumption fields. (Holt 1997: 118)
Studies of youth culture are almost always inextricably linked to music tastes and preferences, for
the simple reason that different music scenes are the most obvious and accessible expressions of
different taste patterns and stylistic/aesthetic differentiation. The strong conceptual link between
studies of youth culture and music is therefore fully justified and only becomes problematic
when the two are being used synonymously without any further consideration of other forms of
cultural consumption and activities which might not necessarily be linked to a music scene.
In order to avoid the pitfalls of a one-dimensional account of South African youth, the survey
questionnaires include a wide range of questions on consumption fields which are not directly re-
lated to music, such as media, idols, brands, sports and religion. The interview sessions were also
structured in a way that encouraged discussions of topics which are not music-related.
4) Construct questions based upon ethnographic description. (Holt 1997: 118)
A pilot study involving 30 (10 of each population group: black, coloured, white) first-year stu-
dents at UCT was conducted prior to the actual fieldwork, which provided important ideas for
the final survey design. Respondents were asked to comment on the questionnaire’s form and
content after completing. This led to the re-formulation or deletion of some questions and the
introduction of others into the questionnaire. Furthermore, before commencing fieldwork the
author attended all sorts of youth events and hangouts, spoke to musicians and experts in the
field and conducted a survey of the relevant literature on South African youth culture. In Brazil a
similar procedure was followed, with the exception that the survey design was largely determined
by the one which had previously been used in Cape Town. Nonetheless, an effort was made to
contextualise the questionnaire and edit it in accordance with experiences made in Cape Town.
A further point, which is not mentioned by Holt, concerns the comparative nature of this study.
Throughout the thesis, generalisations are made about South African and Brazilian youth based
on data collected in Cape Town and Belo Horizonte. From a statistical standpoint these general-
isations, and the comparisons between them, are of little value given the sampling method em-
ployed for this study (see the following section). Strictly speaking, the results presented in this
thesis are only representative of the sample of adolescents that participated in the two surveys,
and they are not even representative of youth in Cape Town and Belo Horizonte. An additional
factor is that Cape Town is far from being typical of South African society with a much smaller
black population, proportionally, than the rest of the country, which, in comparison to other
metropoles like Johannesburg and Durban, is under-represented in the middle and upper classes.
Hence any class/race correlations among the results are likely to be exaggerated and inflated in a
general South African context.
Against this background it needs to be emphasised that the quantitative results presented in this
thesis are not meant to exactly map the tastes and preferences of young South Africans and
2. Research Design
11
Brazilians. Statistics often suggest a level of accuracy which is unrealistic, especially where ‘soft’
concepts such as taste are concerned. What they do reflect, however, are general trends with re-
gard to race, class and taste, that are validated by the qualitative analysis of the interviews (in
Cape Town) as well as secondary literature throughout the thesis.
With this in mind, any discussion of statistical results applies to the respective survey sample first
and foremost. Generalisations to a greater population (Cape Town, Belo Horizonte, South
Africa, Brazil and beyond) are made with the clear understanding that they are not conclusively
proven true, but only supported by the statistical results.
2.2 Survey Samples
2.2.1 Cape Town
The latest census (Stats SA 2012) shows that the metropolitan municipality of Cape Town had
3,740,026 inhabitants in 2011, making it the second biggest in South Africa. Of those, 39% were
African/black (South Africa: 80%), 42% coloured (South Africa: 9%) and 16% white (South
Africa: 9%). The differences in the racial breakdown between Cape Town and South Africa
reflect the city’s exceptionality due to historical reasons. Cape Town’s class structure remains
largely unequal and racialised, with the city’s white population mostly (albeit not entirely) repres-
enting the upper classes and African/black residents the lower classes while coloured people can
be found at every level (Seekings 2010). 
Given these characteristics it is worth pointing that Cape Town differs from other cities in South
Africa not only demographically but also in the spatiality and political importance of class, race
and cultural divides, which needs to be considered when evaluating the study’s findings on a na-
tional scale. This is best illustrated in a comparison of Cape Town with Johannesburg:
In the first place, where choice of residence in better-off neighbourhoods is
available, shared culture, language, and religion appear to play a significant role in
the decision-making process in Cape Town. This in turn suggests that residents
in middle and higher income neighbourhoods perceive themselves as both
neighbourhood and city level to be culturally and linguistically diverse and at
times deeply divided along cultural lines of cleavage. Residents of these
neighbourhoods express pride and derive substantial self-esteem not only from
their class positions but also from their linguistic and religious affiliations,
revealing a degree of conformity with Glazer’s model of a ‘divided city’. Such a
trend appears to be much less pronounced in Johannesburg where cultural
identities are domesticated and accordingly lived out in the private domain.
(Bekker and Leildé 2006: 163)
Respondents were recruited from six public schools in the Greater Cape Town Metropolitan
Area. The survey sought to include all 10th graders at all six schools as well as all of the 11th
graders at two of the schools, Atlantic and North, where there were too few 10th grade pupils.
The survey thus aspired to be a census in selected grades in selected schools.
2. Research Design
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Table 2.1 Response Rates by Schools (Cape Town)3
Population Sample Response Rate
Atlantic High 200 175 88%
Flats High 276 207 75%
Macassar High 343 271 79%
Northern High 334 186 56%
Southern High 216 180 83%
Khayelitsha High 220 177 80%
Total 1,589 1,196 75%
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
Sampling took place at school level with the aim of having a stratified sample of schools in terms
of racial composition and class. A list of secondary public schools in Cape Town was obtained
from the Western Cape Education Department. In discussion with colleagues with experience in
the education sector, a smaller number of these schools was shortlisted and roughly classified as
either predominantly African, predominantly coloured or predominantly white (in terms of stu-
dent population) and then sub-divided into more and less expensive schools (based on the
school fees relative to the group’s average). One school in each group was then randomly chosen
for the survey. Despite these measures the survey is not representative for all schools or even of
all 10th and 11th graders in Cape Town because of the small sample size of only six schools.
Also, the data has not been weighted to change the balance between the six schools. In order to
achieve greater representativeness, sampling on an individual level would have been necessary
with the risk of losing insights into the effect of schooling on race and taste, which are con-
sidered crucial for the questions at hand. The other reason to pursue the school-sampling
strategy was to ensure easy and reliable access to a relatively large number of youth through the
schools, thus facilitating follow-up research in the form of focus-group interviews and later
surveys. 
The following figures and paragraphs give a descriptive summary of the six selected schools, in
terms of the racial and class composition of their pupils.
3. Numbers for Atlantic and North include grade 11 pupils.
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Figure 2.1 Spineplot: School by Race (Cape Town)4
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4. Axes show percentages, bars actual frequencies. Missing values for the race variable are excluded. Totals for
schools including missing values (N/missing): Atlantic (175/5), Flats (207/9), Macassar (271/17), Northern
(186/8), Southern (180/1), Khayelitsha (177/10). For a definition of the race variable see page 31.
5. For an operationalisation of the class variable see page 34.
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The six schools included in the sample span much of the spectra of race and class in contempor-
ary Cape Town and the distributions in Figure 2.1 and Table 2.2 illustrate the ongoing associa-
tion between class and race in post-apartheid South Africa as a result of apartheid. But the num-
bers depicted above also speak of the changing nature of this relationship and the increasing
inequality within the different race groups, thus blurring and blending the colours of social divi-
sion in South Africa (Seekings and Nattrass 2005). For example, the sample distributions show a
sizable proportion of black students at a middle-/upper-class school like Atlantic High. While
some of these learners do not necessarily come from a middle- or upper-class background and
are only able to attend the school by means of a scholarship or some other form of sponsorship,
there is still a number of black students who live in the same neighbourhoods and under the
same living conditions as well-off white or coloured students. Even more pronounced is the het-
erogeneity of the group of coloured survey participants who can be found in virtually all social
strata.
But the increasing complexity of the class/race relationship in South Africa and Cape Town also
makes it difficult to capture all of its hues and shades in a small sample of six schools. One im-
portant missing puzzle piece is private schools which were not included in the sample. These are
attended primarily by students from affluent families, mostly white, but also by coloured and
black schoolchildren whose parents are sceptical of a perceived influx of students from poorer
social backgrounds at formerly ‘good’ public schools. It is worth mentioning though that
Atlantic High is certainly en par (at least in terms of school fees) with the most prestigious priv-
ate schools in Cape Town and Southern High and Northern High are also former Model C
schools with still relatively high school fees, which arguably largely mitigates the omission of a
private school in the sample. Further, Afrikaans-speaking white youth are arguably underrepres-
ented in the sample. However, the language variable used in the analyses does not reflect lan-
guage proficiency but language preference and in fact there is a significantly higher proportion of
white students with one or both parents being native Afrikaans-speakers (and presumably being
Afrikaans-speakers themselves) than those preferring Afrikaans over any other language (includ-
ing English). While in the analysis reference is made to the link between language, media prefer-
ences and taste patterns, it would be interesting to examine to what extent the shift towards Eng-
lish (which can also be observed for African and coloured respondents) is a function of
increased exposure to global popular culture and English-language media. Finally, one needs to
mention the sparsity of very poor coloured respondents in the sample. Notwithstanding the fact
that many coloured respondents, especially from Flats High, come from relatively poor families,
there are only a few participants who come from the most destitute parts of the coloured areas
on the Cape Flats associated with very high levels of unemployment and crime.
The following paragraphs are intended to provide more vivid descriptions of the schools and the
neighbourhoods that surround them.
Atlantic High
Atlantic High is situated in one of Cape Town’s wealthier areas close to the Atlantic seaboard
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and not too far from the city centre. It is a predominantly white area well accessed by tourists
and mostly European foreigners. Although Atlantic High is, like the other schools in the sample,
a public school, its annual school fees are at the top end of the spectrum, comparable to those of
expensive private schools, and significantly higher than at the other schools included in the
study. Accordingly, to a visitor, the school premises and facilities seem to be of a very high
standard in general and especially in relation to those of the poorer schools in the sample.
Atlantic High is a former Model C school, one of the historically white schools which experi-
enced preferential treatment during apartheid. After 1994 Atlantic High, like many other former
Model C schools, experienced an influx of non-white students from less privileged areas. This
happened partly due to the 1996 South Africa Schools Act which provided fee exemptions for
low-income parents in an attempt to desegregate the school system. At the same time, parents
made use of the now open school system in order to ensure a better future for their children by
sending them to what were perceived as ‘better schools’. This trend occurred throughout all
levels of the school system, as described by Jane Battersby (2004: 80):
Parents from historically disadvantaged communities in the city send their
children to Model C schools, usually at considerable cost, even if they are on
reduced fees, because they believe it will provide their children with opportunities
they themselves did not have, opportunities to be counted equal with white
children on entering the workforce. These schools represent high quality
teaching, better discipline, safety; a chance to better oneself through one’s
children. This phenomenon is not limited to Model C schools. Children from
black African communities are sent to historically coloured schools, children
from poor and gang-ridden coloured communities are sent to schools in
wealthier coloured suburbs, filling the gaps left by children from these areas
leaving to go to Model C schools.
This shift in the South African school system left Atlantic High’s student body much more di-
verse in terms of race and class than during apartheid, even if white students still predominate (in
terms of numbers). Comparing Atlantic High’s student body to those of the other schools (apart
from Northern High) in the sample, Atlantic High’s composition of learners in terms of race and
class is indeed quite mixed (see figure 2.1 and table 2.2 on page 14).
Northern High
Northern Suburbs High is the school with the second highest school fees and represents the
second of the three former Model ‘C’ schools in the sample. The school is located at the Atlantic
seaside between the city centre and Cape Town’s Northern Suburbs, a decisively Afrikaans area
of Cape Town. Because of its location and efforts of desegregation, Northern Suburbs High
draws a similarly racially diverse student population as Atlantic High (although with a greater
proportion of coloured students) and is even more diverse in terms of class, which is especially
true for the white students, who, at Northern Suburbs High, are more likely to come from a
‘working class’ or lower middle-class background than at Atlantic High. In table 2.2 on page 14
this is reflected by a larger proportion of learners living under ‘medium’ conditions than ‘good’




If one compares Atlantic High or Northern High with the third historically white school in the
sample, Southern High, the biggest difference between the two is the much larger proportion of
coloured students there; today about two-third of the sample at Southern High are coloured and
only about ten percent are white. This can be partly explained by the schools proximity to the
coloured residential neighbourhoods on the Cape Flats, just across the highway that divides
these historically coloured areas from the formerly white areas in the Southern Suburbs. It is also
an example of the broader shift in South Africa’s school system after 1994, where the intake of
non-white learners into a formerly white school would cause many parents of white children to
send their offspring to other, even more expensive schools, as, to them, the increasing number
of non-white learners at the old school would be perceived as a ‘down-grading’ of that school
(Battersby: 2004). The result in this case is then that a formerly homogeneous white school has
become an almost homogeneous coloured school – an unintended and paradoxical outcome for
a process of ‘desegregation’.
The consequence is that today, at least by looking at the racial composition of the respective sub-
samples, Southern High seems to be more similar to Cape Flats High, a historically coloured
school, than to the other two formerly white schools. This is noteworthy for various reasons.
First, to the visitor, the general impression of the two school premises could not be more dis-
tinct in comparison. Whereas Cape Flats High is housed in a simple one-storey brick construc-
tion next to an open field, Southern High’s driveway, flanked by old trees and a green lawn, leads
to an impressive ivy-clad building emanating the image of an old English boys’ school. This dif-
ference in appearance is even more accentuated by the spatial proximity between the two schools
which are only about five minutes apart by car on the very highway that separates them. The sep-
aration is also reflected in the survey results by the fact that a considerable proportion of stu-
dents at Southern Suburbs High lives on the historically white side of the highway and enjoys
better living conditions compared to learners at Flats High who almost all live in neighbour-
hoods reserved under apartheid for coloured residents.
Flats High
Flats High is a historically coloured school located at the border between the Southern Suburbs
and the Cape Flats. Its school fees are significantly lower than those at the other schools de-
scribed so far and much closer to those at the two township schools in the sample. Most of the
parents of the children at Flats High are blue-collar workers living in nearby neighbourhoods
marked by high unemployment. What generally distinguishes Flats High from the other schools
is that it is a dual medium school, which means that learners can choose to be instructed in either
English or Afrikaans. Accordingly the survey results show that there is a higher proportion of
students choosing Afrikaans as their preferred language than at the other schools, although this
proportion is still modest given the fact that almost nine out of ten (84%) respondents at Flats
High indicate that at least one of their parents speaks Afrikaans but more than half (59%) of




Khayelitsha High is located in the southern part of Khayelitsha. Despite the relative poverty of
its neighbourhood with high unemployment and poor public service delivery, to the visitor the
school seems to fare better than many other township schools (including Macassar High, see be-
low). The school opened only a few years ago and therefore the building and classroom facilities
seem to be in the same or even better condition than at Flats High. Also, the numerous academ-
ic achievement awards in the entrance hall, the perceived cleanliness of the premises and the im-
pression that the respondents at Khayelitsha High seem to be more fluent and comfortable to
speak in English (9% prefer it over other languages – usually Xhosa) than their counterparts at
Macassar High (where only 2% show a preference for English) contribute to the feeling that this
school offers a better learning environment than other schools in the area. But this sense of rel-
ative privilege is not reflected in their social backgrounds with living conditions as poor and un-
employment of parents as frequent as at Macassar High.
Macassar High
Macassar High is the largest school included in the study and provides the largest number of sur-
vey participants (271 out of 1196; 23%), although only 10th graders were included. It is also the
school with the lowest school fees. To the visitor the school premises do not look overly desti-
tute on first sight. Yet the lack and poor condition of classroom facilities such as chairs, tables,
educational posters on the wall and often even doors separating the classroom from the noisy
hallways as well as the large class sizes are clear signs that a lack of resources is negatively affect-
ing the learning environment there. As has been noted earlier, the respondents from Macassar
High do not distinguish themselves distinctively from Khayelitsha High students in terms of race
and class. One difference though, apart from (yet related to) language preferences, lies in the
birthplaces of respondents: both schools cater for large groups of Xhosa-speaking economic mi-
grant families from the Eastern Cape, but the proportion of respondents at Macassar High who
were born outside Cape Town (presumably in the Eastern Cape) is almost half of the total sub-
sample (47%) opposed to just over one-third (37%) at Khayelitsha High.
2.2.2 Belo Horizonte
According to the latest census (IBGE 2011), Belo Horizonte has a population of 2,475,440 in-
habitants. The Metropolitan Region of Belo Horizonte (MRBH)6, including surrounding cities,
has a total of 5,497,922 inhabitants, which makes it the third most populous metropolitan region
of Brazil. The city itself is the sixth most populous of the country. In terms of racial composition
(census 2010): 47% of the city’s population are white (Brazil: 48%), 42% are ‘brown’ (pardo;
Brazil: 43%), and 10% black (Brazil: 8%).
Respondents from six schools from the Metropolitan Region of Belo Horizonte were included
in the sample; two private schools in Belo Horizonte itself and four public schools from Cont-
6. ‘Belo Horizonte’ is used to refer to the entire metropolitan region.
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agem (population 617,741), a largely industrial town bordering the city of Belo Horizonte to the
West.
Table 2.2 Response Rates by Schools (Belo Horizonte)
Population Sample  Response Rate
BH East 196 185 94%
BH West 233 213 91%
FUNEC East 127 102 80%
FUNEC North 143 120 84%
FUNEC South 107 89 83%
FUNEC West 179 151 84%
Total 985 860 87%
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
The geographical distribution of the schools is not entirely arbitrary due to a concentration of
expensive private schools in Belo Horizonte’s city centre and public schools in the urban peri-
phery which Contagem is considered a part of. Another fact which needed to be taken into con-
sideration is the smaller variability of quality and fees among public schools in Brazil, or at least
Belo Horizonte; whereas in South Africa it is not uncommon to find public schools, usually
former Model C schools, which rival the environment, equipment but also the fees of private
schools (e.g. Atlantic High) the schism between public and private schools is arguably much
more defined in Brazil. As a result one can find a large degree of uniformity among the free yet
rather basic public state schools and a large degree of variability among the private schools which
offer a range of educational environments reaching from state school level to the extremely ex-
pensive and prestigious. Therefore the decision was made (in contrast to the sample of schools
in Cape Town) to include private schools in the sample – one (BH East) considered to be atten-
ded primarily by children from middle-class families, the other (BH West) by those from upper-
class backgrounds. The public schools in the sample were chosen following the advice of
Rodrigo Jesus (then working at the Observatorio da Juventude at Universidade Federal de Minas
Gerais, UFMG), today head of the Observatorio da Juventude at Universidade Federal dos Vales
do Jequitinhonha e Mucuri, UFVJM) and Juarez Dayrell (Professor of Education at UFMG and
author of A Música Entra em Cena) using, for the sake of practicability and feasibility, a network
of public schools in Contagem: Fundação de Ensino de Contagem (FUNEC).
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Figure 2.3 Spineplot: School by Race (Belo Horizonte)
















0 25 50 75 100
BH East BH West F East F North F South F West
Preto/Negro Pardo/Mestizo Branco
Refuse Other
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008






















0 25 50 75 100
BH East BH West F East F North F South F West
Very High High Medium
Low Very Low
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
2. Research Design
20
The greater homogeneity of public schools in Brazil and the relative heterogeneity of private
schools are reflected in the student bodies shown in the figures above. Whereas three out of the
four public schools share almost identical features in terms of class and race, one private school,
(BH East) shows much greater diversity, at least in class terms, than the other. The only excep-
tion to this pattern seems to be FUNEC West with a rather curious mix of very poor and fairly
well-off students. In fact, both the regular pattern and the exception are determined by geo-
graphical factors: unlike their private counterparts public schools derive their students from the
immediate neighbourhoods and since the class variable is based entirely on the respondents’
place of residence it is not surprising to see a large degree of homogeneity among them. Thus
the reason for FUNEC West’s relatively diverse student body is its location among three neigh-
bourhoods with fairly disparate socio-economic characteristics. On the other hand, BH West’s
seemingly exceptional wealth of its students is not a sign of localism – although the large major-
ity of its students live in rich areas, these areas are not necessarily in close proximity to the
school.
What the two private schools have in common, apart from being private, is their religious back-
ground which they share with many private schools in Brazil (international schools representing
another large sector of private education), but although their religious character is certainly vis-
ible in the schools’ public image (references to God and Christian values are common in the
schools’ brochures and on their websites) it does not influence their admission criteria or
curriculum in any way that would affect the validity of the survey sample. What arguably counts
more if one compares them to the state schools in the sample are their facilities and equipment,
albeit here, too, they differ from each other in significant ways. BH West, founded almost hun-
dred years ago, is located in one of Belo Horizonte’s oldest neighbourhoods, occupies a historic-
al building with an imposing portico as its entrance and offers the whole range of the Brazilian
educational system from pre-school to higher education. The classrooms are well-equipped and
students have access to different kinds of laboratories, a library, sports facilities, creative environ-
ments and recreational areas. BH East is situated in one of Belo Horizonte more recent and af-
fluent developments. Although its history and building do not evoke the old-world charm of its
counterpart in the Western part of the city, its facilities are nothing short of impressive: the out-
side recreational area, shaded by palm trees, comprises numerous swimming pools, tennis-, soc-
cer- and basketball-courts and a large playground for the younger schoolchildren, while inside
the students have access to a modern library, computer labs, multiple ‘creative spaces’, an audit-
orium and a large, state-of-the-art theatre. For school functions and pedagogical workshops two
large and beautifully kept premises outside of town are available.
It is by describing the luxury at the private schools (especially at BH West) in such detail that the
true chasm between a private and public school education in Brazil becomes apparent. While the
four public schools in the sample are endowed with the basic equipment and facilities required
for an everyday school life (no missing classroom doors like at Macassar High, for example), the
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resources are definitely limited7. Overall, the apparent uniformity of their student bodies (see
page 20) extends to their physical presence in a curious fashion; all the buildings have in com-
mon a concrete-gray functionality, and the recreation area is usually an asphalt soccer or basket-
ball court encircled by the classrooms. So although on first sight the difference between the two
types of school used in the survey seems to be a regional matter (Belo Horizonte vs Contagem)
it is really a question of class, status and centre/periphery. It is thus noteworthy that while num-
bers of self-reported black (preto or negro) respondents are indeed low at all the schools in the
sample, they are especially so at the private schools.
Belo Horizonte’s comparable size, polarisation into a relatively wealthy center and a relatively
poor periphery and its relatively mixed overall population were the main reasons to use it as
Cape Town’s counterpart for the comparative aspect of the thesis.
2.3 Data Analysis
Qualitative Analysis
The qualitative analysis is based on the transcripts of 23 interviews with 58 members of the Cape
Town sample in one-to-one and group sessions. Interview candidates were selected purposefully
according to their racial self-description given in the survey questionnaire and in some cases ac-
cording to their music preferences with the aim to end up with a fairly representative subsample
of the greater sample. In the case of the group interviews the decision was taken to form homo-
geneous groups in terms of gender and race in order to provide the interviewees the necessary
comfort to speak about personal taste as well as racial issues. In some instances this strategy cer-
tainly worked and it can be assumed that because of it some statements, especially regarding race
and ‘others’, were made which might have not been made in a ‘mixed’ setting.8 The sessions were
held on the school grounds and recorded using digital video and/or audio equipment for the
sake of easier transcription; the recordings were deleted after the completion of the study.
The interviews themselves were semi-structured; they followed a certain agenda covering the
three research questions, but the interview participants were allowed to stray from the interview
schedule as long as the discussion continued to be of relevance to the study.
Table 2.3 Interview Schedule9
7. On an anecdotal note: the actual gravity of the financial woes facing these schools was made clear to me on my
second visit to FUNEC West when I attended a staff meeting during which a dramatic budget cutback with
possible lay-offs was announced. The announcement was met with tears and anger.
8. The decision to have homogenous groups is at the expense of insights which could have been gained from
observing the possible change in attitude and self-projection in a more diverse setting; ideally future studies
with a similar methodological approach should incorporate both types of groupings.
9. The schedule was developed in consultation with Sue Moses (2010), co-author of Growing Up in the New South
Africa and Daniel Beatty, director of local youth market research company InstantGrass. Larry Strelitz (2005),
author of Mixed Receptions shared his own experiences conducting interviews on media consumptions with






5 Mins The participants are given large sheets of paper and asked 
to compile a music chart with the Top Ten of their 
favourite music bands and artists.
Discussing music 
charts
20 Mins The charts which were produced during the preceding 
exercise are put on a board/wall next to each other. The 
participants are then asked to comment on their respective 




15 Mins A selection of youth and lifestyle magazines together with a
large sheet of paper, scissors and glue is given to each 
participant. They are then asked to cut out images of 
people and things they identify with or aspire to and create 
a poster collage with them.
Discussing poster 
collages
20 Mins Again the posters are put on a board/wall next to each 
other, and the participants are asked to comment on their 
posters.
Discussing media 20 Mins The charts and posters are used as the point of departure 
for a discussion on music, fashion, youth culture, media - 
in how far they are influenced by ‘Western’ ideas and 
images and to what extent they affect race relations among 
young South Africans. Questions include:
-Why do people listen to different kinds of music and wear
different kinds of clothes?
-Do you think that your generation is more influenced by 
the media than previous ones? If yes, in what ways?
-Are South African youth becoming like American youth?
-In what ways are South African youth distinctively 
‘African’?
-Why are most Hip Hop artists black and most Rock artists
white?




Discussing ‘race’ 20 Mins
The resulting transcripts were coded using a partly premeditated/partly evolving set of themes
associated with youth culture, identity, authenticity and race. The coding of qualitative data basic-
ally consists of cutting the text into categories and rearranging it into themes and patterns (Miles
and Huberman 1999: 56). Ideally, the development of the categories and the categorisation of
the text should happen simultaneously, as if the evolving patterns would come out of the text it-
self. In reality, or at least in this case, categories start to emerge with the stating of the research
question and evolve into key concepts during the interviewing and transcription process. Over
the course of coding, reevaluating categories, creating new ones and re-coding the data, the initial
set of key concepts turns into a differentiated and cross-referencing system of concepts, ideas,
and patterns. For this the qualitative data analysis software TAMS Analyzer (Weinstein 2006)
was used. The development of the qualitative analysis process is illustrated by comparing the ini-
tial and final code sets. The initial set comprised a handful of codes, for example: brands, music,
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race, taste. The final list of codes has dozens of codes, of which, for the sake of clarity, only an
exemplary fraction is being presented below. It is crucial to understand that this is not a random
list of associated terms and ideas in connection with youth culture and race but an exemplary list
of key themes and patterns (organised in so-called code sets) which emerged from the interviews
and as such it does not aspire to represent an universal meaning of what ‘youth culture’ is or of
any of the other terms listed in the table, but can only be really understood and evaluated in
combination with the coded interview transcripts. Thus the table below has been included only
for the sake of transparency in the research process which is sometimes lacking in descriptions
of qualitative research methodologies.
Table 2.4 Code list examples

























After the coding it was still necessary to bring the rather denotational categories of meaning into
a relational form. The first step was to create a co-coding frequency report with the help of the
analysis software, which shows how many times a passage of text has been coded with each pair
of codes, helping to see what codes might be related with each other. The resulting patterns were
identified in the actual texts and the corresponding text passages were compared with the field
notes. At this stage incidences of certain ‘clusters’ of codes began to emerge from the data and
themes started to develop. Using the themes as headings, text excerpts deemed representative for
the data set as a whole were collected in a database which served as the starting point for the dis-
cussion of the qualitative as well as survey data.
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It is noteworthy that focus groups were also conducted in BH, but with less success than in Cape
Town. Four students were hired to conduct the interviews, but unfortunately two of them never
provided transcripts of their interviews. The transcripts of the other two students were very in-
formative and provided the author with useful insights regarding young Brazilians’ attitudes to-
wards class, race and youth culture, but overall the collected material was simply not enough for
a meaningful analysis.
Statistical Analysis
Considering the explicit use of Bourdieu’s theory and conceptual framework in this thesis it
would only seem natural to adopt his preference for correspondence analysis (CA) and multiple
correspondence analysis (MCA) for analysing, interpreting and presenting the survey data collec-
ted for this study. Both methods are indeed highly useful for detecting and visualising hidden
structures in nominal data and they certainly remain valid options for anyone working with data
on taste and cultural consumption (see, for example, Bennett et al. 2009). But it does not repres-
ent the only possible, and sometimes even not the most appropriate, method for dealing with
this kind of data. This is the point made by Chan and Goldthorpe (Chan and Goldthorpe 2007;
see also Chan 2010) in a reply to a critique (Wuggenig 2007; see also Peterson 2007) of an article
titled Social stratification and cultural consumption: the Visual Arts in England (Chan and Goldthorpe
2007) in which they used latent class analysis (LCA) for identifying the main categories of visual
arts consumers and multiple regression analysis in order to test the relative strength of a set of
independent variables for predicting someone’s association with one of those categories. De-
fending their chosen method against claims by Ulf Wuggenig (2007) that their statistical analysis
was incompatible with some of the more intricate points made by Bourdieu, they maintain that
multiple regression analysis (MRA) has certain advantages over CA and MCA as it allows one to
compare the relative impact of individual independent variables and to establish (or rather pre-
sume) causality within the observed relationships between variables.
[O]ur approach does not imply, as Wuggenig would suppose (p. 309), ‘treating
reified variables like agents’, or accepting a ‘Newtonian logic of regression’, or
believing that causal explanations can be directly cranked out of statistical
analyses. The idea is, rather, to obtain as refined an understanding as possible of
the statistically demonstrable relationships that arise in the patterning of cultural
consumption and in its social stratification, so that, in the next stage of the
research process, explicit (and testable) accounts can be advanced of the
mechanisms that give rise to these relationships in terms, ultimately, of the action
and interaction of the individuals involved. (Chan and Goldthorpe 2007: 324)
For very similar reasons as given by Chan and Goldthorpe the statistical analysis of the survey
data presented in this thesis relies mainly (apart from simple bivariate analysis) on MRA. First of
all it allows one to draw conclusions about the ‘net effects’ of stratification variables, that is the
relative strength of the individual variables, on cultural consumption, opposed to what Chan and
Goldthorpe call their ‘gross effect’. Moreover, as opposed to CA and MCA which can only de-
scribe a general relationship between a set of variables, regression analysis, requiring a dependent
variable and a set of independent variables, enables one to make inferences about the causal dir-
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ection of a relationship between two or more variables. This difference is indeed relevant with
respect to the earlier assumptions about the causality between taste and media consumption (see
page 46).
Another problem with CA and MCA in the given context is the lack of a suitable status variable.
Bourdieu could use and elaborate on Weber’s distinction between class, understood as a function
of the market, and status, in the sense of honour and prestige, by using professions as an indicat-
or for social status and correlating it with class and cultural capital. This way he was able to show
that although general correlations between the three exist, these are non-linear and conditional.
For example, while better-off people generally have more refined tastes than those who are
worse off, the old-rich are certainly more discriminating than the newly-rich. And certain groups
like teachers and artists might be middle- or even lower-class but have distinctively avant-gardist
tastes. Putting class and status into relation to each other and mapping various cultural activities
along their axes allowed Bourdieu to make the highly intricate (and slightly cryptic) visual repres-
entations of taste patterns found in Distinction. The problem with a study of youth tastes, how-
ever, is the lack of a meaningful measure of status. What is social status among youngsters? Al-
though prestige certainly plays a decisive role in the social relations among teenagers – ‘coolness’
comes to mind – a valid, reliable and quantifiable variable for this kind of status remains elusive.
Therefore, in this study, matters related to status are dealt with primarily in two ways: (1) school
is considered a proxy for both social status and institutionalised cultural capital, and (2) findings
of the qualitative research are used to clarify the somewhat blurry relationship between class and
status
The class variable itself is reason for a further special characteristic of most of the regression
models used in this thesis. As stated in the introduction one of the main concerns of this thesis is
to explore the relationship between class, race and taste, assuming that cultural consumption is
strongly influenced by class while the nature of this relationship depends on someone’s cultural
background, which is also – arguably in South Africa more than in Brazil – a matter of race.
Therefore it is necessary to compare the impact of class on taste and cultural preferences
between race groups. In the South African case this is being complicated by the particularly
strong association between race and class, as basic assumptions about sample size and frequency
counts required for the kind of statistical analyses applied in this thesis are easily violated. More
precisely it is the virtual absence of white and coloured respondents among Xhosa speakers and
at township schools and their weak presence among the poorest within the sample which result
in two rather distinct research settings rather than a single one which could be easy captured in
regression analysis. In order to account for the particular characteristics of the Cape Town
sample, but also given the research questions at hand, the decision was taken to run separate re-
gressions in sets of two: one including only respondents from city schools (Atlantic High, North-
ern High, Southern High, Flats High), the other including only black respondents. The first
model gives insights into the effects of class, race and cultural background among those who at
least share a fairly comparable school experience (even though the discrepancy in most aspects
between Atlantic High, for example, and Flats High is still quite extreme) whereas the second
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model provides insights into the class and school experiences of black respondents.
In the Belo Horizonte sample diversity and inequality are still significant but less dramatic than
in Cape Town, allowing for unified regression analyses when required.
The extensive use of MRA in this thesis calls for some guidance on how interprete its results.
MRA examines the effects of multiple independent variables (predictors) on the value of a
dependent variable, or outcome. It calculates a coefficient (in this thesis odds ratios are shown)
for each independent variable, as well as its statistical significance, to estimate the effect of each
predictor on the dependent variable, with other predictors held constant. The meaning of this is
best explained with the use of an example: table 6.3 on page 113 shows the effect of a series of
independent variables (race, language, gender, school and class) on two different outcome vari-
ables (first: the respondent has at least one “mediated” idol, second: does the respondent has at
least one “acquired” idol)10 for two different subsamples (first: only respondents at city schools,
second: only respondents categorised as African/black). Therefore the table effectively shows
the results of four different regressions based on the combinations of dependent variables and
subsamples. Looking at the independent variables we see that all the values of the categorical
variables are shown, for example instead of just “race” we find “African/Black”, “White” and
“Coloured”. We also notice that the first regression (second column) does not give a result for
the “Coloured” value, which makes “Coloured” the so-called base value in this case, meaning
that the results for “White” and “African/Black” show the relative increase in odds of a black or
white city school respondent having a mediated idol in her list compared to a coloured respond-
ent. In the given example we see that the odds ratio for American/black respondents at city
schools is 6.443, meaning that the odds of an American/black respondents at a city school to
have a mediated idol is more than six times higher than those of a coloured respondent at a city
school. We can also see that this finding is statistically significant as the p-value is 0.031, meaning
that the probability that we are observing a change in the dependent variable due to a change in
the independent variable (here: “change” from coloured to African/black) and not just as a res-
ult of pure chance is very high (probability = 1 - 0.031 = 0.969 or 97%). The cutoff point for ac-
cepting results as statistically significant is commonly set at p-value of 0.05 (in other words: a
probability larger than 95%). What is important to understand is that the results for the individu-
al variables show the net effect of a variable, keeping the other independent variables constant. If
we look further down the table we find the result for class: an odds ratio of 0.970 and a p-value
of 0.057. These results differ from the ones discussed above in two important ways. First, the
odds ratio is smaller than 1, meaning that it actually reflects a decrease by the factor 0.03
(1-0.097) in the odds of having a mediated idol with every increase in the class variable by 1. This
appears to be a very small decrease compared to the increase we observed with African/black re-
spondents. The difference lies in the type of variable – while in the earlier case of African/black
we could only observe a change from 0 to 1 in the independent variable, the class variable is a
10. “Mediated” in the context of this thesis refers to references that have been adopted from the media or public
sphere, “acquired” to those that have been acquuired through family or schooling.
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continuous variables taking values from 0 to 100, so changes in the variable can be larger than 1.
The second difference to our observations on African/black repondents is that the result for the
class variable is, strictly speaking, not statistically significant, given its p-value of 0.057. However,
in this particular case the decision was made to accept the result as statistically significant due to
the extremely tiny margin between the p-value and the confidence level of 95%.
2.4 Key Concepts
2.4.1 Youth
‘Youth’ is a notoriously elastic and ambiguous term which is being applied to different age
groups depending on the context and purpose of the publication in which it occurs. At times it is
even a contested category as social scientists from the Global South challenge the Northern as-
sociation of youth and adolescence with leisure and freedom (Tyyskä 2005). In this thesis ‘youth’
or ‘adolescents’ primarily refers to ‘teens’ (15-19) opposed to ‘young adolescents’ (10-14) and
‘young adults’ (20-24). In order to account for the unusual variability of South African and
Brazilian life trajectories, exceptions are made for young adolescents whose classmates are pre-
dominantly older than them and young adults who are still in grade 10 or 11 (grade 2 or 3 in
Brazil). It needs to be noted that the proposed usage of the term ‘youth’ in this thesis differs
from what many South Africans understand under youth, as a lot of political commentary, in-
cluding newspaper articles and scholarly work, describes young adults up to the early 30s as
youth due to South Africa’s particular social dynamics which tend to leave young women and es-
pecially men in a state of prolonged youth:
The collapse of employment opportunities can prolong ‘youthood’, by delaying
economic independence, marriage and household formation (Hunter, 2007;
Seekings, 2008; Klasen & Woolard, 2009). For many youth there is no
straightforward pathway to adulthood but instead a permanent state of
uncertainty or stagnation. This has been described as “sitting” in Africa
(Langevang, 2008) and a “culture of waiting” in India (Jeffrey, 2008, 2010).
(Dawson 2012: 32)
2.4.2 Class
Seeing that this thesis borrows heavily from Bourdieu in its theoretical framework, the question
arises to what extent it makes use of his conceptualisation of class. What it does not try do do is
to take the class categories Bourdieu developed in the context of 1960s France and use them in
the context of contemporary South Africa and Brazil. The crux of Bourdieu’s work in terms of
class is not a map of social class that can be simply foisted on different societies. Instead it is his
theoretical work and conceptual tools that make it possible to derive distinctive categories of so-
cial order inductively from knowledge about people’s economic wealth, social connectedness and
cultural preferences within the frame of reference in which they are being applied. At the heart
of Bourdieu’s approach to class is the aforementioned separation between economical, social and
cultural capital. Different combinations and clusters of the three types of capital lead to the es-
tablishment of a class hierarchy. The usefulness of this type of work is evident in recent efforts
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by Bennett et al (2009) and Savage et al (2013223) to redefine the British class system:
[Bourdieu] differentiates between (1) economic capital (wealth and income), (2)
cultural capital (the ability to appreciate and engage with cultural goods, and
credentials institutionalised through educational success), and (3) social capital
(contacts and connections which allow people to draw on their social networks).
Bourdieu’s point is that although these three capitals may overlap, they are also
subtly different, and that it is possible to draw fine-grained distinctions between
people with different stocks of each of the three capitals, to provide a much
more complex model of social class than is currently used.
There have been recent attempts to resurrect class in South Africa, too. Seekings and Natrass
(2005: 255), following a more neo-Weberian approach by building on Goldthorpe’s (1997) work
on class and using occupation (notably on a household, not individual, level) as the defining
characteristic, arrive at seven class categories broadly correlating with income distribution with a
bit of overlap between neighbouring classes.
Alexander et al (2013), in their book Class in Soweto, approach class from a neo-Marxist angle and
define it using nine broader employment categories assigned to individuals (rather than house-
holds), accounting for the high levels of unemployment, marginal employment and a relatively
high mobility of individuals between occupational categories, including unemployment, among
Sowetans. They also ascribe crucial value to the notion of agency in their conceptualisation of
class, recognising the potential of class consciousness as an identity marker and a source of polit-
ical activism. This aspect of the work done by the fine team of researchers behind Class in Soweto
is also evident in their emphasis of subjective class identity; Phadi and Cleruti (2011), in an earlier
publication based on the Soweto dataset, discuss the permeability of middle-class identity, while
Wale (2013) draws on qualitative interview data in order to demonstrate the usefulness of ‘af-
fordability’ as a concept in linking perceptions of class mobility defined in cultural vs economic
terms.
What these publications have in common, and what sets them apart from this thesis, is that they
are primarily concerned with defining class systems that have meaning and reserve applicability
beyond a particular research setting. The particular use of class in this thesis is far more pragmat-
ic in its usefulness restricted to the specifity of the study’s research design, meaning that its con-
ceptualisation and operationalisation of class arguably has little significance outside the context
of this study. This is not to say that its observations on class are meaningless. Instead, what it
means is that one needs to consider the context in which these observations were made before
trying to extrapolate them to a greater population.
Context indeed matters in the pursuit of a useful treatment of class, especially if the context is a
study of school-going youth. This particular study population comes with certain caveats for the
definition of class as common measures of class (e.g. occupation, employment categories, econ-
mic capital, living standard) are not always immediately applicable or only through a proxy (e.g.
parent/caretaker or household). This challenge was further exacerbated by the study’s research
design as the surveys were conducted at schools, without the possibility to interview the chil-
dren’s parents or caretakers, and the questionnaires were self-administered, adding a relatively
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large degree of inconsistency and subjectivity to the way in which class-related questions were
answered. This is also true for a question that asked respondents to self-identify themselves in
class terms (which of course is a very subjective question) to which most respondents, regardless
of their actual socio-economic background, answered that they are middle-class.
In the end, after much experimentation with all the different questions that were intended to
help with the construction of a rich and meaningful class variable, the respondents’ residence
(the neighbourhood they live in) emerged as the most reliable, valid and ultimately practical
measure of class by matching the respondents’ answers to this question with neighbourhood-
level living standard data measures from the census (see the operationalisation of class in Cape
Town and Belo Horizonte on pages 34 and 37). The disadvantage of these measurements is that
they are relatively coarse as they do not account for class variation within neighbourhoods. Their
advantages are that they are reliable because they are grounded in census data and they are mean-
ingful because they are based on living standard which directly relates to the lived experiences of
respondents.
2.4.3 Race
A useful way of starting to conceptualise race involves comparing it to its conceptual sibling: eth-
nicity. The point can be made that race is commonly used as a social category, defined from the
outside, based on phenotypes, and often in order to exclude a certain group of people from priv-
ileges, while ethnicity is associated with a shared belief in a common identity within a group, of-
ten in order to strengthen the position of a minority in society. Accordingly, the main distinction
between race and ethnicity lies in the nature/culture dichotomy; whereas race is mainly, if not
purely, associated with natural and physical classifications of humankind (phenotype), ethnicity is
preoccupied with culture as the reference point for differentiation (Wade 1993; Hall 1996; Ban-
ton 1998; Fenton 2003; Gunaratnam 2003). Certain strands of Black Consciousness literature ac-
knowledge the political interest behind racism (often seen as a direct by-product of historical
capitalism), but diverge from the strict race/ethnicity binary by maintaining that race can serve as
a powerful tool to create a strong identity of blackness in opposition to the dominance of white-
ness in the social sphere (Fanon 1986; 1991; Gilroy 1993; Du Bois 1999; Biko 1987). Both view-
points, to a lesser and greater extent, support the idea of race being a historically shaped con-
struct, which is unlikely to vanish but is being re-fashioned and re-valued over time. 
In the South African context it needs to be pointed out that under apartheid race was not merely
a social construct based on biological traits and phenotypes but politically and legally enforced,
making it arguably the deciding criterion for one’s position in the social order (Posel 2001: 55).
In the same vein, it is widely acknowledged that apartheid’s race politics were not merely ideolo-
gical but rather essential to the maintenance of an exploitative capitalist system dependent on the
constant supply of cheap labour (Wolpe 1972).
Despite the abundant use of racial descriptors in this thesis the author fully acknowledges the
historicity of race and rejects any notion of race grounded in biology. He therefore also recogn-
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ises the shifting meaning of race, not only of the concept in its entirety over time, but also situ-
ationally on an individual level (see page 79 for a discussion of the fluidity of race in Brazil).
Nonetheless he is also conscious of the continuing significance of essentialised race-thinking in
South Africa and elsewhere. And as much as this author subscribes to the humanist vision of a
world without racial classifications, he is also cautious of simply ignoring race and its immense
significance for many in South Africa and elsewhere. Although a post-racial society remains the
goal for anyone who believes in egalitarianism, ignoring race in contemporary society can have
the adverse effect of what it is supposed to achieve in the presence of a racially defined hierarchy
of privilege:
Although as an ideal the race neutral vision remains a valuable guidepost for the
future of any healthy multi-racial democracy, in practical terms it functions [...] to
cast a blind eye toward the enduring problem of racial injustice. Moral
prescriptions about skin color being of no consequence and symmetrical
discourses of treating everyone the same – prescriptions that adhere strongly to
egalitarian, democratic, and even anti-racist discourses – are thereby put in the
service of defending the consequences of the historical violation of race




One challenge that occured during the writing up of the thesis was to find a way of using the
term “race” and racial descriptors in a way that does justice to the social constructedness of the
concept. Two options seemed plausible: (1) to use quotation marks for race and racial categories,
and/or (2) to use more precise descriptions such “respondents who classified themselves as col-
oured”. In the end the decision was taken to refrain from both and instead make the author’s
stance on this topic explicit (which is done here). In the opinion of the author, the use of quota-
tion marks for racial descriptors can suggest a certain artificiality of the concept race that sets it
apart from other social categories used as identity markers, be it in terms of gender, nationality,
language, religious beliefs, sexuality etc. The social constructedness inherent to all of these identi-
fiers, and their exclusive potential, are understood and acknowledged, yet they are very ‘real’ to
those who identify with, or are affected by them. The same is true for race, hence it should not
be treated differently from other social constructs used as social categories. The second option,
using more precise descriptions in lieu of racial descriptors, is a good way of dealing with the risk
of further essentialising notions of race through writing, yet even though some effort was made
in parts of the thesis to do it justice, it was ultimately found to be impractical in a thesis that con-
tains references to race in virtually every other sentence.
In practice, the race variable used in most of the analysis is a composite of two different ques-
tions; one being subjective (“When you think about race, how do you classify yourself?”), the
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other objective (“How do other people see you in terms of race?”). For both questions respond-
ents could choose from African, Coloured, White, Black, Indian, I refuse to define myself or others in racial
terms or Other with the option to write down their own description. The consolidated variable
gives priority to the reply to the first, subjective, question if it is one of the four core categories
Black, Coloured, White or Refuse. If the reply to the first question is either African or simply missing
and the reply to the second question is not missing, it was coded according to the second ques-
tion, given that African is a broad category which lends itself to various (e.g. geographical) inter-
pretations. Finally, those who describe themselves as Indian were grouped with those who ticked
Other and African and Black were grouped into African/Black.11
11. One exception to these rules is a group of 17 respondents at Khayelitsha High and Macassar High who
described themselves as white. One can safely assume that none of the learners at those particular schools
would objectively be described this way, and there are only three possible reasons why some of them
responded “white”. First, they did not take the question seriously, misunderstood the question or they simply
ticked the wrong box by accident. Second, they either wanted to make a point about the perceived irrationality
of the question. Third, they in fact identify themselves with being white. While the second and third
possibilities might apply in some of these cases, it is more likely that the great majority falls into the first
category. As the 17 cases would account for about nine percent of all observations of white, the decision was
taken to exclude these observations from any analysis involving the race variable by coding them as ‘missing’.
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How do others see you?
African Coloured Indian White Black Refuse Other Missing Total
African 118 11 0 9 49 4 1 3 195
Coloured 2 324 5 15 9 5 2 10 372
Indian 0 1 13 0 1 1 1 0 17
White 0 10 0 148 4 1 5 5 173
Black 33 13 3 7 187 5 0 6 254
Refuse 11 24 1 15 16 41 2 3 113
Other 0 4 0 3 1 1 3 3 15
Missing 4 4 0 4 7 1 0 37 57
Total 168 391 22 201 274 59 14 67 1196
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
Table 2.5 shows a high degree of consistency in self-identification and self-reported identifica-
tion by others which is in line with other studies on race in post-apartheid Cape Town and South
Africa (Seekings 2008: 6).
It is important to note that different versions of the consolidated race variable are used through-
out the analysis, as it is not always useful, necessary or possible to retain all categories in certain
kinds of statistical analysis. For descriptive purposes, as in figure 2.1 on page 14, sometimes the
‘long’ version with all categories (except missing values) is being used. In other cases a ‘medium’
version is used which excludes the Other category. The most common, however, is the ‘short’
variant which consists only of the three largest groups, African/Black, Coloured and White, which
cover over 80 percent of the whole sample (including missing cases). This also means that just
short of 20 percent of the sample were not considered throughout most of the analysis. The
decision for this was based on the lack of information about why respondents chose not to clas-
sify themselves in racial terms as unfortunately no follow-up questions were included in the
questionnaires and the topic was also not discussed in the focus group interviews. What can be
said looking at table 2.5 is that a much larger proportion of coloured and white respondents,
compared to African/black respondents, seemed to refuse classifying themselves, but even this is
not entirely certain as almost half of the refusing group also refused to say what, in their opinion,
others think of them in racial terms. Despite the negative impact the relatively high non-response
rate to the race questions might have on the analysis, it can be argued that asking them this way
was still the right thing to do from an ethical point of view, especially in the context of young re-
spondents, where the further naturalisation of race-thinking through strict categorisation would
be a highly indesirable side-effect of this sort of research.
The following table shows the differences between the three race variables and can be used as a
reference for the frequency distribution of the race variable shown in a table or figure.
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Table 2.6 Race Variables (Cape Town)
Race n Long Medium Short
African/Black 437 38.1% 39.3% 43.9%
Coloured 374 32.6% 33.6% 37.6%
White 184 16.1% 16.5% 18.5%
Refuse 118 10.3% 10.6%
Other 33 2.9%
Missing 50
N 1196 1159 1126 1008
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
Ethical questions about asking teenagers to identify themselves in racial terms arose at the begin-
ning of the research process. Allowing respondent to “refuse to define myself or others in racial
terms” was one of the measures to alleviate these concerns. Survey participants were also de-
briefed after the survey, and the use of racial terms was discussed during the debriefing.
Class
In this study, ‘class’ is synonymous with ‘living conditions’, since the nature of the survey allows
only for limited information about the respondents’ actual social-economic situation. Data on
the employment of their parents has been collected, but it is very subjective and partly incoher-
ent. Moreover, there is no data on household income, which would have helped in compiling an
actual class variable.
Instead respondents were asked which suburb or neighbourhood they live in. This information
was aligned with an index on living conditions in Cape Town’s suburbs which was compiled as
part of a study commissioned by the City of Cape Town using census data from 2001 (Roman-
ovsky and Gie 2006). The index takes into account the level of education, unemployment,
household income, unskilled employment, housing and access to public services in a neighbour-
hood. In nine out of ten cases the suburb given by the respondent could be successfully matched
with an entry in the index list. The remaining missing cases (119) were imputed using replies to
some of the survey questions about the respondents’ actual living conditions – ratio of people
per room at residence and access to water, electricity and sanitation – as well as her or his school.
The ‘raw’ living condition index was then grouped into five categories (‘Very Low’ to ‘Very
High’) with fairly equal frequencies. Table 2.2 on page 14 shows the distribution of the class
variable.
The use of living conditions as a proxy for class has theoretical implications for the interpreta-
tion of the results presented below. For one, it does not comply with traditional Marxist notions
of class, in which the subject’s positioning in society is essentially determined by her or his rela-
tionship to the means of production. In the case of schoolchildren this would have been a prob-
lematic approach anyway, although the parents’ occupation could have fulfilled that role (see
above for reasons why this was not feasible), and in a way the use of living conditions on a
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neighbourhood level is closer to a Weberian understanding of class in the sense of shared life
chances. The fact that neighbourhood-level data on living conditions (especially in heterogen-
eous neighbourhoods) obscure the actual living conditions of the individual is largely mitigated
by the strong correlation between neigbourhood income and occupational class as well as educa-
tion (life chances) in Cape Town. According to the Cape Area Study 2005 (CAS) 22% of people
living in Cape Town’s neighbourhoods with the highest income (top quintile in terms of neigh-
bourhood income) belong to the upper or semi-professional class compared to 14% living in
neighbourhood with the lowest income (bottom quintile). Similarly, 80% of residents in the
high-income areas have matric12 opposed to 23% in the low-income neighbourhoods.
Social Status and Institutionalised Cultural Capital (School)
The conceptual difficulties of coming up with a meaningful variable for social status when deal-
ing with a sample of teenagers have already been discussed earlier (see pages 25 to 28). The deci-
sion to use schools as a proxy is a compromise which might not be entirely satisfactory but ne-
cessary given the circumstances. In practice the variable is applied in two different ways due to
the decision to distinguish between city and African/black samples in regressions. In the first,
city mode the schools are used individually, their effect in the regressions discussed according to
racial and class compositions and their position in school-fees based ranking (Atlantic High,
Northern High, Southern High, Cape Flats High – in this order). In the second mode which
looks only at African/black respondents, city schools and township schools are grouped in a bin-
ary variable reflecting the fundamental differences between the two types.
Language
The respondents were asked to give their preferred language, i.e. the language in which they
think and dream, out of a list including all of South Africa’s official languages and some general
categories (e.g. ‘other European language’ and ‘other (South) African language). Nine out of ten
respondents chose one of the three major languages in the Western Cape: Afrikaans, English or
Xhosa. Another eight percent answered the question technically incorrectly by ticking more than
box (the instruction to the question in the questionnaire asked to tick only one box only), but
two thirds of those (61 cases) ticked ‘English’ as one of their choices. It was decided to treat
these bilingualists as English speakers seeing that they are influenced by English to the extent
that it impacts on their innermost thougths and dreams. Overall, the proportion of respondents
falling into the three main categories comes to 95 percent. Excluding other or missing observa-
tions (65 cases) results in the following composition of the basic language variable.
12. Matric is the qualification received on graduating from high school in South Africa.
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Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
For the regression analyses, however, a more meaningful version of the language variable was
used. Assuming that taste preferences, especially when it comes to the impact of foreign influ-
ences on taste, are associated with a preference for English over someone’s native language, the
actual language variable consists of three categories: (1) native English speakers whose parents’
first language is already English, (2) ‘preferring’ English speakers who prefer to speak English
but whose parents are not native English speakers, and (3) those who prefer to speak a language
other than English.
Gender




Given the greater fluidity of racial categories in Brazil compared to South Africa, the decision
was taken to ask the respondents an open-ended question in addition to the subjective and ob-
jective13 questions and to base the race variable used in the statistical analyses primarily on the
cleaned replies to this question. Interestingly, over eighty percent of the open-ended replies are
common racial descriptors, most in line with the racial classifications used in the census. About
another nine percent either did not answer the question at all or used race-unrelated terms (i.e.
by writing down the name of a famous local football team). Thus only (given the alleged invisib-
ility of race in Brazil) about eleven percent expressed indifference (e.g. by writing “human” or
“Brazilian”) or openly refused to answer the question in racial terms. If the open-ended question
was answered ambiguously (empty or refusal/indifference) the reply to the subjective, closed-
ended question was used for classification. If this one also did not fall into one of the main cat-
egories, the objective question was used. As with the Cape Town survey, different versions of
the race variable are used for different purposes; the ‘long’ version consists of all (grouped) cat-
egories, the ‘medium’ version dispenses with the Other category (Indígeno and Amarelo) and the
13. The subjective question is equivalent to “How do you classify yourself in racial terms?” and the objective to
“How do other people see you in terms of race?”. Respondents could choose from one of the census options




‘short’ variable does without the Other and Refuse categories. In discussions of the survey results
sometimes the term “mixed” is used for Pardo/Mestizo in order to account for the fluidity of this
particular category. In addition, and with reference to some studies suggesting that the crucial ra-
cial divide in Brazilian is between white and non-white, a binary variable is also used in some
parts of the thesis.
Table 2.8 Consolidated Race Variable (Belo Horizonte)14
Race n Long Medium Short Binary
Preto/Negro 85 10.1% 10.5% 10.7%
50.4%
Pardo/Mestizo 317 37.5% 39.1% 39.8%
Branco 395 46.8% 48.8% 49.6% 49.6%
Refuse 13 1.5% 1.6%
Other 35 4.1%
Missing 15
N 860 845 810 797 797
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
Class
The class variable is an index of census variables on neighbourhood-level which are fairly com-
parable to the components used for the Cape Town class variable. The difference between the
two class variables is the lack of individual socio-economic indicators in the Brazilian case, lead-
ing to a coarser measure of class (based purely on someone’s place of residence) compared to the
Cape Town data (based on someone’s place of residence and her or his responses to a bunch of
questions related to their standard of living and parents’ employment) and the inability to impute
missing values from the additional variables.15 The four components of the class index derive
from the components of the Human Development Index (HDI) and include the percentage of
individuals over 25 with less than eight years formal education, the unemployment rate among
18-59 year old individuals, the percentage of households with less than two minimum incomes,
and the percentage of individuals in informal employment. For descriptive purposes a grouped
version of the raw class variable is sometimes used (see figure 2.4 on page 20).
Social Status (School)
As with the Cape Town survey, social status is not easily conceptualised and operationalised in
research context based on a school setting with teenagers as survey participants. However, Belo
Horizonte’s particular school system actually helps to justify the choice of schools as proxy for
14. Comparing these proportions with the results of the Belo Horizonte Area Study it appears that white (branco)
respondents are somewhat oversampled at the expense of black (preto) and ‘mixed’ (pardo) respondents: Preto
20%, Pardo 46%, Branco 34%. This is arguably due to the larger student bodies of the two private schools in
the sample which have proportionally fewer poor and black respondents than public schools.
15. The individual socio-economic questions were excluded from the Brazilian questionnaire as the original (Cape
Town) version was considered too lengthy.
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social status. Unlike with the Cape Town survey, private and public schools were included in the
sample as the public school system in Brazil generally covers a far narrower segment of society
than the one found in South Africa with its legacy of ‘good’ and expensive former Model C
schools. Incidentally private schools in Belo Horizonte are concentrated in the wealthy parts of
the metropolitan area (southern part of the city centre) whereas public schools are found in the
urban periphery, including Contagem where the public schools in the sample are located (see
pages 18 to 22 for a detailed description of the schools). The geographical characteristics of the
sample then allowed for a binary distinction between private and public schools which not only
reflects the centre/periphery character but also the very real connotation of social privilege asso-
ciated with living and going to school in Belo Horizonte’s wealthy city centre as opposed to the




3. Subcultures or Cultural Omnivores?
3.1 The View from Within: (Post-)Subcultural theory
Early Youth Studies and Subcultural theory at the CCCS
The first place to look for a comprehensive and coherent interpretation of youth culture is in the
archives of the (now defunct) Centre for Contemporary Culture Studies (CCCS) in Birmingham.
It was here during the 1970s and early 1980s that subcultural theory was established as an
autonomous academic field and ‘subculture’ and ‘youth culture’16 were given the meaning of
youth cultural practices shaped by their social contexts. Before, these terms were used ambigu-
ously by writers within the fields of sociology, psychology and criminology, generally in order to
explain social deviance and delinquency among youth. The earliest usage of the term ’subculture’
in the negative sense can be traced back to the beginnings of urban sociology at the University of
Chicago in the 1920s, where the formal study of youth as an autonomous subsection of society
(not just as a developmental phase) began (Blackman 2005). Although the researchers of the
Chicago School (Burgess 1923; Shaw 1930) were preoccupied with the negative aspects of youth,
their studies can be seen as a precursor to the work at the CCCS as their authors did not try to
understand ‘deviance’ as a consequence of psychological deficiency but as the result of its socio-
economic context.
Largely unrelated to the Chicago School but similar in its approach and conclusions is the work
on youth and delinquency by American functionalists. Talcott Parsons used the concept of
‘youth culture’ in order to describe the intermediary life stage between childhood and adulthood
with its own set of values and rules. Building on Parson’s functionalism a body of work in crim-
inology set out to explain the higher prevalence of crime in lower social classes compared to up-
per classes. In Social Theory and Social Structure (which borrows from an earlier article from 1938)
Robert K. Merton (1957), a former research student of Parsons, basically reiterates the findings
of the Chicago School on deviance which stressed social causes opposed to individual character-
istics. Approximately at the same time Albert K. Cohen (1956) made use of Merton’s (1938)
earlier work in a study of juvenile gangs, titled Delinquent Boys – The Subculture of the Gang. Cohen,
like Merton, focusses on class structure but the explanatory part of his analysis goes beyond the
purely structural and includes psychological causes as he identifies peer influence and the striving
for social status as two crucial variables behind lower-class crime. 
Another influential work on the pressures of peer culture which helped to reinforce the idea of
youth as separate from the realities of adult life was The Adolescent Society by James Coleman
(Coleman 1961). Coleman, who is best known for his work in educational sociology, gave voice
to concerns about a supposedly widening gap in beliefs and values between youth and their par-
ent generations in the early 1960s. The psychological aspects of Cohen’s and Coleman’s work are
16. Although subcultural studies are not restricted to youth, the terms ‘subculture’ and ‘youth culture’ are
sometimes used interchangeably as much work on subcultures focusses on teenagers and young adults. Youth
culture, however, is also used in a much broader fashion in order to separate the experience of growing up
from adult life. And Bourdieu, as discussed on page 48, did not engage much with the cultural preferences of
youth at all. Here the term youth culture refers to the taste and cultural preferences of youth in general. 
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reflected in a strain of psychological and psychoanalytical studies on youth delinquency which
was prominent in Britain from as early as the 1920s (Burt 1925) until the formation of subcultur-
al theory at the CCCS. These studies were later criticised or rejected due to their tendency to as-
sociate working class behaviour with psychological deficiency (Blackman 2005).
British subcultural theory, follwing the general trend towards cultural studies, developed out of a
desire to overcome the pathological interpretation of subculture in favour of a semiotic reading
of subcultures characterised by stylistic differences, as proposed by Phil Cohen (1992, first publ-
ished in 1972) in the groundbreaking article Subcultural Conflict and Working Class Community. The
change from subculture or youth culture in the singular to subcultures in the plural is thus more
than just a semantic phenomenon as it meant the study of different youth subcultures according
to their inherent sets of rules, hierarchies and rituals. Subcultures were no longer seen as danger-
ous deviations from the mainstream or the results of psychological deficiencies, but as autonom-
ous cultural bodies that could be studied ‘from within’. Structural anthropology, with its key con-
cepts bricolage and myth in the tradition of Claude Lévi-Strauss (1966), contributed much to this
theoretical framework. The aim was a semiotic reading of subcultures, an interpretation of youth
culture as style and language, which was achieved by Dick Hebdige (1979) in Subculture: The Mean-
ing of Style portraying Punk rockers’ appropriation and reworking of common cultural objects
into spectacular demonstrations of public resistance to mainstream culture. 
Another major theoretical influence on British subcultural theory, reflected in the notion of res-
istance, is cultural Marxism. In the context of class friction and the challenging of social norms
and values in 1960s/1970s’ Britain, authors associated with the CCCS made use of Gramsci’s
concept of cultural hegemony in order to interpret the emerging wave of youth movements chal-
lenging the social conventions of the parent generation (e.g. punks, skinheads, mods) as a resist-
ance of working class youth to dominant social forces.17 In their use of cultural Marxism they
borrowed heavily from the work of Raymond Williams (1977), who proposed a view of popular
culture which does away with the notion of cultural texts as the work of individual authors in fa-
vour of an analysis taking into account the “(…) complex relationships between authorial intent,
institutional process and aesthetic form” (Osgerby 2004: 115), resulting in the seminal collection
of studies on subcultures by CCCS authors, Resistance Through Rituals (Hall and Jefferson 1976).
The relative optimism of the CCCS authors with regard to working class youth is evident in their
portrayal of adolescents as critical and discerning consumers of media and popular culture. Des-
pite their clear Marxist affiliations the CCCS authors eschewed the pessimistic notions of Marxist
theorists associated with the Frankfurt School, which is exemplified in the work of Theodor Ad-
orno (1991). Central to Adorno’s claims was an interpretation of the rise of commercial popular
culture and the commodification of culture as the demise of ‘high culture’ and the standardiza-
tion of socio-cultural processes through the ‘culture industry’ in the interests of the dominant
17. It can be argued that the structural analysis of youth, with its emphasis on class differences, which was crucial
to early American sociological studies of youth, has found its continuance in British subcultural theory. But
where the former was preoccupied with supposedly ‘deviant’ cultural practices of the working class, British
subcultural theory offered a positive reading of working class youth culture as legitimate and socially acceptable.
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classes in capitalist societies:
The Marxist version of the ‘mass culture’ thesis, then, saw popular music as a
bland, standardised product working in the service of capitalism. From this
perspective, popular music (in common with other branches of the ‘culture
industry’) was criticised for not only underpinning the operation of an
exploitative capitalist market, but also for fostering banal conformity among its
audiences. (Osgerby 2004: 111)
The CCCS authors confirmed the growing significance of the media and consumerism in the
making of youth identities but, influenced by Raymond Williams, they did not make any qualitat-
ive difference between ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture and refused to portray consumers of popular cul-
ture as passive victims of that process. Instead they saw the media and outlets of popular culture,
such as music and fashion, as sites of competition between different subcultures fueled by social
friction in British society. To them subcultures were not just inventions of the media industry
but also ways of life, acquiring their own sense of authenticity. It is at this point where the idea
of a singular youth culture opposed to adult generations is substituted by a fractious array of
multiple subcultures in competition with each other.
It is noteworthy that the different publications associated with the CCCS were not always con-
sistent with each other and partly even critical of some aspects of what would become known as
subcultural theory. This is certainly true for Angela McRobbie and Jenny Garber’s (1976) chapter
on girls and subculture in Resistance and Rituals. Arguing from a feminist standpoint they raise ob-
jections against the portrayal of subcultures as purely or mainly masculine phenomena and the
lack of critical engagement with some of the sexist elements in subcultures encountered by their
fellow researchers in Birmingham.
Another point of contention was the very concept of subculture itself, first formulated by Paul
Willis who points to the paucity of explanatory potential of subcultural theory with respect to the
logical counterpart of subculture – the mainstream:
There has not been a vigorous analysis of the status of the culture a sub-culture is
supposed to be ‘sub’ to. The notion implies a relative positioning which seems to
give an altogether misleading sense of absoluteness and dominance of the main
culture. (Willis 1972: : xlv-xlvi)
Indeed the idea of subculture as a form of resistance was about to receive much criticism once
postmodernism established itself as one of the leading paradigms in the 1980s and 1990s.
Post-structural critiques of subcultural theory
The main point of criticism targeted at the Birmingham School concerned its portrayal of sub-
cultures as a form of working class resistance based on neo-Marxist ideas. Central to post-struc-
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turalists’ arguments was the image of the ‘tribe’ or ‘neo-tribe’18, opposed to subculture, as the or-
ganising principle for youth in an increasingly consumerist society. The change of label was
meaningful as it represented a shift from a Marxist-influenced view of youth culture (the notion
of subcultures as a form of resistance towards the dominant culture) to a Weberian approach
that devalued the political aspect of youth culture in favour of individual agency and hedonistic
consumerism:
Secondly, given that in studies which use ‘subculture’ in relation to youth, music
and style there is a grounding belief that subcultures are subsets of society, or
cultures within cultures, such a concept imposes lines of divisions and social
categories which are very difficult to verify in empirical terms.
(…) On the contrary, it seems to me that so-called youth ‘subcultures’ are prime
examples of the unstable and shifting cultural affiliations which characterise late
modern consumer-based societies. (Bennett 1999: 605)
The new emphasis on agency and fluidity implies a greater autonomy of youth in their search for
identity in tune with a South African trend analyst’s assertion that “a person isn’t isolated in his
or her music or fashion taste any more” (Gamble 2008: 205), meaning that someone’s associa-
tion with a certain ‘tribe’ is no longer absolute and is lived through consumption and perform-
ance. If the emergence of youth subcultural theory meant the breakdown of youth culture into
multiple subcultures, then post-subcultural theory brought the level down to the smallest pos-
sible entity – the individual teenager within its immediate locality.
3.2 The View from Above: Bourdieu’s Distinction in 
Contemporary Society
The Problem with Free Choice in Highly Structured Societies
As a result of the postmodern notion of fluid identities, one common perception of youth today,
in South Africa and elsewhere, is that they are far more flexible in their lifestyle choices than
earlier generations. From a seemingly endless pool of trends, fashions and styles they pick and
choose whatever they like and accommodates their individual taste, independent of their finan-
cial means and/or cultural background. This biased view of youth shown in glossy magazines
and music clips on television disregards the very real social, economical and cultural restrictions
young people find themselves in. David Hesmondhalgh (2005: 25), in a critical review of old and
new literature on subcultures, scenes and tribes, brings this scepticism towards a purely individu-
alistic interpretation of youth culture to the point when he asks: “But what of the factors that
might limit or constrain such choice: poverty, addiction, mental illness, social suffering, marginal-
18. The term ‘tribe’ originates from the book The Time of the Tribes (first published in French in 1988) by the
Italian philosopher Michael Maffesoli (1996). It is noteworthy that although Maffesoli indeed discusses the
consequences of a celebration of consumerism for society, he does not make any direct references to youth
culture as such. In fact, the use of Maffesoli by, for example, Bennett (1999b) in his description of postmodern
youth tribes is rather questionable as he does not pay attention to most of the nuances and influences in
Maffesoli’s work. This becomes evident if one contrasts the book’s subtitle The Decline of Individualism in
Mass Society with the proclamation of free choice in post-structural portrayals of youth.
3. Subcultures or Cultural Omnivores?
43
isation, disempowerment, unequal access to education, childcare and healthcare, and so on?”
The disregard for structural causes in most (post-)subcultural writing manifests itself in the level
of analysis; studies of subcultures, scenes or tribes mostly deal with only one particular group in
contrast to what is usually referred to as ‘the mainstream’ and are ethnographic in nature. Thus
they often provide very detailed accounts of the dynamics within that particular group, and the
symbolic meanings of commodities within those group dynamics, but they provide little insight
into the general consumption patterns of youngsters. Two examples in point are the studies of
Haupt (2008)19 and Basson (2007) on South Africa’s local Hip Hop and Punk scenes, respect-
ively. Although these are two very different and distinct subcultures, they are both being por-
trayed as deviations from the norm and as some form of resistance to the prevailing social order
in South Africa. Basson (2007: 82) writes in the conclusion to her paper:
Originally inspired by the immediate novelty of taking pride in their national
identity after the transition, these individuals eventually came to question their
minority status and to what extent they were a part of the African Renaissance.
As a small group of mostly white middle class males, punk gives them a space
that allows them to enjoy being different from the norm. Their punk disguises
arm them with the weapon of ridicule, allowing them to comment on the world
around them and negotiate their identities in the new South Africa.
Haupt (2008: 217) also stresses the importance of difference and resistance in his description of
conscious Hip Hop in South Africa:
Whilst it is largely true that a significant aspect of hip-hop has been co-opted by
the mainstream media, certain forms of hip-hop continue to offer meaningful
avenues of expression and critical engagement for a specific set of subjects. This
is so partly because ‘conscious’ hip-hop artists have aligned their work as artists
with their identities as activists and educators. The work produced by these
subjects thus does not hinge upon the articulation of counter-hegemonic
positions exclusively, but relies on a measure of social action as well. This issue is
worth consideration in the South African context due to the fact that marginal
subjects are not merely dealing with inequalities produced by global capitalism
and US cultural imperialism. They also have to negotiate the legacy of apartheid.
Basson and Haupt describe Punk and conscious Hip Hop as avenues for those feeling marginal-
ised by the current political imperatives. The reasons for the sense of marginalisation experi-
enced by their study subjects certainly differ: white middle-class kids trying to come to terms
with the political change in post-apartheid South Africa vs black kids resisting the neo-liberal
economic climate. Yet the main theme providing the backdrop for both scenes is resistance to
the social norm – the mainstream – and a coming to terms with South Africa’s dark legacy of
apartheid.
Given the emphasis on resistance it is not surprising that both authors borrow heavily from the
19. Adam Haupt’s (2008) book Stealing Empire: P2P, intellectual property and hip-hop subversion deals with a far wider
range topics than just South African Hip Hop, and Haupt has published several articles specifically dealing with
local music scenes. Nevertheless the book does include an extensive treatment of the theoretical and ideological
ideas behind ‘conscious’ Hip Hop which incorporates some of the main arguments from Haupt’s earlier papers
on the subject.
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CCCS archives, albeit not entirely uncritically (especially Basson stresses the advantages of focus-
sing on youth identities instead of subcultures or scenes). Thus they are both exposed to much
of the criticism which classic subcultural theorists are confronted with, such as being subjective
in the definition and description of the group in question, over- or misinterpreting the symbolic
processes within the group and failing to provide a firm understanding of what these groups are
actually opposed to – the so-called mainstream. This last point, referring to the schism between
subcultures and mainstream, proves indeed problematic for both Basson and Haupt. Basson
(2007: 81) herself doubts that South African punks actually know what they stand against:
So, why do a group of youths who appreciate their country and its creative
benefits have a preference for a discourse and disguise that gives them the
freedom to comment and criticise, more or less undetected? Perhaps it reflects a
sense of uncertainty about where they stand in the current context and an
insecurity to oppose anything directly.
Haupt’s book, on the other hand, is much clearer about what is understood under the ‘main-
stream’ and contains a full chapter about what he calls the ‘Empire’, in dependence on Michael
Hardt and Antonio Negri’s book of the same name about the economic, military and cultural he-
gemony of capitalist societies at the end of the 20th century. It basically combines a pessimistic
neo-Marxist critique of neoliberalism, corporate globalisation and social injustice with an optim-
istic reading of global networking and shared experiences through globalisation as promising av-
enues for anti-capitalist political protest and activism. Haupt (200: 85) interprets this combina-
tion as a fruitful coming-together of neo-Marxism and poststructural theory:
On the one hand, Empire adopts a Marx-inspired emphasis on class and
economic relations in order to explain the ways in which dominant global
interests regulate the lives of subjects. This emphasis accounts for both class
disparities within nation-states and disparities between wealthy countries of the
northern hemisphere and poorer countries of the southern hemisphere. On the
other hand, Empire also adopts post-structuralist thinking by looking at
decentred networks of power (the power of transnational corporations, which
transcends national boundaries, for example) in a globalised world as well as at
multiple, network-oriented challenges (such as media activism, social movements’
use of digital media or counter-discursive art) to imbalances that are created by
neo-liberal economic policies.
According to Haupt’s interpretation of ‘Empire’, globalisation represents simultaneously the
main cause of as well as solution to global injustice, and conscious Hip Hop provides a creative
way for educating young people about the perils of capitalism and possibilities for counter-hege-
monic activism. Thereby he offers a sophisticated and refreshed version of subculturalists’ inter-
pretation of subculture as a form of class-based resistance which manages to incorporate the
global aspect of youth culture and media dissemination today. Yet despite its ambitious theoret-
ical framework, Haupt’s work on South African youth cannot escape the claims made against a
Marxist depiction of youth culture altogether. On first sight his description of conscious Hip
Hop as a counter-discursive movement that arises from within the hegemonic core might delude
the clear boundary between mainstream and subculture, core and periphery, but in the end it is
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built on the same bipolar world view characterising much Marxist writing. In the context of pop-
ular culture the concept of ‘Empire’ evokes, arguably not entirely unintentionally, an imagery
loosely associated with one of the most successful franchises of Western popular culture – Star
Wars. The intergalactic war between the evil empire and brave rebels serves as the ideal meta-
phor for the kind of narrative tools employed by Haupt, in which the supposedly morally superi-
or rebels reject the dominant empire’s all-embracing, homogenising and remarkably faceless
power in favour of individualism and self-determination.
As intriguing as it is to gain insights into the motives and strategies of young South Africans who
deliberately refuse to ‘fit in’, ultimately these studies leave much room for speculation about
whether they are representative for the whole of South African youth, and if not, where the ma-
jority of South African youngsters is located in the cultural landscape between periphery and
mainstream. The argument made here is that a Marxist conceptualisation of youth culture, or
subcultures, does not provide the best way to understand the very real structural variables under-
lying the distinctions between the various taste groups found in South Africa today. What is pro-
posed instead is a theoretical approach which borrows from Bourdieu the emphasis on social
stratification, cultural capital and reproduction of class consciousness and enhances it with recent
insights into the importance of supposedly secondary factors (such as race, ethnicity, gender, and
education) while showing sensibility towards local contexts within a globalised and increasingly
mediated world.
Towards a New Paradigm
One of Bourdieu’s greatest accomplishments was to provide a powerful set of tools for deci-
phering the role of taste in the reproduction of social inequality. Leaving the dualism of Marxist
cultural analysis behind, he offers a far more nuanced understanding of how taste serves as the
intermediary in the exchange between economic and cultural capital: 
If it is true, as I have endeavoured to establish, that, first, the dominant class
constitutes a relatively autonomous space whose structure is defined by the
distribution of economic and cultural capital among its members, each class
fraction being characterized by a certain configuration of this distribution to
which there corresponds a certain life-style, through the mediation of the habitus;
that, second, the distribution of these two types of capital among the fractions is
symmetrically and inversely structured; and that, third, the different inherited
asset structures, together with social trajectory, command the habitus and the
systematic choices it produces in all areas of practice, of which the choices
commonly regarded as aesthetic are one dimension – then these structures
should be found in the space of life-styles, i.e., in the different systems of
properties in which the different systems of dispositions express themselves.
(Bourdieu 2010: 257)
Bourdieu’s differentiation between economic and cultural capital (alongside social capital) is cru-
cial as social inequality is commonly understood in economic terms whereas the importance of
culture is often underestimated or misunderstood. (Bennett et al 2009: 11) Cultural capital is
measured in an individual’s cultural preferences, dispositions and knowledge, accumulated
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primarily during childhood. It comes easily, almost naturally as it is indeed embodied, to those
who grow up in an environment already rich in cultural capital (in the family, school or usually a
combination of both). And its value is not merely nominal but translates into socio-economic
advantages as those rich in cultural capital share similar tastes and preferences which helps, for
example, in job interviews, business negotiations or, for that matter, any situation in which the
perceived ‘cultured-ness’ of someone might count in her or his favour.
It is worth mentioning that definitions of cultural capital, by Bourdieu himself and others, are re-
latively fluid and shift over time. For example, Lareau and Lamont (1988) maintain that in Bour-
dieu’s earlier writings cultural capital was primarily understood as a measurement of informal
academic standards as social attributes, and only encompassed cultural preferences more gen-
erally, as both indicators and determinators of class, in Distinction.20 Thus they propose a defini-
tion of cultural capital that focusses on its exclusive properties and function which resonates
with its usage in this thesis:
[W]e propose to define cultural capital as institutionalized, i.e., widely shared, high
status cultural signals (attitudes, preferences, formal knowledge, behaviors, goods and
credentials) used for social and cultural exclusion, the former referring to exclusion from
jobs and resources, and the latter, to exclusion from high status groups. (Lareau
and Lamont 1988: 156)
The clearest definition by Bourdieu himself with regards to the forms of cultural capital (not so
much its function) is to be found in The Forms of Capital (Bourdieu 1986), in which he distin-
guishes between three types of cultural capital: embodied, institutionalised and objectified:
Cultural capital can exist in three forms: in the embodied state, i.e., in the form of
long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body; in the objectified state, in the
form of cultural goods (pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.),
which are the trace or realization of theories or critiques of these theories,
problematics, etc.; and in the institutionalized state, a form of objectification
which must be set apart because, as will be seen in the case of educational
qualifications, it confers entirely original properties on the cultural capital which
it is presumed to guarantee.
In a recent article on the intergenerational reproduction of cultural capital Kraaykamp and van
Eijck (2011) maintain that the distinction between the three states of cultural capital has often
been neglected in favour of a more selective pars pro toto conceptualisation that focusses on only
one of the three forms. In their own analysis of the interrelationships between the three types
across multiple generations of participants in the Family Survey in the Netherlands they find that
while the reproduction of cultural capital across generations is a universal phenomenon, the de-
20. On the origins of Bourdieu’s ambiguous use of cultural capital as a concept:
[I]n Bourdieu’s global theoretical framework, cultural capital is alternatively an informal academic
standard, a class attribute, a basis for social selection, and a resource for power which is salient as
an indicator/basis of class position. Subtle shifts across these analytical levels are found
throughout the work. This polysemy makes for the richness of Bourdieu’s writings, and is a
standard of excellence in French academia (Lamont 1987a). However the absence of explicit
statements makes systematic comparison and assessment of the work extremely difficult. (Lareau
and Lamont 1988: 156)
3. Subcultures or Cultural Omnivores?
47
gree of this transmission is different for each form of cultural capital (Kraaykamp and van Eijck
2011: 225). A similar point regarding the multi-facetedness of cultural capital is made by Bennett
et al (2009: 257), adding technical, affective, national and subcultural forms of cultural capital to
the list.
In the light of Kraaykamp and van Eijck’s and Bennet et al’s findings it appears fruitful to think
about the value of a conceptual differentiation between embodied, institutionalised and objecti-
fied cultural capital in the context of contemporary South African youth. Here, embodied cultur-
al capital could refer to what is commonly seen as the ‘proper’ way of carrying oneself (beha-
viours associated with the dominant classes) as opposed to physical expressions of being part of
a particular subculture, such as a particular way of walking or talking. For example, interview re-
spondents sometimes mentioned the walk of so-called ‘wannabe gangsters’, and others talked
about the slang that they were using instead of “proper English/Xhosa/Afrikaans”. Or, being
true to Bourdieu’s assertion that embodied cultural capital also takes “the form of long-lasting
dispositions of the mind”, one could make distinctions between those who prefer to listen to
Jazz and Classical Music opposed to others who are into Pop, Rock or Kwaito. Accordingly, em-
bodied cultural capital often goes hand in hand with a particular form of objectified cultural cap-
ital, for example in terms of clothing: neat and tidy shirts and chinos vs hip hoppers’ baggy pants
and branded T-shirts or skinny jeans and black shirts worn by emos.
By now the question arises: can Bourdieu’s intricate theory of how cultural capital constitutes the
dominance of the middle- and upper-classes in society be reduced to broad distinctions between
mannerisms and clothing styles of South African youth? And indeed, the distinctions described
above appear to be merely anecdotal and lacking the hierarchical element of Bourdieu’s class-
based analysis. The argument here is that class distinctions are indeed more opaque but nonethe-
less present among youth, and they become discernible if one takes the third, institutionalised,
form of cultural capital into the equation. In this regard the school remains the primary location
where institutionalised cultural capital is evident. There are clear class differences between
schools (with school fees being the simplest differentiator) as well as varying levels of adaptation
by children to the respective school conditions, as children of parents with a high level of instu-
tionalised cultural capital (i.e. children of parents with tertiary education and respective cultural
preferences) are more likely to feel at home in the elitist environment found at the supposedly
‘better’ schools. 
The hypothesis here is that some forms of embodied and objectified cultural capital correlate
with institutionalised capital. In other words: certain styles and fashions are more common at up-
per-class schools than at lower-class schools.
The reason for the lack of clarity around youth culture and cultural capital stems from Bour-
dieu’s treatment of youth in his work, or rather the lack thereof. In fact he has surprisingly little
to say about the tastes and cultural preferences of young people as he is first and foremost con-
cerned with class and social origin, which are both, in his framework, primarily correlated with
occupational categories which do not apply to school-going youth. This goes hand in hand with
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the transitional nature of youth itself; whereas Bourdieu is preoccupied with established and
fairly static types of distinction, different subcultures and adolescents’ allegiance to them have a
more fleeting character. Accordingly, the opacity of cultural capital in the reproduction of social
inequality is even more distinctive if one tries to find it among adolescents: Bourdieu measures
cultural capital in terms of the appreciation of ‘highbrow’ culture such as fine art and classical
music – visits to the opera, museums and art-galleries, for example – but such activities arguably
do not represent an appropriate yardstick in a contemporary assessment of youth tastes. Activit-
ies and preferences that do apply to the majority of adolescents South Africa and elsewhere –
e.g. popular music, fashion, going out, sports etc. – are classified as ‘lowbrow’ by Bourdieu, and
as such do not count towards cultural capital:
It is important to note in this context that we believe that lower class high status
cultural signals (e.g., being streetwise) perform within the lower class the same
exclusivist function that the legitimate culture performs in the middle and upper-
middle class. However, for the purpose of clarity, the term cultural capital is not
applied to these signals because they cannot be equated with the legitimate
culture. A new concept needs to be coined for these signals; “marginal high
status signal” is a potential candidate. (Lareau and Lamont 1988: 157)
An alternative description for “marginal high status is “subcultural capital”, coined by Sarah
Thornton (1995) in order to describe the transformative nature of cultural capital depending on
the situation. For example, as useful it is to know how to behave and talk ‘properly’ in a formal
setting such as a job interview, the same knowledge is useless in the context of a graffiti contest
where another form of (sub-)cultural capital (‘right’ way of talking, walking and dressing) is re-
quired. The concept of subcultural capital is highly evocative of Prudence Carter’s (2003: 138)
distinction between dominant and non-dominant forms of cultural capital, which arguably is par-
ticularly relevant in the context of youth:
The term “dominant cultural capital” corresponds to Bourdieu’s
conceptualization of powerful, high status cultural attributes, codes, and signals.
Cultural capital provides individuals with an ability to “walk the walk” and “talk
the talk” of the cultural power brokers in our society. Similarly, “non-dominant
cultural capital” embodies a set of tastes, or schemes of appreciation and
understandings, accorded to a lower status group, that include preferences for
particular linguistic, musical, or interactional styles. Non-dominant cultural capital
describes those resources used by lower status individuals to gain “authentic”
cultural status positions within their respective communities. Different, though
interconnected, these two forms of capital represent variable cultural currencies,
the benefits of which vary, depending upon the field in which the capital is used.
Given the described incompatibility between Bourdieu’s theoretical work and the context in
which it is being applied here, it is necessary to go beyond the low- and highbrow dualism in
Bourdieu’s conceptualisation and look for distinction within popular culture. In its original form
cultural capital implies a ‘highbrow’ form of cultural knowledge that one either acquires early-on
during childhood due to the ‘right’ upbringing or through other (usually monetary) means later in
life. Moreover, cultural capital is considered a currency that has real economic value as it eases
the access to economic and social capital, thus helping to reproduce patterns of inequality in
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society. Popular culture, on the other hand, does not qualify as highbrow and therefore, accord-
ing to Bourdieu, is not compatible with the tastes and cultural preferences of the dominant
classes in society. The point is that this conceptualisation of cultural capital is generally outdated
and certainly when it comes to the cultural preferences of teenagers in contemporary South
Africa. In this context one really needs to look at divisions within popular culture that carry dif-
ferent connotations – some are congruent with the tastes of the dominant class (or its offspring),
others are not.
An avenue for resolving the apparent contradiction between the old static lowbrow/highbrow
dichotomy and the fluid nature of young people’s cultural consumption patterns is to think along
the lines of acquired and mediated cultural preferences. The idea behind it is that while the dis-
tinction between what constitues lowbrow and highbrow in the context of contemporary youth
culture is increasingly difficult or even impossible to make, it is still worth distinguishing between
cultural preferences that are largely acquired through the “traditional” transmitters of cultural
capital – school and family – and those that are primarily adopted from the media or, more gen-
erally, the public sphere. This distinction is arguably less normative than the old lowbrow/high-
brow dichotomy, corresponds with the idea of subcultural capital (or non-dominant cultural cap-
ital) but at the same time continues to offer the possibility of distinguishing between forms of
cultural consumption in terms of their accessibility and availability depending on someone’s pos-
ition in the class hierarchy. The actual usefulness of the acquired/mediated conceptualisation will
be tested in the empirical chapters.
Any reconfiguration of cultural capital requires a rethinking of habitus. As with cultural capital
there is no singular definition of the concept by Bourdieu himself. In Distinction he focusses on
the function of habitus “(...) to produce classifiable practices and works, and the capacity to dif-
ferentiate and appreciate these practices and products (taste), that the represented social world,
i.e. the space of life-styles, is constituted.” (Bourdieu 2010: 166) More generally, habitus repres-
ents the capacity of the individual to simultaneously produce and distinguish between cultural
activities and it is principally formed through early socialisation at home and at school. To Reay
(2004), summarising the different ways in which Bourdieu himself employed habitus, it is a
multi-facetted concept: embodied, a form of agency, a compilation of collective and individual
trajectories as well as a complex interplay between past and present. Using her own earlier re-
search on the role of gender and race in the classroom as an example she makes the argument
that although Bourdieu himself focussed on social class his broader definition of habitus is “(…)
primarily a method for analysing the dominance of dominant groups in society and the domina-
tion of subordinate groups” (Reay 2004: 436) which encompasses race and gender alongside so-
cial class. Accordingly, instead of applying a static notion of habitus it is necessary to reconsider
its meaning in a particular research setting in all its manifestations. In its embodied form habitus
bridges the gap between the individual and society as it reveals the imprint of society onto the in-
dividual body in ways “of standing, speaking, walking and thereby of feeling and thinking”
(Bourdieu 1990: 70). In terms of agency Reay (Reay 2004: 433) warns the reader not to reduce
habitus to mere determinism as Bourdieu himself has emphasised that although habitus con-
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strains the possible range of actions and choices of the individual it does not prescribe the
strategies or principles behind them, leaving the door open to a good degree of uncertainty and
indeterminacy. And indeed, as the data presented later will show, individual taste and preferences
rank highly among young South Africans, and determinacy is maybe less obvious in the choices
of individuals but more in the structural consequences through the reproduction of social in-
equality. Reay (2004: 433) is even more specific by distinguishing between collective and indi-
vidual habituses, following Bourdieu’s own ambiguity regarding the uniformity as well as singu-
larity of habituses within a cultural grouping. Finally, Reay (2004: 433) points to the permeability
of habituses over time due to their links with individual histories. Family and school as the earli-
est forms of socialisation certainly lay the foundation for a habitus but later reconfigurations are
always possible depending on the current environment in which an individual finds her- or him-
self in. This is an important point with regard to the role of media consumption in the making of
habitus as influences from outside the individual’s immediate social environment become in-
creasingly more significant. This thesis is also an attempt to incorporate alternative forms of so-
cialisation, such as media consumption, in a contemporary and updated interpretation of habitus.
This point is further strengthened by Bennett et al (2009: 27), criticising Bourdieu’s insistence (at
least in Distinction – his later definitions of habitus became more flexible) that the appropriation
of tastes and distinctions, the forming of habitus, entirely depends on someone’s objective class
position: 
This denies the autonomous force of cultural trainings related to gender, ethnicity
and religion, and provides little scope for the capacity of trans-national cultural
flows to dismantle habitus that are defined in terms of their relations to classes
within a purely national conception of the social.
A second point of criticism by Bennett et al (2009: 27) concerns Bourdieu’s tendency to emphas-
ise “(...) those aspects of the tastes or patterns of cultural participation that most distuingish a par-
ticular class from other classes at the expense of other tastes or practices its members share with
members of those other classes.” In other words: the idea that particular forms of habitus can be
ascribed to entire population segments becomes increasingly untenable if one considers not only
the gaps but also the overlaps in the dispositions of groups defined by their position in the class
system. And again one can argue that this is especially true in terms of youth whose dispositions
fall primarily within the realm of popular culture.
The discussion of the applicability of Bourdieu’s work in contemporary South African and Brazil
also relates to the current debate on cultural omnivores, which divides the contemporary Bour-
dieu-influenced literature into two strands (see also Petev 2010); while more ‘conservative’
proponents of the homology theory distinguish between the qualitative cultural consumption of
lower- and upper-class, a large and growing body of sociological work suggests that the very idea
of class distinction – different taste preferences as a result of class hierarchy – is losing import-
ance as an increasing number of surveys on cultural activities show an inflation of so-called ‘cul-
tural omnivores’ in Western societies. Coined by Richard A. Peterson (1992; see also Peterson
and Kern 1996) in the article Understanding audience segmentation: From elite and mass to omnivore and
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univore, the term cultural omnivore describes a segment of middle- and upper-class, well-educated
individuals who consume large volumes of culture across a wide range of cultural activities and
outlets (opposed to less-educated ‘univores’, see Bryson 1997; Chan and Goldthorpe 2007).
Since then the idea of the cultural omnivore has been used and recycled in order to account for
the increasingly blurred dividing line between ‘highbrow’ and ‘lowbrow’ (Sullivan and Katz-
Gerro 2007; Bellavance 2008; Van Eijck and Lievens 2008; Garcia-Alvarez, Katz-Gerro and
López-Sintas 2007). Here, again, the question arises whether the ‘highbrow’/‘lowbrow’ dicho-
tomy can actually capture the kind of popular culture assumedly popular among teenagers – what
is high and what is low if one compares 50Cents with Alicia Keys? Yet while it is true that evalu-
ative conceptualisations of taste differences are losing significance (albeit perhaps not entirely),
the continued existence of taste differences in an absolute sense is arguably still valid. Also, the
observation that better-off individuals have a wider range of, access to, and consequently con-
sume more popular culture only supports the claims regarding the causal relationship between
class and cultural consumption and does not negate the basic proposition of an interrelationship
between social hierarchy and symbolic expression of status through cultural activities per se:
Moreover, the taste for varied cultural styles and forms, from soap opera to
opera, can itself be seen as a marker of cultural superiority and difference from
more restricted tastes and, therefore, another example of the persistence of
relations between culture and social stratification. Even omnivoric consumption
habits, in other words, adhere to a logic of distinction not least because the high
volumes of cultural consumption across a range of forms marks the omnivour as
culturally distinguished. (Chan and Goldthorpe 2004). (Prior 2005: 133)
Nonetheless, the cultural omnivore debate does bring up a number of issues of relevance to the
research questions posed in this thesis. The most crucial concerns the fact that although the ideal
measurement of ‘omnivouresness’ remains contentious, it is often just about the quantity of cul-
tural consumption, whereas questions about particular genres or types of popular culture are
usually left unattended. For this thesis, which puts emphasis on the role of race in youth culture,
the interesting question would be whether and to what extent a privileged social position enables
and encourages a young South African to adopt tastes outside of her or his immediate social and
cultural environment. In practice: is a child from a privileged background more likely to listen to
music associated with a different race group than its own? And is this relationship between race,
class and taste symmetrical or are those from one group more likely to change their tastes than
those of another group? And what would this mean for the perception of race and social status
in this particular case? For example: we might find that there is a considerable degree of overlap
in taste in American music among schoolchildren at more expensive, relatively diverse schools
regardless of someone’s racial (self-)classification but the question is whether this is also true for
local tastes, i.e. would a child from an Afrikaans background visiting one of Cape Town’s better
schools become a Zola (Kwaito/Hip Hop artist and TV celebrity) fan as easily as it might
become an Eminem fan? And would a black child from one of Cape Town’s townships visiting
the same school start listening to Kurt Darren (Afrikaans singer) or rather Mariah Carey?
Following the criticisms of cultural capital and habitus and the arguments made by the
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proponents of cultural omnivouresness the need for a reconfiguration of Bourdieu’s conceptual-
isation of cultural capital and habitus for the purposes of this study becomes self-evident. This
involves the inclusion of identity markers such as race and gender as identity markers alongside
class, a rethinking of the meaning of lowbrow and highbrow and the recognition that habitus is
not a fixed constant but open to varying influences from the media and gobal cultural flows.
When making this reconfiguration of Bourdieu’s theory it is worth remembering that Bourdieu
himself did not see it as a universal blueprint but as a conceptual toolbox which needs to be ad-
justed to each specific research situation. Diane Reay (2004) makes this point by citing Bourdieu
himself:
I blame most of my readers for having considered as theoretical treatises, meant
solely to be read or commented upon, works that, like gymnastics handbooks,
were intended for exercise, or even better, for putting into practice… one cannot
grasp the most profound logic of the social world unless one becomes immersed
in the specificity of an empirical reality. (Bourdieu 1993: 271 in Reay 2006: 339)
The two diagrams on the next page illustrate exactly how Bourdieu’s tools are put into practice
for the purposes of this thesis.21
21. Although Bourdieu probably would have never approved of a diagram portraying his intricate links between
social origin, class, habitus, taste and cultural capital as causal relationships, a simplified and visual depiction
helps to clarify the basic logic behind the suggested changes to his theory in order to make it work in the
context of contemporary South African youth culture.
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What does a structural approach add to the debates both on youth culture and social inequality
in South Africa? First of all there are Bourdieu’s concepts of cultural capital and habitus, as op-
posed to subculturalists’ Marxist notions of (dominant) mainstream and resistance, which signify
this thesis’ most fundamental rupture with the bulk of literature on South African youth culture.
Whereas the latter approach is responsible for a multitude of highly engaging and useful in-depth
studies of various sub-segments of South African youth, the former promises an account of the
structural interrelationships between sub-segments of South African youth culture without neg-
lecting the supposedly dominant mainstream in favour of an often romanticised subculture. This
paradigm shift also entails methodological consequences23; whereas the humanist tradition of cul-
tural studies has largely been focussing on in-depth, usually descriptive and/or qualitative ac-
counts of singular groups, a structural approach tries to capture as large a segment of the whole
population as practically possible through abstraction, typically by using social surveys. This form
22. Race and gender are understood as social constructs in the two diagrams. Whereas both are related to physical
characteristics (physical gender and phenotype) to more (gender) or less (race) extent, ultimately these only
become meaningful when they are recognised as such in a particular setting. The interpretation of their
meanings depends on the social position of the individual.
23. See subchapter 2.3 on page 22 for a detailed account of the methodology employed in this thesis. 
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of abstraction does not necessarily have to be undertaken without further contextualisation and
in isolation from qualitative underpinnings of the patterns found in the statistical analyses of sur-
veys (which is often the case with the strictly statistical analyses employed by many American
cultural sociologists), but can be done in fruitful synthesis with qualitative accounts of the re-
search object, as demonstrated by Bourdieu himself in Distinction (Holt 1997: 118).
But most importantly a Bourdieuan approach promises insights into the ways social inequality is
being reproduced through culture alongside historical and economical factors. This study aims to
fulfill this promise by putting cultural capital and habitus into practice in the context of South
African and Brazilian youth. With regard to cultural capital this is achieved by examining the re-
lationship between embodied and institutionalised cultural capital and by including race in the
analysis as a variable separate from, yet closely associated with class (chapter 6 on pages 106 to
153). As for habitus: what this study cannot do is to look at the role of the family in the making
of ‘distinctions’. Instead it offers valuable insights into the significance of media consumption,
which is usually treated as just another form of cultural preference but is here hypothesised to
play a crucial role in the making of habitus itself (chapter 7 on pages 154 to 184).
What then remains is to extend the examination of the cultural and social stratification of South
African youth by putting its results into a comparative perspective (chapter 8 on pages 186 to
214). Sometimes the topicality of the globalisation debate obscures the fact that cultural global-
isation often occurs unevenly due to large degrees of variability in access and cultural differences
in the local context. In this respect Bourdieu provides little help and the relevant debates on cul-
tural globalisation, homogenisation and glocalisation promise to offer better assistance.
3.3 The Extended View: Cultural Glocalization
Given the apparent universality of certain trends in popular culture, and particularly youth cul-
ture, comparative studies of the phenomenon continue to be surprisingly scarce. From a historic-
al perspective this might have at least partly something to do with the development of
(post-)subcultural theory as the precursor to contemporary studies of youth culture. Having its
roots partly in the critique of particular strands of American sociology as well as psychology and
being associated with one particular university in Britain, Birmingham, subcultural theory is a
quintessential British phenomenon. The social context of the early 1970s in which it was formu-
lated is crucial for understanding the CCCS authors’ emphasis on class in their analyses as this
time in Britain was marked by a sense of desperation on behalf of the struggling working class.
Thus for Hall, Hebdige and others, at least at the time, British youth culture was best explained
from within British society with little regard for global cultural flows that were either influencing
or influenced by British popular culture. This is also evident in the ethnographic data collected
by various subcultural theorists which is based on the descriptions of a few chosen subcultures
in selected cities in England. Despite these conceptual restrictions to the British context, subcul-
tural theory has assumed quasi-universal currency which is also visible in South African youth
studies where the term subculture is often used self-explanatory and indiscriminately with no or
only brief reference to the British focus of the CCCS, thus implying the existence of some sort
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of parallel between 1970s British and contemporary South African youth.
Post-structural critiques of subcultural theory, themselves to a large extent originating in
Manchester, are associated with a much stronger emphasis on the importance of locality and ac-
tual research carried out in local ‘scenes’ rather than trying to generalise large mass youth move-
ments through the concept of subculture. Also, the poststructural critics of the 1990s were much
more aware of cultural globalisation and how it influenced and was being influenced by local cul-
tural events. In regard to the heightened role of consumerism and commodification authors like
Bennett and Perterson noted the interplay between the local and the global as an exchange,
where youth would inscribe ‘local meanings’ onto global cultural phenomena (Bennett 1999;
Bennett and Peterson 2004).
This heightened sensibility towards global cultural flows, however, cannot deter from the fact
that most of the actual data on which post-structuralists base their arguments can only be fully
validated in the British context. In the 1990s this meant a fascination with the then new and bur-
geoning Rave and club culture that seemed to confirm all notions of a politically largely uninter-
ested, hedonistic and consumerist generation of youth. References, including full-fledged ethno-
graphic studies, to Rave and clubbing have been made in virtually every major publication on
British youth culture during the 1990s and early 2000s. And just as modernist subcultural theory
has been criticised for being biased towards British working class youth culture, so can postmod-
ern youth studies be argued to over-emphasise the importance of a hedonistic Rave and clubbing
lifestyle. Further, by presenting the act of clubbing and attending raves as the defining pastime of
British youth post-subculturalists fall into the same pitfalls of cultural elitism as subculturalists
before them; by equating Britain’s nightlife economy with its youth culture they are neglecting all
those who do not happen to be into raving and clubbing.
Structural studies of popular culture influenced by Bourdieu, too, rarely deal with cultural global-
isation or include comparisons between different localities. A recent welcome and important ex-
ception is Social Status and Cultural Consumption 2010, edited by Tak Wing Chan (2010), consisting
of a series of articles testing, in different countries (the United States, France, Chile, Hungary,
The Netherlands and England), three hypotheses on the relationship between social stratification
and cultural consumption: (1) individualisation (no or weak relationship), (2) ‘homology’ (con-
sumers of mass vs consumers of elite culture) and (3) ‘omnivore-univore’ (consumers of mass
and elite culture vs consumers of only mass culture) (Petev 2010: 1). The results show that in
most countries (The Netherlands and Hungary showing some divergence, but primarily among
the older population) the omnivore-univore hypothesis proves the most suitable one, but only
with the addition of two categories of cultural consumers: ‘paucivores’ (well-off individuals with
a limited range of cultural consumption) and ‘inactives’ (less privileged individuals who do not
engage in any form of cultural consumption apart from watching television). Further, Chan and
his colleagues could make the observation that habits of cultural consumption extend to other
social activities such as sports, self-education etc.
The fact that these observations apply to individuals from a range of different countries brings
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us to the actual point of contention in the debate on cultural globalisation; the theorisation of
cultural globalisation as a homogenising or heterogenising force. The first is associated with
Westernisation, Americanisation and cultural imperialism. It implies the notion of cultures as dis-
crete entities with definite spatial locations and a cultural exchange between ‘the West and the
rest’ which is largely unidirectional and associated with a sense of threat and loss of indigenous
traditions and ways of living (Schiller 1976; Tomlinson 1991; Ritzer 2000). The second is linked
to notions of hybridity, creolisation and ‘glocalisation’. It suggests an understanding of cultural
globalisation as a ‘global mélange’ – all that is local is in the process of being globalised and all
that is global is becoming localised, hence ‘glocalisation’ (Nederveen Pieterse 1995; Robertson
1995; Appadurai 1996; Hannerz 1996).24
While the homogenisation argument has lost popularity and the division between the two
strands has generally become increasingly blurred, both could easily be applied to the South
African context. Considering the omnipresence of ‘Western’ (that is European and American) in-
fluences in music, fashion styles, advertising and language in South Africa, and especially among
its youth, it is tempting to sympathise with the homogenising approach when thinking about the
impact of cultural globalisation there. Yet, taking a closer look at culture in South Africa and the
various changes it has undergone before and after the advent of colonialism, the ‘invention of
traditions’ (Hobsbawm 1988), engineered cultural segregation and other cultural flows from out-
side which not so much seem to penetrate but weave into the larger cultural fabric, one is in-
clined to agree with Roland Robertson, one of the first ‘glocalisation’ theorists:
[The nostalgic paradigm in Western social science] is a manifestation of the not
always implicit world view that suggests that we – the global we – once lived in
and were distributed not so long ago across a multitude of ontologically secure,
collective, ‘homes’. Now, according to this narrative – or, perhaps, a
metanarrative – our sense of home is rapidly being destroyed by waves of
(Western?) ‘globalization’. In contrast I maintain – although I can present here
only part of my overall argument – that globalization has involved the
reconstruction, in a sense the production, of ‘home’, ‘community’ and ‘locality’
(…). To that extent the local is not best seen, at least as an analytical or
interpretative departure point, as a counterpoint to the global. Indeed it can be
regarded, subject to some qualifications, as an aspect of globalization. (Robertson
1995: 30)
In the case of South African youth culture the ‘qualifications’ Robertson refers to are reflected in
the unequal access to media due to historic injustices, the national broadcaster’s implementation
of cultural diversity policies, the conscious choice of artists and audiences between more local or
global content and international media corporations’ well-calculated marketing strategies. The
image of a global mélange when writing about cultural globalisation should not divert from the
24. Although the debate on cultural globalisation only blossomed during the 1990s it is interesting to observe the
parallels to the youth (sub-)culture debate as both underwent the epistemological pendulum swing from
(neo-)Marxist critiques of neoliberalism (the “subculturalists” and “homogenists”) to postmodern celebrations
of the individual agency (the “postsubculturalists” and “heterogenists”) back to the middle where structural
constraints meet notions of plurality. 
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fact that much glocalised culture is conceived and controlled centrally as part of some or other
agenda and that the dissemination of these contents often occur universally or in very similar and
comparable circumstances in different locations. What is then required in order to get to grips
with these shared experiences of cultural globalisation in different parts of the world is to shift
the focus from singular localities to a more multi-sited and comparative approach, as it is done in
this thesis.
The comparison between the role of global popular culture in the remaking of young people’s
racial identities in South Africa and Brazil serves as a good example: young South Africans and
Brazilians grew up in highly racialised and unequal societies despite two almost diametrical his-
tories of race relations (Ribeiro 1995), resulting in a very strong public awareness of race in
South Africa and a much weaker one among Brazilians (Santos 2006). It is therefore interesting
to see that certain aspects of youth culture seem to play out in very similar ways in front of these
two somehow comparable, yet completely different backgrounds. So the following citation from
a relatively recent article on hip-hop in Brazil reminds one strongly of the literature on South
African hip-hop (see page 69):
The “making of race” in hip-hop culture involves becoming consciente
(conscious) and enjoying togetherness. While in the US scholars and rappers alike
have argued that hip-hop’s rearticulation of the “ghetto” is a central and essential
factor in the identity formation of “nigga” (…), in Brazil the centrality of
periferia has influenced the currency of preto, negro (both meaning “black”) and
more recently, mano (“brother”) as alternatives to traditional notions of
blackness in Brazil. (Pardue 2004: 257)
And in the conclusion:
The “hip-hop nation” is not a homogenous set of styles, ideas and practices. An
attention to mediation provides a better understanding of how social groups
“locate” diaspora and “reterritorialize” cosmopolitan expressive forms. (Pardue
2004: 278)
Accompanying the localisation of global trends are reports about recent shifts in the racial per-
ceptions of young South Africans and Brazilians which has been partly ascribed to global influ-
ences (Sansone 2003; Telles 2004: 101). Also, the glocalisation of Brazilian music styles abroad
and at home is well-documented (Magaldi 1999; Perrone and Dunn 2002). What the putting-to-
gether of these mosaic stones suggests, and what has been so poignantly described by Kjeldgaard
as Askegaard as “common structures of difference”, is a form of glocalisation which does indeed
incorporate the localisation of global trends (and vice versa) but at the same time acknowledges
the structuring power of global capitalism as socio-economic inequalities produce similar notions
of privilege and disenfranchisement. In other words: while cultural globalisation does not lead to
the complete annihilation of local particularities (South African Hip Hop still ‘feels’ different
from Brazilian Hip Hop) it does create comparable and compatible hierarchies and systems of
meaning in which race, class and social status play the crucial roles (e.g. Hip Hop understood as
the black voice from the periphery). Thus style and taste function as guides to the individual to
find her or his place in the immediate as well as global society: 
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In this globalizing era of rapid technologically mediated communication, we must
think of style as not only relevant to the construction of local identities and the
gaining of local status (as in Rose 1994, above); as not only a system of
distinction and aesthetics organized around locally relevant principles of value (as
in Irvine 2001); as not only the property of local speech communities or locally
situated communities of practice (as in much of the sociolinguistic and linguistic-
anthropological literature). Rather, we must also view style, as theorized by global
Hip Hop youth, as glocal distinctiveness, where members of the Global Hip Hop
Nation put style to use in order to distinguish themselves from adherents to
other possible styles in their local arenas as well as to simultaneously contrast
with and connect themselves to a global network of practitioners, each claiming
their “own style” (or what U.S. rapper KRS-One [1996: 60] refers to as a “my-
style” and a “your-style”). (Alim, Ibrahim and Pennycook 2009: 109)
A comparative study of taste, like the one presented here, provides us with the rare opportunity
to trace the transnational boundaries of the much spoken about “imagined communities”
(Anderson 1991) and their very concrete limitations in the form of structural contraints such as
the huge socio-economic inequality found in countries like South Africa or Brazil, which to large
degree determines the level of access to such communities. At least in the particular case of
South Africa it also opens up the debate about the true nature of cosmopolitan identities given
their exclusivity both in a symbolic and materialistic way. This is achieved mostly in chapter 8,
where the emphasis is on the comparison between the distribution of cultural capital among
South African and Brazilian school kids. This chapter also deals with the question to what extent
the other two parts – the racialisation of class distinction based on aesthetic taste and the role of
the media as the gateway and gatekeeper of cultural flows shaped by socio-economic inequality –
are the consequences of cultural globalization and signs of so-called “common structures of dif-
ference”. These do not necessarily imply complete cultural homogeny but rather localised ex-
pressions of a shared symbolic hierarchy with regards to social stratification and difference in a
wider sense, and especially in connection with racial discourse.
3. Subcultures or Cultural Omnivores?
59
4. Youth, Social Inequality and Race in Cape
Town and Belo Horizonte
While the preceding chapter dealt with the theory informing this thesis, the purpose of this
chapter is to present the empirical literature relevant to each of the three research questions. It is
therefore divided into three discrete sub-chapters. The first consists of a survey post-Apartheid
South African youth studies, further sub-divided into literature on race, class and schooling and a
more discoursive body of literature dealing with South African youth culture. The second traces
the history of racialised media segmentation in South Africa and describes how this segmenta-
tion persists today. The third sub-chapter describes the commonalities and differences between
South African and Brazilian race-thinking and provides a broad outline of the youth scene in
Belo Horizonte. 
4.1 Youth in Post-Apartheid South Africa
Race, Class and Schooling
In the journal article Beyond Heroes and Villains: The Rediscovery of the Ordinary in the Study of Childhood
and Adolescence in South Africa Jeremy Seekings (2006) traces the development of South African
youth studies since the 1970s. He argues that there has been a significant paradigm shift since the
end of apartheid as the earlier depiction of South African youth was defined by the highly politi-
cised environment of apartheid, in which academic (and public) interest in youth focussed first
and foremost on the images of young black South Africans as “heroes or villains” – freedom
fighters or tsotis (gangsters) – despite the lack of evidence that actual full participation in the
freedom struggle, as hero or villain, was overtly common among young South Africans (notwith-
standing the fact that the great majority of black youth was directly affected by apartheid and the
freedom struggle in some way or the other). Seekings argues that although “moral panics” por-
traying adolescents as either perpetrators or victims of crime, sexual violence, moral degenera-
tion etc. continue to surface from time to time, a burgeoning of youth-orientated surveys and
qualitative work on growing up in South Africa has resulted in a more factual and less agitated
concern with the actual challenges ordinary young South Africans face every day. A large part of
this work, especially the large scale panel surveys, is primarily concerned with ‘hard’ data on
young people’s health, education, living conditions and integration in the labour market, or what
Seekings (2006: 14) calls “the parameters of the social and economic lives of children and adoles-
cents.” But questions related to popular culture, taste and identity, including changes in racial at-
titudes, are usually dealt with in ethnographic studies (with the exception of experimental re-
search by social psychologists or economists), often conducted at schools.
The pioneering work in this respect is by Nadine Dolby (2001) who spent the year of 1996 at
Fernwood High (pseudonym) observing the teachers’ attempts to keep alive the school’s
white’middle-class image although the majority of students at the time was black and the remain-
ing white students coming from poor families. One of the key findings of her study is that al-
though students at Fernwood High refuse to define themselves and others according to old apar-
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theid categories and instead use references to cosmopolitan tastes and styles in music and
fashion, these new descriptors are just as much racialised.
Like clothing, musical taste is linked to collective, racialized identities. In general
terms, most Fernwood students would agree that Africans listen to rhythm and
blues, “slow” music such as Whitney Houston, some rap, and what is known as
“local” music, which is sometimes sung in Zulu, sometimes in English, or a
combination of the two. Coloured students’ (and in this case, coloureds’ and
Indians’ taste differs) musical tastes are similar to Africans, except for the
absence of local music. White music takes several trajectories, and includes rave,
heavy metal, “mellow” music like the Cranberries, and for a small minority of
white students, gangsta rap. (Dolby 2001: 72)
Dolby’s work is of special importance for this thesis not only because of its originality and relev-
ance ten years after its publication, but also because it is inspired by Bourdieu’s ideas around
taste, class distinction and habitus. Thus Dolby’s reasoning for approaching the thorny issue of
racial identities in South Africa from the angle of taste could also be used as a template for the
motivation behind this thesis:
By using Bourdieu’s idea of taste, I switch the focus away from the essences of
cultural identity, and towards what James Clifford (1988) refers to as the
“processes” of identity. Second, such essentialist cultural paradigms posit a
homology between a “people” and a “place”. Our ideas of culture are tied to
geography and to territory, even as we struggle to retheorize a world in which
these links are weakened (if they ever existed in a “real” sense). Taste, in contrast,
allows me to interpret race through a paradigm that is significantly more
deterritorialized. By using taste, I do not jettison the specific context of South
Africa and the cultural fields in which students maneuver. Instead, I mean to
signal that race is significantly (though never entirely) divorced from a specific
and narrow geographical place; instead, race is formed through the global/local
nexus of taste practices, which are then given life in the particular context of
Fernwood. (Dolby 2001: 16)
Dolby is not simply replicating Bourdieu’s studies in 1960s France at a high school in Durban;
instead she uses Bourdieu as a way to generalise the very specific, localised observations on race
dynamics at that school to the point that they can be understood as local expressions of a global
race/taste discourse. A crucial difference between Dolby’s work and this thesis lies in the meth-
odlogy and research design, with important consequences for the type of conclusions one can
draw from the respective research efforts. Dolby spent an entire year at a single school in Durb-
an precisely so she could observe the institutional dynamics between the school and the learners
using ethnographic methods. For this thesis the decision for the school as the research site in
was first of all a matter of logistics and feasibity in the pursuit of reaching large numbers of
youth in an organised setting for a survey (not taking into the account the qualitative methods
also used for this thesis). The difference in data produced by the two approaches falls within the
longstanding debate of qualitative vs quantititative research methods, which very briefly can be
described as the tension between depth and breadth of empirical data. As a result Dolby’s work
is arguably more susceptible to questions to what extent Fernwood High is exemplary of other
schools in South Africa while the research presented here is more geared towards describing
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broader patterns of othering but less their nuances in the lived experiences of South African
youth.
Subsequent school-focussed literature on South African youth identities rarely make the connec-
tion between local and global discourses of difference, at least not in such detail. For example,
Dawson (2003), in her dissertation on youth identities at a school in Johannesburg, makes very
similar observations as Dolby on racialised taste patterns among teenagers, here exemplified by
music preferences:
Learners also linked ‘race’ to music preferences. They were convinced that
certain ‘races’ like certain music genres. For example, in a discussion on fund-
raising activities, one of the respondents in Group A mentioned that part of the
entertainment was a boereorkes. The girls claimed that they didn’t feel as though
they fitted in and that ‘it chased all the coloureds and the blacks away.’ On a
similar note, during a discussion on the music played at the matric farewell, the
girls in Group E (African girls) claimed that ‘we [black learners] never get to
choose much.’ ‘And the music is white,’ added another girl. ‘Yes,’ agreed a third,
‘It’s just rave. Even if we have these sokkies, discos, whatever … ’ ‘Even if they
play our music,’ continued her friend, ‘it’s half a song and its [sic] ridiculous.
Then they just play one song or half a song and the rest of the night is boere
music’. By this, she meant any type of music that she assumed was enjoyed only
by white people, for example, rave and heavy metal, and not ‘boeremusiek’,
which is a specific type of music style. When probed about what was meant by
‘our music’, one of the girls answered, ‘house music, kwaito, R&B.’ (Dawson
2003: 89)
Dawson’s work echoes Dolby’s (and this thesis’) findings in that the interviewed schoolchildren
make racial distinctions based on music and fashion tastes, and not necessarily in political terms.
Unlike Dolby, however, Dawson does not attempt to embed her findings within the frameworks
of class distinction or the greater globalisation/glocalisation debate, which shall not distract from
its usefulness as a detailed and accurate account of the significance of popular culture in the re-
shaping of racial discourse in South Africa.
Similar is true for Jane Battersby’s (2004) study of non-white children at former Model C schools
(previously privileged under apartheid) in Cape Town, in which she concludes that the influx of
non-white students at these schools has not led to much racial desegregation and that non-white
students have to adapt to the cultural values of those schools which have remained largely un-
changed since apartheid25. Vandeyar (2008: 291), who carried out fieldwork at three desegregated
schools in Tshwane, comes to the same conclusion:
25. This and the following references dealing with interracial contact at schools are vaguely related to a body of
literature in social psychology which probes the applicability of the “contact hypothesis” (Allport 1954; see also
Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) at desegregated schools. The hypothesis is that intergroup contact on equal terms
reduces prejudice and promotes integration. As useful and insightful the relevant studies are (see, for example,
Journal of Social Issues 2010, volume 66, issue 2 on interracial contact in South Africa), numerous studies
presented in the remainder of this chapter and elsewhere (Erasmus 2010) contradict the applicability of the
hypothesis due to the historical imbalances of status engrained in race-thinking. The findings presented later in
this thesis only add to the skepticism as crucial markers of difference ultimately go beyond the sphere of
immediate contact and are at least partly determined by mediated impressions of taste and style.
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As appears to be the trend in the vast majority of desegregated schools in South
Africa, students are expected to adjust their outlooks and their identities, molding
themselves to the cast of the dominant culture. Consequently, this study found
that assimilation is still the dominant approach at schools (Carrim, 1998; Vally
and Dalamba, 1999). Essentially, students are expected to act and behave
‘‘white’’. Students wanting to ‘‘fit in’’ are placed under tremendous pressure to
confirm and be absorbed into the system.
The fact that in desegregated schools assimilation still means that non-white pupils are expected
to adapt to what is seen as white culture is highly relevant to this study as it poses the question to
what extent the perceived ‘whiteness’ is in fact a representation of a racialised understanding of
class, in which white indeed signifies the ‘upper’ classes. Drawing on a wealth of interview and
survey material collected throughout a 15-years period at schools primarily in Cape Town but
also Johannesburg and elsewhere, Soudien (2010) confirms the dominance of ‘whiteness’ at de-
segregated schools in South Africa, as implied in the title of his article The Reconstitution of Privilege:
Integration in Former White Schools in South Africa. Yet Soudien’s analysis, thanks to the abundance
of qualitative data at his disposal, manages to make fairly fine-grained distinctions between dif-
ferent strategies schoolchildren, white and non-white, employ in order to cope with the chal-
lenges of transformation and assimilation at desegregated schools, leading to a variety of “com-
plex identity formations” (Soudien 2010: 352) determined by race just as much as gender or
class.
Another study of schoolchildren in Cape Town (more specifically the Fish Hoek Valley outside
Cape Town) by Imke Gooskens (2006) is more optimistic about the changing nature of race at
mixed schools, asserting that “(…) in individual interactions and in talking about relations with
peers and friends of different backgrounds, young people strongly emphasise being the same,
‘wish away’ or ignore race as a factor in their lives, but simultaneously use racial name-calling in
subversive and humorous ways.” However, Gooskens acknowledges that structural challenges
such as spatial segregation and the lack of mobility, as well as the validity of racial discourse
among the parent generation puts limits to the children’s non-racial ideals. She emphasises that
racial differentiation among those children is not a carbon copy of apartheid racism, but is fluid
and open to reinterpretation (Gooskens 2006: 44).
Gooskens’ ethnographic work is in fact part of a larger long-term project dealing with adoles-
cents at three different locations in the Fish Hoek valley which culminated in the book Growing
Up in the New South Africa: Childhood and Adolescence in Post-Apartheid Cape Town (Bray et al. 2010).
The book, which is largely based on quantitative data – mostly from the Cape Area Panel Study
CAPS conducted by the University of Cape Town’s Centre for Social Science Research, CSSR) –
and rich ethnographic data obtained during a fifteen months fieldwork period in the neighbour-
hoods Masiphumele, Ocean View and Fish Hoek close to Cape Town, offers unique and multi-
facetted insights into ordinary young South Africans’ hopes, worries, problems and achieve-
ments. It also deals with the continuing salience of racial discourse among youth, occasionally by
reference to racialised class distinctions defined by style and taste:
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Darren lives in Fish Hoek and would be classified coloured, but actively tries to
dissociate himself from the behaviour of a group of ‘coloureds’ at school (who
are mostly from Ocean View and are considered ‘common’). He describes the
group as follows:
They walk with a bounce like in American movies, speak loudly, use a mix of lazy
English and kombuis Afrikaans, are disrespectful towards teachers, and think
they are cool, but generally act very immature. [Kombuis is Afrikaans for
‘kitchen’, in this case indicating a simplified, slang form of the language.] (Darren,
boy, aged 17, Fish Hoek)
Racial stereotypes are sometimes expressed in association, or even synonymously, with assump-
tions about someone’s socio-economic background, which, again, poses the question to what ex-
tent contemporary racial differentiation among South African youth can be divided from its geo-
graphical context and considered as a consequence of global capitalism. This theme is further
discussed in Bray et al’s (2010: 150) description of sites of consumption, e.g. the shopping mall,
frequented by the adolescents in the valley.
Teenagers across the research sites had clear ideas about which clothes shops
were to be avoided because they carry a certain class stigma, and in which ones
they aspired to shop. There were strong similarities in the brands and shops
favoured by all young people, suggesting a shared link with the broader world
beyond of modern urban youth. Yet this relationship with a wider consumer
culture is largely played out within existing peer networks from each community,
and independently of their peers from other neighbourhoods (although there are
some exceptions regarding tastes in fashion or music that arise in the context of a
mixed school environment; see below). Young people’s abilities to fulfil
aspirations to buy and wear these goods are, of course, tied to economic means.
Unsurprisingly, middle-class children shopped much more frequently and
extensively with their parents and on their own. The fact that a number of very
poor children alluded to their discomfort at being among attractive goods that
they could not afford suggests that consumption habits served to reinforce
boundaries between children from different neighbourhoods. On Fish Hoek
Main Road, patterns of consumption separate the spaces that young people use.
Young residents of Masiphumelele and Ocean View tend to frequent the
supermarket and games shops at one end of the high street, whereas middle-class
children are to be found in the banks, boutiques and cafes at the other end.
Bray et al directly address the consequences of economic inequality on consumption patterns and
use of public space reinforcing class divides between youth. But they are quick to point out that
matters of taste are not merely a function of social stratification, but “largely played out within
existing peer networks from each community”. This observation is as important as it is accurate
and poses a substantial challenge to any examination of taste patterns, since peer effects are diffi-
cult to operationalise and measure. Furthermore it can be argued that peer networks, at least in
the South African context, are defined by spatial and social constraints, so they too ultimately
only reflect the more general divisions found in South African society. Nonetheless, the observa-
tion serves as a crucial reminder that generalisations about taste seldom exactly match the actual
preferences of individuals (or close networks of individuals for that matter), but that shall not
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distract from the fact that general trends related to social stratification (i.e. gender, race, ethnicity
and class) do exist. It also underlines the need for more sophisticated analyses of data on taste
suited for understanding the exchange of preferences through networks.
In their discussion of racialised consumption patterns Bray et al also look towards the possibility
of consumption as the birthplace of a shared identity in the sense of a common (middle-)class
consciousness adopted by young South Africans regardless of their cultural backgrounds. Here
they refer to Lucert Nkuna’s (2006) research at the The Zone, the youth-orientated section of
the Rosebank shopping mall in Johannesburg, where she follows up on an earlier study by Sarah
Nuttall (2004) on Y-Culture. Following her own qualitative research (observation and interviews)
over an extended period and a survey with 212 participants, Nkuna comes to a number of in-
triguing findings. In her conclusions she manages to identify a common middle-class identity
which transcends racial and gender divisions:
The Zone is emblematic of the new South Africa. It could not possibly have
existed before 1994. Here, blacks and whites now have friendships based on
equality, and, for the most part, men treat women with respect. The culture is
also about age. The Zone youths are a generation that have grown up together in
the post-apartheid era. Whilst the new culture is racially and gender inclusive, it is
also, in particular, class exclusive; the culture of a relative thin layer of late teens
and early twenties. What distinguishes these multi-racial, middle-class, male and
female youths is identification with Model C English, R&B music and relatively
costly brands. These signifiers include and exclude, carving out The Zone
identity. Americanised, global youth culture provides ready-made signifiers, but
South African inflexions – especially in fashion – can add to local and, more
particularly, black self-confidence (and, since fashion is gendered, specifically
black female pride). Globalisation is implicated in the identity of The Zone, both
through the range of cultural options it provides and through the inequalities it
intensifies. (Nkuna 2006: 999)
But despite noticing a sense of a shared identity among the kids frequenting the mall, Nkuna
makes sharp observations on the fine intricacies of taste distinctions between different groups of
kids at the mall, both in terms of class and race, at other points in the article:
An interesting development has been the advance of two subcultures, at least
among the young men. These are the ‘amabourgeois’ and the ‘amatsatsatsa’, with
the latter probably a reaction to the former. ‘Amabourgeois’, which predominates
The Zone, is seen as a white thing, as ‘expensive’, so is probably only a conscious
style among the black and coloured youth. There are some Indian amabourgeois,
but they do not try to get attention by the way they dress like black and coloured
youth. The amatsatsatsa are keen followers of fashion, but are not ‘high class’
people, or do not wish to appear so, avoiding expensive brands. (Nkuna 2006:
1001)
The point here is not to prove some form of inconsistency or contradiction in Nkuna’s writing –
in fact her work stands out as one of the most detailed and accurate depictions of South Africa’s
consumerist middle-class culture – but to reiterate the complex entanglement of race and class
consciousness in contemporary South Africa. There is no doubt that a shared class identity is
helping young South Africans to see their commonalities, yet, as the continuing salience of race
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in formally desegregated places attests to, it is at times the class identity itself which is seen as ra-
cialised (i.e. ‘middle-class being a white thing’) and exclusive. Moreover, as Nkuna points out,
today’s youth identities are no longer the product of purely South African contestations but a
conglomeration of local and global influences.
Another attempt at grasping the complexities of growing up in post-apartheid South Africa,
Crain Soudien’s (2007) Youth Identity: Schooling, Culture and the Making of Youth Identity in Contempor-
ary South Africa, recognizes the importance of globalization in the making of post-apartheid youth
identities through “cultural borrowing and adapation” as well as “individualism”. In combination
with individualism, adaptation does not mean the mere copying of European or American
trends, but the agency of the individual to blend these international trends with local ones into
“new ways of being South African”. But Soudien also recognizes that the specific social circum-
stances in South Africa make it generally easier for white youth to ‘play’ with these new identities
than for their black peers – a crucial point as this thesis’s findings on unequal accesses to global
cultural flows will show. Thus Soudien (2007: 38) is careful not to simply conflate global and loc-
al discourses of difference but to evaluate local identities in the light of multiple, including global,
sources.
We would make a grave mistake to see South African youth simply as southern
versions of their globalized cousins in the UK and the USA. We would also be
mistaken to see them as card-board cut-outs on the landscape of South Africa’s
racial history.
Soudien’s concern about contemporary South African youth understood merely as an offshoot
of European and American popular culture is justified given the tendency in much public debate
to portray South African youth as passive consumers of American Hip Hop, RnB, movies and
television series. Nonetheless, as Soudien agrees, it is necessary to acknowledge and identify the
mediated global influences in their identity make-up. In this respect, studies on particular South
African ‘subcultures’, often associated with a particular racial group, prove to offer a fresh
perspective.
Melissa Steyn’s (2001) Whiteness Just Isn’t What It Used To Be offers an interesting perspective on
the pervasiveness of the association of whiteness with dominance. While the book is primarily
concerned with a very specific aspect of race-thinking and only very peripherally (if at all) with
youth culture, consumption or class and does not contain a single reference to Bourdieu it
provides a solid understanding of the historical and ideological foundations of the perceived nor-
mality of white privilege that, one could argue, is also evident in the racialised class hierarchies
described in this thesis. Steyn achieves this by first outlining the historical roots of a white “mas-
ter narrative” that developed primarily through the contrast with and ultimately the dehumanisa-
tion of “the other” in the course of colonialism. The main part of the book, however, is a collec-
tion of various sub-narratives of white South African identity in post-apartheid South Africa.
Thus, by revealing the heterogeneity, constructedness and unevenness of whiteness, she manages
to unmantle its monolithicity and, ultimately, supposed naturalness. At the same time she opens
herself up to criticism that her presentation of “ideal-types” of white discourse helps to normal-
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ise the very narratives behind them, thus limiting the exploration of alternative forms of white
identities on an individual level:
Steyn as well as Nakayama and Krizek pointedly discusses the danger of
discursive overdetermination, and yet in the very act of drawing together general
lines of discursive confluence, based on valid and fairly extensive fieldwork, the
conditions are necessarily created for exclusion. The analytical move is from a
general theory of the origins of whiteness (in the case of Steyn especially), to
particular and variable examples of whiteness, and then back to a more general
mapping of the terrain based on groupings of the particular. My problem with
this procedure, rich and revealing as it is, remains that such general mapping
tends to become a function of its own supra-narrativity, perhaps to some extent
at the expense of the more variable narrativity of the particular in its own domain
before and beyond the capture and rewriting of particular narratives in the larger
act of mapping. (de Kock 2006: 185)
de Kock’s point serves a good reminder to always remember the fragility and complexity of stud-
ies of identity, be it through discourse analysis as in Steyn’s case or in an empirical study such as
this one.
Youth Culture
The racialisation of South African youth culture, understood within the context of cultural glob-
alization, is neither a new nor particularly uncommon phenomenon, if one takes into account the
large body of social-anthropological work on urbanisation and Africans’ (selective) appropriation
of western culture during the industrialisation period in Southern Africa. An early and classic ex-
ample is Monika Hunter’s monograph on the influence of Western culture on township dwellers
in 1930s urban East London which repeatedly refers to the growing significance of European
and American culture and the disappearance of ‘tribal’ culture:
There is little Native dancing. …Young people gather in private houses,
particularly on Friday and Saturday evenings, for parties, but here European fox
trots [sic] were more often performed than the old Bantu dances. And the music
is European and American ragtime. About the street one more often hears
ragtime hummed than an old Bantu song. (Hunter 1936: 127)
East London deserves a special mention due to the depth of social-anthropological and sociolo-
gical research conducted there (Reader 1960; Mayer 1961; Pauw 1963; Ntsebeza 1994; Bank
2006), but the significance of American and particularly black American influences on township
youth during apartheid is also well-documented for other locations such as Soweto (Glaser 2000)
and Sophiatown (Coplan 1985; Hannerz 1994; Nixon 1994) in Gauteng and the Cape Flats in
Cape Town (Wilson and Mafeje 1967; Ngcokoto 1989; Gainer 2000). The preoccupation of aca-
demics with the Westernisation of African identities, in its worse forms uncomfortably reminis-
cent of the colonial fascination with the contact between ‘European civilisation’ and ‘African
primitivity’, took a turn when white supremacy in South Africa ended and academics discovered
that “whiteness just isn’t what it used to be” (Steyn 2001) and being coloured is not less a vulner-
able position after the end of apartheid (Erasmus 2001; Adhikari 2005).
Still, the first wave of post-apartheid literature on ‘new’ subcultures concerned mostly the
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Kwaito movement. Commonly understood as the sound that accompanied South Africa’s dis-
covery of a national discourse which went beyond the trenches of apartheid logic, Kwaito em-
bodies the antithesis of the heavily politicised atmosphere of the apartheid years, in that it meant
the celebration of freedom and hedonism, and the reinterpretation of the urban peripheries, the
townships, as sites of cultural innovation and ‘coolness’. As such it is usually, and sometimes
negatively, stylized as the triumph of commercialism and materialism over ideology among the
first generation of young black South Africans who experienced their formative years without
having to fight against the oppressive laws of the previous regime. But despite kwaito’s focus on
fun and having a good time a (relatively small) number of Kwaito songs deal with the legacy of
apartheid in terms of racism (e.g. Kaffir by Arthur Mafokate) or the challenges of growing up in
the townships (e.g. Mdlewembe by Zola). In the same vein it would be misleading to automatically
dismiss Kwaito as music without meaning because of its general focus on beats instead of lyrics
(Peterson 2003; Mhlambi 2004; Allen 2004), or to locate it merely in the post-apartheid period
without making references to its roots in marabi dance, mbaqanga and bubblegum music (Boloka
2003). While it is necessary to acknowledge the musical complexity of Kwaito and of its meaning
in the lives of black urban youth during the 1990s, it is undeniable that this post-apartheid gener-
ation was more prone to consumerism than their parent generations, especially from the late
1990s onwards. Part of this development was an opening-up to foreign, especially US or West-
ern, influences, which are evident in the music (House and Hip Hop), fashion (streetwear) and
language (urban lingo), making it at once a truly cosmopolitan and distinctively South African
phenomenon. Another sign for the paradigm shift in the cultural, especially musical, sector that
occurred during the 1990s was a process of intensifying commodification and commercialisation,
exemplified by the way in which one of the first Kwaito groups, Boom Shaka, was assembled by
music producer Don Laka in 1993 in a similar fashion as British and American boy groups at the
time. A further example is the emergence and growing success of Gauteng radio station YFM
and associated youth magazine YMag which captured the spirit of Kwaito and gave it a name –
Y Culture (Nuttall 2003; 2004; 2008). Young South Africans’ insouciance at embracing the non-
values of consumerism and materialism has been poignantly noted by Gavin Steingo (2005: 351)
in the article South African Music after Apartheid: Kwaito, the ‘‘Party Politic,’’ and the Appropriation of
Gold as a Sign of Success in which he points to the inversion of gold as a symbol of oppression to
one of success in the imagery and lyrics of Kwaito. A more positive reading of the consumerist
inclination of South African black youth is presented by Bhekizizwe Peterson (2003: 210).
For one, the preoccupation with consumption can be interpreted as an
acceptance of the larger societal ethos that informs many South Africans of
different backgrounds and ages. Alternatively, even in its most nihilistic forms,
the celebration of consumption in black youth may attest to their courage and
commitment not to give in to the conditions of poverty and strife found in the
townships. The success of many artists, actors and soccer stars affords them a
measure of upward social mobility, a change in class and status that many find
difficult to negotiate.
Material wealth becomes a symbol for success and “upward social mobility” in a time when
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poverty is rife but expectations are high. Ideological battles of the past give way to the consensus
of consumerism – yet consumerism itself is usually stylized and comes in different flavours and
colours.
But the rise of consumerism does not go unchallenged in the new South Africa as another strand
of literature dealing with Hip Hop is witness to. Following the example of US American Hip
Hop, local Hip Hop started at the fringes of society and urbanity in the early 1980s where black
youth were looking for a way to vent their anger and frustration with being disadvantaged in an
unfair and unequal society. In this case “black” was the racial identity deliberately chosen by
those early rappers in the Cape Flats – according to apartheid’s crude categorisation they would
have been considered coloured. Hip Hop provided members of bands such as Prophets Of Da
City and Black Noise to distance themselves from a perceived illicit partnership between the col-
oured population and the white regime and to align themselves with the Black Consciousness
Movement. The 1990s saw the expansion of popular Kwaito artists such as Zola and Bongo
Muffin into Hip Hop territory and today genuine Hip Hop crews such as ProKid and
Driemanskap are successfully rapping in the African vernacular in order to reach a large and
growing audience of fans who appreciate the depth, sincerity and relevance of much local Hip
Hop.
But despite South Africa’s strong tradition of so-called conscious Hip Hop, the controversy
about hip hop’s role as an effective agent for the perceived Americanisation of South African
youth continues to simmer at the surface of much public debate. The negative perceptions of
Hip Hop are at once acknowledged and challenged by Adam Haupt (2008: 392) who has written
extensively on South Africa’s, and especially Cape Town’s, Hip Hop scene over the years:
However, black urban youth’s fondness of African American popular culture and
counter-cultures developed within the broader context of the rise of US cultural
imperialism. In the years that preceded the decline of apartheid, the SABC
shifted from offering just one TV channel to presenting its viewers a choice of
three TV channels: TV1, TV2 and TV3. While these channels seemed to be
interpellating viewers along the lines of language, race and culture, what is more
significant for the purposes of this chapter is that SABC programming made use
of a large amount of US content. By the late 1980s, viewers watched a range of
shows, such as Solid Gold, Fame, The Cosby Show, Miami Vice, Wiseguy,
Spencer For Hire, A Man Called Hawk, The Tracy Ullman Show, Cheers, Hill
Street Blues, Knight Rider and Magnum PI, to name a few. In an informal
discussion I had with former POC MC and producer Shaheen Ariefdien, he
recalled that a similar pattern was emerging in the time that he spent in the
former apartheid homeland Bophuthatswana (with his musician father Issy
Ariefdien). The homeland’s TV and radio programming offered consumers an
impressive range of entertainment that was mostly obtained from the US. His
way of making sense of these changes in South Africa, which had introduced TV
programming only in the late 1970s, was that the apartheid government was
dazzling its citizens with US entertainment while the townships burned; in short,
it was offering citizens spectacle as a means of diversion. At the same time, the
previously isolated apartheid state was now also giving viewers a glimpse of less-
restricted societies abroad as well opening the door to US cultural imperialism.
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In the article Haupt goes on to further problematise the growing influence of American Hip
Hop on young South Africans’ gender roles, as young men are increasingly adopting the macho
tough men attitude of famous gangster rappers. In his book Stealing empire: P2P, intellectual property
and hip-hop subversion (Haupt 2008: chapter 5) he contrasts these hegemonic depictions of mas-
culinity with the critical feminism of local Hip Hop crew Godessa, making the point that Hip
Hop can offer a vehicle to educate young South Africans about local issues despite (and perhaps
also because of) its association with the bling-bling trope found in its commercial strain. The the-
oretical assumptions and implications of Haupt’s work (discussed on page 44) aside , his rich and
detailed account of the local Hip Hop scene offers intriguing insights into the ambiguity and
ambivalence in South African youth studies which is often encountered at the junction of sup-
posedly local authenticity and global homogeneity. This is also the impression taken from Gary
Pritchard’s (2009: 54) discussion piece Cultural imperialism, Americanisation and Cape Town hip-hop
culture, which he concludes as follows:
As hip-hop culture makes increasing inroads into popular culture worldwide, it is
easy to overlook, or discount altogether, the importance of local cultural forms,
an interrogation of which is necessary when exploring questions of
Americanisation or cultural imperialism. My experiences have convinced me that
hip-hop cannot be viewed simply as an expression of American culture and, in
Cape Town at least, it takes on new meanings and provides a platform for local
expression.
But Hip Hop is not a prominent subject only because of its transnational relevance (see also
Bennett 1999; Osumare 2001), but also, in the South African context, because of its popularity
among coloured youth. This phenomenon has been discussed, among others, by Daniel Ham-
mett (2009: 413) in Local beats to global rhythms: coloured student identity and negotiations of global cultural
imports in Cape Town, South Africa:
Coloured students professed their liking for hip-hop because of the style and
‘bling’ culture associated with it. They also drew on narratives on urban
maginalisation in rap lyrics to claim commonalities of experience. Within these
processes, black American musicians are being consumed and claimed in certain
ways by coloured youth that render race as ambiguous. Black Americans are
conceived of differently to black South Africans – the tensions around
marginalisation and un-entitlement expressed against the black majority in South
Africa (Hammett 2008) are passively invoked in coloured student’s claims on
narratives of urban marginalisation in black American popular culture.
Hammett’s observations are a perfect example for the intricacies of South African youth’s racial
identities; coloured kids identify with the discourses of aspiration portrayed in American Hip
Hop apparently in the same fashion as black youth celebrate consumerism and materialism as a
way out of the “ghetto” (township). At the same time there is an emphasis on the discourse of
marginalisation inherent in the “ghetto” imagery, expressing a real sense of being disadvantaged
in the face of black political and white economic dominance in contemporary South Africa (Bat-
tersby 2003).
Given the relative wealth of literature on Kwaito and Hip Hop, the tastes of young white South
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Africans are fairly underrepresented in current youth studies. Dolby (2001), drawing on her field-
work at Fernwood High, discusses young white South Africans’ identities and taste preferences
in a separate journal article in which she proposes that they are best understood through a global
image of whiteness:
While whiteness is often analysed as a phenomenon that is contained within the
nation (Giroux, 1997; McCarthy et al., 1997; Hage, 1998), here the nation is
abandoned [10]. Instead, the framework for interpreting whiteness both refuses
and stretches beyond the nation-whiteness is able to reposition itself as part of a
global whiteness that promises the power and privilege unavailable within the
confines of the nation [11].
For white Fernwood youth, the only way to rescue a sense of a ‘white’ self is to
connect to whiteness outside of South Africa's border-specifically to the global
flow or ‘scape’ (Appardurai, 1996) of white popular culture that unites white
youth around the world. These desires for escape, for breaking the bonds and
bounds of blackness, manifest themselves in the limited public arenas of the
school where students have outlets for expression. Cultural practices, below I
discuss the example of the school fashion show, become a way for white students
to assert a collective racial self that attempts to burst out of the blackness in
which it feels encased.
The notion of a “global image of whiteness” is popular in recent works on white South African
identity. It has been discussed in detail by Melissa Steyn (2001) in her book Whiteness just isn’t what
it used to be: white identity in a changing South Africa and is also a common theme in Soudien’s (2007;
2010) work on South African youth. Gary Baines (2008: 110), in a book chapter on popular mu-
sic and whiteness in South Africa, contextualises the notion of a global image of whiteness in the
music tastes of white South Africans and somewhat qualifies it by distinguishing between Engl-
ish and Afrikaans speakers:
Music, then, is capable of creating and reinforcing an awareness of shared
experience among individuals irrespective of their geographical location. Thus
English-speaking listeners living in apartheid South Africa were able to affirm an
identity which was not ‘first and foremost South African’ (Muller, 1997: 8). They
were able to imagine themselves as part of a world-wide Anglophone community,
differentiated from white English-speakers elsewhere only by virtue of the fact
that they happened to be resident in South Africa. Many white Afrikaans-
speakers, especially amongst the youth, also listened to Anglo-American popular
music. But not all whites identified with Europe or regarded themselves as being
rooted in that continent. Their heritage tied them to Africa and this did not
prompt a sense of cultural inferiority. In fact, some whites took pride in music
performed and produced by South African artists and identified with their music.
The stark contrast between supposedly black, coloured and white tastes, and especially music
tastes, depicted here shall not detract from transformative and integrative potential of music in
post-apartheid South Africa. For example, Christopher Ballantine (2004), in Re-thinking ‘whiteness’?
Identity, change and ‘white’ popular music in post-apartheid South Africa, chronicles the success of white
musicians from Johnny Clegg to Syd Kitchen and Koos Kombuis who either completely adopt
neo-traditional African music styles, incorporate stylistic elements in their music or use language,
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both in terms of lyrical content and dialect, in order to overcome old barriers between racially
defined music styles. More recent examples coming to mind are the Folk/Afropop group
Freshly Ground, afrorockers The BLK JKS from Johannesburg, and Rave/Hip Hop success
story Die Antwoord. But Ballantine (2004: 112) also recognises that some bands are rather naive
(to the point of sheer ignorance) in their attempts at incorporating the “African exoticism” in
their songs:
More problematic yet is the unashamed ethno-tourism – voyeurism by another
name – of the largely white audiences that patronise some of the offerings at a
festival such as Rustler’s Valley. Sound Journey (ca. 1999) is a record of one of
those events: it presents black South African ‘pre-colonial’ music as romantically
exotic, linking it implausibly to markers of ‘primitive’ music (panpipes,
didjeridoos) from elsewhere in the world, and exploiting it for the entertainment
of modern, global, middle-class sensibilities.
Other groups, Ballantine (2004: 113) notes, shed their South African identity altogether:
Fourthly, just as some South African whites think of themselves as somehow
‘American’ or ‘British’, so too do some popular-music groups shape themselves
according to foreign sounds and images. For instance, Just Jinger’s Something for
Now (1998) is clearly rooted in US rock and valorises ‘jumpers, coke, sweet Mary
Jane’; Sugardrive’s Sand Man Sky (1997) is a grunge album; while Amersham
(1998, 2000), Tree (1999) and Point Sirens (1999) all decisively orient themselves
towards The Beatles – and, in the case of Point Sirens, towards Crosby, Stills and
Nash as well.
These examples show that musical hybridity is not yet considered an entity in itself, in the sense
that essentialised notions of what constitutes black or white music continue to persist and a cros-
sover between the two is still seen as exactly that. To a large extent this has something to do with
South Africa’s particular history, the bluntness and intensity of social engineering at the roots
and heart of its society. But there is also another dimension to it, one informed by global capital-
ism and a globally shared class imagery which finds its expression, for example, as “ethno-tour-
ism” in the “modern, global, middle-class sensibilities” described by Ballantine. However, on the
local level, these shared sensibilities do not necessarily manifest themselves uniformly but rather
help to further define and accentuate the fault lines between separate identity groups in South
Africa, as evident in the three major discourses of identity commonly associated with South
African youth today and briefly touched on in the preceding paragraphs: aspiration, marginalisa-
tion and escape. The first, aspiration, refers to the triumph of consumerism and materialistic de-
sire among the post-apartheid generation. Although often, and perhaps rightfully so, portrayed as
a sign of the demise of idealistic imaginations of South Africa rising beyond the pragmatic, and
maybe short-sighted, logics of modern capitalism, it can also be interpreted as a move away from
the painfully political era of apartheid and as an expression of the hopes and dreams this trans-
ition has brought to places where there were none before. Accordingly, these hopes and
dreams – cast in images of material wealth – are to be found in the Kwaito and Hip Hop videos
played late at night on national television. The flipside of aspiration, however, is disillusion-
ment – a feeling expressed by many, often coloured, youth who feel betrayed and marginalised
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by the post-apartheid governments and seek recognition in the angry contempt for mainstream
society expressed in Hip Hop – either by embracing the gangster imagery and symbolism of
mostly American Gangster Rap or the political consciousness of mostly local Hip Hop. In con-
trast, white South African kids often have no qualms about adopting a firmly middle-class iden-
tity – as long as it is framed within a global image of whiteness where Africa only has a place in
the realm of exoticism and the “ethno-tourism” described by Ballantine.
Although these admittedly rather coarse depictions of South African youth seem to be merely
discursive and based primarily on sentiments and vague ideas of race and class consciousness
rather than facts, it is one of the main intentions of this thesis to ground these discourses in ob-
jective observations on structural inequality which is assumed to qualify and determine access to
different cultural flows – for example and most importantly through the media. The following
section provides an overview of the historical origins of South Africa’s notoriously segmented
media sphere which continues to be segmented not despite but also because of global trends in
media broadcasting.
4.2 Media Segmentation in South Africa
“Whenever I switch on the TV I see apartheid.” – This line by Cape Town comedian Nik Ra-
binowitz is remarkable. Because what he means is not the dark legacy of the old South Africa
casting its shadow on today’s news through stories of poverty, crime and HIV. Instead he is re-
ferring to the fact that one can usually watch the evening news simultaneously in at least three di-
fferent languages followed either by a hip Kwaito show recorded in Soweto, an Afrikaans slap-
stick comedy or an American action movie with Steven Seagal. The results presented in chapter
7 show that the punch line is not far from reality – at least the teenagers included in the survey
seem to make their choices what to watch on television largely according to ethnic and linguistic
characteristics. Yet media segmentation is not a new phenomenon nor is it specific to South
Africa. To a large extent it is the result of the increasing commercialisation of the public sphere,
the commodification of popular culture and the establishment of transnational target audiences
sharing similar taste patterns. Nonetheless the history of public broadcasting in South Africa
helps to understand the findings presented in this thesis and puts them into a more meaningful
context, as it highlights and illustrates the issues of inclusion and exclusion in terms of media
access.
The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) was established in 1936, based on the
same principles as the British Broadcasting Corporation (and various other public broadcasters
throughout the Commonwealth). The ideals behind the ‘Reithian’ principles (named after their
author Sir John Reith) are national unity and public education, meaning that public broadcasting
in South Africa, just like in Britain, needed to be universally accessible in order to establish a
single public sphere and instill normative values in society. However, the way these principles
were applied in practice stands in stark contrast to their inclusivity, as only English- and
Afrikaans-speaking (white) South Africans were considered full citizens and thus to be part of
the united nation in the making – African languages or the concerns of black South Africans
were not taken into account in the broadcaster’s programming. This fatal flaw in SABC’s set-up
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was to be exploited by the National Party government under apartheid when racial segregation
was increasingly formalised and institutionalised. The bias towards Afrikaans in national broad-
casting and the restriction of African languages almost exclusively to regional stations serving the
so-called homelands were not merely a reflection of apartheid and its divisive policies but were in
fact crucial and effective tools in achieving the apartheid ideal of racial segregation. In his semin-
al paper The Constant Companion of Man: Separate Development, Radio Bantu and Music Charles Hamm
(1991) is making some discerning observations on the austerity in the public broadcaster’s deci-
sion for separate broadcasting. According to Hamm, the first wave of Rock’n’Roll in the late
1950s was seen as a threat to the morality of young white South Africans by the conservative
press, the apartheid government and the Afrikaaner church (Nederdruits Gereformeerde Kerk),
and all potentially ‘corrupting’ music was to be banned from SABC. Nonetheless, by the
mid-1960s the most popular radio station among young white South Africans was the
Mozambican LM which played all the ‘bad’ music the conservative government did not want
white South African youth to hear.
The SABC intervened on the cultural level by refusing to play certain types of
contemporary popular music, on grounds that ‘a high proportion of [it] is morally
unacceptable’ (AR 1967, p. 32), and by offering in its place ‘something more than
mere beat music . . . in harmony with and linked to a constantly growing desire in
young people nowadays for programmes of a more serious kind’ (AR 1966, p. 6),
always in keeping with the ideology of Separate Development. Taking as a guide
its own position that ‘our broadcasting service for Europeans must emphasise…
our two different cultures and languages’ (AR 1959, p. 4), the SABC developed
separate strategies for its ‘white’ services. (Hamm 1991: 155)
In contrast, the so-called Bantu stations were considered to cater for the tastes of the black pop-
ulation. In practice this meant a lack of educational programmes, a virtual absence of foreign
news, a focus on local (referring to the bantustan, not South Africa) ‘events’, and an emphasis on
agricultural topics. Accordingly, most of the music was either traditional African, choral or popu-
lar, as the tastes of white and black South Africans were considered too different by the Minister
of Post and Telegraphs, Albert Herzog, cited in Hamm (1991: 156), who supported the amend-
ment of Broadcast Act of 1936 which allowed the formal segregation of public broadcasting into
black and white radio stations. The amendment was passed in 1960, formalising Herzog’s senti-
ments towards what he saw as unsurpassable difference in black and white tastes:
The Bantu experts will tell you – and we all know it – that the taste of a White
Man is not the taste of a Bantu. The taste of a Bantu is not the taste of a White
Man. We live in totally different spheres; you can almost say that we live in
different civilisations. I do not for a moment allow myself to be told that these
programmes which are broadcast for our Europeans can give great satisfaction to
the Bantu because we as Europeans do not understand the desires and tastes of
the Bantu. (Debates 1960, pp. 2445-7)
It is worth making a note of the self-contradicting dualism – racial segregation under the cloak of
national unity – at the roots of South African broadcasting in order to fully understand the re-
cent debates about the transformation of South Africa’s mediascape after apartheid. The process
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which led to the new South African Media Charter was a challenge between the three main
stakeholders in the public broadcasting environment which brought the old tensions to the fore.
On the left one saw the civil society organisations in favour of a pluralistic solution (including
more scope for commercial broadcasters), somewhere in the middle the commercial broad-
casters calling for more deregulation and commercialisation, and on the right individuals from
the ANC who demanded the same control over the broadcaster for the new government as it
had been available to the old regime.
The resulting media charter, which was adopted in 1992, can be seen as a victory for the civil
society organisations, as it “(…) recognised the right to receive and disseminate information as a
basic requirement of democratic citizenship and participation, and established a commitment to
an independent public service broadcaster regulated by an independent body (ANC, 1992)”
(Barnett 1998: 555). This meant that the Charter’s commitment to independency was regulated
by the Independent Broadcasting Act (IBA) which prescribed the establishment of a govern-
ment-independent board responsible for the broadcaster’s programming following the old Reith-
ian principles of national unity and public education. But the development from a government-
controlled state broadcaster to an independent one serving the public, as enshrined in the Media
Charter and the IBA, has not meant an end to the controversy and debates surrounding the
broadcaster’s future on account of at least three conflicts in connection with the Charter itself.
First, the Charter’s commitment to national unity is riddled with the fundamental contradictions
at the heart of the idea of the Rainbow Nation itself as it concedes equal priority to the recogniti-
tion of the country’s diversity in terms of language and culture as well as the project of nation-
making and the pursuit of a singular South African identity. A case in point is the establishment
of three TV channels (instead of two, as originally prescribed in the Charter), two of which
(SABC 1 and SABC 2) broadcast in a multitude of languages while the third station (SABC 3)
broadcasts in English only. As much as this approach serves the protection of minority groups
and the preservation of cultural identities, it proves to be a major stumbling block on the path
towards a single public sphere as individuals continue to consume public broadcasting according
to their language preferences. The second conflict lies in the Charter’s provision for the further
commercialisation of the country’s broadcasting environment, both within the public broadcast-
ing network and through the licensing of new privately-owned stations, namely eTV and the sub-
scription-based satellite service DSTV. This point is related to the first conflict insofar as the
high costs associated with producing local content in various languages (as required by pre-
scribed quotas) increase SABC’s already strong dependency on non-fee income sources and the
need to compete with the newly-established stations for advertising revenue through the intro-
duction of popular and cheaper foreign (mostly American) programmes, as they can be found
mostly on SABC 3. Moreover, the addition of subscription-based satellite services translates into
profound doubts about the universality of access, as it creates a real divide between rich and
poor in terms of access to non-SABC, foreign channels and programmes. The third source of
conflict lies in the questionability of the broadcaster’s independency, as the filling of key posi-
tions with ANC-members within the organisation and on the regulation board over the years has
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aroused suspicion over the network’s credibility especially among the non-ANC constituency,
possibly driving them towards the private networks and stations.
For the aforementioned reasons South Africa’s mediascape today is a far cry from the Reithian
ideal of a strong and independent public broadcaster sustaining a single public sphere. Instead it
appears fragmented along the intersecting lines of language, class and culture. In an almost
prophetic article Clive Barnett predicted in 1998 that the restructuring of South Africa’s of me-
diascape and the project of nation-building would not be a mutually beneficial endeavour:
The economic policies of the ANC-led government, shaped by broader
international processes, is leading to the increasing commercialisation of the
broadcasting system even as it embraces a new public service credo. On the other
hand, the task of nation-building has to address a series of sub-national identities
which reflect entrenched patterns of socioeconomic division. To a considerable
extent, in South Africa cultural and linguistic differences correspond with stark
and entrenched socioeconomic inequalities. The interaction of the economic
dynamics of commercialised broadcasting with the structure of social economic
and cultural differentiation thus render it difficult for the broadcasting system to
successfully bind together diverse identities and audiences into a single national
public while at the same time maintaining financial viability. (Barnett 1998: 568)
Barnett’s analysis of the South African broadcasting environment suggests that the old South
Africa’s social frontiers of class and race will continue to exist not only despite, but actually be-
cause of the further commercialisation of the South African media due to the conflation of the
two factors in the South African context. The accuracy of his prediction is readily discernible in
the annual reports of the All Media and Product Survey (AMPS) conducted by the South African
Advertising Research Foundation (SAARF), which gathers all sorts of data on South Africans’
consumption behaviours, including media consumption, showing that South Africans have in-
deed very different media preferences depending on race. It is also reflected in the qualitative
data collected by Larry Strelitz (2002; see also 2004; 2005; 2008) for his PhD titled Where the Glob-
al Meets the Local: South African Youth and their Experience of Global Media. The interviewees, all stu-
dents at Rhodes university at the time, had strong associations with particular television and ra-
dio shows, to the point that some of them, all black, male and from rural areas, referred to the
television viewing room of their residency as the ‘homeland’ where they would watch South
African soap operas, African language news and soccer. Absent from their TV diet were any for-
eign television series or shows.
Faced with an institutional culture in which they feel white and black middle-class
norms dominate, they have felt the need to consolidate and signify their
difference. The nightly ritual of local television consumption in the ‘homeland’ is
one of the means of achieving this. As Thompson notes (1995: 204), migrant
populations – these students have ‘migrated’ to Rhodes University – often display
a strong quest for roots. (Strelitz 2002: 164)
The image of the viewing room as the ‘homeland’ – a term deeply steeped in South Africa’s his-
tory of formal racial segregation – is fitting, as it underlines the continuing segregation of South
Africa’s mediascape despite the political transition from apartheid to democracy. Also, Strelitz
4. Youth, Social Inequality and Race in Cape Town and Belo Horizonte
76
does not reduce the observed differences to a matter of racial preferences, as he points to the sa-
lience of class distinction in the students’ choices. For example, he reports that the group of
young men was critical of what they described as middle- and upper-class ‘coconuts’ – black stu-
dents who preferred to speak English over African languages and adopted most of the habits of
traditionally white South Africans studentship such as drinking and wearing certain kinds of
clothing. Furthermore, Strelitz’s account illustrates the unequal access to global cultural flows
among young South Africans, lending further support to the claim that media preferences are
not simply homologous with aesthetic taste patterns per se. Instead they reflect social inequalities
and regulate the ways in which young people interact with the local and global spheres, thus fur-
ther accentuating notions of difference.
The magnitude of media fragmentation described here is certainly particular to the South African
context, and so are the levels of inequality and the omnipresence of references to race and racial
differences. Nonetheless, there are certain elements to the South African case which are observ-
able in other parts of the world as consequences of global capitalism and globalisation. These in-
clude increasing levels of social heterogeneity (both in terms of economic inequality and cultural
diversity) and consumerism, especially among younger generations. These commonalities
provide the necessary space for a comparative perspective based on the assumption that the ra-
cialisation of taste patterns and media segmentation is itself largely a product of cultural global-
isation resulting in ‘common structures of difference’. However, any comparison of this kind re-
quires a careful consideration of the fundamental differences in the cultural make-up (especially
regarding matters of identity and racial discourse) of the two settings in questions, in this case
South Africa and Brazil.
4.3 Brazilian Connections
Despite the shared colonial history, socioeconomic similarities and racial diversity of the two
countries, sociological comparisons between South Africa and Brazil, especially with regard to
identity and race, are still remarkably rare. In fact, direct comparisons are virtually non-existent;
two of the more resourceful books on the topic include USA in the comparison, and a working
paper by Jeremy Seekings takes Nigeria into the equation. The first of the three, Beyond Racism:
Race and Inequality in Brazil, South Africa, and the United States (Hamilton et al. 2001), is an edited
volume covering mostly the economic aspects of racial inequality in the three countries. The
second book, Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of South Africa, the United States, and Brazil by
Anthony Marx (1998), looks at the historical and political roots of formal discrimination in
South Africa and the United States, and, in contrast, the alleged lack thereof in Brazil. Marx ar-
gues that in order to overcome the political divisions between the different parts of the white
population in South Africa and United States, it was necessary to unite them in the face of a
common ‘threat’ – black people. The resulting institutionalisation of racial discrimination in the
two countries (albeit in different forms and to varying degrees) led to formal resistance and the
Black Consciousness movement, and ultimately to the deeply ingrained racial consciousness
which is still present in the United States and especially South Africa, yet is perceived to be
largely absent in Brazil. Seekings, on the other hand, makes the point that South Africa’s racial
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heterogeneity in combination with its historical class/race overlap is making far-reaching redistri-
butional policies possible (well-off whites willing to concede the need for economic transforma-
tion and blacks showing intra-group solidarity), whereas in Brazil the lack of political power
based on strong racial identities preempts pro-poor policies. What these comparisons show, and
what is crucial to understand before any further comparisons are made, is that although the two
countries share many socio-economic characteristics, the racial discourses in the two countries
vary significantly.
The demographic and socio-economic similitudes between the two countries are deceptive in
that they seem to suggest that also their racial compositions would be fairly similar. But this
would mean to ignore the particularities of race in South Africa and Brazil, which are best to be
contrasted in order to be fully understood. This has been achieved by Ribeiro in an unpublished,
yet excellent summary of the two countries’ intellectual origins of race thinking. By citing two
sociologists who contributed immensely to the definition of the racial imaginary and vocabulary
in their respective countries, Ribeiro manages to reveal the crucial contradiction between South
African and Brazilian racial discourse: the rejection vs the celebration of hybridity based on
pseudo-biological grounds. First Ribeiro dissects the work of Geoffrey Cronjé, one of the found-
ing fathers of South African sociology (Uys 2009: 237), who is also known as “the mind of apar-
theid” (Coetzee 1991).
The blood of whites has to be kept pure. Cronjé’s nemesis is therefore first and
foremost blood-mixing (bloedvermenging). It has a strong connotation of complete
loss of self and identity: Coetzee warns us that the prefix ver- has a perfective
force. Vermenging therefore implies a mixture that cannot be undone, an
irreversible state of affairs. For Cronjé, blood-mixing is inevitably detrimental and
ultimately leads to a state of of mengelmoes or total lack of differentiation. Coetzee
(p.11) tells us that mengelmoes comes from Dutch/Afrikaans mengel (mixing up),
cognate with English ‘mangle’, and moes, cognate with English ‘mush’. In
colloquial usage the term is always derogatory, implying a ‘mixture in which not
only individual character but all original structure have been lost; what is left is
shapeless, undifferentiated and pulpy – much like faeces, in fact’ (id).
Cronjé’s portrayal of bloedvermenging as the ultimate loss of identity is contrasted with Gilberto
Freyre notion of mestiçagem as the ideal (and idealised) source of Brazilian identity, depicted in
his seminal work Casa-Grande e Senzala (The Masters and the Slaves) (Freyre 1986, originally publ-
ished in 1933).
In the works of Brazilian sociologist, anthropologist and writer Gilberto Freyre
blood-mixing (miscigenaçao or mestiçagem) is elevated to the level of an unequalled
virtue that would have saved Portuguese civilisation in the tropics and in Europe
from the ethnocentrism, narrow-mindedness and utter prejudice of civilisations
of North European origin such as those of the United States or South Africa
(Freyre, 1971: 137ff, 1980: 320-1). For Freyre fluidity is not to be checked, on the
contrary it is good that there should be a free flow, that the white blood of Luso-
Brazilian masters should mix with that of African slaves and Indian women to
form a pliable, vigorous, flexible race and most – most importantly – a truly
unique civilisation in the tropics. (Ribeiro 1995: 5)
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Freyre’s idealistic depiction of miscegenation is said to be at the heart of Brazil’s founding myth,
and Brazil has indeed often been presented as some sort of racial paradise in comparison to the
United States and certainly South Africa. Yet the image of Brazil as a ‘racial democracy’ has long
suffered severe cracks in the face of clear evidence, including census data, that non-white Brazili-
ans have always been and still are more likely to live in poverty, be unemployed, live in poorer
neighbourhoods, have worse education etc. than their white compatriots (Hellwig 1992; Skid-
more 1972; 1983; 1993; 2003; Hess and Matta 1995; Cleary 1999; Reichmann 1999; Sansone
2003). But it was only after Brazil’s transition to democracy that the government started to move
away from the self-image of racial harmony and acknowledge that racial discrimination is real
and rife in Brazilian society, leading to the introduction of affirmative action laws in the early
2000s (Htun 2004) in spite of the opposition of those who consider the fluidity of Brazilian
(non-)racialism as a value threatened by the introduction of rigid racial categories necessary for
the implementation of race-based affirmative action (Kamel 2006).
The more intricate arguments against or in favour of race-based affirmative action aside, the two
standpoints perfectly reflect the conundrum of race in the Brazilian context; on the one hand, ra-
cial discrimination in virtually all spheres of Brazilian public life – from the labour market to me-
dia representation – is well-documented by scholars and acknowledged by most Brazilians and
the government. Nonetheless, Brazilians are generally ambiguous at classifying themselves or
others and most deny discriminating others in terms of race. It is this fluidity, or hybridity exem-
plified by the image of the mestizo, which poses the greatest challenge to students of Brazilian
race relations as it is seen almost as the polar opposite of South Africa’s or even the United
States’ rigid classification system. Yet, despite the apparent vagueness of the concept in the
Brazilian setting, it is crucial to recognise its evaluative hierarchy, which Skidmore (1972: 3) is
able to describe so poignantly while explaining the position of the mulato in Brazilian society:
Such behavior suggests that a mulatto, whose phenotypical features had given
him social access about which he felt insecure, might find this mobility
endangered by having his social status redefined through the exposure of his
family origin. The result was a subtle and shifting network of color lines, which
created ambiguity and tension for all mixed bloods. Evidence of this tension can
be found in the large Brazilian folklore about the ‘untrustworthy’ mulatto. His
neuroses have been poetically pictured in Freyre’s The Mansions and the
Shanties. He is the central figure in Brazil’s ‘racial democracy’, because he is
granted limited entry into the higher social establishment. The limits on his
mobility depend upon his exact appearance (the more ‘Negroid’, the less mobile)
and the degree of cultural ‘whiteness’ (education, manners, wealth) he has been
able to attain. The successful application of this multi-racial system has required
Brazilians to develop an intense sensitivity to racial categories and the nuances of
their application.
What Skidmore hints at in his article from 1972, and which is supported by recent works on class
and race in Brazil, is the existence of a black-white-continuum which does allow for greater mo-
bility depending on phenotype and social status (the Brazilian saying “money whitens” comes to
mind) but is nevertheless fundamentally discriminative in that black, with negative connotations,
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is seen at the lower end and white, with positive connotations, at the upper end of the stratum.
In practice, this combination of mobility and hierarchy can have consequences (such as the ‘ad-
option’ of differing racial identities by members of the same family (Harris, Consorte, Lang and
Brne 1993: 452)) which are not entirely, yet relatively unusual in the South African context where
the definitions of racial categories are far stricter and accounts of ‘race-change’ as a way to cir-
cumvent oppressive racial policies during apartheid rather anecdotal. But it also means that the
multitude of race/colour terms used by Brazilians when asked about their race is not the sign of
complete indifference or unawareness that it is sometimes portrayed to be. In fact, one could ar-
gue that the Brazilian ingenuity of creating new and surprising racial descriptors – asked for
their skin colour participants in the 1976 survey came up with 134 different terms from acastan-
hada (cashewlike tint; caramel coloured) over fogoio (florid; flushed) to vermelha (reddish) – is partly
due to attempts to ‘whiten’ their racial identity. This is also the observation made by Livio San-
sone (2003) who conducted a survey with 1024 participants in two different locations in Brazil,
in which the respondents were asked to self-classify themselves, friends, family members and
neighbours in racial terms. Sansone found that although the range of replies was surprisingly
broad – 36 distinctive terms were provided – 91 percent of informants used eight terms (moreno,
pardo, branco, preto, negro, dark, light moreno, mulato) which are more or less compatible with the offi-
cial census classification comprising branco, preto, amarelo and pardo. But even with the other 28
terms included, Sansone was able to recode the replies into four main categories of the black-
white-continuum comprising 98 percent of the informants (so only two percent described them-
selves outside the continuum): branco (white), moreno (mestizo), mulato/pardo (dark mestizo), preto/
negro (very dark/black). What is maybe most disconcerting, apart from the sheer variety of hues
and shades, to students of South African or American race relations is the subdivision of the
‘mixed-race’ category, for which a whole range of possible terms seems to apply: moreno, mestizo,
pardo, mulato – each with its own nuances and subclassifications. Sansone argues that usage of
one of these terms is not necessarily as arbitrary and unsystematic as it might seem, and the long
lists of racial terms found in many quantitative studies, including the census, are rather mislead-
ing because most of them are used only by tiny fractions of the population. Also, according to
Sansone, some of them use qualifying attributes only to underline or illustrate, in a humorous
fashion, their association with one of the more common racial descriptors (e.g. ant-coloured =
dark moreno). And again others, such as mulato, are common in some regions but hardly used in
others. Yet Sansone does not suggest that a straightforward simplification of the race classifica-
tion system, such as the essentially three-tiered census (white, mixed, black plus Asian and Indi-
genous) or even a bi-racial (black and white) classification, is necessarily the best way forward.
Instead he argues that it is necessary to acknowledge and study the nuances of what he calls
“native terms” (as opposed to superimposed ‘official’ categories) as they provide rich informa-
tion about the subtle racial discrimination which is indeed more prevalent in Brazilian society
than commonly assumed. In his own research, for example, he notices that many informants in
poorer neighbourhoods classified themselves, their family and neighbours ‘lighter’ than in the
opinion of the interviewer, but when asked about the neighbourhood in more general terms,
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they were much less reluctant to ‘admit’ that most of its inhabitants were of a ‘dark’ colour. San-
sone also gives a whole array of examples of the role of context in which race questions are be-
ing asked. These include certain themes (e.g. carneval being a ‘black thing’), situations and places:
The streetcorner and the neighborhood are generally seen as liminal spaces in
which it is less necessary to use “white” codes. This liminality is constructed in
opposition to the outside world, above all the cidade alta (neighborhoods where
more wealthy people live), contacts with bureaucracy (for example, the
solicitation of documents and the processing of requests), the search for work,
and, for some, contacts with the police. (Sansone 2003: 44)
Furthermore references to mestiçagem are sometimes used in order to avoid black or white
descriptors (which can be insulting):
The responses regarding color are influenced as much by somatic preference than
by the discourses of racial democracy and the celebration of mestiçagem (racial
mixture). Relations of friendship, just as the fear of offending someone, can
bring someone to classify a neighbor’s family with a term held as positive –
above all, moreno in the place of preto and mista or misturada in the place of white
or black. Those who an individual shows affection for (for example, close
relatives or boyfriends and girlfriends) and/or respect (for example, a boss or
employer), one tends to give a few “advantage points” on the chromatic scale –
defining them as lighter than they actually are. (Sansone  2003: 45)
Sansone’s dissection of the Brazilian race categories is discussed here in such detail not because
his observations are necessarily fully applicable to Brazil in general, but because he manages to
acknowledge the existing fluidity of race in the Brazil context while pointing out the subtle yet
evaluative connotations associated with certain shades of skin colour. Some of these connota-
tions are directly linked to class in the sense that wealth and “spaces of wealth” are considered to
be first and foremost in the white domain while poverty and street life are commonly associated
with blackness. In a similar vein this thesis, although focussing on South Africa and Cape Town,
promises to shed new light on the significance of such generalisations for young Brazilians today,
and in what ways they might be associated with actual taste patterns and certain forms of popular
culture, as the existing literature in this respect is rather sparse. Although there is an abundance
of literature on ‘Afrobrazilian’ culture, other aspects of cultural globalization, popular culture,
and especially youth culture, are rarely discussed, despite matching findings by Sansone and Tell-
es (2004) that the influx of foreign trends and cultural flows appears to have significant influ-
ences on young people’s racial imaginary; both authors report of the tendency among young
black Brazilians to prefer the term “negro”, associated with music and culture in general, instead
of “preto”, which has a lower-class connotation. Telles speculates that this could be the sign of a
growing black political consciousness among black Brazilians due to the growing influence of the
US American civil rights movement. Other literature points to the growing popularity of black
American music and youth culture, i.e. Hip Hop and Funk, among young Brazilians (Sansone
2003; Pardue 2007; Gordon 1999; Pieterse 2010; Pardue 2004; 2004). Juarez Dayrell’s (2005) A
Música Entra em Cena deserves a special mention as it chronicles the history of the Rap and Funk
scene in Belo Horizonte, where the Brazilian data for this thesis has been collected. Dayrell, who
in the theoretical part of his book often refers to the much debated idea of multiple subcultures
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in the Birmingham tradition (Dayrell 2005: 35), makes a couple of observations which are of dir-
ect relevance to this study. The first concerns the shared origins of Brazilian Funk and Hip
Hop – black American music. This might seem self-evident but it is noteworthy as it goes hand
in hand with another point by Dayrell that Funk and Hip Hop are to be understood as creative
expressions of the marginalised and disadvantaged. So even though it is not an autonomous
theme in Dayrell’s book, the connection between social inequality and racial differentiation and
discrimination is certainly an important factor in his account of Belo Horizonte’s youth scenes,
as evident in his description of the early Hip Hop events in Belo Horizonte.
The dances were performed by youth from the periphery, mostly blacks. There
were spaces where the entry of a white person was frowned upon, being a cause
for fights. There was an identification of black, or “brown”, music with blackness
and with a black imagery – especially bell-bottom pants, platform shoes, the use
of braces, a black or white jacket and a hat – representing a positive black
identity.26 (Dayrell 2005: 48)
The other point of relevance made by Dayrell is his distinction between Hip Hop and Funk as
separate styles despite their shared origins. According to Dayrell (2005: 51) the fundamental dif-
ference between the two styles lies in their ‘messages’; whereas Funk is more about rhythm and
dance, Hip Hop focusses on lyrical, often socially conscious, content. Here the parallels to South
Africa’s Hip Hop and Kwaito scenes are impossible to ignore; the romanticisation of local Hip
Hop as authentic and conscious versus the somewhat derogatory portrayal of Kwaito and Funk,
respectively, as consumerist music without meaning. It has been shown earlier that reducing
South Africa’s Hip Hop scene to local, conscious Hip Hop can be problematic as it means to
banalise and underestimate the impact of commercial, ‘mainstream’, Hip Hop. It has also been
argued that Kwaito and local House music are not devoid of symbolic value, even though Hip
Hop, both commercial and conscious, is sometimes portrayed to better reflect a certain ‘ghetto’
authenticity. A similar thing seems to happen in the case of the Brazilian Hip Hop/Funk dicho-
tomy, as most scholars, like Dayrell, seem to restrict their textual analyses to the supposedly
more meaningful conscious Hip Hop, while commercial Hip Hop, i.e. Gangster Rap, is often
confined to the realms of aesthetic and moral judgement.
This last point is supported by looking at one of the very few (or only?) direct comparisons of
South African and Brazilian youth culture; Edgar Pieterse (2010: 440) argues that Hip Hop rep-
resents a crucial means of expression for marginalised youth in Cape Town and Rio de Janeiro:
These four dimensions of hip-hop – specificity, open discourse, multi-layered
discourse and ‘shine-ism’ – make it a complex and dynamic form of popular
culture, and one which offers a rich reservoir of materials for identity
construction. Hip-hop offers not only insights and perspectives on the working
of the world, but also how to ‘hold’ oneself – politically, stylistically, ideologically,
socially, psychologically – in that world. The case studies from Rio de Janeiro and
26. Os bailes eram freqüentados por jovens da periferia, na sua maioria negros. Havia espaços onde a entrada de
um branco era mal vista, sendo motivo de brigas. Havia uma identificação da black music, ou “brown”, com a
negritude e com um visual black – especialmente calças bocas-de-sino, sapato plataforma, o uso de
suspensórios, blazer preto ou branco e chapéu –, o que marcava uma identidade negra positiva.
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Cape Town underscore how politically conscious hip-hop offers a coherent
ideology to resist the truncated realities of drug gang-dominated everyday spaces
and lifestyles in pursuit of tougher alternatives.
Pieterse’s work is groundbreaking because he demonstrates impressively the similarities in daily
experiences and attitudes of kids growing up in the urban peripheries (favelas and townships) of
developing societies by capturing the aesthetics, practices and symbolism of Hip Hop as a form
of political resistance to the social inequality defining both South Africa and Brazil. But Pieterse,
too, focusses mainly on the so-called ‘conscious’ Hip Hop, although he does acknowledge the
great (and arguably more problematic) influence of commercial gangster Rap and RnB on ad-
olescents. In this sense Pieterse’s work is simultaneously remarkably innovative because of its
comparative character and fairly ‘conservative’ in that it relies on a rather optimistic reading of
local Hip Hop as a particular subculture with its own set of rules and values, separate from the
mainstream. As it has been discussed before, such in-depth accounts of particular youth scenes
are necessary in order to understand the lived realities of young people today and Pieterse’s work
is especially useful as it provides such rare glimpses into the world of youth in two so separate
yet similar locations. But focussing on the specificity of Hip Hop, and especially one very
specific strand of this genre, also carries the risk to look past some of the more general and
structural characteristics of adolescents, especially those who grow up in the perceived main-
stream. For example: while Hip Hop and, to some extent, the Funk movement are fairly well-
documented as creative expressions of resistance by the marginalised and disadvantaged, any
scholarly work on Brazilian Rock, Punk, Crossover etc. is extremely scarce despite a strong
Brazilian tradition of Rock, and especially Heavy Metal.
An exception is Mercadores de Sentido: Consumo de Mídia e Identidades Juvenis, in which Veneza
Ronsini (2007) contrasts the consumerism of hip hoppers with the anti-materialism of young
punks in Brazil based on interviews with youth in two cities in Rio Grande de Sul: urban Santa
Maria and the more rural Caçapava do Sul. Interestingly, Ronsini is inspired by two theoretical
strands which are also relevant for this study. For one she refers directly and extensively to sub-
cultural theory in the tradition of the CCCS in Birmingham by incorporating significance parts of
its conceptual framework in her own research. However, she also acknowledges the narrowness
of the original approach taken by Hebdige and others who focussed mainly on the cultural sym-
bols in the lives of white working class young men, and she is careful to make conceptual distinc-
tions between “subcultures”, “countercultures” and “styles” as she discusses her study object.
And she also goes beyond the conceptual and theoretical limits of subcultural theory by incor-
porating the work of other sociologists and social anthropologists such as Geertz, Elias and,
most importantly, Bourdieu. In many ways Bourdieu’s presence in Ronsini’s work resembles the
one in this study; she uses his interpretation of taste in order to make class distinctions which are
not solely determined by Marxist interpretations of class as division of labour but the expression
of cultural dispositions passed on through the habitus as a result of the individual’s position in
the triangulation of economic, social and cultural capital. This allows her to make observations
of class differences in relation with popular expressions of youth culture and taste.
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Hip-hop is a style that allows youth from the periphery to communicate with
those from other social classes, especially from the middle class, in danger of
being downgraded (Bourdieu, 1991, p.145-152) and deterred from their class
trajectory as their purchasing power decreases and they fail to obtain the school
qualifications necessary for employment. The irreverent but careful visual
presentation of hip-hoppers avoids the aesthetic intolerance towards the taste of
the petty bourgeois, unlike punk which symbolizes a challenge, and,
consequently, the perception of the working classes that it refers to. As the
communication between classes increases, class conflict, previously a matter of
expressive intentions of cultural styles, is being replaced by milder forms, as
evidenced by the replacement of baggy clothes of hip-hop, inspired by the
clothing of black American prisoners, through sportswear brands like Nike or
Adidas.27 (Ronsini 2007: 178)
Although it is not a major theme in Ronsini’s work, the extension of the taste/class association
by race and gender as additional factors of taste preferences certainly shine through, offering a
good example for the applicability of the proposed theoretical framework influenced by Bour-
dieu also in the Brazilian setting. This impression is further strengthened by the work of Jessé
Souza (Souza 2006; 2004) who also makes use of Bourdieu’s theory of class distinction in order
to explain the causality between race and the reproduction of social inequality in Brazil, as op-
posed to other studies which merely describe the relationship between race and class, i.e. black
and disadvantaged, in absolute terms.
In the specific case of Brazilian social formation skin color is a secondary aspect
in relation to class habitus, but that obviously does not mean that racial prejudice
does not exist or is unimportant. It just means that the invisibility of cultural and
symbolic “class racism”, specifically by those authors who “buy” into the
economic/Marxist conceptualization of class and become Marxists without
knowing it, makes “race” the only dimension where the symbolic and cultural
dominance is made visible. This visibility of race is achieved by non-economic
means. Ignoring the logic of (especially modern) social hierarchy (dominance),
which is based on the naturalization and opacity of its “evaluative hierarchy”
anchored in institutions and made possible by unconscious institutional and
27. O hip-hop é um estilo que permite a comunicação dos jovens da periferia com jovens de outras classes sociais,
especialmente com os de classe média ameaçados desclassamento (Bourdieu, 1991, p.145-152), sujeitos a
interromper a trajetória de classe pela queda do poder aquisitivo familiar e pela insuficiência da titulação escolar
para obtenção de emprego. A irreverente mas cuidadosa apresentação visual dos hip-hoppers evita a
intolerância estética ao gosto pequeno-burgûes, ao contrário do punk, que simboliza um desafio a ele e, por
conseqüência, ao modo de percepção das classes populares que o têm como referência. Á medida que a
comunicação entre as classes aumenta, os conflitos de classe manifestos pelas intenções expressivas dos estilos
culturais vão sendo substituídos por formas brandas, como atesta a substituição das roupas largas do hip-hop,
antes inspiradas nas roupas dos negros norte-americanos encarcerados, pelos trajes esportivos de marcas como
Nike ou Adidas.
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social practices, allows “race” to be the only visible indicator of a logic of social
hierarchy (dominance) which goes far beyond “race”.28 (Souza 2006: 90)
Together, Ronsini and Souza offer an excellent blueprint for implementing a Bourdieuan inter-
pretation of the racialised class distinction visible in young Brazilians’ taste preferences. They
provide a possibility to go beyond mere descriptions of subcultures, as useful and important as
they are for understanding the actual life experiences of adolescents, and begin to understand the
naturalisation of social inequality and discrimination in contemporary society. Moreover, because
of the recognition of social structure (opposed to individual agency or the totality of economic
interpretations of class) as the deciding factor behind racialised class distinction, it becomes pos-
sible to elevate the discussion from the national to the transnational level, as structures can be
compared and local conditions be separated from the global effects expected to produce com-
mon structures of difference in different locations around the world.
28. [A]inda que a cor da pele seja um dado secundário, no caso específico da formação social brasileira, em relação
ao habitus de classe, isso, obviamente, não significa dizer que o preconceito racial não exista ou que seja de
pouca importância. Significa apenas que é a invisibilidade dos aspectos culturais e simbólicos do “racismo de
classe”, precisamente por aqueles autores que “compram” o conceito economista de classe do marxismo e se
tornam marxistas sem o saber, que torna a “raça” a única dimensão onde a dominação simbólica e cultural é
tornada visível. Essa visibilidade da “raça” é conquistada pela de natureza não-econômica. É o
desconhecimento da lógica da dominação social especificamente moderna, baseada na naturalização e na
opacidade de sua “hierarquia valorativa” ancorada institucionalmente e tornada possível por práticas
institucionais e sociais consumadas pré-reflexivamente, que permite que a “raça” possa ser o único índice
visível de uma lógica de dominação social que lhe ultrapassa de muito.
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5. Race and Identity in Numbers
Moving from the historical and conceptual underpinnings of differences in racial classification
and segregation between South Africa and Brazil this chapter is concerned with the empirical
characteristics of the respective survey samples in terms of identity and race. Supported by inter-
view material the numbers presented in this chapter paint a very vivid and intricate image of
South African and Brazilian ‘race relations’ from the perspective of youth, highlighting the simil-
arities and differences between the two research settings.
Identity
Before discussing race itself it is necessary to look at its status and importance for the schoolchil-
dren who took part in the two surveys compared to other ways of differentiating oneself from
others. For this purpose respondents in both surveys were asked to choose from a list one de-
scription that best describes themselves culturally. In Cape Town, the list consisted of 23 differ-
ent options which comprised descriptors related to race, ethnicity (Xhosa, Afrikaans, Zulu etc),
language, religion, heritage (European/African) and youth culture as well as the possibility to
provide their own open-ended response if required.29 Figure 5.1 below shows the proportional
distribution of responses for each race group.
Figure 5.1 Bar: Identity by Race (Cape Town, Percentages)
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Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
29. Gender was purposefully not included in the list, as it represents a too strong primary identifier.
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The most obvious insight taken from the graph above concerns the astonishing discrepancy
between the separate groups; the majority of black respondents identifies itself through ethnicity
(or culture), in this case Xhosa, followed by a very mixed range of responses mostly made up of
references to Africa, youth culture, race and nationhood. Coloured respondents on the other
hand identify themselves through religion (four out of ten, split into half between Christians and
Muslims) followed closely by race (coloured). The most heterogeneous group, however, is made
up of white respondents; the most popular choices were within the realm of youth culture (a
quarter of responses), followed by a patchwork of choices in the eleven to seventeen percent
range excluding only ethnicity.
Apart from the unexpected strong religiosity of coloured respondents these patterns are actually
in line with common perceptions of each population group. The choices of black respondents
reflect the strong identification with supposedly traditional values and local popular culture de-
scribed later in the discourses of taste and identity in Chapter 6. As with the choices of coloured
respondents; although the dominance of religion in this group cannot be easily explained and re-
quires further exploration, the relatively strong self-association with ‘colouredness’ as a source of
identity can be interpreted as the desire to be recognized as an independent ‘reified’ group along-
side (not between) the fixed black/white-binary. The multiplicity of identifiers among white re-
spondents then refers to their ambiguity and ambivalence towards their status in South Africa.
Overall race does not seem to represent the most important way for defining oneself in relation
to others for the great majority. However, the variation of choices across groups suggests that ra-
cial identity does in fact influence to a large degree the way in which Cape Town’s youth see
themselves and others. And indeed, to say “I am Xhosa” or “I am African” does carry racial con-
notations, even if those are undefined, subconscious and unintended, and to say “I am coloured”
is of course a far more obvious example of expressing one’s racial identity. In comparison, white
respondents in general seem to be much less aware of their racial classification, yet one needs to
keep in mind that “Afrikaans- or English-speaking” and even more so “European” are markers
of identity which in the South African context are often used to substitute the primary race
descriptor as they signify what one is not: not Xhosa-speaking, not African. The question then is
whether references to popular culture are a truly post-racial way of asserting one’s identity. The
answer to that question becomes more complex if one considers that almost three quarters of
those white respondents who chose youth culture as the main identifier described themselves as
either punker, rockers, surfers or skateboarders (not hip hoppers, gangsters, etc.) in response to a
separate question. One interpretation would be that young white South Africans have largely
moved beyond race as a dominant identifier and are more readily adopting new ways of distin-
guishing themselves from others. An alternative explanation lies in scholarship on whiteness, re-
vealing how the apparent colour-blindness of many whites in the United States (Gallagher 2003)
as well as in South Africa (Steyn 2001) is either a result of the historical “invisibility” of whites as
the dominant reference group in colonial race-thinking, a tendency of whites to avoid association
with “old” identity markers associated with whiteness or a combination of both. The truth
aruguably lies somewhere between these two explanation, in that non-racial ways of self-identi-
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fication indeed offers young white South Africans an opportunity to disassociate themselves
from the apartheid discourse and practice of race-categorisation, albeit arguably often in denial
or igorance of privilege derived from being white.
Therefore: apart maybe from religion which has to remain a blurry category, “I am South Afric-
an” is arguably the only expression which clearly articulates a determination to move beyond old
markers of separation towards a shared identity (and even this can be disputed, as the expressed
intention does not say much about the willingness to make real changes in day to day life). 
In contrast the choices of the participants in the Brazilian survey are remarkably different.
Figure 5.2 Bar: Identity by Race (Belo Horizonte, Percentages)
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Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
Unlike their South African peers, respondents in Belo Horizonte answered the identity question
almost uniformly independent of their racial self-classification; about three out of five, irrespect-
ive of race, describe themselves first and foremost as either Brazilians or “Mineiros” (referring to
the regional identifier associated with the federal state Minas Gerais which Belo Horizonte is the
capital of). Additionally one fifth of the sample chooses religion to do so, and overall less than
one out of ten uses a racial identifier, leaving only a ten percent margin for the youth culture
category.
Together the two figures summarise the main difference between South Africa’s and Brazil’s dis-
courses of identity despite their shared characteristics of racial diversity and economic inequality:
a strong sense of national identity and a sense of homogeneity in Brazil versus a fragmented na-
tional self-image and the preeminence of cultural, ethnic and racial identifiers in South Africa.
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This offers an intriguing premise for applying the findings of the Cape Town survey and inter-
views in the Brazilian context as one can indeed assume two very different conceptual under-
standings of race and identity in the presence of objectively shared conditions in terms of divers-
ity and socio-economic inequality. 
Racial Classification
The theoretical and historical as well as actual difference between the two locations with regards
to racial classification have already been discussed on pages 31 to 34 in the methodology chapter
and on pages 77 to 85. But apart from merely classifying themselves respondents were asked the
questions why they did it the way they did (e.g. because of apartheid, physical characteristics or
culture) and what the most importance influence is for how they see themselves and others in
terms of race (e.g. family, friends or the media).
Figure 5.3 Stacked Bar: Reasons for Racial Self-Classification by Race (Cape Town, Percentages)
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Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
The bar chart above shows some remarkable (and statistically significant, see χ² test) differences
in the reasoning behind racial self-classification between population groups. Half of the African/
black respondents note “Heritage/Family” or “Culture” (both with equal proportions) as the
main impetus behind the way they classify themselves in terms of race. The same applies only for
roughly a quarter of white and coloured respondents, respectively. Especially the relatively high
proportion of “Culture” is noteworthy as it fits the assumption that black respondents tend to
articulate their choices and preferences in cultural or ‘traditional’ terms. Overall, “Physical char-
acteristics” is the reason mentioned most frequently, but the relative frequency varies signific-
antly from group to group; three out of five white respondents mention it as the main reason as
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opposed to only one out of five black respondents while coloured respondents are somewhere
in-between with one-third of their group giving the same answer. White respondents’ preference
to ascribe race to physical characteristics leaves room for debate; on the one hand it can be inter-
preted as a rejection of race as a mutable, perhaps even dispensable, construct. On the other
hand it could signify a certain pragmatism, or even indifference, towards race issues. In any case,
the other potential answers are generally more relevant to coloured than white or black respond-
ents; the way society (or ‘other people’) sees oneself is the deciding factor for more than two out
of five coloured respondents, and almost one out of ten coloured respondents thinks that histor-
ical reasons, i.e. apartheid, play the most important role. Equally one out of ten coloured re-
spondents plainly refuses to make any judgements based on race, a sentiment shared by a mar-
ginally smaller proportion of black respondents and a substantially smaller proportion of white
respondents. The tendency of coloured respondents to name socio-historical reasons supports
the notion that coloured youth continue to feel disadvantaged in South African society.
As interesting as these findings are on their own, it is ultimately once again their incongruity
which sets them apart from the results for the same question asked in Brazil.
Figure 5.4 Stacked Bar: Reasons for Racial Self-Classification by Race (Belo Horizonte, Percentages)
73 11 8 5 3
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Physical characteristics Family Culture
Others Refuse
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
The responses of the Brazilian survey participants, independent of their racial classification, to
the same question resemble those of white South African respondents; three quarters base their
racial (self-)classification on phenotypes, between eleven and fourteen percent claim they learnt it
from their family, presumably their parents, while a small minority ascribe it either to cultural
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factors, the ways others see them or they refuse to answer the question.
The emphasis on phenotype shared with white South Africans is noteworthy because if it is true
that Brazilians are indeed less aware of race and phenotypes are simply registered as what they
are without the deeply engrained racial connotations one finds in South Africa, does this mean
that a majority of white South Africans in the sample has actually abolished ‘race thinking’? The
following section will explore this question in more detail as respondents were provided with
very straightforward questions regarding their attitudes towards race and ‘interracial contact’.
Racial Attitudes and ‘Othering’ 
In both questionnaires, respondents were presented with a list of statements on race issues in
South Africa (e.g. affirmative action, the role of white and black South Africans in the country’s
development) and Brazil, to which the respondents were asked to indicate their level of agree-
ment on a 5-degree Likert scale. These questions have been selected from a number of previous
social surveys on race and/or discrimination in South Africa and elsewhere.
Figure 5.5 Dotplot: Racial Attitudes by Race (Cape Town, Means)30
Race is being overemphasized.
_______________________________________________________
Against racial quotas in SA sports.
_______________________________________________________
Against AA in access to higher education.
_______________________________________________________
Against AA on labour market.
_______________________________________________________
Whites richer than blacks due to historical injustices.
_______________________________________________________
Black people are as competent as white people.
_______________________________________________________
Everyone born in Africa is an African.
_______________________________________________________
Stop blaming the past.
_______________________________________________________
Without whites SA would not be as developed.
_______________________________________________________
Without blacks SA would not be as developed.
_______________________________________________________
People from my group are being discriminated.
_______________________________________________________
All were victims of apartheid.
_______________________________________________________
In SA we do not talk about race issues enough.
_______________________________________________________
We should think of ourselves as South Africans.
_______________________________________________________
1 2 3 4 5
Blacks in America are different.
_______________________________________________________
African/Black Coloured White
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
The list exhibits a number of general trends. First of all, black and white respondents generally
30. Statements are abbreviated. See the questionnaire in the appendix for the complete wording; Symbols show
group means based on a five-degree Likert scale: (1) “Strongly Disagree” (2) “Disagree” (3) “Neither agree nor
disagree” (4) “Disagree” (5) “Strongly Disagree”.
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find themselves at opposites when asked to indicate their level of agreement with statements
concerning affirmative action and the consequences of apartheid, while coloured respondents on
average are located somewhere in between. A large degree of disagreement exists, for example,
about the statements that “whites are richer than blacks due to historical injustices”, “all were
victims of apartheid” and “without black people South Africa would not be as developed as it is
today”.
On the other hand, statements with a reconciliatory character and/or implying a sense of ‘mov-
ing forward’ generate the highest levels of agreement among the three groups. For example, the
respondents largely agree that “South Africans should stop blaming the past” and that “everyone
born in Africa is an African”. Also, albeit to varying degrees, respondents mostly oppose affirm-
ative action policies and racial quotas on in labour market, in access to education and especially
professional sports.
These findings in combination appear ambiguous, but they do support the view that while young
South Africans have differing perceptions of race and racism in the past and present, a majority
also shows clear intentions to move beyond the racial divide of the past, even if this intent is
sometimes expressed in contradiction with deeply ingrained beliefs and stereotypes about ‘the
other’.
However, there are also some other curious, intuition-defying, findings. For example, when con-
fronted with the rather problematic statement (problematic as its negation implies outright ra-
cism) that given the same education and opportunities black people are just as competent as
white people, on average black respondents show a lower level of agreement than coloured and
white respondents. As will be shown with the results for questions on interracial dating and mar-
riage, this self-discriminatory trend among black respondents needs to be treated most carefully,
as one cannot conclusively estimate the consequences of the (mis-)wording of the questions and
statements nor the actual motivation behind the different ways respondents interpret and answer
them, but one cannot ignore the consistency in which this pattern occurs for a series of distinct
questions. Another example are the statements “If it wasn’t for white people South Africa would
not be as developed as it is today” and “If it wasn’t for black people South Africa would not be
as developed as it is today”. At their core sits the deeply problematic assumption that whether or
not colonialism and apartheid were ultimately morally ‘wrong’, both were in a sense inevitable in
order to ‘civilise’ and ‘develop’ South Africa which is why South Africa today enjoys a better in-
frastructure and economy than other countries in the region.31 Although the arguments in favour
of this theory are laden with flawed arguments, misuses of historical facts and theory and skewed
ideologies, they are a good example of some of the preconceptions that continue to persist and
thrive in South Africa (and elsewhere) today, as the following figure demonstrates.
31. See, for example, Moll (1991) for a rebuttal of this theory.
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Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
About three out of five of black and just under half of white respondents do not discriminate in
the question which of the two groups is more responsible for the country’s development. The
proportions of those who put their ‘own race’ ahead of ‘the other’ are also relatively similar with
about three out of ten for both groups. The most significant difference, however, reveals itself in
the “self-discriminatory” category where respondents chose the other group to be more respons-
ible for development than their own; one out of four black respondents (dis-)agreed with the
statements accordingly, compared to only six percent of white respondents. Again one needs to
take into account the possibility of misinterpretation either due to unfortunate wording or Engl-
ish-language deficits on behalf of the respondents or a combination of both. Nonetheless, as
these separate observations are consistent with each other, one needs to consider the self-dis-
criminatory tendency among black respondents as an unexpected and unintended, yet note-
worthy finding of the study. 
Another finding worthy of further investigation is the attitude towards affirmative action; Figure
5.7 shows the level of disagreement with the three statements referring to affirmative action and
racial quotas in the labour market, in education and professional sports for each race group.
32. Values are percentages reflecting the difference between the levels of agreement for the two assertions “South
Africa would not be as developed without blacks/whites”: (+) own group > other group, (0) own group =
other group, (-) own group < other group.
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Do you (strongly) oppose
racial quotas/affirmative action in (...)?
African/Black Coloured White
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
Without going into the debate on affirmative action in too much detail, the use of apartheid cat-
egories to determine previously disadvantaged groups deserving advantages in the access to high-
er education and employment is obviously problematic if the pursuit of a non-racial society, as it
is enshrined in the constitution, is meant to be of the highest priority. The matter is commonly
portrayed to be especially unpopular among young white South Africans who see themselves dis-
criminated because of political crimes committed before their time. The common counter-argu-
ment is that young white South Africans keep on benefitting from the social and economic capit-
al acquired by their parent generations during decades (or even centuries if one extends the
argument to the beginning of colonialism) of racial oppression, thus offering them a wider range
of life chances than previously disadvantaged South Africans despite the economic discrimina-
tion they face in the form of affirmative action.
Thus race remains a contentious subject among young South Africans. Even though children
and youth would rarely directly admit that they are discriminating racially in any way, race is and
remains one of the key variables that young South Africans make use of in order to make sense
of their surroundings. And more often than not this way of making sense of one’s own position
in society is interlinked with a hierarchical understanding of economic privilege and disadvant-
age, as expressed in the following excerpt of a conversation between girls at Southern High.
33. Bars show percentages of individual groups in agreement with the respective statement.
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Lucy: It’s a white apartheid.
Catherine: It’s what?
Lucy: It’s a white apartheid.
Catherine: Ja, it’s getting terrible…
Later in the interview:
Interviewer: So what are the bad things in the moment?
Danica: Infrastructure, I think. The roads are atrocious.
Chantal: Jobs. There are not really a lot of jobs. And quite a few people, they
have a good job right now, but there are people within the business,
they are trying to cause trouble for them. And things like that are very
easily caused here in South Africa, people get jealous very easily and
they try to take jobs away because there aren’t many job opportunities.
Interviewer: So is that what you mean by white apartheid?
Lucy: It’s just like everything has been changed around. Look, in the past the
blackies were like “All these nice cars the whiteys go around with”.
Now you see a nice car – “Oh my word, damn cool car, and oh, it’s
them in the car!”
Catherine: (Laughs and nods heavily.)
Lucy: It is! If you look at the staff in most companies, they are all black
people. They are. And if you want to study at UCT, it’s like a whole big
thing, I mean, to get in, they have to base certain things on race and
who is an international student and stuff like that. I mean i know
someone who passed matric with 101 percent and then she could not
get into the study she wanted to study because of that.
A similar a sense of being marginalised in the new South Africa is observable among coloured
youth. In fact, the choice of green as the colour marking the voices of coloured interviewees
throughout the thesis (in combination with blue representing black and yellow representing
white) is not entirely arbitrary, as it underlines the notions of ‘being in the middle’, fluidity and
hybridity associated with coloured identities in South Africa, which have been poignantly sum-
marised by Zimitri Erasmus (2001: 13): “For me, growing up coloured meant knowing that I was
not only not white, but less than white; not only not black, but better than black”. The sense of
incompleteness as well as the hierarchy of colours referred to in her assertion stem from old ra-
cist assumptions about miscegenation and race-mixing which presuppose a fixed and essential-
ised racial binary of black and white. Within this discriminatory system only black and white are
granted the spurious luxury of certainty and stability, whereas colouredness remains a blurred
category characterised by uncertainty and vagueness. Historically, the ambiguity of coloured as a
racial category was reinforced by apartheid laws which granted those classified as coloured more
rights than those classified as black, but still less than whites. This led to a rift within the col-
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oured community between those seeking to erase ‘coloured’ as a product of colonialism and
apartheid and to align themselves with the black consciousness movement and others aiming to
reify it as a self-assertive identity with its own culture, language and customs. However, accord-
ing to Daniel Hammett (2010), in practice the “erasure/reification binary” (the term used by
Hammett) often makes place for a more fluid, and complex, interpretation of colouredness
which enables the individual to choose strategically between different notions of colouredness
depending on the situation. Crucially, these contradictions and slippages within the formation of
coloured identity have been carried into the post-apartheid era as the political change is often not
perceived to have improved the vulnerability of coloured identity in South Africa despite the ex-
ploration of new avenues towards a redefinition of coloured identity by some.
Fear of African majority rule, perceptions that Coloureds were being
marginalized, a desire to counter pervasive negative stereotyping of Coloured
people, and attempts at capitalizing on the newly democratic environment in
pursuit of political agendas have all played a role in fueling Coloured
assertiveness in the new South Africa. It has become commonplace for Coloured
people disaffected with the new South Africa to express their disgruntlement by
lamenting that “first we were not white enough and now we are not black
enough.” (Adhikari 2005: 176)
The “disgruntlement” and feeling of being marginalised all over again described by Adhikari are
certainly evident in many of the interviews with coloured adolescents34:
Clara: First it was white racism, now it’s black racism. Coloureds will always be
in the middle.
Charney: We are always in the middle.
Later in the interview:
Interviewer: You said earlier that as coloureds you are always in the middle. Can you
explain to me what you mean by that?
Charney: They always make more of the whites and the blacks, and then they
never look at the coloureds. And whatever I say, or whatever we say, is
like neverminded. Our opinion never counts. It is always what the
whites and the blacks say. We also have the education that they have,
but it is because they look at our background, and they look at our skin
colour, and then they just say no.
Often the perception of being discriminated is related to a perceived disadvantage in the labour
market:
Interviewer: Do you feel that by being coloured you are disadvantaged today? 
34. Hammett’s (2010: 256) analysis of interviews with coloured schoolchildren in Cape Town reiterates the theme
of marginalisation detected in the interviews at hand:
The invocation of coloured-as-marginal or as ‘the twilight people’ (Adhikari, 2005) was frequently
evident, with students stating that ‘I am proud to be one [a coloured] although at times we don’t
get some of the privileges that the Africans nowadays get’ (Sun Valley Student 1), and ‘A coloured
is someone that is never seen or listened to, it is someone that is caught in between the blacks and
the whites’ (Sun Valley Student 2).
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Natasha: My mother works, she works in this department somewhere, where they
handle bursaries and job opportunities, and she says that at the mo-
ment, if you are coloured you have more chances of getting in. Now
that is where the race thing falls in again. You are white and you may be
more skilled than a black man, but that black man will get the post ac-
cording to his race. And I think that’s unfair, because, I mean, why
don’t you give the job to the person more skilled, because he will do a
better job at what he is doing. So my mom said if I move it’s much bet-
ter, because at the time I am grown up it’s gonna be like Oh you have to
be a black or you have to be a white and the coloureds are gonna be out
again, so she says it’s kind of messed up there.
Adrianna: Ja, because at the moment, it’s like a ladder where the blacks are right
on top, and the coloureds in the middle, and the whites are at the
bottom.
Natasha: We are always in the middle.
Adrianna: So, there is never gonna be chance where we are, like, on top.
What is particularly interesting about this last exchange is Natasha’s assertion that being coloured
(thus previously disadvantaged) is actually an advantage on today’s labour market in terms of af-
firmative action policies. But instead of taking this fact at face value she manages to turn it into a
possible future disadvantage, thus reaffirming the sense of marginalisation expressed in the state-
ment “We are always in the middle”. Natasha’s pessimism serves as an example for the ways in
which “race is being reworked as a divisive and exclusionary political identity [and] mobilised
through discourses of marginalisation and perceptions of ‘un-entitlement’ to socio-economic cit-
izen rights” (Hammett 2010: 256). But according to Hammett the usage of race as a potentially
“exclusionary political identity” in association with “discourses of marginalisation” is comple-
mented by a second theme: “the apolitical conceptualisation of race (of being coloured) linked to
taste and socio-cultural influences and the ‘politics of aspiration’” (Hammett 2010: 256):
The conception of colouredness amongst other groups of students varies and is
often less political in nature. For many youth, the construction of racial
(coloured) identity is about negotiations and appropriations of taste, style and
cultures of consumption. In these practices, being young and coloured is
associated with particular ‘politics of aspiration’ (Steingo, 2005) and the
expression of identity through appeals to images and imaginaries of success and
aspiration that conflate taste and race (Dolby, 2001; Hammett, 2009). Amongst
these students, being coloured is associated with the consumption of specific
musical genres (Western hip-hop and rap music primarily) and fashion/brand
label clothing and accessories. As one student explained, ‘Our coloured people
like to wear like Levi’s and Billabong – we like good stuff’ (Robert, interview, 13
September 2005). For these youth, race does not have an overt political meaning;
being coloured is defined in relation to consumption and given new socio-
cultural meanings. (Hammett 2010: 256)
The survey results and qualitative data presented later confirm the “politics of aspiration” of col-
oured as well as black adolescents in the form of brand-consciousness and consumerism, but
they also show that the persistence, and to some extent re-invention, of racial differences can
only be understood in the interaction between local discourses of nationhood, alienation and be-
5. Race and Identity in Numbers
97
longing on one side and global notions of cosmopolitanism and imagined communities on the
other side. Many white adolescents, for example, are seriously disconnected from many events
and developments in their own country – on a political and cultural level. On the other hand,
they are often passionate about local music and trends – as long as they take place in a distinct
space which takes its cue from a global image of whiteness providing stability and support in a
moment in a time when the self-assuredness of whiteness, in South Africa and elsewhere, is
showing cracks in the face of what is perceived as the growing dominance of African-American
popular culture. But whereas white South Africans only relatively recently started to show signs
of self-doubt in face of a changing political landscape (at least on a large scale – alternative youth
movements such as Punk or Voëlvry already existed in the 1980s), colouredness in South Africa
is inherently entangled in a discourse of erasure and reification as a result of the vagueness, ambi-
guity and vulnerability associated with being the hybrid category within a essentially binary
concept of race. This sense of being in the middle, or being left out and neglected, is at the core
of a discourse of marginalisation which continues to define the making and re-making of col-
oured identities in South Africa. While a minority of coloured youth seeks to overcome this vul-
nerability by aligning themselves with black South Africans through Black Consciousness ideo-
logy in the tradition of Cape Flats Hip Hop, the majority seeks to escape the South African
context altogether by connecting with American Hip Hop, Gangster Rap, RnB and the crass ma-
terialism associated with those music styles. By doing so they, too, allude to a sense of blackness
which goes beyond the pseudo-biological categories established during colonialism and apar-
theid. But often the self-identification with blackness is restricted to a cosmopolitan understand-
ing which encompasses a certain American ghetto imagery but not necessarily the lived realities
of fellow South Africans.
Given this background and the dichotomous nature in which the arguments for or against af-
firmative action are usually framed, the results shown in figure 5.7 on page 94 can be considered
to be somewhat remarkable. The majorities of all three race groups demonstrate discontent with
the existence or introduction of affirmative action in access to education and employment, as
well as racial quotas in national sports teams selections, even though these levels are considerably
higher for white (more than nine out of ten across the board) than coloured (around two-thirds
for education and employment; closer to nine out of ten for sports) and black respondents (more
than half for employment; roughly three out of five for education and sports). In essence, despite
the presence of a significant discrepancy in the levels of (dis-)agreement with affirmative action
policies in accordance with how they affect members of the individual groups differently, the
majority of respondents does actually oppose them, which can be seen as a general preparedness
among the participants of the survey to move beyond racial discourse and racial markers in en-
suring a just and fair distribution of life chances in South African society.
Thus, despite clear differences in the evaluation of the past and the acknowledgement of racial
problems in the present (members of all three groups feel discriminated) the main impression
from the chart is that young South Africans, at least those participating in the survey, are gen-
erally prepared to leave the old racial divides and move forward.
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But it also needs to be said that it is relatively ‘easy’ to agree to these reconciliatory notions and
sentiments unless one harbours serious reservations about the project of nation-making and
democracy-building in a non-racial, new South Africa. Whether they have actual consequences in
the way South Africans, and in this case South African youth, approach ‘others’ in real life situ-
ations is the subject of a series of survey questions in which respondents were asked if they
would mind someone from a specific race category to marry a close family member and what
they think about dating someone from a specific group. And as the following figures show: it is
still far from common, at least for the survey participants, not to discriminate when race matters
become personal.


























































Family member marries a (...) person?
Don’t mind Mind a little Mind a lot
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
Black respondents are generally least discriminant of new family members from another race
group than their own. In fact, and in line with the earlier observations about self-discriminatory
tendencies among black respondents, a marginally bigger proportion (about one percent differ-
ence) of that group prefers a white over a black new family member. And again: the possible
reasons behind these numbers are manifold; there might be problem with the actual wording of
the question and its answers which makes them difficult to understand correctly for non-native
English speakers, or a more nuanced understanding of marriage as an institution might exist
among some respondents which is in contradiction to the crude racial categorisation and blunt
directness of the question itself. Arguably a part of the discrepancy can be explained by these and
similar reasons, yet one also needs to take into consideration that coloureds are the least popular
among black respondents by a considerable margin which negates the assumption that the ques-
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tions were answered uniformly and in disregard of racial categories.
In any case, the results for coloured and white respondents speak a clearer language; only about
half of the respondents in these groups would not mind if a close relative married a black per-
son. This is a very low proportion considering that the admission of actually ‘minding’ is a rather
problematic statement to make. Less surprisingly, members of both groups are generally open
towards intra-racial marriages with nine out of ten coloured and almost all white respondents
having no objections against a coloured relative marrying a coloured partner or a white relative
marrying a white partner, respectively. Differences occur, however, when the question is about
marrying someone from the other group; compared to the low level of tolerance towards black
partners, coloured respondents are relatively accepting of white partners; three-quarters would
not mind. White respondents on the other hand show a significantly lower tolerance level to-
wards coloured partners; only two-thirds do not mind.
In summary one can say that the group which experiences the highest level of acceptance amon-
gst all groups, white respondents, is the one which is the least tolerant of ‘outsiders’ in their own
families, whereas those who are most tolerant of ‘others’, black respondents, are the ones which
experience the least tolerance among the other groups. Coloured respondents share whites re-
spondents’ ambiguity towards black South Africans, but also experience less acceptance among
white respondents than vice versa.
One needs to keep in mind that coloured and especially white students in the sample are the
ones most exposed to interracial contact on a daily basis as most of them frequent more diverse
schools than most of the black kids in the sample. These findings are therefore fairly dis-
couraging with regard to the hopes and expectations associated with children of the post-apar-
theid generation who were supposed to overcome political and cultural differences inherited by
colonialism and apartheid in a sort of playful way, simply by going to the same schools. This
pessimistic outlook becomes even more valid if one looks at the respondents’ willingness to date
someone from another group.
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Would you mind dating a (...) person?
Don’t mind Mind a little Mind a lot
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
The results shown in the pie graphs above largely resemble those shown in figure 5.8 on page 99,
with two noteworthy exceptions: while both coloured and white respondents already show little
tolerance towards interracial marriages involving black individuals within their own families,
these levels are even lower in terms of dating. Just under one third coloured and over one-
quarter of white respondents would not mind dating a black person.
An additional question concerning the survey participants’ tolerance towards ‘others’ within their
own social environment was about their preference of living in a ‘mono-racial’ opposed to a
‘mixed’ neighbourhood. About one out of six black (17%), one out of five (22%) and one out of
four (24%) white respondents said that they would actually prefer to live in a neighbourhood
with only members of their ‘own race’. These again are high figures, and taking into account the
results for marriage and dating one can assume that they would be even substantially higher for
certain group-specific combinations among white and coloured respondents.
In summary: the notions of ‘colour-blindness’ and ‘moving forward’ observed in the ways espe-
cially white respondents answered questions on racial categorisation and racial attitudes are to a
large degree refuted by the level of discrimination found in the responses to the marriage and
dating questions. Even if there exists a certain shared willingness to move beyond racial dis-
course, stereotyping and ‘othering’ based on race continue to be common practice in South
Africa. Given the persistency of ‘race thinking’ and racial discrimination in South Africa, it will
be interesting to see whether similar observations can be made for the Brazilian context.
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Figure 5.10 Dotplot: Racial Attitudes by Race (Belo Horizonte, Means)35
Racial discrimination does not exist in Brazil.
____________________________________________________________
Against AA in access to higher education.
____________________________________________________________
Against AA on labour market.
____________________________________________________________
Whites richer than blacks due to historical injustices.
____________________________________________________________
Black people are as competent as white people.
____________________________________________________________
Without whites Brazil would not be as developed.
____________________________________________________________
Without blacks Brazil would not be as developed.
____________________________________________________________
People from my racial group are being discriminated against.
____________________________________________________________
1 2 3 4 5
In Brazil we do not talk about race issues enough.
____________________________________________________________
Preto/Negro Pardo/Mestizo White
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
In general, the respondents in Belo Horizonte responded far more homogeneously to the attitu-
dinal probes, arguably partly due to the absence of some of the more controversial statements re-
ferring to South Africa’s much more recent and immediate troublesome history of institutional-
ised racial discrimination. Even more so, the generally strong support for “White people are
richer than black people due to historical injustices” and “Black people are as competent as
white people” and the general lack of agreement that Brazil would not be developed without
either black or white people are strong signs that the earlier observed non-racialism is also pre-
valent here. Nonetheless there are two related points in Figure 5.10 which speak against the of-
ten-cited image of Brazilian racial harmony: respondents from all groups strongly disagree that
racial discrimination does not exist in Brazil, and negro/preto respondents feel significantly
stronger discriminated than their pardo or white counterparts (the respective Mann-Whitney
statistic comparing the two means reports a p-value of 0.000).
Thus, despite the general sense of non-racialism apparent in the data, there is strong evidence
that the respondents’ own perceptions of race and racial discriminations do not necessarily coin-
35. Statements are abbreviated. See the questionnaire in the appendix for the complete wording; Symbols show
group means based on a five-degree Likert scale: (1) “Strongly Disagree” (2) “Disagree” (3) “Neither agree nor
disagree” (4) “Disagree” (5) “Strongly Disagree”.
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cide with this impression, leading the discussion to the marriage and dating questions introduced
in the Cape Town section earlier.


















































Family member marries a (...) person?
Don’t mind Mind a little/Mind a lot
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
Although the overall picture looks very different from Figure 5.8 on page 99, there are certain
similarities; negro/preto respondents, like black respondents in the Cape Town sample, are the
least discriminating group, a small proportion of pardo survey participants show an animosity to-
wards marriages with a pardo individual, whereas a similarly small proportion of white respond-
ents have the same sentiments towards pardo, and, to a much greater degree (seventeen percent)
towards negro/preto people. Even if these numbers are low compared to the Cape Town numbers,
they do not correspond with the image of non-racialism which has so far dominated the analysis
of the Belo Horizonte data. Instead they are much more in line with the acknowledgement of
race issues seen in Figure 5.10 on the previous page and the feeling of being discriminated of
nego/preto respondents. This trend becomes more pronounced as respondents are asked about
their preparedness to get involved with a member from a different race group.
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Would you mind dating a (...) person?
Don’t mind Mind a little/Mind a lot
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
Again, as it has been the case with the Cape Town sample, the dating question produces an exag-
gerated version of the marriage graph; while preto/negro respondents continue to be largely insus-
ceptible to racial discrimination when it comes to dating, already one out of ten pardo respond-
ents claims to be have second thoughts when considering dating a preto/negro boy or girl.
Accordingly, about the same proportion of white respondents feels that way about pardo indi-
viduals. But the most intriguing finding concerns white respondents’ attitude towards dating
someone who is classified as preto/negro; just above a quarter of them have doubts when it comes
to that. While this is still a far cry from the three quarters of white South African respondents
who are not sure about dating a black girl or boy, it certainly represents a significant deviation
from the non-racialism evident in the previous figures.
Summary
In summary, the discrepancy in the ways respondents from the two samples define themselves –
distinctive heterogeneity across race groups in Cape Town and strong homogeneity in Belo Ho-
rizonte – sets the tone for the remainder of this section; for South Africans ethnicity, race, reli-
gion and youth culture, depending on their racial classification, are the most important sources
of identity. And although race as direct reference only matters for coloured respondents, the
point can be made that the other markers are often used in order to make distinctions which are
at least related to the discourse of race in the South African context. Identity in Brazil, on the
other hand, is first and foremost defined by a strong sense of nationhood and regionalism; about
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sixty percent of the respondents, irrespective of race, use the identifiers “Brazilian” or “Mineiro”
in order to define themselves, racial classification is used only in about ten percent of the cases.
A similar pattern can be seen when it comes to the reasons for the ways in which respondents
classify themselves and others; whereas a majority of black respondents mention heritage, family
or culture as reasons, a relatively large proportion of coloured respondents names society, and an
even larger proportion of white respondents, six out of ten, mentions physical characteristics.
But the Brazilian respondents, regardless of race, top even that figure as three quarters of them
use the phenotype above anything else in order to classify themselves and others in terms of
race.
Regarding the results for the attitudinal questions/statements one needs to distinguish between
differing interpretations of South Africa’s past, which understandably does not apply to the
Brazilian context, and a shared general interest in overcoming the racial divide and to move for-
ward, which seems to resemble the general sentiment in the Brazilian sample. Yet both sets of
results are showing signs that the positive intentions are not necessarily reflected in day to day
experience; especially Brazilian respondents concur that racial discrimination does prevail in
society.
The last part of the chapter supports this impression both in Cape Town as well as Belo Hori-
zonte; when the survey participants are asked to indicate whether they would mind or not mind
if people from different racial categories than their own married into their families or whether
they would mind or not mind becoming involved with someone from a different group an in-
triguing, and worrying, common trend begins to reveal itself: black respondents (negro/preto in the
Brazilian context) generally do not mind in both instances, but coloured (or ‘mixed’ in the
Brazilian context) and especially white respondents are particularly sceptical about having a black
person in the family or dating one themselves.
To interpret this last finding simply as white (and coloured) racism would be understandable, yet
it arguably does not do justice to the complexity of the issue as it ignores the role of deeply in-
grained hierarchies of race which are related to deeply ingrained hierarchies of class representa-
tions. This point leads to the heart of the thesis – the relationship between cultural capital, social
inequality, class and race.
5. Race and Identity in Numbers
105
6. Distinction
The premise of this thesis relies to a large extent on the assumption that the differences in taste
and cultural preferences of South African youth follow class distinctions. However, a large and
growing body of literature suggests that in Western societies these very same class distinctions
are becoming increasingly opaque as the traditional bearers of elitist tastes are being replaced by
cultural omnivores – individuals who seemingly no longer differentiate between high- and low-
brow in their cultural consumption (see page 51).
The case of South African youth presents a fascinating opportunity to apply and test the idea of
the cultural omnivore. Although it has attracted many supporters, the concept has not gone un-
challenged even in the North-American context where it first originated. It is also very rarely ap-
plied in unequal societies such as South Africa, although its basic premise – members of middle-
and upper-class adhering to a non-distinguishable mix of low- and highbrow tastes – resonates
very much with common assumptions about the possibility of a unified public sphere as a result
of a growing middle-class in South Africa. Furthermore, according to proponents of the theory,
what distinguishes the cultural omnivore from his or her antipode (the cultural univore), is not
only a wider range of cultural preferences and activites but also a higher tolerance for those with
other tastes than his or her own, which is a desirable attribute in a nation marked by diversity.
One of the very few applications of the theory in South African scholarship is an investigation
into the preferences for art performances of 500 attendees of the National Arts Festival in 2008
(Snowball, Jamal and Willis 2010). Art performances were categorised into seven types:
• Movies/Films
• Classical music concerts
• Musical theatre or musicals
• Modern or contemporary music concerts or Rock/Pop concerts
• Fine art exhibitions
• Dance, physical theatre, or Ballet
• Stand-up comedy
Apart from questions on attendance the questionnaires distributed among festival goers included
statements such as ‘‘Going to live theatre performances temporarily takes me away from life’s
hassles’’ and respondents were asked to indicate how descriptive these statements were of them-
selves on a 5-degree Likert-scale. It also included socio-demographic questions on home lan-
guage (as a proxy for race and cultural differences), household income, age groups, sex and
nationality.
The findings of the study were that festival-goers by and large (92%) can be described as some
form of cultural omnivore in the sense that they invariably attended both popular as well as high
culture events, but the authors distinguish between three types of omnivores: modern omnivores
(attending at least two of: movies, popular music, comedy), traditional omnivores (attending at
least three of: classical music, musicals, art, dance) and actual cultural omnivores (attending at
least four of: movies, popular music, comedy, classical music, musicals, art, dance). Regression
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analysis using binary variables for attendance as dependent variables and socio-demographic in-
dicators as independent variables showed several statistically significant results with, for example,
age being an important (and intuitive) predictor for someone’s attendance at classical music con-
certs. Overall, the authors conclude that “[f]indings, for the most part, did not show Bourdieu-
like ‘‘high’’ and popular culture consumption patterns that varied mainly according to indicators
of social class, like education and job” (Snowball, Jamal and Willis 2010: 482), thus supporting
the optimistic notion of the homogenising effect of cultural omnivorousness.
However, whether these findings can actually be extrapolated to South African society at large is
questionable. First, as the authors themselves admit, the sample is biased towards a “(...) relat-
ively wealthy and well-educated minority of South African society and it is thus unknown wheth-
er similar patterns can be found in a random sample of South Africans” (Snowball, Jamal and
Willis 2010: 482). To illustrate this bias: 82% of the sample were English-or Afrikaans-speaking
(as home language), 42% were between 18-25 (reflective of the festival taking place in Graham-
stown, a university town) and 30% earned more than R20,000 per month. According to the au-
thors the sample therefore represents primarily an upper-class constituency, thus interpreting the
finding that the vast majority of respondents are some sort of cultural omnivores (according to
their own definition) as evidence for the validity of the omnivore hypothesis in the South Afric-
an context. But this conclusion can be challenged for at least two reasons: (1) It can be argued
that the very attendance of an art festival itself constitutes a very ‘bourgeois’, ‘highbrow’ cultural
activity which takes precedence over the attendances of single events within that festival. Attend-
ance of live art performances is generally a very narrow measurement of cultural consumption as
it requires a much higher level of interest, initiative and resources to attend an event – especially
a ten-day art festival – than listening to music or reading a book. The point that attendance with-
in the festival is secondary is further strengthened by the fact that the National Arts Festival is
specifically designed to showcase the entire range of cultural performances (from popular to
high) and visitors are actively encouraged to venture outside their comfort zones and explore
new forms of cultural expression. (2) Given the nature of the festival, the authors arguably em-
ploy a rather loose definition of cultural omnivorousness by collapsing ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’
omnivores into the same category. In a way it seems as if ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ are only syn-
onyms for the classic high- and lowbrow categories, raising doubts about the legitimacy of de-
scribing members of either group as omnivores. Furthermore, the classification of events used
here goes primarily along a ‘vertical’ axis in that it essentially maintains Bourdieu’s hierarchy of
low- and highbrow cultural consumption but it does not provide much ‘horizontal’ differentia-
tion by dividing at least some of the individual types of events into sub-genres. For example, it
would be interesting to know whether attendants of contemporary music concerts, regardless of
their socio-economic or cultural background, went to see the same artists. But even with this
knowledge the findings would have been spurious in that they could easily reflect just a measure-
ment of curiosity rather than actual taste. After all, a white middle-aged professional watching a
show by a local Hip Hop group from Khayelitsha at the National Arts Festival is a very different
thing from a black teenager from that very township downloading and listening to every song of
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the band on her cellphone. Or to further illustrate the point: a classical music concert or a fine
art exhibition held in a township would also likely draw a large audience but one would not ne-
cessarily describe all attendants as connoisseurs of classical music or fine art and therefore as cul-
tural omnivores.
Atkinson (2011), in his pointed critique of cultural omnivorousness, goes even further by making
the argument that not the consumption of different forms of culture is the deciding factor but,
using music as an example, the genesis of musical proclivities, which often can only be revealed
through qualitative accounts:
Specifically, the very inculcation of cultural capital in childhood, the formation of
symbolic mastery, dovetails with an apprenticeship in classical music, manifest in,
above all, a proficiency in playing classical music on ‘noble’ instruments—
whether piano, cello, clarinet, viola or orchestral percussion—or if not that, then
a serious pursuit of ballet, always started in early life with the encouragement or
even exhortation of parents eager to invest capital and strengthened through
frequent contact with the paraphernalia of music. (Atkinson 2011: 175)
Although this chapter cannot provide the depth of analysis Atkinson demands36 it does offer a
critical application of the omnivore hypothesis in the South African context, which goes beyond
mere exercises of categorisation. The purpose of this in relation to the larger thesis is to gain a
nuanced understanding of the unifying but also divisive nature of popular culture, especially with
regard to racial differences. Just as much as an optimistic reading of cultural omnivorousness
evokes hopes of greater homogeneity among future generations of South Africans, a pessimistic
reading of distinction would imply a continuation of the fault lines of class and race running
through society to this day.
To this end this chapter consists of the analysis of three survey questions: “Who are your idols?”
“What music do you like?” “What are your favourite brands?” All three questions refer to the embodied
form of cultural capital (“long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body” according to Bourdieu)
in terms of the broader definition of cultural capital that includes dispositions to certain forms of
popular culture that go beyond the ‘classic’ distinction between lowbrow and highbrow and do
justice to the context of contemporary South African youth culture. Apart from merely describ-
ing the racialisation of South African youth culture, special attention is given to testing the rela-
tionship between embodied and institutionalised cultural capital (schools attended by respond-
ents) using regression analysis. The statistical analysis of the survey results is supported by
interview excerpts grounding the statistical results in lived experiences of South African youth.
Here a discursive approach is employed in order to demonstrate the ongoing salience of racial di-
visions in South African youth while showing the diversity of individual tastes and cultural pref-
erences within these subdivisions.
36. Despite his advocacy for qualitative research Atkinson (2011: 185) does acknowledge the need for quantitative
research on distinction:
The lesson is thus that quantitative research—necessary for displaying national patterns and
international comparisons—must be alive to possibilities for a more nuanced analysis.
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6.1 Who are your idols?
While music taste remains the litmus test for testing hypotheses of distinction, the survey ques-
tionnaire was designed to also include other aspects of taste relevant to youth. One of them has
been surprisingly neglected in studies of distinction and omnivorousness: fandom. Although
there is a large body of work on the subject it is commonly in literature on identity and mostly in
connection with sports, and virtually non-existent in studies of taste and distinction. Interest-
ingly, one of the very few exceptions is the survey conducted by Smith (2011: 123) for her PhD
thesis on media consumption of black youth around Durban, in which she asked the questions
“Who is/are your role model(s)?” and “What television personality would you most like to be like?” But while
the results to these questions will be discussed below, it is worth mentioning that Smith did not
relate them to distinction either.
In order to get the most accurate impression of fandom at the surveyed schools the respondents
were asked to write down up to five names as a response to the open-ended question “Who are
your idols?”37. The inclusion of the question in the questionnaire was rather experimental as the
quality and the very nature of the results were unpredictable. The experiment was a success in
the sense that the clean38 list of responses comprises 942 individual names which can be matched
with a celebrity using Google and Wikipedia. Table 6.1 lists the ‘top idols’ for each race group in
order to illustrate the choices made by the respondents and to give a first impression of their
variability across the different groups.
37. The full question: “In the space below please provide us with a list of your idols. It can include any local or
international celebrity (for example a famous politician, writer, musician, television- or film star), who is
important to you. You can write down up to five names. Please write each name on a separate line.”
38. Apart from correcting spelling mistakes and substituting nicknames and pseudonyms with full names, data
cleaning also meant the replacement of musicians’ names with band names, where applicable, in order to avoid
multiple mentions of different members of one and the same band. Mentions of family members and friends
were retained although they do not represent celebrities. 38 names were either invalid (illegible or abstract) and
a further 35 names could not be matched with a celebrity.
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Table 6.1 Top Idols (Cape Town)39
Rank African/Black Coloured White
1 Zola Nelson Mandela Nelson Mandela
2 Nelson Mandela Beyonce Oprah Winfrey
3 Beyonce Oprah Winfrey Jessica Alba
4 Oprah Winfrey Akon Lance Armstrong
5 Rihanna T Pain Angelina Jolie
6 Ntando Jessica Alba Charlize Theron
7 DJ Sbu Chris Brown Eminem
8 Eminem Tupac AB de Villiers
9 Menzi Ngubane Mariah Carey Bob Marley
10 R Kelly 50Cent Johnny Depp
11 Rebecca Malope Christiano Ronaldo Kelly Slater
12 Sonia Sedibe Jennifer Lopez 50Cent
13 Thabo Mbeki Tyra Banks Beyonce
14 Jackie Chan Ciara Natalie Du Toit
15 Chris Brown Rihanna Nirvana
16 Mandoza Angelina Jolie Red Hot Chili Peppers
17 50Cent Timbaland Sandra Bullock
18 Justin Timberlake Justin Timberlake Slipknot
19 Usher Pharrell Tyra Banks
20 DJ Fresh David Beckham Victor Matfield
… Halle Berry Usher
… Steven Seagal
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
A glance at Table 6.1 reveals a number of intriguing links between the choices respondents make
regarding their favourite idols and discourses of identity and difference. The most consistent
choices across all three groups are Nelson Mandela and Oprah Winfrey. Mandela’s popularity is
self-explanatory given South Africa’s recent history but Oprah Winfrey’s case is particularly in-
teresting as she managed to command a great presence in South Africa’s public life in recent
years through numerous well-publicised visits to the country, attendance at major events, in-
volvement in charity and the opening of a school for gifted girls from disadvantaged back-
grounds. Her actions have gained her great popularity and respect among many South Africans,
39. Mentions of family members, especially parents (either as “parent”, “parents” or “mother”, but notably never
“father”) have been removed from these lists, but it is noteworthy that they are the most frequent choice
among white respondents.




including most of the interview participants who would acknowledge her positive involvement in
South Africa to the extent that one interview participant was absolutely convinced that Oprah
was actually from South Africa. Oprah’s popularity in this survey directly matches the findings of
Smith (2011: 123), who in her own survey on media consumption of Durban youth also found
Oprah to be the best-liked TV personality.
Beyond these two iconic figures the similarities between the separate lists become incoherent and
partial; there are a few shared names of Hip Hop and RnB stars, especially between black and
coloured respondents, but other than that mostly differences stand out. The most obvious, for
example, concerns the numbers and rankings of South African celebrities in each list. While
black respondents have eight South Africans among their top idols, including then president
Thabo Mbeki, coloured respondents have none, apart from Nelson Mandela, and white respond-
ents have five: Mandela, two rugby players, a Hollywood actress and a swimmer, all of them
white (apart from Mandela).
Of course these lists are merely for descriptive and illustrative purposes as they cover only a part
of all the mentions made by the survey participants. For a more reliable and meaningful analysis
it was necessary to condense the data by grouping the individual idols in categories.
• Society: Politicians, social movement leaders and historical figures
• Culture: Artists, writers, poets, classical musicians
• Religion: Religious figures and leaders
• Family: Parents, grandparents, siblings, extended family
• Sports: Active sportsmen, sports legends, sport functionaries
• Media: Actors, film and TV characters, TV and radio presenters
• Music: Singers, bands, musicians (excluding classical music)
Table 6.2 shows the percentages of respondents mentioning the separate categories at least once
in their list of idols, by race. 
Table 6.2 Mentions of Idols by Race (Cape Town, Percentages)
African/Black Coloured White Total
Music 87 73 47 75
Media 58 59 49 57
Society 43 23 29 33
Sports 13 25 31 21
Family 5 13 21 11
Culture 6 5 11 7
Religion 1 2 5 2
Total 894 667 291 1852
Cases 418 335 150 903
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
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Similar to the lists of individual idols before, the separate frequency distributions summarised in
Table 6.2 show both similarities regarding the most popular categories and clear differences re-
garding the less frequent choices. The greatest commonality is that media (especially actors) and
music stars together represent the most popular choice of idols regardless of race. The society
category is also relatively popular among members of all three groups but is marginally topped
by sports celebrities among coloured and white respondents.
Overall the most fundamental difference between the three groups is the sheer number of idols
mentioned; black respondents wrote down 4.5 names on average, coloured 3.8, and white only 3.
Accordingly a χ²-test on the number of idols mentioned and race reports a statistically significant
result (p=0.000). This pattern will continue throughout the rest of the analysis as white respond-
ents consistently tend to provide less responses to open-ended questions (see section 6.3 on
brand preferences on page 134) and be less ‘enthusiastic’ about distributing scores for music acts
(see the following section on page 121). Although it is ultimately impossible to tell whether this
is due to a flaw in the research design or a genuine and meaningful difference in the way mem-
bers from different groups answer survey questions, one could explain the discrepancy by a gen-
eral lack of engagement with popular culture in general, or a sense of complacency (or disillu-
sionment), among better-off youth (which are mainly represented by white respondents in the
sample), in line with some of the characteristics describing cultural omnivores in Western societ-
ies (see chapter 3.1 on pages 40-43). This point is further supported by the greater range of
choices across all categories among white and, to a lesser extent, coloured respondents compared
to black respondents; whereas the preferences of the latter group centre around media, music
and society, almost a third of white respondents mentioned a sportsperson and about a fifth a
family member40. And even though only five and ten percent of white respondents named a reli-
gious or cultural figure, respectively, these ratios are still considerably higher than those for black
respondents, which adds further plausibility to the prevalence of cultural omnivouresness among
better-off, white respondents in line with the results by Snowball et al (2010).
In order to explore the interplay between race and class as well as language, gender and schools
in more detail a series of logit regressions has been conducted. To this end, the various categor-
ies of idols were grouped into two categories, respectively speaking to forms of cultural capital
that is acquired (society, culture, religion, family) or mediated (music, media, sports) – see page
50 for a discussion of mediated (adopted from media/public) vs acquired (acquired through
school/family) cultural peferences. The two sets of regressions determine the probabilities of
having at least one ‘acquired’ or ‘medidated’ idol in the list for two different subsamples; one
looks only at city schools (all schools but township schools), the other only at African/black re-
40. The low frequency of mentions of parents (especially fathers) for black respondents is in contrast to the
findings of Smith’s (2011: 123) survey, in which “(...) the overwhelming majority of respondents in both urban
and peri-urban sites indicated their ‘mother’ (specifically) was their role model.” Whether this is a result of the
different wording of the question – Smith used “role model” instead of “idol” and did not ask specifically for
names of celebrities – or different sampling or a real difference between youth in Durban and Cape Town can
ultimately not be determined.
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spondents (see the discussion on pages 25 to 28 for more details). Concerning the expected res-
ults it is possible to distinguish between two sets of hypotheses: either one expects a direct posit-
ive correlation between class and taste assuming a linear change in quality from acquired to
mediated (following ‘classic’ interpretations of class-based distinction) or a more complex rela-
tionship in which acquired cultural capital is positively associated with class but mediated cultur-
al capital is neutral.
Table 6.3 Logit: Idol Acquired/Mediated (Odds Ratios, Cape Town)
Mediated Acquired
Subsample City Schools African/Black City Schools African/Black






English: Native 0.552 (omitted) 1.288 0.387
(0.372) (0.435) (0.115)
English: Preferred
English: Other 0.327 1.822 0.945 0.579
(0.145) (0.605) (0.884) (0.222)
Male 1.720 0.338 0.418*** 1.320
(0.115) (0.200) (0.000) (0.168)
School: Southern/Flats 4.191**
(0.003)




Class 0.970 0.976 1.021** 1.005
(0.057) (0.521) (0.004) (0.616)
Observations 539 384 539 408
Pseudo R² 0.108 0.060 0.112 0.009
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
On first sight the findings seem to support the omnivore thesis: class does not affect mediated
but only, statistically significantly, acquired choices (the null-hypotheses that a negative relation-
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ship exists between class and mediated and none between class and acquired are both negative).41
However, this interpretation, based purely on the statistical significance of the class variable, is
misleading for a number of reasons. First, although the class variable is insignificant at the
p<0.05 level, it proves to be significant at the p<0.06 level, which is good enough to accept the
first null-hypothesis and thus reject the omnivore hypothesis. But in any case the formal evalu-
ation of the class variable shall not distract from the race effect which makes a straightforward
interpretation of Table 6.3 difficult. First of all, not only are the predictive values of the two
African/black models very weak (Pseudo R²<0.12) but they also do not report any statistical sig-
nificant independent variables, suggesting that black respondents make very similar choices, in-
dependent of their socio-economic background or where they go to school. Accordingly, black
respondents at city schools are six times more likely to have a mediated idol compared to col-
oured respondents, controlling for class, school, language and school, allowing for the interpreta-
tion that black respondents are generally far more likely to have a mediated idol than white and
coloured respondents. Between coloured and white respondents a significant difference in their
choices of mediated and acquired idols is not directly discernible, yet students at predominantly
coloured schools (Southern/Flats) are about four times more likely to have a mediated idol than
their peers at predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic), who are three times more likely
to have an acquired idol.
Thus, one can draw the following conclusions based on the results in Table 6.3. A statistical rel-
evant relationship between class and the quality of taste, here exemplified by the choices of idols
made by respondents divided into mediated and acquired, does exist but it is intercepted by race
in two different ways: class does not matter among black respondents who generally have a
much higher appreciation for mediated idols compared to their coloured and white peers. But
among those visiting city schools class does matter; in line with previous findings on the class/
taste relationship respondents from poorer families (more accurately: adolescents staying in
poorer suburbs) are more drawn towards mediated idols and less acquired idols than kids from
wealthier families (areas). And although a direct relationship between race and class is not discer-
nible, an interaction between race and schools certainly exists; controlling for class, among other
variables, respondents at the predominantly coloured schools (Southern/Flats) are far more
likely to have a mediated idol and those at predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic) are
more likely to have an acquired idol. From these two findings we can also infer that white re-
spondents at predominantly coloured schools (Southern/Flats) are more likely to have a medi-
ated idol (Mann-Whitney test: z=1.816, p=0.069) and less likely to have an acquired idol than
their counterparts at predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic) (Mann-Whitney test:
z=-2.482, p=0.013), while coloured respondents at predominantly white schools (Northern/
Atlantic) are less likely to have mediated idols than their coloured peers at predominantly col-
41. The seemingly weak change in the odds ratio for the class variable can be misleading, considering it applies to a
scale from 1 to 100. For example, in the case of the city schools/acquired scenario an odds ratio of 1.02 means
a doubled increase in odds (to have an acquired idol) for a respondent with class = 79 (staying in Wynberg),
compared to class = 29 (staying in Guguletu), since 0.02 * (79-29) = 1.
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oured schools (Southern/Flats) (Mann-Whitney test: z=-3.444, p=0.001) and more likely than
them to have an acquired idol (Mann-Whitney test: z=3.811, p=0.000). These findings support
the assumption that a correlation between embodied cultural capital (idols) and institutionalised
cultural capital (schooling), as discussed in subchapter 7.8 on pages 186 to 214, does indeed exist.
The qualitative difference in idol choices notwithstanding, the two most popular categories
among respondents from all backgrounds are the music and media ones, including famous act-
ors. In order to get a better understanding of the heterogeneity within these broad categories,
one of them (music) is being subdivided into separate genres, as seen in the following table.
Table 6.4 Mentions of Music Idols by Race (Cape Town, Percentages)
African/Black Coloured White Total
RnB 49 55 10 47
Hip Hop 33 60 21 41
Kwaito/House 57 2 1 31
Pop 13 28 28 20
Afropop 22 0 1 12
Rock 3 7 58 10
Gospel 15 2 0 9
Total 693 373 85 1151
Cases 361 242 71 674
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
Some of the interview excerpts exhibited various ways in which adolescents regularly make refer-
ence to music in order to express how they perceive themselves in society, but also how they see
‘others’. Music is often used as a shortcut to convey assumed knowledge about different seg-
ments of society and more often than not these differentiations have racial connotations. Using
these connotations as the backdrop for meta-narratives of racial identity carries the risk of over-
generalising certain trends and ignoring the nuances and variety of music tastes among the separ-
ate groups. The proportions of frequency distributions in Table 6.4, however, largely justify or at
least support the assumptions behind the race/taste binaries described by the interviewees; sing-
ers and bands of (predominantly) local music genres such as Afropop, House/Kwaito and Gos-
pel are almost exclusively favoured by black respondents. Representatives of other styles domin-
ated by North American artists, such as Hip Hop and RnB, are relatively popular among all race
groups, but especially among coloured respondents, whereas Rock singers and bands are idolised
most strongly by white respondents. The most ambiguous genre is Pop, likely due to the broad
definition of that category, followed by Hip Hop and RnB which are both especially popular
among black and coloured respondents. With regards to the class-based hypotheses on taste
preferences, these clear differences further illustrate the need to discuss class effects on taste in
relation to race and racialised class status. Accordingly, Table 6.5 summarises the regressions
testing the strength of the correlation between race and two of the ambiguous music idol cat-
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egories in combination with other structural factors, such as class, among respondents at city
schools.
Table 6.5 Logit: Idol Music Categories – City Schools (Odds Ratios, Cape Town)
Hip Hop RnB






English: Native 1.370 0.908
(0.349) (0.785)










Pseudo R² 0.161 0.231
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
The race-based differences in music idol preferences evident in the cross-tabulations are re-
peated in the regression results: although there is no statistically significant difference between
black and coloured respondents when it comes to Hip Hop and RnB idols, the odds for a white
respondent to have a rapper or RnB singer on her or his list is only about a fifth of those for a
coloured respondent, controlling for language, gender, school and class. Class itself does matter,
statistically speaking, at least with regards to Hip Hop; although the odds ratio seems marginal it
represents a 0.16 decrease in odds for each one-step increase on the 100-levels class scale. For
the RnB variable class does not show significance, which is arguably partly due to the strong
gender effect: the chance that a boy has a RnB idol is a fraction (0.2) of that of a girl. Moreover,
while exponents of both genres are very likely to be popular among respondents from predom-
inantly coloured schools (Southern/Flats), this is especially true for RnB, as the odds in this case
are more than three times higher compared to predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic).
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So just as with general idol categories before, it makes a difference what kind of school you go
to: white kids going to predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic) are much less likely to
have a Hip Hop (Mann-Whitney test: z=4.180, p=0.000) or RnB idol (Mann-Whitney test:
z=4.791, p=0.000) than white kids going to predominantly coloured schools (Southern/Flats),
while coloured kids going to predominantly coloured schools (Southern/Flats) are more likely to
have a Hip Hop (Mann-Whitney test: z=-2.606, p=0.009) or RnB idol (Mann-Whitney test:
z=-3.538, p=0.000) than their coloured peers at predominantly white schools (Northern/
Atlantic). These findings give way to a similar preliminary conclusion like the previous results
from the general idol regressions: both class and race are valid predictors for determining
someone’s choice of a Hip Hop or RnB artist, yet the most intriguing result is found in the actual
variability of these seemingly fixed associations when they are compared across different types of
school. Again, a certain hierarchy is discernible, in that respondents at predominantly coloured
schools (Southern/Flats) are inherently more strongly associated with the Hip Hop and RnB
idols category than those at predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic). The implications
of these findings with regards to cultural omnivorousness, the interplay between embodied and
institutionalised cultural capital and distinction within popular culture will be discussed at the
end of this chapter on pages 150 to 153.
As much as the findings presented in Table 6.5 provide a good understanding for the distinction
between white and coloured, they do not satisfactorily answer the same questions concerning
black respondents. Therefore Table 6.6 presents a series of regression models restricted to black
respondents.
Table 6.6 Logit: Idol Music Categories – African/Black (Cape Town, Odds Ratios)
Afropop Kwaito/House Hip Hop RnB
Subsample African/Black African/Black African/Black African/Black
English: Native 0.927 2.071 1.175 0.709
(0.959) (0.276) (0.792) (0.584)
English: Other 4.734 2.374 0.611 0.673
(0.137) (0.090) (0.285) (0.398)
Male 0.267*** 1.661* 2.427*** 0.262***
(0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000)
School: Townships 6.153 6.020* 0.807 0.859
(0.115) (0.011) (0.725) (0.799)
Class 1.011 1.006 0.997 0.989
(0.527) (0.611) (0.802) (0.282)
Observations 408 408 408 408
Pseudo R² 0.095 0.056 0.039 0.080
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
The most fundamental result emerging from Table 6.6 is the general homogeneity of black re-
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spondents in their choices of music idols, if one ignores the gender effect (boys are far more
likely to have a Hip Hop or Kwaito idol than girls, who are more likely to have a RnB or Afro-
pop idol). Language or class play hardly any significant role, but schooling – institutionalised cul-
tural capital – is important in the case of Kwaito and House music, which are far more popular
among those who visit one of the schools in the townships. This last finding lends further sup-
port to the assumption that schooling does indeed influence taste and it does so in correlation
with racialised perceptions of class representations, which will be discussed in detail at the end of
the chapter.
So far the results have helped a lot to gain a better understanding of the interaction between race
and class in the making of young people’s taste preferences, here exemplified by their choices of
idols. They have also revealed the importance of gender dynamics in the process. One aspect,
however, which has not received enough attention is the question of locality: do black respond-
ents really have more South African idols than coloured and white respondents as implied by the
list of top idols on page 110?








































Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
Black, coloured and white respondents have in common a strong preference for non-South
African (mostly North-American) musicians and actors (media and music). But only large pro-
portions of black respondents also favour South Africans in those categories, while the numbers
of coloured and white respondents are marginal, which perfectly reflects the impression gained
from the list of idols on page 110. They do show sizable support for South African representat-
ives of the society category, but again the proportion of black respondents exceeds this by the
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factor two. About one out of ten white respondents gave the name of a foreign celebrity in the
society and culture category while only a small minority of coloured and black respondents made
a similar choice.
What these numbers show is an association between local and global cultural preferences and
race, adding a further dimension to the nature of distinction and probing the validity of cultural
omnivorousness among young South Africans (especially white young South Africans). The
question is whether the simple distinction between ‘low’ and ‘high’ culture really does justice to
the diversity of cultural activities today as aspects such as locality can be argued to matter just as
much as their perceived cultural value. In the concrete case of South African youth: Would it be
valid to describe middle- and upper-class South Africans as cultural omnivores just because they
are knowledgeable both of popular and more ‘sophisticated’ music or does it matter that they are
likely to be knowledgeable of only a particular kind of popular music (mostly American and
South African Pop and Rock) but do not know much of the South African music enjoyed by the
majority of their peers (for example House and Kwaito)? This question leads to further questions
regarding the notion of cosmopolitanism which is often associated with cultural omnivorousness
(Cheyne and Binder 2010: 3). As Cheyne and Binder (2010: 2), in their article on the importance
of locality in American elite taste for Hip Hop music, observed: cultural omnivores in the States
do not indiscriminately appropriate forms of popular culture such as Hip Hop but according to
certain criteria:
Elite critics’ writings signal to readers cultivating omnivorous taste a logic of
appropriation that incorporates or rejects rap music based on three place-based
criteria. They write that rap must be produced in local places, not in corporate
studios for the national market, to be authentic; that ‘‘the ghetto’’ is a site from
which rap full of personal meaning emerges; and that foreign rap is aesthetically
innovative and politically important when compared to domestic production.
This is not to say that the same criteria apply to South African youth with a relatively wide range
of cultural preferences, but place and locality certainly matter when it comes to distinction
among South African youth. Asked directly whether they connect more with American than with
South African popular culture, the following results emerged:
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Figure 6.2 Local vs American Cultural Preferences
I prefer watching foreign TV channels.
________________________________________
I prefer watching American TV shows.
________________________________________
I prefer watching American movies.
________________________________________
I prefer listening to American music.
________________________________________
I prefer listening to international
music on radio.
________________________________________
1 2 3 4 5
I prefer American music, TV and movies.
________________________________________
African/Black Coloured White
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
Figure 6.2 allows for two basic yet crucial observations. First, there is a general preference for
American music, television and movies across all three groups. However, and this is the second
observation, black respondents show much lower levels of preference than their white and col-
oured peers. One reading of these findings is that, compared to coloured and white youth, black
adolescents feel ‘more at home’ in the new South Africa. A more nuanced reading goes further
by questioning the common notion of cosmopolitan identities being associated with cultural om-
nivorousness. What seems to be emerging instead is a sense of disconnectedness of middle- and
upper-class (and especially white and coloured) youth from the discourse of cultural identities,
and ultimately nation-making, in South Africa. It relates to what Soudien, in his work on old and
new forms of privilege at South African schools, refers to as “Global Whiteness”:
The first is referred to as Global Whiteness – an association with successful
White middle-class lifestyles elsewhere in the world and a dissociation from Black
South Africa. This discourse has come to be associated particularly, but not
exclusively, with English-speaking White South Africans. Ambiguity of identity is
a persistent theme in this group. Levels of identification with Africa were found
to be low. (Soudien 2010: 354)
But before these observations are thoroughly discussed at the end of the chapter, the following
section will look at music taste more closely.
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6.2 What music do you like?
The gradual shift from idols in general to the focus on music in the previous section is not acci-
dental, as music, and the styles and scenes associated with music, is considered to be the most
immediate but also most layered and meaningful representation of youth culture. Bourdieu, too,
gave music a special status among the different forms of cultural consumption, writing in Distinc-
tion that “nothing more clearly affirms one’s class, nothing more infallibly classifies, than tastes in
music” (Bourdieu 2010: 10), and the first pages of Distinction are dedicated to class differences in
music taste. But of course Bourdieu’s idea of such differences were very different to the ones to
be measured here; his analysis dealt with the familiarity with classical pieces such as Well-Tempered
Clavier, Rhapsody in Blue and Blue Danube, none of which could be expected to be recognised by
more than a very small fraction of the participants of this survey.
Regardless of whether his analysis of the cultural preferences of French was biased towards an
overly elitist understanding of culture, a strict division into lowbrow and highbrow forms of cul-
ture as envisioned by Bourdieu simply would not lead to any meaningful results in any contem-
porary context. Yet, as the results to the idol questions show, differences between cultural pref-
erences still exist and they correlate with class as well as race and gender. To what extent they are
indeed signs of real distinction will be further explored in this section using statistical analysis of
two survey questions on music as well as qualitative analysis of interview material on music taste.
The first survey question on music taste asked respondents to choose their favourite music
styles. The results show a correlation with race, in line with results taken from the All Media and
Product Survey (AMPS) 2007 (SAARF 2007), in which participants were asked the same ques-
tion. Although the question posed to the schoolchildren offers more possible answers than the
one posed in the AMPS, the results for the most popular choices do corroborate, as the follow-
ing two charts show.
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Kwaito Rap/Hip Hop Rock/Pop
House/Techno/Electro R&B/Soul Gospel
Source: AMPS 2007






























Kwaito Rap/Hip Hop Rock/Pop
House/Techno/Electro R&B/Soul Gospel
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
42. Weighted data based on a sample of 16-19yrs olds in Cape Town (applies also to the other AMPS graphs).
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The numbers depicted in Figure 6.3 need to be treated with caution. The genres are broad and
the distinctions between them vague. This is especially true for House music which incorporates
and influences many other electronic music styles, such as Kwaito and Trance which were also
included in the list of possible answers. In general, most of these broad classifications can be re-
classified into more refined sub-categories. Further, in both surveys the question allows for mul-
tiple choices, which makes it easy for respondents to make light-minded selections, especially
those who like to say that they “like a bit of everything”, even if they tend to listen to one kind
of music more frequently than others.
Therefore the survey included a second, more nuanced measure of music taste by asking re-
spondents to rate a total of 42 bands and musicians with scores from 1 (“Awful!”) to 5 (“I love
that stuff!”). The list of artists was compiled using current music charts and feedback from the
pilot study, and incorporates local and international artists which were classified according to
genres.
Table 6.7 Music Genres (Cape Town)
US Hip Hop
50 Cent, Eminem, Kanye West, Pharell, Run DMC, Timbaland, Tupac Shakur
US Pop/RnB
Gwen Stefani, Kelly Clarkson Black Eyed Peas, Beyonce, John Legend, Justin Timberlake, Mary
J Blige, R. Kelly, Rihanna
South African Hip Hop43/Kwaito
Bongo Muffin, Brasse van die Kaap, Driemanskap, Godessa, Pitch Black Afro, Skwatta Kamp,
Tumi, DJ Sbu, Kelly Khumalo, Mafikizolo, Ntando, Zola
South African Pop/Rock
Bloc Party, Green Day, Linkin Park, Beatles, The White Stripes, The Dirty Skirts,
Fokofpolisiekar, Just Ginger, Springbok Nude Girls, The Rudimentals, Danny K,
Freshlyground, Karin Kortje
For each genre a composite variable was compiled by calculating the mean of the scores for all
(non-missing) artists in that group. In order to account for missing values (meaning that the re-
spondent does not know the respective band or singer) the resulting values for each genre were
multiplied by the square root of the ratio between the number of bands the respondent attrib-
uted scores to in that genre (the non-missing values) and the total number of bands in that
43. It is worth mentioning that South African Hip Hop is in itself a very fragmented category with artists from
both ends of the spectrum. The diversity of the genre is described by Künzler (201141):
[C]ontemporary South African rap is more about individual identity than group identities. It is a
tool for young South Africans to construct an individual urban and ‘modern’ identity that is both
South African and global, with its membership of Hip Hop culture. In the field between
resistance and affirmative co-optation, rappers produce discourses that are not concordant, but
polyvocal. South African rap music is thus a contradictory form of cultural expression.




group44. Respondents who did not give scores to any of the bands of a certain genre, but who
rated other bands outside of that genre were then given the lowest value for that music category,
assuming that someone who does not know any of the bands of a genre generally does not like it
very much. Those respondents who did not rate any of the bands in the whole list (21 cases)
were given missing values across all music categories. The resulting values were then cut into five
groups, thus producing ordinal variables taking values from 1 (very low preference for genre) to
5 (very high preference)45. The following figures demonstrate that while the more refined music
taste variables corroborate with both the AMPS and YCS results above, they provide greater ac-
curacy and more nuances than the conventional music taste measure.
44. Example: a respondent gave Eminem five points but did not rate any of the other American Hip Hop artists.
His or her total score x for the American Hip Hop genre would therefore be x=sqrt(1/7)×5=1.9. For someone
who rated all American Hip Hop artists with 5 the equation would be x=sqrt(7/7)×5=5.
45. A decision had to be made whether to create groups which correspond to the distributions of the ‘raw’ genre
variables (by using fixed intervals for the cut-off points) or groups with (fairly) equal frequency counts (thus
distorting the measure used for the ‘raw’ variables). Both methods are equally valid in their own ways but in the
end the decision was to use the latter, as the first option would have resulted in variables having categories with
very low frequency counts (especially at the extreme ends), which in turn would have prevented them from
inclusion in regression models.
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The operationalisation of the music taste variables used in the figures allows us to discern not
only the likes, but also the dislikes of the survey participants, which, according to Bourdieu
(1984: 56), are a much more effective measure of taste in any case, as “[i]n matters of taste (…)
all determination is negation; and tastes are perhaps first and foremost distastes”. 
Overall the results for the separate variables are largely coherent and correspond to the findings
of the idol question presented on pages 109 to 120; characteristics in terms of language, class and
schooling associated with a specific population group correspond with the likes and dislikes of
the members of that group and vice versa. The only exceptions are, to varying degrees, American
Hip Hop and RnB, for which it is difficult to make definite judgements purely based on mean
comparisons. Therefore a series of regressions on the music variables have has been conducted
using binary versions of the music scores (respondents with scores above the respective mean of
the ‘raw’ genre variable were coded as ‘fans’).
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Subsample City Schools African/Black






English: Native 0.417* 0.580 0.705 0.681 0.633 0.078*
(0.022) (0.089) (0.220) (0.550) (0.484) (0.031)
English: Other 0.361* 0.476* 0.376** 0.552 0.543 0.359
(0.017) (0.050) (0.005) (0.218) (0.223) (0.350)
Male 2.344*** 0.380*** 0.881 3.468*** 0.408*** 0.325*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.475) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014)




School: Townships (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 0.866 1.094 19.126***
(0.808) (0.880) (0.000)
Class 1.017* 0.995 1.004 1.016 1.000 1.018
(0.011) (0.422) (0.483) (0.129) (0.961) (0.178)
Observations 605 605 605 413 413 413
Pseudo R² 0.149 0.122 0.110 0.091 0.037 0.209
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
While the regression analysis confirms the previous observation that the members of the differ-
ent population groups generally stick to ‘their’ respective music genres, it is white respondents
who show the largest aversion to music other than ‘their own’; the chances of a white respond-
ent being a fan of American Hip Hop or RnB is only a fraction (about an eighth and a quarter,
respectively) of that of coloured respondents. In comparison, coloured and black kids going to
city schools do not have significantly different preferences concerning these two music genres.
Also not a surprise is white respondents’ strong preference for Rock music and local Pop acts
compared to the other survey participants.
The results for the gender variable is mostly, but not entirely, consistent with the previous find-
ings; a preference for American Hip Hop strongly correlates with being male, and RnB with be-
ing female. However, Kwaito and local Hip Hop, contrary to the idol results, are also associated
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with being female, which cannot be easily explained, but it necessary to keep in mind that the
question for someone’s role model is likely to elicit far more gendered responses (as one would
expect the respondent to name idols of her or his own gender) than the music question (as being
a fan of a musician of the opposite gender is arguably more common).
The language variable deserves a greater deal of attention than it received for the idol regres-
sions, as non-English (preferring) speakers at city schools are substantially less fond of the
mostly American bands and musicians (and local Pop stars) in the list than those who do prefer
to speak English (either because they are native speakers or adopted English as their first lan-
guage). The only, but intriguing, exception is American Hip Hop, which is preferred by ‘English-
adopters’ even compared to native English speakers.
Despite some differences the results so far are largely in line with the results for the music idol
categories. However, a look at the class variable gives a slightly different impression than the one
taken from the idol regression; whereas the category of Hip Hop idols is negatively associated
with class, the relationship is inverted when it comes to American Hip Hop as a genre. Although
apparently contradictory on first sight, the discrepancy can at least be partly explained by the dif-
ferent delimitations of the variables; the one includes Hip Hop musicians, including South Afric-
an ones, in general, while the other includes only American rappers. Nonetheless, one crucial dif-
ference in results between the two sets of regression cannot be explained away that easily – the
lack of statistically significant results for the school variables. In the case of the music idol cat-
egories it was possible to make out a distinct fluidity in respondents’ otherwise seemingly fixed,
race-based choices depending on the racial composition of their schools. In short: white kids go-
ing to predominantly coloured schools (Southern/Flats) would make different, ‘more coloured’,
choices than their peers at predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic), and vice versa.
Also, African/black respondents at township schools are far more likely to have local idols, or
local music idols, than their African/black peers at city schools. Although the last observation
holds true in the regressions on music variables (no relevant effect of being at a township school
on American Hip Hop and RnB preferences, but strong effect on local Hip Hop and Kwaito
among African/black respondents), the other scenarios do not apply, or at least not to the music
variables used for the regression analyses. Arguably in this case the composition of the variables
somewhat distorts the results, as they capture only a very broad definition of what constitutes a
‘fan’ of a genre (music genre score above the mean) and ignore any subtleties within the two
groups defined by the binary. Accordingly, a series of Mann-Whitney tests on each ‘raw’ (un-
grouped) music score variable produces different results: white kids going to predominantly
white schools (Northern/Atlantic) distribute lower scores to American Hip Hop (z=2.643, p-
value=0.08) and RnB (z=2.112, p-value=0.035) and higher scores to Rock (z=-3.063, p-
value=0.002) than white kids at predominantly coloured schools (Southern/Flats), which is in
line with the previous observations on music idols. Doing the same comparisons for coloured
respondents, however, yields far more ambiguous findings, as they are statistically insignificant
for Rock (z=0.744, p-value=0.457) and RnB (z=-1.226, p-value=0.220). The only case in which
the result is statistically significant is American Hip Hop, however contrary to expectations, as
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coloured kids at predominantly coloured schools (Southern/Flats) turn out to have a weaker
preference for American Hip Hop than those at predominantly white schools (Northern/
Atlantic) (z=2.447, p-value=0.014).
Although these results are congruent with the positive association between class and American
Hip Hop, the analysis of the quantitative data on music taste yields mixed results with respect to
the relationship between embodied and institutionalised capital. In terms of cultural omnivorous-
ness the results are clearer though; although better-off, mostly white, respondents demonstrate a
broad taste in different kinds of music, their preferences are nonetheless clearly demarcated from
those of coloured or African respondents. The best way to make sense of this is by understand-
ing the meaning of cosmopolitanism in the local context. For that it is worth having a look at
some of the individual ratings for local bands and musicians.
6. Distinction
130
Table 6.9 Local Bands/Artists Ratings (Cape Town, Percentages)
African/Black Coloured White Total
Brasse vannie Kaap
Awful 17 11 27 17
Don’t like it 9 7 11 9
Neither 6 15 7 9
Like it 4 21 5 11
Love it 3 21 3 9
Don’t know it 61 26 47 45
Freshlyground
Awful 8 12 16 11
Don’t like it 13 16 17 15
Neither 23 27 24 25
Like it 23 16 20 20
Love it 19 4 10 12
Don’t know it 13 25 13 18
Ntando
Awful 4 21 24 14
Don’t like it 5 9 7 7
Neither 11 7 5 8
Like it 21 2 1 10
Love it 53 2 0 24
Don’t know it 6 60 62 37
The Rudimentals
Awful 15 17 20 17
Don’t like it 9 10 7 9
Neither 8 6 15 8
Like it 1 1 12 3
Love it 1 1 13 3
Don’t know it 65 65 33 59
Zola
Awful 2 24 33 16
Don’t like it 1 13 10 7
Neither 5 15 11 10
Like it 13 9 2 9
Love it 76 5 1 35
Don’t know it 3 35 42 22
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
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Among the five bands shown in the table are the three local favourites (measured by the percent-
age of respondents who like or love the band/musician) for each population group: Brasse van-
nie Kaap (Hip Hop, coloured), Freshlyground (Afropop/Crossover, white) and Zola (Kwaito,
African/black). Apart from the fact that white respondents are far less enthusiastic about local
bands in general (see discussion on page 112), maybe the biggest surprise here is that the most
popular band among white respondents is a multi-lingual Afropop group with a multi-racial cast
of members. Moreover, unlike the other bands presented here, Freshlyground also manages to
gather a sizeable number of followers of coloured and especially African/black respondents be-
hind them; in fact a larger proportion of African/black respondents than white respondents is in
favour of the band. Looking at Freshlyground’s popularity across all three groups in isolation
could lead to the impression that South African youth is indeed overcoming the frontiers of the
past with cultural omnivorousness paving the way. But a look at the other results in the table
tells a different story – not only are the respective favourites of each group (with the exception
of Freshlyground) unpopular but overwhelmingly unknown to outsiders. In this light Freshly-
ground’s popularity maybe needs to be reconsidered following the findings of Cheyne and Bind-
er (2010) on the selective appropriation of Hip Hop in American elite tastes, where a sense of a
“rugged authenticity” and “aesthetic innovation and oppositional politics (...) unaffected by com-
mercialization” determine whether a rapper is considered worthy of a review by an established
cultural critic. In this case the argument can be made that Freshlyground manages to bridge and
encompass a certain local authenticity and cosmopolitan imagery. A similar conclusion is offered
by Balfour (2012: 132), writing in Freshlyground and the possibilities of new identities in post-apartheid
South Africa:
In South Africa, and with particular reference to Freshlyground’s Nomvula (2004),
it is clear that contemporary culture responds to the legacy of politicisation and
activism arising from the Apartheid past, anticipates the new socio-economic and
political constellations of power (in the form of neo-liberalism, its elites, and
interests) that appear to support a Western conception of Cosmopolitanism as a
vehicle for identity. This conception is challenged on every aspect of its
formation (its insistence on an absence of connection, isolation, individuality, and
its aspiration to willed migration) to suggest another form of the cosmopolitan
self, equally located within the global middle class.
Ultimately it is the association with cosmopolitan middle-class – also apparent in some of
Freshlyground’s lyrics (Balfour 2012: 128) – which makes the group so popular among middle-
class (and often white) young South Africans, which was arguably their core support base from
the beginning (in its initial years the band was known for almost relentlessly touring Cape
Town’s live venues popular with students). Therefore its real achievement in bringing together
South Africans from different backgrounds is not a bridging from lower-class audience to
middle-class white youth but the opposite: the broadening of its audience from a fairly narrow
middle-class fan base beyond racial and class divides.
The Rudimentals are an example of a band that has not quite achieved this step yet (at least not
at the time when the survey took place). Although it is a racially mixed Ska band proud of its
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Reggae roots, its popularity among the non-white section of the sample is virtually non-existent.
This is not to say that the live audiences at its shows are not fairly diverse (at least by Cape
Town’s standards), yet it has its roots in the same circuit of live venues frequented by student
bohemia as Freshlyground but without having gained the same recognition beyond its core
audience.
Some of this certainly has something to do with language. Freshlyground is the only true multi-
lingual group in the mix, with lyrics in English and Zulu. The effect of language, and how it af-
fects reception and understanding of lyrics, is only partially captured by the survey, yet it is safe
to assume that the use of the vernacular in much South African music is likely to deter many
white and coloured youth from getting into Kwaito, Spaza etc. This is at least the sentiment of
some of the interviewees:
Interviewer: What radio are you listening to by the way?
Thobani: Umhlobo Wenene.
Mfundo: And whites can't listen to Spaza because it is Xhosa. They can't listen to
it, so they will listen to those other stations.
Solomon: And I think people who play Rock music, a lot of them they are wild.
Interviewer: So you think it is a language thing too?
Mfundo: Ja, I think so. Because you can't listen to something that you can't hear.
And:
Emile: (Talking about his personal top ten on his poster) Freshlyground, that is
a South African band, they incorporate Jazz and all that. Not Kwaito.
Kwaito is like rapping in other languages, I can't understand what they
are saying.
Randall: You can't understand what they are saying. You can't listen to some-
thing that you can't relate to.
Interviewer: Like Zola? Not a good option?
Randall: No, because you go to a township and you do the survey there, you will
get a different response, maybe there will be more Kwaito, because it is
all in their language and they respond better to their music.
Interviewer: Do you think it is going to change or stay the same?
Edwin: It is going to stay like that.
Randall: It is going to stay like that, because people these days, they do not en-
courage others to listen to our own music, because some of us are too
stubborn, because they don't want to change, they don't want to take a
chance to change. And they stay with their own music.
So language is certainly a crucial part of any explanation for why tastes in local music are still so
divided in post-apartheid South Africa but it does not explain the divergence of tastes in non-
South African music. And the rare cases where preferences overlap (Freshlyground) do not really
present themselves as examples of omnivorousness as they tend to be expressions of a cosmo-
politan middle-class taste first and foremost. Hence the preliminary conclusion that when it
comes to popular culture (fandom, music), various forms of distinction are very much alive
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among young South Africans while cultural omnivorousness applies only in a very narrow mann-
er that ignores the extremely selective choice of non-elite tastes even when language barriers are
taken into account.
So far the analysis has focussed on intangible preferences and tastes (especially in music) but has
neglected the very real and materialistic aspects associated with consumerism. Therefore the fol-
lowing subchapter aims to extend the argument by looking at the brand choices of survey
respondents.
6.3 What are your favourite brands?
The examination of the idol and music questions has led to some intriguing findings on racialised
status hierarchies which sometimes, but not always, coincide with actual class differences as one
can observe a shift in respondents’ taste patterns, as a form of embodied cultural capital,
depending on the racial make-up of the school they attend. It has also provided good arguments
against the usage of the concept of cultural omnivorousness in relation to elite tastes. Yes, better-
off youth do demonstrate a remarkable openness towards foreign and some selected local music
and idols but the overlap between their taste patterns and those of lower classes is ultimately al-
most negligible. Differences in music taste and fandom aside, so far no attention has been given
to objectified cultural capital. In the context of youth (and also beyond that), one form of objec-
tified cultural capital that almost obtrudes itself is branding as the very purpose of brands is to
signify status and lifestyle. It is thus incomprehensible why the sociological study of brands is still
in its infancy. As David Holt (2006: 300) maintains in a brief introduction to the sociology of
branding:
While marketing gurus assign to brands near-religious powers, academics and
critics have largely ignored brands except to shake their heads in disgust. As
poignant symbols marking out where capitalism meets consumerism, it is hardly
surprising that brands often stand accused as the capitalists’ weapon of choice to
prey upon anxieties and concoct false desires. But the most common academic
stance is simply to ignore brands as too crass and too popular to deserve serious
inquiry. I am not aware of a single academic article in the top social science
journals devoted to the study of brands. It is as if Marx chose to ignore the rise
of factories in industrializing England because they were too ubiquitous, or
Simmel dismissed the rise of money economies because currencies had become
too popular to be a legitimate object of study.
Indeed, academic literature on branding remains remarkably sparse, except for work on brand re-
ception in marketing related journals (e.g. Journal of Consumer Research), anthropological stud-
ies of material culture in the vein of Appadurai’s (1986) The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cul-
tural Perspective and a a body of literature on consumer culture (Arvidsson 2006; Lury 2004; Moor
2007). Although the topics of most of this literature rarely relate directly to the questions posed
in this thesis, they sometimes nevertheless provide insights which are surprisingly close to the ar-
guments laid out it in this thesis. Narunsky-Laden (2008: 128) in article on commercial media
and identity, interpreting Appadurai on consumption:
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Appadurai’s view of practices of consumption as a ‘force of habituation’, as a
centrals means of regulating, among other things, ‘the rhythms of accumulation
and divestiture that generate particular states of material wealth’ (Appadurai 1997:
26), converges with my own view of consumer culture as a means of regulating
procedures of change, thereby increasing the stabilising effect of the emerging
social order, and standardising global structures of common difference(s) in the
age of globalisation (Wilk 1995).
But in the end sociological work on branding in connection with distinction or cosmopolitanism
is restricted to a handful of publications, one of them a study of the interplay between global
brands and cosmopolitanism using the example of two ‘global’ coffee brands in Toronto. While
the object of investigation has little to contribute to the subject matter of this thesis – neither
Starbucks nor Second Cup have branches in South Africa – the findings do resonate with some
of the observations made earlier:
Expressed as a style and displayed through taste, consumers are distinguished by
their hip, metropolitan worldliness, especially in contrast to an imagined rural and
working-class parochialism. As Binnie et al. (2006) indicate, being cosmopolitan
has become a desirable point of distinction for new middle and gentrifying
classes. (Bookman 2012: 14)
If a tendency towards (supposedly) global coffee brands is an indication of cosmopolitanism and
a “point of distinction for new middle and gentrifying” classes in Toronto, can a similar conclu-
sion be drawn with regard to the brand preferences of South African youth? In other words: can
we expect better-off youth to have more ‘cosmopolitan’ brand preferences (whatever these
would look like) than their less privileged peers? Or will we find that cultural omnivorousness
also encompasses brand preferences, blurring the lines between elite and lower-class as well as
African/black, coloured and white tastes? An interesting twist to these questions is provided by
Renée Gosline (2009) in a paper dealing with the question of how luxury brands maintain their
authenticity and symbolic value when counterfeits become barely distinguishable from the ori-
ginals. His findings suggest, in short, that individuals usually have no clue whether a luxury item
is ‘real’ or ‘fake’ when they see it out of context. But as soon the same object is shown in usage,
with someone holding or wearing the object, they usually become very confident about their
classification of the object. Gosline (2009: 8) sees this as evidence “(...) that lower status groups,
even when they come to possess symbols of the elite, are eventually exposed because their true
selves and “habitus” are inevitably revealed (Bourdieu 1984)”. So according to Gosline, simply
owning a luxury item, fake or real, is not enough; instead it is the ‘proper’ way of wearing or
handling the object that matters. Hence it might be the case that the relationship between class
and brand preference is not as straightforwards as it might seem.
But brands, especially clothing brands, are infamous for another form of distinction as they are
known to be the source for much bullying at schools despite the prevalence of uniforms at South
African schools. How quickly observations on someone else’s clothing style can turn offensive
and into racial stereotyping is illustrated by the following excerpt of an interview with a group of
girls at Northern High.
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Lucy: If you get a black person, he would probably like Kwaito, but I don’t
know what they are singing.
Chantal: And House.
Catherine: Ja, and House.
Chantal: And the way they dress, it’s also, like…
Catherine: It's different.
Interviewer: How different?
Danica: It’s their clothings.
Chantal: They would wear the Grasshoppers and the…
Catherine: No, that’s for the coloured people.
Lucy: What I find most obvious with black people is that black people are al-
lowed to wear bright colours.
Danica: Makes them stand out even more. (laughter)
Lucy: They do, honestly…
Catherine: It’s honest!
Lucy: They wear orange, and green!
Catherine: Orange, ja – au.
Lucy: And it’s not green, like that green (points to her jacket). It’s like lawn
green…
Danica: They don't take pride in their clothes. Like other people…
Lucy: Some black people dress very nice.
Catherine: Like Miranda. She dresses nice.
Danica: But Miranda is a white person.
Catherine: Ja, Miranda is white inside. (others laugh in approval)
Chantal: Ja, and then, I mean you get the coloured people who try to be really
girly, white. And the boys they try to be, white boys, they try to be col-
oured, and they wear the Krugers and they wear their hair this. They
hang out mostly with a different race group. They think it’s cool, be-
cause… Most of my friends are coloured, but I didn’t let them change
me, I didn’t let them make me dress this, didn’t let them sort of influ-
ence me, you understand?
This exchange contains a number of instances in which the margins between harmless comment-
ary on other people’s taste and actual racial discrimination become precariously narrow. Danica’s
comment that the bright colours black kids at their school allegedly wear “makes them stand out
even more” is a sign that the presence of black kids at a formerly white school continues to be
considered to be somehow unusual at best and not quite right at worst by at least some of the
white children (and perhaps parents and teachers) at the school. Danica also maintains that “they
[black kids] don’t take pride in their clothes” which is only somewhat, but not entirely, disputed
by Lucy who says that at least “some black people dress very nice”. But even her partial objec-
tion to Danica’s generalisation is further diminished by Catherine’s remark that Miranda, a black
girl, does indeed dress nice, but only because she “is white inside”. The discussion is concluded
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by Chantal’s admission that most of their friends are coloured, but she “didn’t let them change
her, didn’t let them sort of influence her”. The interview shows just how deep the racialisation of
style is embedded in the consciousness of South African youth, even to the extent that certain
brands are assigned to a particular group (Grasshoppers, Krugers = coloured), providing a back-
drop to the open-ended survey question (“What are your favourite brands?”) on brands, to which re-
spondents could provide five brand names. In total 294 unique and valid brand names (brands
that could be identified using Google and Wikipedia; 153 names, in many cases music bands or
generic identifiers, could not be identified or were considered invalid) were mentioned by the re-
spondents; Table 6.10 lists the Top 20 brands for each race group. 
Table 6.10 Top Brands
Rank African/Black Coloured White
1 Nike Nike Billabong
2 Adidas Billabong Nike
3 Levis Roxy Roxy
4 Puma Quicksilver Puma
5 Lacoste Levis Quicksilver
6 Daniel Hechter Adidas Levis
7 Converse Puma Samsung
8 Polo Samsung Adidas
9 Billabong Lacoste Guess
10 Samsung Timberland Sony
11 identity Nokia YDE
12 Reebok Converse Mr Price
13 Uzzi identity Apple
14 Carvela Sony Lacoste
15 Kurt Geiger YDE Volcom
16 K-Way Guess identity
17 Roxy Hemisphere Dolce & Gabbana
18 Nokia Diesel Sissy Boy
19 Armani Reebok Woolworth






Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
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Most of the listed brands are fashion or clothing labels, apart from a few electronics and cell-
phone manfacturers, such as Sony, LG, Samsung, Nokia and Apple. The most popular brand is
Nike; other brands which are relatively successful across the board include Adidas and Puma as
well as Levi’s. Non-South African names dominate the list, even though a handful of local retail
fashion stores and clothing brands also feature. Beyond these commonalities there are clear dif-
ferences in the types of clothing brands preferred by the three race groups. More specifically
there are two large categories of brands which hardly overlap: luxury fashion design labels such
as Lacoste, Daniel Hechter, Polo, Kurt Geiger, Armani etc. preferred by African respondents
and surf brands such as Billabong, Quicksilver, Roxy etc. preferred by coloured and especially
white respondents. 
Taking into account all the brand names mentioned by respondents shows that the Top 20 list
captures the complete image quite accurately; fashion and clothing brands (here subdivided into
two categories including Shoes/Sneakers) indeed represent the most popular choices by com-
prising just about three quarters (78 percent) of mentioned brand names, followed by cellphones
(including network operators such as Vodacom, MTN and Cell C) with nine percent, electronics
manufacturers with seven percent and others (five percent). This pattern does not change much
between the different population groups; focussing on fashion and clothing brands, however,
brings back some of the themes from the interviews discussed in the previous section.
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Casual Jeans Luxury Surf/Skate Urban
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
Figure 6.9 is another example for the generally lower response rate (here: number of replies to
open-ended questions) of white respondents. Accordingly, black and coloured respondents
answered more enthusiastically by providing an average of four to five brand names compared to
three to four for white respondents (excluding those who did not give any valid names at all).
But the two clearest results regarding fashion preferences are clearly discernible: African re-
spondents show a much stronger liking for expensive ‘luxury’ brands such as Lacoste and Polo
than their coloured and white peers, who in turn prefer surf brands such as Billabong and Quick-
silver. These findings seem to be at least partly counter-intuitive; while the popularity of surf
brands among white and coloured respondents does not surprise, black respondents’ penchant
for particularly expensive brands does not seem to fit the correlation between class and cultural
capital, knowing the unequal race-class distribution in the sample.
In fact these results are very much in line with Bourdieu’s own observations on cultural
consumption:
In cultural consumption, the main opposition, by overall capital value, is between
the practices designated by their rarity as distinguished, those of the fractions
richest in both economic and cultural capital, and the practices socially identified
46. The subcategorisation of clothing brands is primarily based on Wikipedia entries and/or the information
provided on a brand’s website. “Luxury” describes expensive high fashion labels, “Urban” is for trendy and hip
youth-orientated brands, “Skate/Surf” and “Jeans” are self-explanatory. Arguably the most diffuse category is
“Casual” with brands which would not easily fit in one of the other categories, such as outdoor-orientated
brands or large retail chains.
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as vulgar because they are both easy and common, those of the fractions poorest
in both these respects. In the intermediate position are the practices which are
perceived as pretentious, because of the manifest discrepancy between ambition
and possibilities. In opposition to the dominated condition, characterized, from
the point of view of the dominant, by the combination of forced poverty and
unjustified laxity, the dominant aesthetic – of which the work of art and the
aesthetic disposition are the most complete embodiments – proposes the
combination of ease and asceticism, i.e. self-imposed austerity, restraint, reserve,
which are affirmed in the absolute manifestation of excellence, relaxation in
tension. (Bourdieu 2010: 171)
And:
As much as by the absence of luxury goods, whisky or paintings, champagne or
concerts, cruises or art exhibitions, caviar or antiques, the working-class lifestyle
is characterized by the presence of numerous cheap substitutes for these rare
goods, ‘sparkling white wine’ for champagne, imitation leather for real leather,
reproductions for paintings, indices of a dispossession at the second power,
which accepts the definition of the goods worthy of being possessed. (2010: 387)
Bourdieu’s description of the consumption patterns of the rich and the poor resonate with the
findings in two ways. First, the preference of the richest for the rare and distinguished does not
really have an equivalent in a study of brand preferences. Granted, there are luxury brands por-
trayed to be rare and distinguished but the very idea of a brand goes against what Bourdieu is de-
scribing here, especially in a time and place where the search for the authentic, natural and or-
ganic has acquired the status of the truly distinguished, exemplified by the many weekly organic
‘neighbourhood markets’ frequented by the hip and affluent. Another example of this penchant
for the rare and distinguished is the following excerpt from an interview with three girls from
Atlantic High.
Interviewer: Why do you think people are listening to different kinds of music? Or,
for example, why would someone not know The Wild Eyes47
necessarily?
Susan: Well, depends, I was raised… my father is into very old Punk and stuff.
Because my friends and I are into the local music scene and we came
across The Wild Eyes and it struck me, some people maybe prefer more
Hip Hop, where there is not so much instruments…
Kerry: It is more accessible, popular music. And it is harder to find our bands
that are playing or old music, unless you have the resources.
Susan: And the band, The Wild Eyes, they have a certain image and people
with a certain image follow them, so someone with a different look or
being used to a different scene might feel uncomfortable at a place like
Evol, which is where The Wild Eyes play.
The second point by Bourdieu that relates to the results shown here concerns the desire of the
47. The Wild Eyes is a local Indierock outfit known for its norm-defying goth aesthetics with a small but devoted
following which largely centres around the alternative Friday night hangout Evol. At the time of the interview




members of the dominated classes for the symbols of material wealth, even if they can only af-
ford cheap copies, which alludes to a discourse of aspiration that is very current in South Africa
today and also evident in the depictions of logos of expensive clothing brands such as Lacoste
and Diesel and images of expensive handbags, shoes, watches and cellphones on the posters by
black respondents produced during the interview.
One poster (Picture 6.10 on page 148) stands out as it is less cluttered with objects but features
an image of a joyous Obama family accompanied by Oprah Winfrey48, nutritional information, a
surfer and the Billabong logo. The maker’s commentary on his choice of images serves as a re-
minder that aspiration is not always simply a matter of materialistic desire:
Interviewer: Can you tell me something about your posters?
Masande: When I see this picture I see a happy family (picture shows the Obamas
with Oprah, this was before he became the presidential candidate), but
me, I never had the chance my family go out and enjoy – me and the
family. And even on Sundays we don’t go to the table. Everyone goes to
be in the bedroom, all eat alone or in the lounge.
Ja. And also there is Chris Brown, new artists, promising artist, young,
my age.
Interviewer: How old is he?
Masande: Eighteen. But has nice style. And these nutritions here – that’s with
black people, don’t want nutrients, they all eat junk food.
Interviewer: You like healthy?
Masande: Ja, I like healthy food. We also taught in school about healthy food.
This food is probably from another country, I would like to taste other
country food. Also, I would cook for them South African food. I never
had the chance to taste other country food. This one is a sport brand
(Billabong). Mostly this sport brand is with coloureds, I don’t know
why. Quite a little of black people want this sport brand. I would love to
ask why the coloureds like this sport brand, and why black people don’t
like this sport brand. It’s a surf brand.
Interviewer: How big is Loxion Kulcha?
Masande: Ja, this brand, when it came out it was very popular. But now it is not
anymore. And you know, it is because of the price of it.
Interviewer: Is it expensive?
Masande: It’s not that expensive. It is maybe about R50. I don’t know why, a lot
of black people, they want expensive clothing.
Interviewer: So you think that making it cheaper actually made it less attractive?
Sizwe: Ja.
Masande’s affinity for Billabong is also not arbitrary, as in another part of the interview he ex-
presses the wish to learn surfing, even though (or maybe because) he has observed that “this
sport is mostly done by white people”. But he is also critically aware of the importance of ex-
48. Barack Obama had not even entered the presidential candidate race and was virtually unknown to most people
(including myself) at the time of the interview.
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pensive brands among his peers and even claims that Loxion Kulcha, the most prominent brand
targeting explicitly urban black youth, has lost a lot of its popularity because it is actually too
cheap, which relates directly to Bourdieu’s observation on cultural “activities which are perceived
as pretentious, because of the manifest discrepancy between ambition and possibilities”. Dolby
(200171) made the same observations during her time at Fernwood High:
For African students, however, social status is intimately connected to the price
one pays for a particular commodity. African students are more likely than
coloureds to bypass American jeans and identification, instead preferring
European names such as Giorgio Armani and Daniel Hechter. Zola, an African
girl, comments on this phenomenon, explaining that whites don’t dress in style,
and buy jeans that are R50 or something. But when you are black [African], you
are wearing R50 jeans, people are going to say mmm, that’s ugly. We are looking
for labels and names. We just look for the label, and the label counts, and it costs
as well.
The results gained from the brand preference question appear somewhat messy and contradict-
ory to the other results for role models and music. Although there are some clear differences in
brand preferences between members of different racial groups, they are partly non-intuitive as
many black respondents seem to prefer luxury brands but have little desire for surf brands,
which are big among coloured and white respondents. However, it does start to make sense if
one considers brands less as an expression of selfhood and rather as a sign of aspiration. The
form of aspiration itself then largely depends on the position of the individual in society; the
status symbols of the upper classes are arguably less alluring for someone who is already im-
mersed in a middle- or upper-class lifestyle as opposed to someone to whom they represent real
and tangible change in the quality of living. One way to think about this phenomenon is through
McCracken’s (2008: 104) concept of ‘displaced meaning”, describing “[c]onsumer goods [as]
bridges to these hopes and ideals”. According to McCracken displaced meaning usually refers to
a place or a point in time, such as a “golden age” or a “glorious future”. In the case of township
youth the desire for luxury brands can be argued to refer to the unfulfilled promise of a prosper-
ous future following the successful struggle for political freedom.
Therefore one must be careful not to mistake the aspiration of working-class African/black
youth as an aspiration to be white when racial connotations enter the quotation. As Narunsky-
Laden (Narunsky-Laden 2008: 142), referring to the advertising campaign by the South African
brewery Hansa in which old notions of South African identities are being challenged and re-ar-
ticulated49, writes:
49. The messages circulated by the campaign included these two (see Narunsky-Laden 2008: 125):
1) I HATE BEING BLACK. If it means some people think they know my criminal record. My
rhythm. My level of education. Or the role affirmative action has played in my career. I’m not
someone else’s black. I’m my own. I LOVE BEING BLACK.
2) I HATE BEING WHITE. If it means some people think that I’m not a real South African.




This implies a newly normative use of black identity mediated by popular global notions of
what ‘being black’ might mean in the global arena today, and presents another form in
which black South Africans might proclaim social membership in South Africa’s
middle class(es), while distinguishing their own collective identity therein. In this
sense then, the appellation ‘black’ is optimised not as a racial category in a
discriminatory or sectarian sense, but rather as a viable cultural option, one that is
increasingly aspired to, and proudly so. It seems to me that decision by black
South Africans to choose to identify themselves as ‘black’, by producing cultural
artefacts and commercial media products intended also, but not exclusively, for
black readerships, resonates with the Hansa advertisements, and echoes the
inclusion there of being ‘black’ and being ‘white’ as equally viable middle-class
options.
Following Narunsky-Laden’s interpretation of black middle-class consumption patterns it is
worth remembering that the racialisation of class distinction does not imply a homogenising pro-
cess leading to a complete absorption of socio-cultural differentiators into either a non-descript
or essentially white middle-class identity. However, this shall not distract from the required addi-
tional effort of non-white members of the middle-class, who are expected to constantly confirm
their class identity whereas white members are commonly expected to just fit in.
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Picture 6.1 Poster – Lucy (1062), Northern High
Picture 6.2 Poster – Dexter (1121), Northern High
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Picture 6.3 Poster – Susan (53), Atlantic High
Picture 6.4 Poster – Cameron (664), Southern High
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Picture 6.5 Poster – Hendry (233), Cape Flats High
Picture 6.6 Poster – Randall (238), Cape Flats High
6. Distinction
146
Picture 6.7 Poster – Melissa (257), Cape Flats High
Picture 6.8 Poster – Natasha (1059), Southern High
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Picture 6.9 Poster – Tanja (161), Atlantic High
Picture 6.10 Poster – Masande (1400), Macassar High
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Picture 6.11 Poster – Cecilia (162), Atlantic High




The findings presented in this chapter reflect the deeply embedded racialisation of South African
society across and along socio-economic stratification: a long history of divisive and discriminat-
ory policies has created a situation in which racial descriptors are still largely synonymous with
class identifiers, despite good (and bad) efforts of the democratically elected governments since
the end of apartheid to undo the injustices of the past. In this sense the observed differences in
cultural preferences between black, coloured and white respondents could be simply ascribed to
class differences. However, the evidence shows that it is not that simple; it is true that class plays
a crucial role, but the link between race and class is so intricate that race itself has become a
pivotal signifier in the representation of class, as whiteness is still largely associated with the
dominant, and coloured and black, to differing degrees, with the dominated class, even where ac-
tual class differences do not apply.
There are two major factors contributing to this perception. First, there is the link between
schooling (or institutionalised cultural capital) and embodied cultural capital in the form of role
models, music and brand preferences. For example, the two schools with the highest school fees,
Atlantic High and Northern High, have the highest proportion of white students in the sample
of schools and, consequently, the highest prevalence of cultural preferences attributed to white
students. Their role models are often writers, historical or religious figures or their own parents
as opposed to celebrities from music, film and sports. Most of their role models are from over-
seas; American or European, not South African. They prefer mostly American Pop and Rock
music as opposed to Hip Hop, RnB and Kwaito. And their favourite brands are surf labels such
as Quicksilver and Billabong. But the results also show that such racially defined disposition are
not static as students tend to adopt the taste of the predominant race group at their school, i.e.
non-white students at predominantly white (and upper-class) schools are more likely to have a
preference for white tastes than their peers at predominantly non-white school. By the same
token white students visiting predominantly coloured schools (Southern/Flats) are more likely to
share the preferences of that group: music and movie stars as role models, American Hip Hop
and RnB for music. And although black respondents generally appear relatively homogenous in
their taste preferences there is clear evidence for stronger local preferences among respondents
at township schools compared to their peers at city schools.
But all this variance occurs within the racialised hierarchy of class distinction with white middle-
and upper-class tastes representing the dominant class at the most prestigious and expensive
schools. The continuance of white middle-class traditions at (previously) predominantly white
schools (Northern/Atlantic) has been problematised elsewhere as well as its immediate impact
on the well-being and academic performance of non-white students. (Battersby 2004; Dolby
2001; Mckinney 2007; Soudien 2007; McKinney 2010) It has also been noted by Soudien (2010:
355) that the ‘assimmilation’ of non-white students at predominantly white schools (Northern/
Atlantic) is clearly asymmetrical:
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It was not surprising, therefore, that relationships between White and Black
students at school were delicate. While there were many crosscultural and
crossrace friend-ships, the terms of these were often asymmetrical. The Coloured
youth had to fit in with what their White friends required. (It was rare that the
new friends were African.) A girl at this school (commenting on her Coloured
classmates) said, “Some of them can be very good, they’re very smart, they know
how to behave themselves .... They don’t come out of very good homes .... That’s
what the difference is.” Comments of this nature were common.
But what has been somewhat obscured by focussing on the school setting are the broader con-
sequences of maintaining not just school traditions but entire sets of cultural preferences as os-
tensibly superior over others. Unfortunately this thesis does not provide the required scope
either, yet it is worth having a look at studies such as Hunter and Hachimi’s (2012) work on the
South African call centre industry, where they identify the ‘skill’ of having a ‘Model C’ English as
the most important employment criterion:
In South Africa, we found that what is important for young people’s access to
Anglophone service work is the acquisition of English language skills through
schooling in desegregated English-medium institutions. This is one reason why
access to high-quality English has become a key form of class differentiation for
black South Africa.
Yet South Africa historically had a larger settler population than most colonial
societies and we have shown how language can also be used to preserve white
privilege, since white South Africans still have the greatest ability to utilize (and
define) prestigious English. (Hunter 2012: 563)
The second crucial finding is that the conditions for the continuance of old power structures
have their roots outside the South African context as much as within. One can discern a link
between middle-/upper-class, whiteness and dominance which blends with the historical make-
up of South African race relations but is ultimately the combined outcome of South Africa’s par-
ticular history and a universal phenomenon that legitimates the global image of whiteness as rep-
resentative of the dominant class. In other words: while the strong association between class and
race in South Africa has its roots in the country’s particular history, it is reproduced through
global popular culture under the disguise of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism suggests a cer-
tain openness towards global trends, values and experiences. But while it is true that upper-class
survey participants are generally drawn towards international (mostly American) role models and
music, lower-class participants also have non-South African idols and listen to non-South Afric-
an music. Again, the full extent and nature of class distinction with regard to locality only
becomes apparent when it is combined with race. Battersby (2004: 283) reports from her field-
work at a former Model C school in Cape Town:
All black African and coloured pupils are exoticised within the school, treated
almost as permanent exchange pupils, visitors from other cultures to inform local
pupils of the places they don’t, can’t or won’t go to. When speaking to a group of
Grade 11 pupils about their plans for the future, one white girl said she wanted to
go travelling because she was bored with Cape Town. A black African pupil
within the group interrupted and put it to her that she didn’t really know Cape
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Town at all, she only knew the parts that were culturally white. This sense of the
school being a white place where pupils from other backgrounds could enter to
teach about their lives was reinforced by some of the teaching. In a history lesson
on anti-apartheid protests for example, the teacher brought in black African
pupils from an adjacent classroom and called on them to Toyi-toyi for the class.
Racial distinctions are arguably more accentuated in South Africa than in, for example, Britain or
the United States for historical and linguistic reasons but these examples nevertheless point to a
gap in the otherwise vigorous and thriving scholarship on distinction and cultural omnivorous-
ness as race and ethnicity are rarely touched upon. In any case, they raise serious doubts about
the appropriateness and validity of the image of the cosmopolitan omnivore, as the much-cited
openness to cosmopolitan tastes appears to have a far lesser known counterpart – a disinterest
(bordering to ignorance) in local trends and cultural activities that exist outside the immediate
and familiar environment of the individual.
Looking at these facets of distinction – the racial connotations of class and the combination of
familiarity with cosmopolitan middle-class tastes and ignorance of local or national cultural
knowledge – goes a long way in describing two separate realities of South African middle-class
youth today. One is the in-between state of the children of South Africa’s new black middle-class
portrayed by Kopano Matlwa in her semi-autobiographical book Coconut, in which the protagon-
ist Ofilwe feels trapped between what she sees as her African origins and the expectations of
(white) middle-class. She feels neither there or here, prompting her to question her own identity.
Her inner conflict illustrates the complexity of distinction and takes it to a personal level rarely
accessed by academic work.
Ofilwe’s struggle stands in contrast to the other reality of at least some white South Africans: an
effortlessness to ‘just fit in’, an almost natural knowledge of how to behave and what to say at
dinner parties, public events or job interviews. However this easiness is often complemented by
a certain sense of alienation, maybe even isolation, in the greater South African public sphere.
Juxtaposed like this, if one would really want to talk about cultural omnivores in South Africa,
one would arguably find them among the so-called “coconuts” or urban black South African
youth in general, following Ndlovu (2011: 273) writing about the bilingualism of amaZulu:
[T]his bilingualism reflects the postmodern fluidity and cultural omnivorous
(Sullivan and Katz-Gerro 2007) nature of the South African black, urban middle
class, and now black urban youth in a far more globalised South Africa. The
postmodern fluidity and cultural ‘omnivorousness’ of this audience is anchored
by Isolezwe’s editor, Thulani Mbatha, when he makes reference to this paper’s
target audience:
The modernising Zulu is … [s]omeone who may go back home to the
rural areas to slaughter a cow to the amadlozi [ancestors], but is equally
comfortable taking his family out for dinner and a movie in a shopping
mall. (Tolsi 2011: 2)
Black South African youth’s allegiance to both local trends as well as cosmopolitan dispositions
adds to critical engagements with the very idea of cosmopolitanism, expressed by Skrbis and
Woodward in their qualitative analysis of focus group interviews with 76 participants in the Aus-
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tralian city of Brisbane:
At the heart of the idea of ‘openness’, the sentiment at the very centre of
conceptions of cosmopolitanism, is a fragile commitment to the broad gamut of
cosmopolitan experiences and ideals. Everyday ideas about openness as
expressed within the talk of our participants seems to be a most brittle form of
cosmopolitanism, fractured by deeply structured feelings and allegiances
regarding self and others, benefits and dangers, and local and global, which seem
to inhibit the full expression of cosmopolitan openness. (Skrbis and Woodward
2007: 744)
In the end there is no competition for the title of the ‘true’ South African cultural omnivore, but
the search for him helped to get to the point of this chapter, which was to demonstrate the very
real taste distinctions along class and race lines separating South African to this day. Cultural om-
nivorousness and cosmopolitanism then might be useful to describe the preferences of middle-
and upper-class youth but they do not provide a solid basis for a non-racial and shared identity
for South African youth.
What this chapter did not deal with is the genesis of cultural capital. According to Bourdieu
someone’s habitus en- or disables a person to make the ‘right’ choices in terms of ‘legitimate’
cultural consumption and the ‘right’ assertions of other people’s choices. Habitus itself is deeply
engrained in the individual’s psychological and physical make-up due to early exposure to or
absence of so-called ‘legitimate’ culture through family upbringing and schooling. But if one ac-
cepts the premise that cultural capital is not only an indication of ‘legitimate’ culture but also cer-
tain forms of popular culture which are to some degree neither the direct outcome of schooling
nor upbringing, then it is worth considering a third formative influence on youth today: media




The separation of taste and media into two individual chapters signifies the special role media
consumption plays in young people’s lives today. On the one hand, someone’s preference for a
certain radio or TV channel seems to be just as much a matter of taste as someone’s fondness
for a particular celebrity, music style or band. On the other hand, it is media itself which is often
seen as the main driver in the dissemination of trends, ideas and fashions. Moreover, media con-
sumption differentiates itself from taste in that it is ultimately a function of access, considering
that someone needs the financial and practical means for watching television or listening to the
radio. This is especially true in a highly unequal society such as South Africa’s, where access to
satellite TV or the internet is a given for a small wealthy minority and out of reach for the great
majority, and where public broadcasting, and reception, of television and radio is traditionally
fractured into different segments based on language and other cultural criteria.
Seen in this light media takes on a function in relation to habitus not unlike that of the educa-
tional system in that it has a crucial formative effect on how one perceives and is perceived by
the world, yet the level of access to it largely depends on the depth of one’s pockets. Of course
the kind of impression the two entities leave on a child or adolescent are very different – the
privilege of visiting a good (middle-, upper-class) school is perceived to add an acquaintance and
familiarity with the tastes of the dominant class to an individual’s persona that can rarely be
‘learnt’ at a later stage in life, whereas media consumption is commonly seen to leave only a fleet-
ing familiarity with popular culture – magazines, movies, music, websites. However, if it is true
that the knowledge of certain forms of popular culture itself has the capability to be recognized
as legitimate cultural capital, as the previous chapter set out to demonstrate, then the familiarity
with a certain type of music played on the radio, television series or even online services like
Facebook, Twitter or Instagram indeed becomes a function of habitus just like subconsciously
knowing how to behave in a fine-dining restaurant or making small talk with a potential future
employer. The purpose of this chapter is to make this very link between taste and media con-
sumption and preferences visible through the lenses of class and race. However, lacking an oper-
ationalisation of habitus, the difficulty here is to actually ‘measure’ the effect of media consump-
tion on respondents’ dispositions and the way they perceive themselves and others. Therefore
the statistical analysis in this chapter is mostly exploratory in that it attempts to demonstrate a
causal link between media consumption and taste, which is further substantiated using interview
material on respondents’ media preferences.
It is worth mentioning that the singling out of media consumption from general cultural con-
sumption has no precedent in Bourdieu’s work. Most of what he had to say about the media was
in relation to cultural production (Bourdieu 1993; 1996) rather than cultural consumption, but
even that was not much:
For all its strengths, however, Bourdieu’s sociology of cultural production has
important limitations when it comes to analysing contemporary cultural
production. It is simply astonishing how little Bourdieu has to say about large-
scale, ‘heteronomous’ commercial cultural production, given not only its
enormous social and cultural importance in the contemporary world, but also its
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significance in determining conditions in the sub-field in which he is clearly much
more interested, restricted production. The result is that Bourdieu offers no
account of how the most widely consumed cultural products – those
disseminated by the media – are produced. While Bourdieu’s work on cultural
consumption is remarkably comprehensive, covering everything from rugby to
Rocco and His Brothers, from Pernod to Petula Clark, his coverage of cultural
production is highly selective, and very much focused on restricted production.
(Hesmondhalgh 2006: 217)
This silence on media consumption, especially as a part of habitus, has been kept up in most of
the literature on distinction despite the ever-growing public attention given to the impact of the
media on today’s youth. One of the very few scholars open to the idea of considering media con-
sumption as part of the habitus is Nick Couldry (2004: 358):
For habitus is fortunately not tied to Bourdieu’s controversial belief that the taste
dispositions of social classes are shaped decisively by the early differences in their
material conditions of existence; it can also be used more generally to understand
the range of “generative structures” (McNay, 1999, p. 100) that shape
dispositions. Even if a problem with Bourdieu’s account of class-specific habitus
in the arena of taste is that it ignores how mass media have aided the de-
differentiation of taste boundaries (Wynne O’Connor, 1998), there is huge scope
for investigating how media might have changed the fundamental conditions
under which dispositions of all kinds are generated.
Whether mass media has indeed “aided the de-differentiation of taste boundaries” as Couldry
says with reference to Wynne and O’Connor’s (1998) Consumption and the postmodern city is debat-
able. The argument presented here, and substantiated by the survey results below, is that narrow-
casting – the splitting of media channels into specialised outlets to cater for well-defined target
audiences – is in fact reinforcing existing taste boundaries. And if we accept the premise that the
media has a formative effect on contemporary youth, then South Africa’s notorious media seg-
mentation (see pages 73 to 77) is likely to affect children from different socio-economic and cul-
tural backgrounds in different ways. In fact many interview participants were very much aware of
the fragmentation of South Africa’s mediascape, which is illustrated by the following excerpt:
Interviewer: Why do you think that is? Why do you go to one school and people like
Rock music, and then you go to another school it is RnB, Hip Hop…
Yolanda: I think we are not listening to the same radio. Other people, they listen
to other radio, so they are dependent on the music they gonna play, so
we depend on our radio.
Amanda: And most of the time, we as black people, we don’t have DSTV, so they
see so many things on DSTV, they watch DSTV. So, many people see
that and do what they do.
Interviewer: So you think it makes a difference if someone has DSTV, for example,
which is international television, I guess.
Amanda: Yes. Because on DSTV you see lots of things, lots of things, but on the
TV we watch, we don’t see many things. We always watch news.




While many interviewees were of the opinion that it is ultimately their personal preference
whether they liked a particular channel or radio station more than other channels and stations,
others agreed with Amanda and Yolanda that it is also at least partly a matter of economic con-
straints. And not only do at least some youth have a pretty good understanding of the ways in
which the South African mediascape is fractured along the lines of class and race, but they are
also aware of, and often condone, the marketing strategies of media producers targeting their
audiences based on these criteria.
Interviewer: What about population groups, or racial groups, do you see any
differences?
Charlene: Yes, definitely. Most of the blacks, or African, they would read Babe, or
True Love. I think, magazines are designed they are targeted at specific
racial population groups.
Kerry: Yes, definitely. Definitely.
Susan: You have to design it for the market, so you know exactly how you
want to sell it.
Interviewer: But do you think - it is divided, South African youth, do you think that
is a good thing?
Charlene: Probably, because you can’t exactly have a black, or African, or col-
oured person who does not have as much income as someone else to
buy the exactly same magazine.
Susan: And he still has the choice.
Charlene: The choice is their’s, it’s just up to you.
Interviewer: (Talks about the once planned but eventually abandoned merger
between YMag and SL, one commonly perceived as a “black”, the other
as a “white” youth magazine.)
Kerry: I heard about that. Also for Cosmopolitan, if they put a black girl on the
cover, even if it is Naomi Campbell, the sales decrease so much.
Interviewer: You say that’s just how it works.
Charlene: It just makes it easier for the consumer and the producer.
Kerry: People are just attracted to things that are similar to them.
What is perhaps most disconcerting about this exchange between schoolgirls from Atlantic High
is the way in which they talk about South Africa’s racialised class structure as a matter of course,
in the sense that “a black, or African, or coloured person (…) does not have as much income as
someone else”. Surely such statements are not far off the mark; African or coloured South Afric-
ans are generally poorer than their white compatriots for obvious historical reasons. But it is the
way in which race and class become entangled in the sense that black is seen as an equivalent for
‘poor’ and white for ‘wealthy’ to the extent that class consciousness becomes a matter of black
and white, and black and white becomes a matter of status.
In the face of such confusion the analysis in the remainder of this chapter largely examines the
combined effects of race and class as well as status, language and gender on respondents’ media
preferences. Where appropriate they are enhanced by including music taste as an independent
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variable. The chapter’s empirical part is divided inyp two sections dealing with traditional (televi-
sion, radio, music television) and new forms of media. Where available (television, radio, new
media) the section begins with data on young people’s quantitative usage of this particular media
form (how much?), followed by the presentation of data on the qualitative differences (what
kind?). As in the previous chapter the empirical results are presented in a concise fashion for the
sake of clarity and coherence. Their theoretical implications and connotations are discussed in
more detail at the end of the chapter.
7.1 Television and Radio
Television
One part of the literature review (pages 73 to 77) outlined the various tensions surrounding
South Africa’s public broadcasting agency, beginning with the principles of inclusiveness and na-
tional unity governing the public broadcaster and the repeated betrayal of these principles
throughout history, the opening-up of broadcasting to commercial demands and pressures and
the ongoing debate over the public broadcaster’s political independency in the face of repeated
attempts by the ruling party to interfere in its programming. It has been argued that all these
factors contribute to the current fragmentation of the mediascape on the basis of language, econ-
omic inequality and cultural differences, thus rendering the quest for a single public sphere in
South Africa difficult to impossible.
South Africa’s television industry is a good example of this in the face of an astonishing degree
of multilingualism compared to a relatively small number of channels: SABC 1 broadcasts mainly
in Nguni languages (isiZulu, isiXhosa, isiSwati and isiNdebele), SABC 2 in SeSotho and
Afrikaans, and SABC 3 in English. All three channels, but SABC 1 and 2 more than SABC 3,
have a high quota of local content, including a whole range of ever-popular soap-operas. eTV is
the only commercial channel and broadcasts almost exclusively in English, showing mostly Hol-
lywood and B-grade American productions alongside a few popular local soap-operas. M-Net is
a subscription-funded digital satellite channel which used to provide a daily two-hourly open
time slot until shortly before the survey was carried out. But the vast majority of its programme
then, and all of it now, was and is accessible only by means of set-top decoders together with a
monthly subscription. DSTV is another subscription satellite which incorporates all of South
Africa’s public as well as M-Net channels, but overall offers a much wider range of nearly 100
video and 78 audio channels (at the time when the research was conducted). Among others, sub-
scribers have access to a variety of movie channels with the latest offerings from Hollywood,
multiple sports channels featuring international sports events, as well as major news channels
from the UK and USA and elsewhere, such as BBC, CNN and Al Jazeera.50
Besides the fragmentation of channels in terms of content and the exclusivity of much interna-
tional programming due to the high costs of satellite TV, traditional broadcasters are also af-




fected by the increasing popularity of new media, most importantly the internet, as sources of in-
formation and entertainment. It is arguably a combination of all these factors which leads to the
disparities in self-reported television consumption shown in the graph below.



















Black n=410 Coloured n=367 White n=177
chi2=54.5, p=0.000
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
Despite the growing competition from alternative media forms, watching television generally
continues to be a favourite pastime activity among South African youth. Over half of the parti-
cipants in the survey admits to watching more than two hours of television every day. White re-
spondents watch less television than black and coloured respondents (based on self-reported es-
timates), but still more than half of them say that they spend more than one hour per day in
front of the television screen. Far more striking than the differences in quantity are the differ-
ences in the quality of television consumed, as the respondents were also asked to pick their fa-
vourite television channel. Again the results do not reflect the actual viewing behaviours but only
the preferences of respondents; respondents were able to choose a favourite channel despite
spending more time watching a different channel, not having a TV at home, or, if they chose the
satellite channels, not having a subscription to Mnet or DSTV.
51. Due to the nature of the research design, accurate measures of media consumption were impossible to obtain.
Dedicated media market research studies such as AMPS usually use ‘peoplemeters’ and diaries, among other
methods, in order to measure actual listening and viewing behaviour. For this study it was necessary to rely on
self-reported estimates, which are subjective at best and incorrect at worst, but ultimately in line with the AMPS
results for the same questions.
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Figure 7.2 Stacked Bar: Television Channels by Race (Cape Town, Percentages)
5 1 17 12 65
6 4 16 39 35
72 1 4 18 5








SABC 1 SABC 2 SABC 3 eTV Mnet/DSTV
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
The stark discrepancy in respondents’ channel preferences represents on one level the language
gap between the three population groups; almost three-quarters of black kids like to watch
SABC 1 which broadcasts in Xhosa, among other languages, whereas the vast majorities of col-
oured and white respondents prefer English language channels such as SABC 3, eTV and M-
Net, and to a much lesser extent SABC 2 which broadcasts partly in Afrikaans52. But it also
demonstrates the inequality of access to newer (and more expensive) forms of media and com-
munication (see also figure 7.9 on page 181); about two out of three white respondents prefer
satellite TV over any of the free television channels compared to one-third of coloured respond-
ents and only just about one out of twenty black respondents.
The absoluteness of the contrasts depicted in Figure 7.2 is somewhat qualified by the AMPS data
on viewing habits. Here the respondents (16-19 year olds in Cape Town) were asked to name the
TV channels they had tuned into the previous day.
52. The lack of popularity of SABC 2 is arguably partly due to the undersampling of Afrikaans-speaking whites.
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Source: AMPS 2007
Coloured youth turn out to be far more avid TV watchers than their black and white peers, most
of them having watched more than one channel that day. Both black and white respondents, on
the other hand, mostly stuck to a particular channel – SABC 1 for African/black and satellite TV
for white kids, which is both in line with the favourite choices of black and white kids in the sur-
vey. Arguably the biggest discrepancy between the two surveys lies in the coloured kids’ lack of
preference for SABC 2 and the high viewing rate for that channel among coloured respondents
in the AMPS survey. But overall the interrelationship between race, language and TV program-
ming was also recognized by some of the interview participants.
Interviewer: (Referring to media segmentation) Do you think it could have a negat-
ive effect?
Mfundo: I think it does not have a negative effect, because what I watch on
SABC 1 is Xhosa and white people watch Afrikaans and English. And
SABC 1 is benefitting all of us. So if I can’t watch SABC 3 and watch
Afrikaans I will not hear anything and I am not interested in Afrikaans.
Solomon: I think it does have a negative effect. Because I mean the shows on
SABC 1 are always interested in what the Zulu and Xhosa culture are
doing, and SABC 2 will be giving you things that are based on the
Afrikaans culture, so we get to learn about all the cultures by watching
SABC 1 so we don’t know much about the other cultures.
And:
Interviewer: Why do some people watch different channels than others? Where do
you think this is coming from?
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Abigail: It could be races. Coloureds watch eTV, and then you get South Afric-
ans or people who watch SABC 1 because it plays, how can I say, Afric-
an programmes. You get the Africans who watch SABC 1 because
SABC 1 plays more African programmes. And SABC 3 would get Indi-
ans watching, because SABC 3 has Indian programmes. And eTV, most
coloureds would watch that.
And:
Megan: Yes, SABC 1 is mainly for the black people. 2, okay I think the 2 has
gotten into Afrikaans now because of having watched it lately. I have
been watching it lately and they are bringing a lot of Afrikaans shows
and stuff, but I think, mainly it is because of the one race that’s just
been shown lately, like the blacks and stuff, that has kind of been more
on TV, so I think they are trying to level the thing out.
Annalishka: Even if it is made for the coloureds, they got a lot in their language on
that channel.
Megan: And 3 is American and…
Annalishka: …eTV is for the coloureds, mainly.
Megan: Ja. This is more, like, the movie channel.
Megan speaks about the “one race that’s just been shown lately, like the blacks and stuff” and by
that expresses her disapproval with a perceived loss of representation of what she considers to
be her own group – (white) Afrikaans-speakers. She does recognise the presence of Afrikaans on
SABC 2 as an attempt “to level things out”, even though her friend Annalishka is quick to point
out that this is primarily aimed at the coloured population by drawing a distinction between
white audiences as a whole and Afrikaans-speaking coloureds. They are adding to this somehow
confusing mix references to locality and content which are not further explained in detail as if no
further explanation is needed. It is this self-explanatory manner which shows how natural the in-
tersections of race, class, media and taste appear at least to these two girls, and arguably to most
South Africans.
The girls’ references to Afrikaans illustrate the importance of language as the most influential
factor in South Africa’s television segmentation. In fact, the overwhelming popularity of SABC 1
(which broadcasts a lot of its content in Xhosa) among African/black respondents and the gen-
eral disregard for SABC 2 render a further investigation of these channels’ (lack of) popularity
among other groups unnecessary and also impractical as very low frequency counts make regres-
sion models unstable. Therefore the following analyses focus on the relative preferences for
SABC 3, eTV and DSTV/Mnet within the city schools sample, and SABC 1 and eTV among
African/black respondents. They follow the same logic and questions as the ones in the previous
chapter on taste by comparing the strength of the separate influences on respondents’ television
viewing preferences. However, this time the effect of schooling (or institutionalised cultural cap-
ital) does not have priority. Instead the focus is on the effect of class as an indication of access,
especially with regard to satellite television as it has a higher economic barrier than the other
channels. The hypothesis is that class has a negative effect on the preference for satellite TV in
comparison to other channels. The only other difference to the previous regression models lies
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in the dependent variable (discrete with more than two categories opposed to a binary) which re-
quires a multinomial regression instead of a logit regression. In practice, a multinomial regression
compares the discrete values of the variable against a chosen base outcome through a series of
logit regressions. By shifting the base outcome it is possible to obtain a complete set of binary
comparisons between all the values.
Table 7.1 Mlogit Regressions: Television Channels (Cape Town, Odds Ratios)
Base SABC 3 Mnet/DSTV SABC 1
eTV Mnet/DSTV eTV eTV
Subsample City Schools African/Black




White 0.751 1.332 (omitted)
(0.518) (0.423)
English: Native 0.596 1.231 0.484* 3.142
(0.247) (0.633) (0.047) (0.161)
English: Other 2.052 1.744 1.176 0.710
(0.234) (0.354) (0.722) (0.580)
Male 2.905*** 2.558*** 1.135 2.959***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.581) (0.000)
School: Southern/Flats 2.102 0.587 (omitted)
(0.057) (0.120)
School: Northern/Atlantic 0.279*** (omitted)
(0.000)
School: Townships (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 0.305
(0.089)
Class 0.969** 0.995 0.974** 0.988
(0.005) (0.676) (0.001) (0.356)
Observations 551 396
Pseudo R-squared 0.177 0.135
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
Leaving SABC 1 and SABC 2 out of the analysis allows one to focus on some of the more nu-
anced findings on television preferences. For once, the degree of the racialisation of TV channel
preferences is indeed strong, but not as strong as the first impression would suggest, if one takes
into account gender, language, class and schooling. The odds ratios for the race variables remain
remarkable; for example the chance of white respondents preferring eTV (which has been de-
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scribed as the “coloured TV channel” in one of the interviews) over SABC 3 is about three quar-
ters of that of coloured respondents, and black respondents’ score is even lower at about 60 per-
cent of that. At the same time black and coloured respondents’ odds to choose eTV over Mnet/
DSTV are about three quarters greater than that of white respondents (the fact that the ratios are
equal is coincidental, just as the black respondents’ equal odds ratios for the SABC 3 vs eTV and
SABC 3 vs Mnet/DSTV comparisons). But the strong indication for racialised television prefer-
ences notwithstanding, the corresponding p-values do not show statistical significance. Class, on
the other hand, is a statistical significant independent variable in two of the three city schools re-
gressions. Here a positive relationship between class and satellite TV is expected, but it holds
true, at least statistically significantly, only in comparison with eTV, not with SABC 3, thus the
hypothesis (positive effect of class on preference for satellite TV, no effect on comparisons of
‘free’ channels) would have to be rejected if one does not distinguish between separate channels.
Instead it is eTV which shows a negative correlation with class, even if compared to other free
channels. This holds true if one compares eTV with SABC 1 among black respondents, even
though this result is also not statistically significant. Further, kids attending predominantly white
schools (Northern/Atlantic) are much less likely (odds ratio of 0.28) than those at predominantly
coloured schools (Southern/Flats) to prefer eTV over Mnet/DSTV (controlling for class as well
as race, language and gender). Thus all evidence points to a special status of eTV among the ex-
pected results for the other channels.
Exactly why eTV is increasingly popular among poorer respondents can arguably not be ex-
plained without a more detailed content analysis of the programmes shown on each channel, but
the finding in itself is enough to illustrate that media preferences, like taste, are not necessarily a
direct function of race, class or gender, but the result of an intricate interplay between all factors
as well as the actual content (in this case TV programming such as movies, series, soap operas,
talk shows, news and sports). But what is certain is that the respondents’ choices have much to
do with locality as African/black respondents tend to watch more ‘homegrown’ television than
coloured or white kids. This is in line with the findings of the previous chapter in that it implies a
certain connection between whiteness and middle-class cosmopolitanism, which was also ob-
served by Strelitz (2005133) during his work on the media consumption of South African univer-
sity students:
Carol, a white female middle-class student, wrote that her favourite programme
was the American sitcom Friends. Her essay gave the reasons for this preference
and also offered reasons for her rejection of local television productions as being
inappropriate to her identity as a ‘global being’:
South African productions seem to place their emphasis on providing
viewing material which depicts life as experienced by the working-class
majority in our country. My reality, on the other hand, is not reminiscent of
this way of life, and it is in this context that I relentlessly turn to foreign
(mostly American) programmes for my television entertainment. I
experience myself as a ‘global’ being. On this note I identify more with the
‘cliquey’ and humorous bunch of ‘twenty-somethings’ of Friends, with their
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smooth American accents, than with, what seems to me, the comparatively
primitive actors and actresses in local productions such as Isidingo.
Carol’s frank admission summarises in one paragraph the racialised nature of class distinction
among South African youth. First, she manages to establish a dichotomy of white middle-class
and black working-class without even mentioning race directly. Then she makes the link between
whiteness and cosmopolitanism and describes her own detachment from local productions. It is
also noteworthy that Carol’s choice of her favourite television series is hardly arbitrary, as the vir-
tual absence of non-white characters in Friends has made the show the subject of academic de-
bates (see Chidester 2008). This is not to say that white youth such as Carol consciously avoid
programmes with black actors and Carol would probably outright refuse any such claims53. In-
stead the point is again that the conflation of race and class connotations has become so en-
trenched that it appears normal and somehow ‘natural’ to young South Africans (and arguably
young people elsewhere).
Radio
The point has been made that new forms of media influence the ways in which people entertain
and inform themselves to varying degrees, depending on access. It is already possible to see this
effect in the respondents’ self-reported time spent watching television, and it becomes even
clearer if the same question is asked about radio consumption.
53. The Bill Cosby show, for example, was highly successful American series that featured only African-American
actors. It is however of relevance to this study that there is controversy about the show due to allegations that it
portrayed an African-American family in an essentially white middle-class setting. (see Gray 1989)
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Black n=408 Coloured n=354 White n=179
chi2=80.0, p=0.000
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
Over half of the black respondents say they spend at least one hour every day listening to the ra-
dio. Two thirds of coloured respondents acknowledge that they do so for at least half an hour a
day. In contrast, three out of five white respondents say they listen to the radio for half an hour
or less daily (almost half of those maintain that they never listen to the radio). These numbers
alone represent an important indicator for the chasm between young people’s mediated realities
in South Africa, as radio broadcasting can be argued to be the most localised, immediate and, im-
portantly, affordable mass medium. In combination with white and coloured respondents’ strong
affinity for (mostly international) satellite television, one can see how the racialised local/global
dualism discernible in respondents’ tastes and cultural preferences (see previous chapter) is also
caused by different degrees of local and global media consumption, which itself is at least partly a
function of economic inequality. 
Respondents were also asked to choose their favourite from a list of popular radio stations






























Cape Talk Kfm 5fm Heart
Good Hope Metro Umhlobo Wenene Bush Radio
Source: AMPS 2007
The qualitative difference is defined by the radio stations’ use of language and music; even
though it might often seem that most radio stations play the same commercial hits over and over
again, one can find very specific differences in their musical content, also and especially among
Cape Town’s most popular stations. Also, although all stations are required to adhere to the
same regulations for local content quota (25% for commercial stations, 40% for public and com-
munity stations), there are still enormous discrepancies in the amount of local and international
music aired from station to station.
The language factor is easily discernible, as Umhlobo Wenene is the only station in the list which
does not broadcast in English (its programming is in Xhosa instead). The taste factor requires
some background information about the music programming of the stations; Umhlobo Wenene,
Bush Radio and Metro FM, the favourite radio stations among black youth, play local and global
Hip Hop, RnB as well as Kwaito. 5fm, the radio station listened to mostly by white kids, plays a
lot of American Pop and Rock music, and Good Hope FM, popular among coloured kids, has a
lot of American RnB on its playlists.
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Table 7.2 Radio Stations by Race (Cape Town, Percentages)
African/Black Coloured White Total
Stations All City Townships All All All
Good Hope 12 42 8 71 20 36
Umhlobo Wenene 36 6 40 0 0 16
Kfm 15 4 17 5 13 11
Heart 0 0 0 12 0 5
5fm 3 10 2 10 63 16
Metro 10 17 9 0 0 5
Bush Radio 22 19 23 1 1 10
Cape Talk 1 2 0 0 3 1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
n 389 48 341 336 156 881
χ² = 863.7291 p = 0.000 (whole sample)
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
The responses to the radio question match the AMPS results fairly accurately; the favourite radio
stations for each group are almost always the ones which the members of the group listen to
most frequently. An exception are Heart’s overall low popularity (even among coloured respond-
ents) as well as black and white respondents’ disproportionate disregard for Cape Talk and Kfm,
respectively. Nonetheless these divergence are not contradictory to the AMPS results, as abso-
lute preferences do not necessarily reflect actual listening behaviours. The most intriguing results,
however, concern black respondents’ division into Good Hope, Umhlobo Wenene, Kfm or
Metro listeners depending on whether they attend a city or township school. A similar division
was observed by Smith (2011: 104) in her study of black youth’s media consumption in
KwaZulu-Natal.
So to a great extent respondents’ radio preferences really seem to be based on race. But again
certain cleavages, such as the schism within the African/black population, do not seem to be
easily explained by the race factor alone. Moreover, there are good reasons to assume that radio
preferences correlate with music preferences. As discussed earlier, the relationship between mu-
sic taste and media preferences might yield an answer to the question whether media consump-
tion affects habitus, even though habitus itself is not included in the statistical analysis.
In order to do the peculiarities of city and township schools justice, separate analyses were con-
ducted, as with the previous regressions. Also, not all radio stations could be included in the ana-
lysis as the wider range of choices and the resulting lower frequency counts prohibit the use of
certain categories in the analysis from a statistical standpoint. It is only possible to use them in
this way by applying them in race-defined subsamples, which has been done with some of them
using only an African/black subsample.
Given the virtual ubiquity of radios in South Africa, the class variable, as a proxy for access, is
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not expected to yield interesting results. Instead the main hypothesis for this set of regressions
concerns the relationship between music taste and radio station preferences: a preference for
Good Hope FM and Kfm is assumed to correlate with a preference for Hip Hop and RnB while
the same is assumed to be true for Rock and South African Pop and 5FM.
Table 7.3 Mlogit Regression: Radio Stations – City Schools (Cape Town, Odds Ratios)
Base Good Hope FM 5fm
Kfm 5fm Kfm






English: Native 0.429 0.534 0.804
(0.139) (0.172) (0.730)
English: Other 0.228 0.336 0.679
(0.062) (0.080) (0.660)




School: Southern/Flats 1.058 0.569
(0.907) (0.120)
Class 0.989 1.010 0.979
(0.413) (0.406) (0.192)
US Hip Hop/RnB 0.376* 0.237*** 1.588
(0.011) (0.000) (0.248)




Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
Good Hope represents the most popular radio station among all respondents attending one of
the city schools, mainly due to its great popularity among coloured kids, almost three quarters of
whom chose it as their favourite. This is reflected in the regression analysis: compared to col-
oured youth, white adolescents are almost eight times and African/black ones more than twice
as likely to pick Kfm or 5fm as one of their favourite radio stations. It is however noteworthy
7. Recasting Race
168
that the results for African/black survey participants at city schools are statistically insignificant,
shifting the focus to the music taste variables which actually turn out to have a significant impact
on radio preferences, as expected. Here it is very clear that fans of the two genres associated with
‘coloured tastes’ – American Hip Hop and RnB – are indeed far more likely to listen to Good
Hope than one of the two ‘white stations’, which, consequently, are positively correlated with the
‘white genres’ Rock and local Pop. This association between music taste and radio preferences
was also noted by some of the interviewees.
Interviewer: What is your favourite radio channel?
Everyone: Goodhope.
Interviewer: Why do you prefer Goodhope?
Clara: I like its music.
Charney: But if you look at 5fm, it is the same. It is similar. But 5fm also plays
more Rock, and if you listen to Goodhope, it is RnB, which we like.
Clara: And it is fun because they talk a lot of nonsense. They make jokes.
Interviewer: But again, why do you think different people listen to different radio
stations?
Marieke: Different kinds of music. Their tastes are different.
And:
Interviewer: What are your favourite radio stations by the way?
Ricardo: Goodhope FM (others agree). And Heart. Some of us listen to 5fm be-
cause of the Rock. Some of us.
Hendry: I do.
Interviewer: Why do you think that is?
Cheslyn: They got good songs that we know. Lots of songs that people like.
Interviewer: So is it just the music?
Hendry: And sometimes the way they speak.
And:
Interviewer: Why would you not listen to 5fm for example?
Mzawupheli: What I don’t like about 5fm is sometimes when I tune to 5fm I hear
Rock’n’Roll. I don’t like Rock’n’Roll, most of the time I listen to RnB
so stations like Metro FM, Kfm, they specialise mostly on RnB. So
that’s why I tune into them.
Given the semi-universal accessibility of radios, it does not surprise that class does not have a
major influence on respondents’ choice of their favourite station, as its actual influence has
already been discussed in relation to white respondents’ low interest in radio as a medium in gen-
eral. The same is true for the statistical insignificance of the school variables, although it is pos-
sible to recognise a somewhat expected trend in favour of Good Hope among respondents at
predominantly coloured schools (Southern/Flats). 
The muteness of the gender variable then seems somewhat surprising considering the great
gender effect on music taste, but taking into account that radio stations usually cover a range of
related genres (e.g. Hip Hop and RnB) explains why boys and girls tend to tune into the same
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stations. It is more worthwhile to pay attention to the language variables, despite their formal
lack of statistical significance, as the odds of preferring Good Hope over 5fm or Kfm are
strongly increased for those who prefer to speak a language other than English. Given Good
Hope’s popularity among coloured youth this applies first and foremost to Afrikaans-speakers –
in fact one can assume that the Xhosa-speakers falling into the same category are the reason why
the language variable misses statistical significance at the 0.05 level by small margins.
Table 7.4 Mlogit Regression: Radio Stations – African/Black (Cape Town, Odds Ratios)









English: Native 6.957 2.231 2.269 0.321 0.326 1.017
(0.156) (0.522) (0.479) (0.391) (0.353) (0.988)
English: Other 5.082 0.952 1.443 0.187 0.284 1.515
(0.084) (0.949) (0.613) (0.073) (0.146) (0.574)
Male 0.525 0.731 0.590 1.393 1.125 0.807
(0.104) (0.504) (0.193) (0.400) (0.694) (0.602)
School: Townships 10.452* 0.956 6.846 0.091* 0.655 7.159
(0.046) (0.964) (0.075) (0.046) (0.729) (0.083)
Class 0.986 0.983 1.005 0.997 1.020 1.023
(0.452) (0.297) (0.757) (0.875) (0.304) (0.221)
SA Hip Hop/Kwaito 12.170** 8.375 3.134 0.688 0.258 0.374
(0.008) (0.076) (0.143) (0.779) (0.137) (0.424)
US Hip Hop/RnB 0.370* 0.837 0.658 2.263 1.778 0.786
(0.027) (0.746) (0.371) (0.058) (0.061) (0.599)
Observations 366
Pseudo R-squared 0.102
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
The impression of language and music taste being the major factors behind radio segmentation is
reinforced by black respondents’ respective preferences. The preference for a language other
than English, in this case Xhosa, translates into five times higher odds for preferring Umhlobo
Wenene over Good Hope, and a decrease of odds by more than eighty percent for preferring
Umhlobo Wenene over Metro. Simultaneously, the odds for having a preference for Umhlobo
Wenene over Good Hope is more than tenfold for fans of local Hip Hop and Kwaito, whereas a
penchant for American Rap and RnB decreases the likelihood by about two thirds. Similar ratios,
albeit to lesser degrees, also apply to Metro and Bush Radio.
But the decisive result concerning class and status lies in black respondents’ division into
Umhlobo Wenene or Bush Radio listeners depending on the type of school they are attending.
While someone’s residence (expressed in the class variable) does not matter, the odds of prefer-
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ring Metro vs Umhlobo Wenene is only a tenth and Bush radio vs Metro seven times higher
among township school kids compared to their peers at city school. In combination with the res-
ults for the language and music taste variables this speaks of a qualitative distinction which can-
not be explained through varying levels of access alone.
It shows that media segmentation must be interpreted as two separate, yet mutually reinforcing,
processes. On the one side there is the issue of uneven access – despite celebratory or gloomy
(depending on the viewpoint) depictions of the media’s ubiquity in young people’s lives, real and
significant differences in the accessibility of certain media forms persist. Then the results presen-
ted in this section largely reflect another process; even with regard to a virtually truly ubiquitous
media outlet as the radio (and in a similar fashion: television) strong differences between differ-
ent groups and strata of youth remain. While they can be interpreted first of all in racial terms as
a consequence of the intentional targeting of specific audiences by the stations themselves
(primarily through music and language), they are, at least among black kids, crosscut by differing
perceptions of status and locality (going to a former Model C school, liking American Rap and
listening to Metro as opposed to attending a township school, listening to Kwaito and tuning
into Umhlobo Wenene).
The combination of these two processes is then responsible for some of the rather muddled de-
scriptions of contemporary South African youth: while racial differences in taste and media con-
sumption are often acknowledged in public debates on South African youth, homogenisation
through Westernisation (and supposedly accompanying social ills such as moral demise, increas-
ing individualisation or, on a more positive note, the breaking down of racial barriers) usually
takes the centre stage. The impression gained from the data presented here is that homogenisa-
tion does not really take place:
Media discourses on consumption in South Africa are not perceived reductively
as a straightforward insistence by Africans on ‘going West’ (see Nyamnjoh 2000:
9-10), but rather in terms of the ways they enable people to devise new ways of
doing things in life (see Even-Zohar 1997), and access new resources and sets of
strategies directed at the social and individual production of selfhood (Laden
2001a, 2001b, 2001c). In this regard we should be attentive to the transformative
power and local reworkings, not merely the culturally homogenising effects of
commercial media discourses, consumer culture and patterns of consumption,
and their impact(s) on people’s senses of social membership and individual
selfhood. (Narunsky-Laden 2008: 127)
However, the rejection of homogenisation shall not distract from the constraints to consumers’
options as a result of limited access and narrow-casting. An example of the explicit targeting of
certain audiences by television and radio channels is the promotional campaign for Yizo Yizo, a
highly popular drama series in a township setting, which aired on SABC 1:
The national radio station MetroFM, with the largest youth listenership in the
country, broadcast a talk-show the day after each week’s episode. A further
feature of the multi-media profile for Yizo Yizo was the release of a soundtrack
CD, which became one of the fastest-selling music CDs in the country. Both the
soundtrack CD and the Yizo Yizo magazine illustrate the explicit use of popular
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commercial media formats to support the primary objective of stimulating
discussion of the television series. The music soundtrack from Yizo Yizo is
particularly important. It features local kwaito music, which is a distinctively
South African hybrid form of pop music, mixing elements of imported house,
hip-hop and rap with homegrown traditional and pop music styles (Stephens,
2000). The use of township dance music in the television series was an integral
element of the ‘reality-effect’ created around the programme, and thus a key
element in both building a large youth audience and in realizing the objective of
stimulating discussion about real-world social and policy issues. (Barnett 2004:
261)
The result of this explicit targeting of specific audiences clearly goes against the Reithian prin-
ciples of public broadcasting – national unity and public education (see page 73). Instead of sup-
porting the process of nation-building by creating a single public sphere, South African media,
including its public fraction and especially television, has reached a level of fragmentation that al-
lows society – ‘the audience’ – to split up into individual groups defined by race and class and
have them retreat into their respective imagined communities. And even though this is not a de-
velopment unique to South Africa as it is part of a universal process, its consequences are argu-
ably even more significant here than elsewhere, as the national media, for historical reasons, nev-
er even had a common base to begin with.
Music Television
Another good example of narrow-casting is music television. In the relatively short period of its
existence as a distinct media outlet, its mother channel MTV has branched out into a network of
regional, national and specialised channels, creating an even less transparent myriad of competit-
ors on the way. (Osgerby 2004: 42) In South Africa today subscription to a satellite service gives
one access to a whole range of different music channels, some of them part of the larger MTV
network, others owned by local media companies.
Despite the potentially wide range of music channels on offer, it is at the same time the most ex-
clusive domain of media culture as it is affected by the ‘satellite divide’, meaning that the inequal-
ity of access to satellite TV affects the pair of graphs below more than the other AMPS/YCS
combinations shown before. AMPS data is based on actual viewing behaviour and, presumably
the lack of DSTV/M-Net set top boxes in black and coloured households does not provide for
meaningful observations on preferences for a certain channel. Moreover, AMPS data for 2007 is
only available for two channels: MTV and MTV Base.
In this case the type of question asked in the YCS proves to be more appropriate, because one
can assume that many kids who do not have satellite TV at home still know most of the music
television channels and have a preference for one over the others based on the kind of music
that is played there. So while the lack of access shows itself in a relatively small number of valid
responses for black respondents (258 out of a total subsample of 435), there are very clear differ-
ences in preferences if one compares them across racial categories.
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Channel O and MK89 (of which Channel O is by far the more popular one) are the two genu-
inely South African stations on offer and the favourites among the black kids in the sample;
more than half prefer them over the MTV/VH1 channels. Channel O focusses heavily on local
music, featuring Hip Hop and Kwaito stars, most of them black. MK89’s programme is also dis-
tinctively local but far more diverse in terms of music (in fact it shows mostly South African
Rock, but its overall popularity is too weak to warrant a separate category).
More than half of the coloured respondents mentioned MTV Base as their favourite channel,
which is the African offshoot of MTV and as such offers a heavier focus on supposedly ‘black
music styles’ such as RnB, Hip Hop, Reggae and Dancehall. Moreover it plays originally African
sounds, e.g. Kwaito, Zouk, M’balax and Afrobeat and regularly features African and South Afric-
an artists. In a way it can be described as a hybrid between MTV Europe, above, and Channel O,
below, as it offers both a heavy rotation of international, largely American, black musicians as
well as local talent.
Eight out of ten white respondents prefer to watch MTV or its smaller sister channel VH1.
MTV is the oldest and globally most popular music channel, symbolising the global conquest of
American pop culture in the 1980s and 1990s. Today there is not one single MTV anymore, as
the company offers a plethora of regionally flavoured offshoots of its mother channel around
the world (with MTV Base being the African version). In fact the MTV broadcasted on South
Africa’s satellite service (alongside MTV Base) is MTV Europe and as such it features mostly
American and English, and hardly any local or other African content. One can certainly expect
to see more mainstream American Pop and Rock on this channel than on MTV Base and
Channel O.
Given this background, and because of the low cell count for white respondents who prefer to
watch Channel O/MK 89 (five), it has been decided to include the music taste variables instead
of the race variable in the respective regression model in order to ensure robustness.
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Table 7.5 Mlogit regressions: Music Television
MTV/VH1 Channel O/MK 89 MTV Base
MTV Base MTV/VH1 MTV Base MTV VH1






English: Native 0.766 2.734 0.200 13.675
(0.448) (0.420) (0.064) (0.051)
English: Other 1.046 3.516 0.530 6.636
(0.924) (0.254) (0.250) (0.083)
Male 1.134 0.966 0.913 1.058




School: Townships (omitted) 0.171 0.237 0.721
(0.084) (0.126) (0.747)
Class 1.000 0.990 1.001 0.989
(0.957) (0.527) (0.963) (0.499)
US Hip Hop/RnB 2.819*** 0.987 1.758 0.561
(0.000) (0.972) (0.125) (0.204)
Rock/SA Pop 0.552*
(0.012)
SA Hip Hop/Kwaito 1.494 1.269 1.178
(0.598) (0.749) (0.852)
Observations 475 247
Pseudo R-squared 0.208 0.056
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
The music taste coefficients in table 7.5 further validate the underlying assumptions with regard
to the hypothetical triangular relationship between race, taste and media preference. Each one-
degree increase on the five-degree scale for American Hip Hop (associated with coloured) means
that the probability of preferring MTV Base over MTV/VH1 increases by almost two-thirds,
whereas the probability of preferring Channel O/MK 89 over MTV Base decreases by almost 40
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percent (with the control variables kept at their means). Accordingly, a higher Kwaito/South
African Hip Hop score (associated with black) results in a higher probability of having a prefer-
ence for MTV Base over MTV/VH1 as well as a preference for Channel O/MK 89 over MTV
Base and MTV/VH1. At the other end of the musical spectrum, a higher Rock/South African
Pop score (associated with white) decreases the probability of watching both MTV Base or
Channel O/MK 89 by about 40 percent but does not make a significant difference for compar-
ing the two non-white channels directly. The only music style which is not positively associated
with a single channel is RnB/American Pop. It does, however, cause a slight (about 18 percent)
yet statistically significant decrease in the probability of preferring Channel O/MK 89 over MTV
Base. As for the control variables, only class proves to be of importance in predicting someone’s
favourite music television channel. There is no significant difference in the comparison of
MTV/VH1 and MTV, but Channel O proves to be more popular among socio-economically
weak respondents.
Overall, one needs to keep in mind that the principal factor with respect to music television is
the highly uneven access due to socio-economic constraints, which is reflected by the low re-
sponse rate for that particular question for coloured and especially black respondents (three out
of four and six out of ten, respectively, opposed to more than eight out of ten for white re-
spondents). Furthermore, the explicit racial narrow-casting behind the station’s programming
cannot be emphasised enough, as Stadler’s (Stadler 2008: 13) description of Channel O suggests:
Channel O, a digital satellite television (DSTV) channel offered by the pay-TV
company MultiChoice Africa, has incorporated popular terminology that
references black identity and the impact of globalisation in its marketing
campaigns. This channel addresses a young, upwardly mobile, predominantly
black audience with advertising strategies that demonstrate an awareness of the
discourse of cultural imperialism. The advertisements feature coconuts that do
not have white centres: they are chocolate all the way through. In other words,
Channel O represents itself as actively resisting domination by foreign media
products that feature and address white people. The caption beside the
chocolate-centred coconut reads, ‘Channel O. Uncolonized: Get back to black’,
meaning that watching the black-oriented programming will enable the black
audience to avoid the internalisation of white culture. Because Channel O is an
expensive satellite service rather than being free-to-air, it is likely that its well-to-
do audience members are (or are in danger of becoming labelled) coconuts. In
this instance the media is encouraging black viewers to return to their roots, and
to value their own identities and cultures.
According to Stadler the very access to Channel O sets its black viewers apart from those who
do not receive satellite television and is enough to label them ‘coconuts’. And in a an almost
ironic twist, Channel O’s (self-)advertising draws a very clear line between its targeted audience –
young, black, upward-mobile – and white viewers. This way it seemingly eschews having to imit-
ate the symbolism of white middle-class and is able to offer an alternative middle-class identity to
the one described in this study so far. But even if this is an exciting development worth of furth-
er investigation, it needs to be emphasised that this alternative class identity is also deeply
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steeped in racial and (post-)colonial discourse – the abandonment of race altogether does not
seem to be a viable option for media companies in order to attract sizable audiences. 
7.2 New Media and Communication
Over the last two decades there has been a shift from ‘traditional’ media (television, radio, print)
to modern Information and Communication Technology (ICT). The abundance of information
and distraction found online and the immediacy of modern communication by SMS, email and
social network sites have changed the consumer behaviour of individuals around the globe. New
media distinguishes itself from traditional media primarily in that it is highly individualised and
multi-facetted, leading Castells (2009: 64) to remark that “[we] do not “watch” the Internet as we
watch television. In practice, Internet users (the majority of the population in advanced societies
and a growing proportion of the third world) live with the Internet.”
One needs to keep in mind, however, that accounts of the growing dominance of online media
are usually based on the experiences in developed countries where internet access, cellphones
and satellite television are relatively affordable and generally widespread compared to other parts
of the world where they remain out of reach for most people. For example, a study of the link
between computer usage and cultural capital in Flanders (Belgium) does not produce any signi-
ficant results, which the authors largely ascribe to the virtually universal access to ICT in
Flanders (Tondeur and Sinnaeve 2010: 13). In South Africa, on the other hand, the high costs as-
sociated with having personal internet access have created a real digital divide54 which is also eas-
ily detectable in the graph below.
54. It needs to be said that thanks to the tremendous developments in the mobile market and the virtual ubiquity
of cellphones in South Africa a much higher proportion of South Africans from low-income backgrounds can
be found online today compared to when the fieldwork for this study was conducted (see Kreutzer 2009). But
whether mobile access to the internet is indeed equivalent to the ‘full’ online experience and leads to an equal
decrease in traditional media consumption is still open to debate.
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Black n=370 Coloured n=334 White n=171
chi2=158.8, p=0.000
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
The differences in internet consumption between the three main population groups are astonish-
ing: over half of the white respondents report accessing the internet at least twice and half of
those even at least four times a week. In contrast, three out five black respondents say that they
never go online and only one out of four coloured respondents visits the web at least twice a
week. But of course the graph is problematic – primarily internet consumption is not assumed to
be a function of race but of economic factors and actual access to the internet. Whether this is
true is subject to the following series of regressions testing the relationship between race, class,
access and internet consumption in combination with a number of control variables. Since we
are dealing with an ordinal dependent variable an ordered logit regression is the appropriate
method here.55
55. An ordered logistic regression (ologit) basically consists of a series of logits, stepwise (starting with the lowest
level) grouping the individual levels of the dependent variable and comparing them with the group of higher
scores. Since the coefficients (here: odds ratios) presented here only reflect a single equation for all levels of the
dependent variable, their interpretation is not as straightforward as with the other regression models used in
this thesis and will therefore be done in more general terms.
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Table 7.6 Ologit Internet Consumption (Cape Town, Odds Ratios)
Subsample City Schools African/Black
Race: African/Black 0.680 (omitted)
(0.276)
Race: Coloured 0.497** (omitted)
(0.002)
(Race: White) (omitted)
English: Native 0.917 1.044
(0.748) (0.941)








School: Townships (omitted) 0.603
(0.381)
(School: Atlantic)
Internet: Home 4.389*** 2.434**
(0.000) (0.002)
Observations 529 351
Pseudo R-squared 0.114 0.053
Brant p>chi2 0.977 0.941
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
The results for these regressions are slightly ambiguous when it comes to the race and class ef-
fect but are clear regarding the importance of access for internet consumption. As for race: white
respondents indeed spend far more time online than their black and coloured peers, even con-
trolling for access and economic background, but only the results for coloured respondents are
statistically significant. Class, although statistically significant in the city schools model, has only
minor effects on time spent online, arguably due to the strong access effect: having an internet
connection at home increases the odds by factor four among city school students and factor two
among black kids. Despite their ambiguity these results largely fit expectations, but what is rather
unexpected is the significant effect, both in absolute as well as statistical terms, of the gender var-
iable: according to both regressions boys spend significantly more time online than girls. This
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leads to a topic which has been neglected in the discussion of the media results so far: gender di-
fferences in media usage among adolescents have been a matter of academic debate at least since
McRobbie and Garber (1976) drew attention to the lack of engagement with gender issues in
subcultural theory. The early studies on subcultures conducted at the CCCS were male-centric,
with some explicitly focussing on stereotypical representations of masculinity such as the biker
movement. Initially the role of women and girls had been somewhat neglected and misrepresen-
ted in some of these accounts, in the sense that men (or boys) were seen to live out their subcul-
tural identities in public whereas women (or girls) were assumed to be restricted to the privacy of
their own four walls (or the bedroom, to be more specific) (Frith 1978: 64). McRobbie and
Garber (1976; McRobbie 1978) objected to this passive and negative characterisation of young
women by emphasising the crucial role they played in the sexual revolution as well as in the fash-
ioning of a counter-hegemonic youth style in all sorts of public spheres, from fashion to music.
Post-feminist writers in the 1990s extended the arguments by their feminist predecessors by
highlighting the social independence and sexual self-confidence of young women at the time in a
variety of different contexts such the Rrrrriot Grrrl movement, the Rave movement and also
through the emergence of the so-called girls groups, such as the Spice Girls. It is noteworthy that
these positive accounts of the new feminine, bordering to the celebratory, were often in line with
the generally (overly) optimistic elucidations of post-subcultural theory. More recently the focus
of attention has been readjusted to the actual differences in the ways young women and men are
using and perceiving old and new forms of media and communication without questioning the
fundamental equality between men and women in the making and representation of popular cul-
ture. For example, there is a large and growing body of literature which describes (Park 2009),
sometimes explains and occasionally disputes (Gross 2004; Shaw and Gant 2002) the discrepancy
in the ways young women and men use the internet. While the extent of this discrepancy is un-
der discussion, virtually all studies (almost all of which have been conducted in the US or
Europe) confirm the results presented here that male respondents spend more time online than
female respondents. While some more recent studies have shown that there are either no differ-
ences in internet usage by gender or that the gender gap is rapidly narrowing, the results presen-
ted here are remarkably similar to slightly earlier studies from overseas which recorded a marked
difference in the frequency and ways young men and women were using the internet. Other re-
cent studies maintain, however, that while the frequency of internet usage, in the USA at least, is
today fairly equal among youth regardless of gender, there is still a distinction in the quality of in-
ternet usage with boys spending more time online for entertainment while girls are using it more
for information. Unfortunately the data on internet usage from the Cape Town Youth Culture
Survey does not allow for such detailed analysis and thus the actual qualitative differences in us-
age can only be speculated about, but the actual difference in online time between boys and girls
points to a real and relevant variation between boys’ and girls’ media usage. 
The language factor deserves attention too, as Xhosa-preferring black respondents spend signi-
ficantly less time online than their English-preferring peers. However, here one needs to ques-
tion the direction of causality between the dependent and independent variable: do kids spend
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more time online because they prefer to speak English or is it the other way around: they start
preferring English because they use the internet? The collected data alone does not provide
definite answers to this question, but the findings do imply a further mode of distinction among
black respondents based on language preferences.
But as interesting as these results are they are also somewhat unidimensional as they do not tell
much about the actual accessibility of new media and communication, especially beyond internet
access. For this purpose four additional questions were asked about the respondents’ access to
new forms of media and communication56:
1. Do you have satellite TV (DSTV) at home?
2. Where do you have access to the internet?
3. Do you have a personal email address? 
4. Do you have a cellphone?






















Cellphone Satellite TV Email Internet
Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007
Figure 7.9 shows that while cellphones are quite common among all survey participants, satellite
TV, internet access at home and a personal email address are not. Using a scale based on the
four variables it is possible to obtain a more detailed image of the inequality of access.
56. Only questions 1 and 3 result in binary variables. In order to answer the cellphone question respondents could
choose from ordered categories (“<R30” “R30-R100” “R100-R200” “>R200”) or the response “No
cellphone”. Here it will also be treated as a binary variable (“Cellphone” / “No Cellphone”). The internet
question allowed for multiple responses. Here we only look at the option “Internet at Home”.
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Looking at the combined access variable57 stratified by race reveals remarkable differences
between the groups. White respondents in the sample have access to at least one of the four
commodities, and more than two-thirds have access to three or all of them. On the other hand,
almost the same ratio of black respondents has access to only one or none, and only about one
in ten enjoys access to three or all forms of media and communication. Coloured respondents
are somewhere in the middle; compared to black respondents the ratio of those who are very
well-connected (three or more out of four) is three times higher, but at the same time almost half
of them only have one or none of these means at their disposal.
As opposed to television and radio, internet access at home, satellite television and cellphone
ownership (at least at the time when the fieldwork was conducted) are affordable to only a frac-
tion of South Africans, so again the apparent racial divide can be argued to be a function of class
differences first and foremost. But as it also has been argued before: racialised access to (new)
media, even if it is due to socio-economic reasons, leads to an uneven distribution of cultural
capital along racial lines and ultimately the reproduction of an inequal and racialised class struc-
ture in South Africa. Even more so if one considers computer literacy as part of an updated un-
derstanding of cultural capital and a requirement for many skilled jobs. A study on the computer
attitudes of schoolchildren in South Africa conducted at six middle-, upper-class, predominantly
57. Please note that only cases with non-missing values for at least three of the four composite variables were
included. If only one was missing, the empty variable was randomly filled with 1 or 0 (Yes or No).
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white schools (Northern/Atlantic) and two township schools has shown that pupils from less
privileged schools are significantly disadvantaged in this respect, even if they have at least some
computer access at school:
This research did not reveal gender differences in computer attitude, but showed
differences in attitude towards computers between schools with students from a
different social status. The computer attitude of the students from the two
township schools was lower – but still positive – than the computer attitude of
students from the other schools. These students also had less access to
computers at home and at school and, therefore, less computer experience. As
mentioned by Ordidge (1997), access might have a direct influence on actual use
of computers and students’ computer attitude. Nevertheless, the results did not
show a negative attitude of students from the township schools towards
computers. What is more, students in these schools showed a relatively high
interest in computer-related careers. (Bovée, Voogt and Meelissen 2007: 1774)
It is also worth keeping in mind that if levels of media access, especially to online media, are as
unequal as they are described here in an urban setting, then the experiences of South Africa’s and
global media by members of the urban and rural population must be worlds apart. (see Tlabela,
Roodt, Paterson and Weir-Smith 2007)
7.3 Discussion
The results presented in this chapter speak of a fragmented mediascape with the fault lines along
class, race, language and, at least with regard to internet usage, gender divisions. They show that
the contradiction inherent in the policies governing South Africa’s public broadcasting – catering
for multiple audiences in terms of culture and language while promoting national unity – extends
to South Africa’s mediascape in general and is further exacerbated by the class-based schism
between local and global media:
National unity as the normative ideal of broadcasting and telecommunications
policy has come under increasing strain due to a complex combination of
technological change, shifts in regulatory policies, corporate restructuring, and
the globalization and deterritorialisation of cultural identities (Morley and Robins,
1995). Policy goals of integration [of] different social groups ‘vertically’ into a
single nation-state are increasingly in tension with the ‘horizontal’ integration of
individuals and social groups across national boundaries that transnational
systems of production, distribution and consumption of cultural commodities
has facilitated (Collins, 1991). (Barnett 1998: 553)
What this means is that the one of the most promising catalysts of national unity, the media, has
become one of the most polarising forces in South African society. The consequences can be
seen in the figures and graphs presented in this chapter: African/black respondents’ preference
for SABC 1 and local radio stations partly broadcasting in the vernacular in contrast to whites’
preference for satellite television and online media.
Accordingly, the results presented in this chapter with regard to race are very clear: it is a highly
consistent predictor for the amount, type and content of media consumed among the survey par-
ticipants. On its own this basic observation would be an extremely essentialist interpretation of
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race and its function in media consumption. Clearly, one does not listen to the radio or surf the
internet more often just because one is black or white. But if one contextualises these findings
within a discourse of locality, cosmopolitanism and local (self-)alienation, then it is possible to
locate them along an axis of media penetration ranging from the local (radio) over the national
(television) to the global (internet). They also shed light on the role of the media in the afro-
/eurocentric dichotomy which largely defines the racial imagery, sense of nationhood and the
meaning of ‘home’ in South Africa. More specifically, it is possible to make a connection
between the self-identification of black youth within local discourses and a preference for local
content available on radio and television as well as between white youth’s self-identification with
cosmopolitan notions of whiteness and individualism and a preference for satellite television and
the internet. The absence of colouredness from the dichotomy is not entirely arbitrary as it
reflects the inconsistent and contrary position articulated by many coloured youth (and also
shared by many white, especially Afrikaans-speaking youth). It reflects a deep sense of belonging
in South Africa together with a definite feeling of alienation which appears to cause many to
break away from the South African national discourse either through complete withdrawal into
highly localised, immediate structures (for example, the hokke, or hangouts, in the Cape Flats de-
scribed by Salo (2003: 361)), or through the identification with external ones, exemplified by the
popularity of American Hip Hop among coloured youth.
An insightful account of how television can change young people’s self-perceived position in
society, and how socio-economic boundaries can prevent them from ‘living’ this change, is
provided by Elaine Salo (2004: 30) in her work on young women in Manenberg, a suburb in the
Cape Flats notorious for crime and gangsterism:
Access to new cultural capital through television programmes free the young
women, at least temporarily, from the stifling constraints of the local social and
moral norms. These Rio Street adolescents’ transformation and renovation of the
local domestic and public spaces through their consumption of TV programmes
and popular music often inspire the more adventurous few to find their way
across the city to the cosmopolitan nightclubs or trendy beachfront
neighbourhoods. However their physical and social journey into these spaces is
bedeviled by the gap between their know-how of the South African
cosmopolitan style and spaces and their lack of the material resources required to
actually inhabit this world.
Salo’s account of young women trying to emulate the lives they watch on television and how
they often fail due to socio-economic constraints but also because of their lack of the appropri-
ate mannerisms and styles (cultural capital) is a good reminder that media does not only have a
socialising function (habitus) but is itself an indicator of cultural capital; the familiarity with cer-
tain media outlets (think: Mail & Guardian vs Sun; Isidingo vs Twin Peaks) can create distance or
proximity toward members of the dominant class. Another example is computer literacy –
second nature to many who grew up with computers at home but an ‘acquired’ skill at best to




8. Common Structures of Difference?
Before going into the taste patterns and media consumption of Brazilian youth it is worth re-
capitulating the difference between the public perceptions of race in South Africa and Brazil: the
fluidity of racial descriptors in Brazil. Whereas race represents a crucial part of identity for most
South Africans due to the strict, all-determining racial classification system imposed during colo-
nialism apartheid and its retention in important parts of public life (e.g. labour market) since the
end of apartheid, it can be argued that Brazilians are generally less immediately aware of their
own race or that of others. Basically, asking a stranger about her or his race in South Africa
would cause confusion because in most cases the answer to this question would be assumed to
be obvious. In Brazil the same question would cause no less confusion, but because in most
cases the other person would probably not immediately understand what is meant by the ques-
tion. As a consequence, many Brazilians refrain from classifying themselves in terms of a black/
white (or preto/branco) dichotomy in favour of one of the ‘mixed’ (e.g. pardo or mestizo categories).
Given this fundamental difference between South African and Brazilian race-thinking, it might
appear futile to search for racialised taste patterns in a society that seems to value hybridity more
than anything else. However, although conscious racial categorisation remains foreign to many
Brazilians, the subconscious association of different shades of skin colour with positive or negat-
ive connotations and socio-economic connotations is very much alive in Brazil. Peter Fry (2005:
257), in his book on the persistence of race in Brazil, provides several examples of advertising
campaigns with explicit references to the association between class and race. Here is one of
them:
In the first half of 2000 a series of posters, aimed at portraying the subway as a
means of rapid transportation, appeared in Rio de Janeiro. Among others, there
was one of a white guy who claims that it is the cookie seller who likes traffic
jams, and one of a young black man who catches the subway because “eating
breakfast in a hurry is a pain.” Again a shift toward the counter-intuitive. The
middle-class white boy wants to distance himself from potential stigmatization by
being stuck in a traffic jam, while the black guy, who is probably a worker
(because of the blue collar of his shirt), is more concerned about having breakfast
unhurriedly. In this poster, the black person is not in a Candomblé temple, nor
on the football field, but sipping a cup of coffee before boarding a mode of
transport that can be used by everyone.58
As much as the portrayal of a black young man in a subway on his way to work might be an im-
provement over stereotypical depictions of Afro-Brazilians performing rituals or chasing a ball,
the class/race hierarchy is certainly not challenged by these two images – white: middle-class,
58. No primeiro semestre de 2000 apareceu no Rio de Janeiro uma serié de cartazes visando projetar o metrô como
meio rápido de transporte. Entre outros, havia o de um rapaz branco que reclama dizendo que quem gosta de
engarrafamento é vendedor de biscoito e o de um jovem negro que apanha o metrô porque “tomar café da
manhã com pressa faz mal”. De novo uma mudança rumo ao contra-intuitivo. O menino branco de classe
média quer se distanciar da estigmatização possível por estar perto de um engarrafamento, enquanto o negro,
provalmente trabalhador (pela sua camisa blue collar), está mais que preocupado em tomar o seu café da manhã
sem pressa. Neste cartaz, o negro não está num terreiro de candomblé, nem tampouco no campo de futebol,
mas sim na sua copa tomando café antes de embarcar num transporte que pode ser usado por todos.
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black: working class. This class/race nexus in Brazilian public consciousness represents the refer-
ence point for the comparison between youth in Cape Town and Belo Horizonte, making for an
intriguing, if challenging, premise for the analysis of the rest of the Brazilian data. In essence, the
Cape Town data has revealed a certain dualism in the way racial identities of youth are reinforced
and reformed. On the one hand, there are deeply racialised discourses of identity which link the
historical racial segregation in South Africa, post-apartheid notions of nationhood, belonging and
alienation as well as different, equally racialised, interpretations of locality along the local/global-
continuum. On the other hand, one finds the deeply embedded social inequality, based on class
but also historically racialised, which is responsible for the unevenness of access to certain kinds
of cultural flows. These two dynamics are at the root of a racialised hierarchy of privilege; cultur-
al omnivorousness and cosmopolitanism disguise the ongoing stereotyping of blackness as es-
sentially local, lowbrow, economically disadvantaged and whiteness as essentially global, high-
brow, economically privileged. The purpose of this chapter is to test whether these discourses of
race, class and locality are unique to the South African context or whether it is possible to identi-
fy a certain universality by establishing ‘common structures of difference’ (see pages 55 to 59) in
Brazil.59
8.1 Who are your idols?
The responses given to the idols question by the Cape Town sample exhibited a number of in-
triguing characteristics in terms of mediated and acquired classifications of taste and racial dis-
tinctions. These are expected to be less explicit in the Brazilian case given the greater conformity
of the sample. However, a glance at the lists of idols compiled by the respondents indicates that
these expectations are not entirely accurate.
59. At this point it is necessary to reiterate the statistical results presented in this thesis are not strictly
representative of any population beyond the sample of adolescents in Cape Town and Brazil. Generalisations
and comparisons ar based on general trends that emerge from the survey data in combination with qualitative
data and secondary literature and should be treated as such. See page 11 for a longer discussion of this point.
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Table 8.1 Top Idols (Belo Horizonte)60
Rank Preto/Negro Pardo/Mestizo Branco
1 Beyonce Ivete Sangalo Ronaldo
2 Claudia Leitte Ronaldo Ivete Sangalo
3 Ivete Sangalo Beyonce Claudia Leitte
4 NeYo Rihanna Barack Obama
5 Ronaldo Angelina Jolie Bob Marley
6 Cristiano Ronaldo Claudia Leitte Angelina Jolie
7 Rihanna Deus Jesus
8 Deus Jesus The Beatles
9 Exaltasamba Bob Marley Cristiano Ronaldo
10 Jesus Chris Brown Jorge e Mateus
11 Sorriso Maroto NX Zero Kaka
12 Sorriso Maroto Brad Pitt
13 Britney Spears Kleber
14 Cristiano Ronaldo Britney Spears
15 Justin Timberlake Deus
16 NeYo Gisele Bundchen
17 Bruno Gagliasso Juliana Paes
18 Jorge e Mateus Lionel Messi
19 Kaka Victor e Leo
20 Kleber
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
Compared to the lists compiled from the responses of young Capetionians, the choices of the
Brazilian respondents differ with a stronger emphasis on local names like Brazilian Pop (Axé)
singers Claudia Leitte or Ivete Sangalo, soccer stars like Ronaldo or Kleber and religious figures
among all survey participants. But the common passion for Brazilian music and soccer cannot
divert from the fact that there also significant discrepancies. For example, five of the eleven
names on the list of black respondents do not appear on that of white respondents, among them
RnB stars Beyonce and Rihanna and rapper NeYo who all can also be found on the list of
‘mixed’ respondents. Accordingly, white respondents chose a number of mostly foreign names
which did not appear on the list of black (Bob Marley, Angelina Jolie, Britney Spears) and that of
‘mixed’ respondents (Barack Obama, The Beatles, Brad Pitt). The choices of ‘mixed’ respond-
ents, finally, represent a mix in themselves with Brazilian Emo rockers NX Zero, American Pop
star Justin Timberlake, telenovela star Bruno Gagliasso and local soccer hero Kleber being ex-
60. The complete list of names, after cleaning, comprises 833 individual names. The lists presented only show
names which were mentioned by at least ten (five in the case of black respondents because of their considerably
weaker representation in the overall sample) members of a subgroup.
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clusive to that group.
However, the names shown in the list represent only about a quarter of all the responses. For a
more comprehensive account the replies were grouped by type.
Table 8.2 Mentions of Idols – Belo Horizonte (Grouped by Type, Percentages)
Preto/Negro Pardo/Mestizo Branco Total
Music 86 80 69 75
Media 27 35 43 38
Soccer 29 27 34 31
Society 11 14 18 16
Culture 7 13 17 14
Religion 16 14 9 12
Family/Friends 10 4 7 6
Sports 4 3 9 6
Total 139 518 690 1347
Cases 73 272 336 681
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
Comparing the results for Cape Town and Belo Horizonte with regard to the choices of idols re-
veals broad commonalities but also some significant differences. In both cases singers and film
or TV stars represent the majority of choices made by the respondents with the difference that
the South Africans named substantially fewer music stars (47%) than their Brazilian peers (75%),
whereas South African black and coloured kids had more movie stars (58% and 59%) than the
respective groups in Belo Horizonte (27% and 35%). A further peculiarity of the Brazilian
sample is the popularity of soccer players (here treated separately from other sport stars in order
to underline the sport’s dominance) who turn out to be far more well-liked than political or his-
torical figures.
In the South African case it was possible to make a reasonably straight-forward connection
between the respondents' choices and racialised patterns of mediated and acquired idol prefer-
ences. In this case, however, the situation is different because of the small subsample of black re-
spondents. For these reasons here and in the following regressions the focus – in terms of race –
is on the differences between white and non-white respondents.
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Table 8.3 Logit: Idol Acquired/Mediated (Belo Horizonte, Odds ratios)
Mediated Acquired






Private School 1.344 1.676*
(0.506) (0.035)
Observations 658 658
Pseudo R-squared 0.001 0.027
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
The regressions show that there is virtually no difference between white and non-white respond-
ents’ preferences for acquired (society, culture, religion, family) or mediated idols (music, media,
soccer, other sports). In fact, the overall results are pretty much meaningless given the extreme
low Pseudo R² values. The only vaguely interesting result is the statistically significant coefficient
for private school kids (students at one of the Belo Horizonte schools) who are sixty percent
more likely than public school kids to make an acquired choice, which is both broadly in line
with the cultural omnivore argument (better-off individuals have both low- and highbrow prefer-
ences) and the results of the Cape Town survey (kids attending predominantly white schools
(Northern/Atlantic) make more acquired choices). Nonetheless, race itself does not factor into
the equation at all. In line with the Cape Town analysis music idols category was further broken
down into individual genres.
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Table 8.4 Mentions of Idols – Belo Horizonte (Grouped by Music Genres, Percentages)
Preto/Negro Pardo/Mestizo Branco Total
Rock 27 48 50 46
Rnb 37 27 16 23
Pop 11 17 24 20
Axé/Forro 16 18 20 19
Hiphop 24 19 12 17
Mpb 19 11 13 13
Samba/Pagode 21 18 5 12
Sertanejo 11 11 11 11
Gospel 11 11 4 8
Total 111 380 350 841
Cases 62 211 224 497
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
The crosstabulations of music genres by race show a different picture, as racialised preferences
for certain music genres, both local and foreign, are easily discernible. For example, half of the
white and ‘mixed’ respondents chose a Rock idol compared to a quarter of black respondents.
Almost two out of five black, one out of four of ‘mixed’ and less than one out of five white re-
spondents had a RnB singer on their list. And while about one out of five black or ‘mixed’ sur-
vey participants is a fan of a Samba musician, the same applies to only one out of twenty white
respondents. These numbers resemble the Cape Town results (African/black and coloured: Hip
Hop/RnB; white: Rock; African/black: local). Whether they hold true in regression analysis in-
volving class, gender and school variables is subject of the following table.
Table 8.5 Logit Idol Categories: Music Genres – Belo Horizonte (Odds Ratios)
Axé/Forro Samba/Pagode RnB/Hip Hop Rock
Race 1.106 0.305** 0.525** 1.122
(0.690) (0.001) (0.001) (0.522)
Male 0.308*** 0.255*** 0.747 0.771
(0.000) (0.000) (0.124) (0.122)
Class 0.995 1.014* 0.998 0.994
(0.335) (0.046) (0.595) (0.129)
School 1.396 0.199*** 0.757 1.160
(0.331) (0.001) (0.321) (0.554)
Observations 658 658 658 658
Pseudo R-squared 0.044 0.148 0.036 0.006
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
The regression analysis mostly, but not entirely, supports the impression gained from the
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crosstabulation as Samba, RnB and Hip Hop prove to be significantly less popular among white
than non-white respondents. However, for the overall most popular genre – Rock – the results
are statistically insignificant and the Pseudo R² is extremely low. Here one needs to take into the
consideration that the fault line does indeed not run between white and non-white kids but
rather black and non-black kids (see Table 8.4 on the previuous page), thus rendering results for
the race variable practically meaningless.
But apart from race it is also worthwhile contemplating the supposedly contradictory class and
school results for Samba/Pagode stars which are mentioned often by respondents from better
off backgrounds but less from private schools visiting kids. Here it is crucial to remember that
the class variable used in the Brazilian survey is rather crude (using only neighbourhood-level
survey data as a proxy), and given low odds ratio and weak significance it is best not to over-in-
terpret this finding.
Another way of differentiating idol choices is by dividing them into local and foreign celebrities,
which in the South African revealed some striking differences between black respondents on one
side and coloured and white respondents on the other side.








































Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
The differences found in the Belo Horizonte sample might not be as dramatic as in Cape Town,
but they are remarkable nonetheless. First, local politicians and historical figures are generally un-
popular compared to foreign (mostly American) ones (to a good part due to Barack Obama’s
popularity in the wake of his presidential election that happened shortly before the fieldwork
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period). Second, while local and foreign actors and other cultural proponents (other than singers)
enjoy the same degree (or lack) of popularity among non-white respondents, foreign ones are
definitely more popular among white respondents. Third, local and foreign musicians are equally
popular among ‘mixed’ respondents, black respondents prefer local talent, whereas half of the
white sample picked a foreign singer or band, but less than two out of five a local.






Race: White 1.266 0.655* 1.601* 0.851
(0.256) (0.017) (0.014) (0.344)
Male 0.280*** 0.443*** 0.522*** 0.746
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.065)
Class 0.998 0.997 1.001 1.000
(0.576) (0.508) (0.756) (0.931)
Private School 0.980 0.500** 1.912* 1.243
(0.944) (0.005) (0.014) (0.364)
Observations 658 658 658 658
Pseudo R² 0.058 0.079 0.050 0.006
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
If tested in combination with the usual set of control variables, the relationship between race
(here again coded as white/non-white due to the small sample of black respondents) and locality
proves to be statistically significant; the odds of white kids to have a Brazilian music star on their
list is a third less than that of non-white kids, while they are sixty percent more likely to have an
American actor (or generally foreign ‘cultural’ personality). Also fitting the earlier findings from
both the Belo Horizonte and Cape Town samples is the statistical significance of the school vari-
able; compared to public school youth, kids at private schools are only half as likely to have
chosen at least one Brazilian music star, but almost twice as likely to have one choice from the
foreign culture, film and television category.
In summary: the idol choices of the Brazilian kids, classified by race, differ from those of the
South African sample in significant but not opposite ways. While the acquired/mediated distinc-
tion is less nuanced in Belo Horizonte than in Cape Town, it is possible to identify statistically
preferences of non-white respondents for local music (and especially ‘traditionally’ black Brazili-
an music styles such as Samba and Pagode) and RnB and Hip Hop. In a study of the empower-
ment of black Brazilian youth through Hip Hop lyrics, Jennifer Roth-Gordon (2012: 38) writes:
Brazilian hip hop’s iconic figures of the mano (black brother) and the playboy
(white wealthy male youth) draw on the North American binary to reject the past
and present push to whiten. Seen most often on album covers and in glossy mag-
azine photo spreads, Brazilian rappers (who all identify as manos) generally sport
‘bling’ in the form of rings and chains, heavy sweatshirts or extra large clothing,
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and US style ski caps or baseball hats. The playboy – the target of their mockery
and not an assumed identity (see Roth-Gordon, 2007a) – is described in rap lyrics
as a male youth who is preoccupied with ‘fashionable’ preppy clothes and
expensive imported commodities. The successful racialized opposition of these
figures thus relies on competing patterns of global consumption and bodily
aesthetics, including hairstyle.
As has also been emphasised in the case of youth in Cape Town, the tendency of better-off and
white kids to favour foreign (mostly American) influences does not mean that members of lower
classes and non-white youth do not identify with foreign influences at all. In fact, it is the disreg-
ard of white respondents for local trends and their selectivity when it comes to global cultural
goods (mirrored by working-class selectivity, as described by Roth-Gordon) that is most remark-
able, and which, at least in the opinion of this author, poses a real challenge to the notions of
middle-class cosmopolitanism and cultural omnivorousness. The responses to a number of direct
questions regarding respondents’ attitude toward local vs global popular culture reinforces this
impression.
Figure 8.2 Dotplot: Subjective Attitudes towards Westernisation (Belo Horizonte)
I prefer watching foreign TV channels.
________________________________________
I prefer watching American TV shows.
________________________________________
I prefer watching American movies.
________________________________________
I prefer listening to American music.
________________________________________
I prefer listening to radio stations
which play more American music.
________________________________________
1 2 3 4 5
I prefer American music, TV and movies.
________________________________________
Preto/Negro Pardo/Mestizo Branco
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
The pattern above resembles the one of the Cape Town sample (see Figure 6.2 on page 120) to a
remarkable degree, with white respondents being most in favour of American content, black
(preto/negro) least in favour, and ‘mixed’ (pardo/mestizo) somewhere in between. The following
subchapter explores these themes with regard to music taste in more detail.
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8.2 What music do you like?
Music and dance have always had a special meaning for Brazil’s national identity with the com-
plexity of the country’s social structure deeply embedded in its rich and vast music scene. Ac-
cordingly, in Brazil music is always a reflection of the performer’s social origins, which, of
course, is very close to what this thesis sets out to show with regard to taste and class distinction.
Maciel (2006: 253) goes so far to identify the “rhythm” of the dance styles of the ‘underclass’
(subcidadania) as part of Brazilian society’s greater “choreography”.
The chords of the rhythms of the underclass reveal that there are various dances
and different ways of dancing that play roles which are correctly reflected in its
precarious habitus.
That's how the revealing accounts of a situation of social inequality, domination
and exploitation are duly choreographed by the dominating and the dominated,
exploiters and exploited, as “variations of steps and rhythms.” These are so
“naturalized” that the majority already knows how to dance.61
For most Brazilians it is not unusual to associate local music styles with certain population
groups defined by class or race/ethnicity. Hence the more interesting question is whether a sim-
ilar phenomenon can be observed for popular music styles that have their origin outside the
Brazilian context and are associated with youth first and foremost. According to Pedrozo (2011:
119) class distinctions among Brazilian youth are certainly rife with lower classes emulating up-
per classes in the pursuit of acceptance.
Although consumption is central to young people’s identity creation, the
processes of youth identification and belonging are deeply associated with class
boundaries in Brazil. Young people’s identity construction is incorporated in
their cultural specificities and, in Brazil, the local context of inequalities affect the
way youngsters deal with subjective matters. Fear of exclusion was verbalised in
some discourses especially among low income interviewees. Discrimination is
visible between upper and lower classes and even among members from lower
classes; therefore, there is a need to emulate upper classes, as a matter of fitting
in. As Brazilian society is highly consumerist as respondents mentioned, people
attribute importance to being ‘cool’ and fashionable. 
Although Pedrozo’s statement strikes a chord with some of the findings presented so far, it is
debatable if “emulating” is the right word and concept for, for example, the kind of assimilation
observed in Cape Town (e.g. non-white kids at predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic)
having more global tastes than their peers at non-white schools), as it implies a sort of homogen-
isation taking place. As Jennifer Roth-Gordon has pointed out above, some black youth who feel
marginalised feel empowered by Hip Hop exactly because it challenges the norms and values of
the dominating class. The results for the idol question support this assumption enough to war-
61. Os acordes dos ritmos da subcidadania revelam que existem várias danças e diferentes dançantes que
desempenham papéis devidamente inscritos em seus habitus precários.
É assim que os fatos reveladores de uma situação de desigualdade social, de dominação e exploração são
devidamente coreografados por dominantes e dominados, exploradores e explorados, como “variações de
passos e ritmos”. Estes são tão “naturalizados” que a maioria já sabe como dançar. 
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rant further investigation of racialised music taste patterns. However, secondary data from Belo
Horizonte Area Study (BHAS) 2005, in which respondents were asked what kind of music they
listen to, does not necessarily substantiate the impression of racialised taste patterns in Brazil.
Table 8.7 Music Genres by Race (BHAS 2005, Percentages)
Preto Pardo Branco Total
Sertaneja 71 69 64 68
Romantica 65 68 66 67
Religiosa 66 65 52 61
MPB 41 53 56 52
Samba 48 42 46 45
Pagode 54 41 34 41
Classic 29 35 43 37
Rock 19 31 35 30
Jazz 17 21 26 21
Rap 17 14 11 14
Funk 19 13 9 13
Total 889 2054 1505 4448
Cases 199 453 341 993
Source: Belo Horizonte Area Study 2005
Apart from some spurious findings for Classic, Jazz (preferred by white respondents more than
‘mixed’ or black respondents), Rock (disliked by black respondents) and Pagode (preferred by
black respondents) the results of the BHAS do not indicate any significant differences in music
taste depending on race. Two points need to be taken into account though: the question is very
broad and allowed for multiple choices, making it easy for the respondent to tick a box even if
she or he does not ‘really dislike’ a particular genre but is also not exactly a fan. The other issue is
the survey’s broad sample in terms of age – adolescents are not included and young adults rep-
resent only a fraction of the sample, making it difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions for
that group alone. These issues notwithstanding the available data does at least not contradict the
findings of the survey for music styles.
A similar question (“What music style do you prefer? “– multiple choices were possible) was posed to
the schoolchildren.
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Table 8.8 Music Genres by Race – Belo Horizonte (Perccentages)
Preto/Negro Pardo/Mestizo Branco Total
Pop/Rock 44 59 66 61
Pagode/Samba 64 50 48 50
Axé/Forro 48 45 49 47
Hip Hop/RnB 55 46 45 46
Musica Eletronica 36 45 48 46
Sertaneja 34 41 48 44
Gospel 56 39 25 34
Funk 38 36 30 33
Bossanova/MPB/Jazz 28 27 37 33
Total 343 1230 1567 3140
Cases 85 317 395 797
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
The relations between group preferences for individual genres reflect the same patterns as the
findings for the music idol question (see Table 8.4 on page 191). Furthermore, they are mostly, if
not completely, in line with the results of the Cape Town survey; those music styles commonly
associated with black (Samba, Hip Hop, RnB, Gospel) are indeed most popular among black re-
spondents, whereas those associated with white are generally preferred by white respondents
(Rock, Sertaneja, Bossanova, MPB). As much as these findings support the argument of com-
mon structures of difference, some of the issues with the BHAS data also apply here: broad cat-
egories and the possibility of multiple options invite respondents to make thoughtless choices.
Therefore the survey incorporated the same fine-grained measurement of music taste based on
individual bands and musicians as the Cape Town survey before (see page 123 for a description
of how these variables were compiled). The following table shows the grouping of bands and
musicians into genres, based on Wikipedia classifications.
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Table 8.9 Music Genres (Belo Horizonte)
Axé/Pagode/Samba
Chiclete com Banana, Claudia Leitte, Exaltasamba
Brazilian Hip Hop/Funk
Nação Zumbi, Marcelo D2, O Rappa, Racionais MC's, Rappin' Hood
Brazilian Rock/MPB/Sertanejo
Ana Carolina, Caetano Veloso, Tom Jobim, Seu Jorge, Capital Inicial, Fresno, Jota Quest, NX 
Zero, Skank, César Menotti e Fabiano, Edson e Hudson, Jorge e Mateus
US Hip Hop/RnB
Tupac, 50 Cent, Akon, Black Eyed Peas, Eminem, Ne-Yo, Timbaland, Beyonce, Chris Brown, 
John Legend, Justin Timberlake, Rihanna
US Pop/Rock
Amy Winehouse, Britney Spears, Kelly Clarkson, Evanescence, Green Day, Linkin Park, 
Metallica, My Chemical Romance, The Beatles
Just like with the Cape Town survey the ‘new’ music variables provide a much more accurate and
precise measurement of music taste, as can be seen in the following graphs.
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Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
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If one compares the graphs with those for the Cape Town sample (see pages 125 and 126) one
recognises immediately the fundamental difference between the two locations; while the group
means for the Cape Town sample are generally widely dispersed, the ones from the Belo Hori-
zonte survey centre around the general mean, meaning that the music taste of the Cape Town
sample is much more heterogeneous than that of the Belo Horizonte sample in all relevant as-
pects. Nonetheless, a few notable deviations from this rule stand out: a marked preference for
American Rock and Pop among white respondents compared to non-white respondents, the
same for Brazilian Hip Hop and Funk and black respondents as well as a generally strong gender
impact (apart from American Rock and Pop). Whether these observations remain valid in a logit
regression analysis in which these factors are being combined is subject of the following table.











Race: White 1.024 0.828 1.555** 0.879 1.319
(0.887) (0.246) (0.008) (0.424) (0.085)
Male 0.465*** 1.917*** 0.370*** 0.608*** 0.737*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.042)
Class 1.010** 0.999 1.005 0.999 1.002
(0.006) (0.883) (0.143) (0.771) (0.550)
School 0.698 1.207 0.660 1.138 1.203
(0.122) (0.410) (0.077) (0.571) (0.415)
Observations 750
Pseudo R-squared 0.032 0.020 0.048 0.012 0.013
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
What is maybe the crucial insight to be taken from Table 8.10 is the sparsity of statistically signi-
ficant results apart from the gender variable that produces strong results for every single cat-
egory. The race effect, however, is far weaker than for the Cape Town sample, with the only
‘truly’ significant result being white respondents’ preference for Brazilian Rock, MPB and Ser-
taneja. Arguably American Rock and Pop can be added to the list given its p-value bordering on
statistical significance. In contrast, the results for the gender variable are very clear: boys prefer
Brazilian Hip Hop and Funk while girls prefer all the rest. But then the opposite is true for the
class and school variables which virtually have no effect on music taste whatsoever (the result for
Samba/Pagode might be statistically significant but the effect is weak nonetheless). Overall the
lack of validity is supported by the very low pseudo-R² values.
Thus, generally, taste differences in Belo Horizonte, at least with regards to music, are indeed
much less distinct as it is the case in Cape Town. Yet the association of white respondents with
specific cultural flows, namely Rock and Sertaneja, but not Hip Hop and Pagode or Samba, is re-
markable. Norbert Wildermuth (2008: 361), in his work on media consumption of Brazilian teen-
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agers, explains the very specific connotations of Pagode in comparison to Rock by referring to
the statements of one of his interviewees, Ana Paula:
I like rock. I listen to Bon Jovi, Guns’n’Roses… Linkin Park, music like that, you
know? … But things like brega, pagode, I hate [with emphasis] brega and pagode.
I hate. I really don’t like it. When I’m at a party and it is played, I can listen to it, I
can dance to it, normally… I can dance pagode sometimes, but brega I really
don’t like. – Those people who really like brega and pagode, they also love to
dress indecorous. It’s terrible, I just hate it.
He then provides an explanation for Ana Paula’s strong distaste for brega:
In Recife, pagode and brega is the music of the (lower income) masses, of the
public dance hall, where the beer is cheap, the dresses short and the dance floor
an arena for close physical contact.
[...] For Ana Paula and Rosina, pagode and brega signify the sexual availability of
lower class girls, of female ‘cheapness’, as we were told.
Together with an abundance of evidence for the purposeful self-“whitening” of many Brazilians
the observed link between whiteness, locality and social status indicates the existence of a racial
hierarchy not that different from the one described in the South African context. To what degree
this phenomenon is the result of two largely independent processes or caused mainly by largely
homogeneous global cultural flows is the topic of the next subchapter focussing on media access
and consumption.
8.3 Media Access and Communication
South Africa and Brazil’s media spheres distinguish themselves from each other in many crucial
ways. While South Africa’s media is marked by a long and continuing history of fragmentation
(by default during apartheid, today because of the trinity of economic constraints dictating the
reform and governance of South Africa’s public broadcaster, political agendas – some in the
name of nation-building – and uneven access to certain media forms due to socio-economic in-
equalities), Brazil’s mediascape is defined by a large degree of homogeneity characterised by the
virtual absence of a popular public broadcaster (Brazil’s first and only public station, TV Brasil,
was only founded in 2007 and is readily accessible in only some municipalities or by cable and
satellite TV), the relative irrelevance of subscription-based cable or satellite TV, and, most im-
portantly, the dominance of the Globo Network (Rede Globo). Given the fundamentally different
context in Brazil, even the slightest variation in television preferences can be considered signific-
ant and meaningful.
More space for variance can be expected with regards to radio consumption. Here mainly re-
gional and specialised channels are the most popular, posing the question whether the same tri-
angulate relationship between race, music taste, radio preference observed in the Cape Town will
be seen in Belo Horizonte. 
That aside, the role of the Brazilian media in fostering racial stereotypes has been repeatedly the
subject of public debate over recent years as white Brazilians are claimed to be over- and black
Brazilians often misrepresented in television shows, tabloids and news stories:
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Projected mainly as a phenomenon of life in the urban centres of São Paulo and
Rio de Janeiro, the discursive practices of Brazilian television reproduce a
stereotyped dichotomy between the white, prosperous, modern and rational
south, and the black, impoverished, archaic but colourful north-east of Brazil.
Optimistic perspectives on a globalized mediated consumer culture – which claim
that it in principle enhances multiple identifications, thus providing young people
with the means to explore and negotiate the ‘local-global’ contradictions of a
rapidly changing society in a creative way – need to be qualified. (Wildermuth
2008: 366)
Interestingly, Wildermuth, who conducted a series of interviews on media consumption with ad-
olescents in Recife in Northern Brazil, makes reference to the local-global continuum, even
though his criticism points to the representation of racial stereotypes in the media, not to the un-
equal access to media which is focussed on in parts of this thesis.
In the same vein as Wildermuth, in an article that very convincingly demonstrates the extent of
racial discrimination on the Brazilian labour market and the indifference of Brazilian towards this
discrimination, dos Santos and Silva (2006: 14) blame explicitly the media for this sort of indif-
ference by writing that “[w]e are socialized not to regard Afro-Brazilians as ordinary citizens, our
equals in law, because the Brazilian mass media have made them either invisible or stigmatized
and, as their brainwashed consumers, we are simply unaware of any discrimination against
them.”
Television
As discussed earlier, huge qualitative differences in the preferences for TV channels are not ex-
pected among Brazilian youth. This, however, does not negate the possibility for observations of
more general trends in adolescents’ media behaviour.
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Negro/Preto n=83 Pardo/Mestizo n=306 Branco n=388
chi2=14.400, p=0.072
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
Compared to the Cape Town sample differences in the self-reported amount of time spent
watching television varies only insignificantly between the three population groups. Although a
slightly positive trend from white to ‘mixed’ to black can be observed, it affects basically only the
two highest categories, i.e. the percentages of black, ‘mixed’ and white respondents spending at
least one hour per day watching television are all virtually the same, providing a first indication of
the homogeneity of Brazilian television viewers, which is further explored in the following graph.
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Figure 8.9 Stacked Bar: Television Channels by Race (Belo Horizonte, Percentages)62
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Rede Globo Rede SBT MixTV MTV Brasil
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
The previously mentioned dominance of Rede Globo is confirmed by the preferences of the re-
spondents; the majority prefers it over any other other channel. But again, the devil is in the de-
tail: one out of five black respondents prefers Brazil’s second most popular channel, Rede SBT,
or MixTV. ‘Mixed’ respondents show a slightly lower proportion, while only six percent of the
white respondents made the same choice. The difference seems small, but it is intriguing, espe-
cially concerning MixTV which is an openly accessible, youth-oriented music channel similar to
MTV Brasil. Therefore the following regression analysis includes two music variables for the
direct comparison of the two music channels in addition to the usual control variables.
62. The complete list of TV channels available to respondents comprised the following: Rede Globo, Rede Record,
Rede SBT, Rede Bandeirantes, TV Cultura, Rede Minas, MixTV and MTV Brasil. Those channels which do not
appear in this graph had been excluded from the statistical analysis due to extremely low frequency counts.
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Table 8.11 Mlogit Regressions: Television Channels (Belo Horizonte, Odds Ratios)
Base Rede Globo Rede SBT MixTV
Rede SBT MixTV MTV Brasil MixTV MTV Brasil MTV Brasil
Race: White 0.533 0.425* 0.982 0.797 1.842 1.949
(0.133) (0.043) (0.948) (0.694) (0.201) (0.187)
Male 2.382* 0.490 2.696*** 0.206** 1.132 5.319***
(0.019) (0.085) (0.000) (0.003) (0.777) (0.001)
Class 1.009 1.001 0.987* 0.993 0.978* 0.984
(0.349) (0.865) (0.023) (0.553) (0.037) (0.120)
School 0.053*** 0.410 1.843 7.780* 35.020*** 5.107*
(0.001) (0.125) (0.099) (0.044) (0.000) (0.017)
Music: US Pop/Rock 3.798**
(0.008)
Music: US Hip Hop/RnB 0.088***
(0.000)
Observations 641 630
Pseudo R² 0.076 0.154
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
The regression results indeed show a statistically significant negative association between white
respondents and MixTV in relation to Rede Globo. However, the comparison of MixTV and
MTV Brasil does not reveal any meaningful race effect. On the other hand, the inclusion of the
two music variables confirm the assumption that the preference for one of the two music
channels is to a large part determined by music preference, and here race does come into play
again as the two crucial music variables themselves come with racial connotations. Moreover the
school effect suggests that mostly kids from private schools favour MTV Brasil over other
channels63, including MixTV. So while the overall dominance of Rede Globo is undeniable, there
are at least traces of evidence that suggest a tendency of racialised preferences which correlate
with social status in the form of the school variable. The only contradictory factor is the lack of a
clear class influence, as the results actually indicate a negative, counterintuitive relationship
between the class variable and preference for MTV Brasil. But the actual effect is in fact so weak
that it is largely negligible. Besides the results for race, class and school, the clearest findings are
then in relation to the gender variable: Rede SBT and MTV Brasil are considerably more popular
among male respondents, whereas MixTV is favoured by female respondents. While intriguing
and noteworthy, such results cannot be interpreted without a much more detailed content ana-
lysis of the actual programming of these stations.
63. The unusually high odds ratio for the comparison of Rede SBT and MTV Brasil must not be taken at face
value as it is due to very low, and therefor distorting, frequency counts.
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Radio
Radio broadcasting plays a pivotal role in the South African mediascape due to its quasi-universal
coverage and accessibility, especially compared to other, more exlusive media forms such as tele-
vision and certainly satellite TV and the internet. In Brazil, radio has a significantly lower priority
given the popularity of television and a generally better accessibility of the internet. Nonetheless,
it still represents a useful measure for respondents’ overall media behaviour, especially if contras-
ted with data for television and internet usage. It is in this context that the results of the figure
below are useful for estimating variances in local and global content consumption between
groups.



















Negro/Preto n=78 Pardo/Mestizo n=303 Branco n=381
chi2=38.376, p=0.000
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
Even if the radio does not enjoy the same status in Brazil as it does in South Africa, the numbers
presented here are nonetheless remarkable, as they reflect a very similar racialised local/global
skewness as previously identified within the Cape Town sample, albeit to a considerably lower
degree: half of the white respondents never or rarely (less than 30 minutes per day) listen to the
radio compared to one third of black and slightly more than that of ‘mixed’ respondents. The
question is whether these quantitative differences translate into qualitative ones as members of
different groups prefer different radio stations.
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Figure 8.11 Stacked Bar: Radio Stations by Race (Belo Horizonte, Percentages)
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Mix FM 98 FM 107 FM Extra FM
Radio Itatiaia Jovem Pan FM BH FM
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
Compared to the Cape Town sample, the differences in radio preferences are certainly far less
pronounced among the Brazilian respondents. Especially the ‘mixed’ subsample does not have a
clear favourite. Among black respondents Extra FM is the most popular with just about a
quarter of votes, while just above one third of white respondents chose Jovem Pan FM as their
number one station. These are relatively small margins – a regression analysis including music
variables for control (music is the deciding content, at least for youth, when it comes to radio)
will show whether they are large enough to be statistically significant.
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Table 8.12 Mlogit Regression: Radio Stations (Belo Horizonte, Odds Ratios)
Mix FM 98 FM Extra FM





Race: White 1.653 0.668 1.377 0.404** 0.833 2.063*
(0.103) (0.219) (0.265) (0.007) (0.527) (0.020)
Male 1.609 0.500* 2.045** 0.311*** 1.271 4.091***
(0.106) (0.038) (0.009) (0.001) (0.368) (0.000)
Class 1.007 1.006 1.016* 0.999 1.009 1.010
(0.328) (0.399) (0.012) (0.939) (0.145) (0.168)
School 1.092 0.961 2.727* 0.880 2.496* 2.836*
(0.839) (0.932) (0.011) (0.790) (0.022) (0.019)
Music: Axé/Pagode 1.068 13.374*** 0.928 12.518*** 0.868 0.069***
(0.827) (0.000) (0.789) (0.000) (0.611) (0.000)
Music: US Hip Hop/RnB 0.533* 0.483* 1.210 0.907 2.269** 2.503**
(0.043) (0.031) (0.523) (0.775) (0.004) (0.005)
Music: US Pop/Rock 2.320** 0.449** 1.353 0.193*** 0.583 3.015***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.274) (0.000) (0.063) (0.000)
Observations 499
Pseudo R² 0.170
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
Extra FM and Jovem Pan FM are indeed the two stations which show the most distinctive char-
acteristics in terms of statistical significance. When compared directly it is revealed that Jovem
Pan FM’s listeners are mostly white, male, go to private schools, do not like Axé or Pagode, but
do like American music of any kind. This last observation on music seems contradictory as one
is used to the distinction between American Hip Hop and RnB on one side and Rock and Pop
on the other side when it comes to the racialisation of music, as mentioned at various points
throughout the thesis. But here the emphasis lies on the duality of local (Axé/Pagode) and for-
eign music which becomes apparent if one takes a snapshot of the two music top tens promoted
on their respective website in early March 2011: whereas Extra FM’s list features eight songs by
Brazilian singers and bands, one by Shakira (Colombia) and the latin-flavoured “Alejandro” by
Lady Gaga, Jovem Pan FM’s comprises only a single Brazilian group (NX Zero) and nine US
American singers and bands. Thus the message is clear and consistent with the other findings so
far; media and taste preferences might be far less racialised in Brazil than in South Africa, but
this does not mean that race does not factor at all. Instead one can observe a triangular relation-
ship between racial identity, taste and locality which resembles that of South African society to a
surprising degree.
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New Media and Communication
After having established crucial signs for common structures of difference between Cape Town
and Belo Horizonte in terms of taste patterns as well as media preferences this last subchapter
focusses on accessibility of new forms of media and communication. Again, the levels of in-
equality discernible in the South African context when it comes to internet access and satellite
TV are not to be expected in Brazil where internet connectivity in most urban areas has reached
first world levels at much lower costs than in South Africa. Nonetheless, the digital divide
between rich and poor has still not been bridged and satellite TV is in Brazil, as in South Africa,
a luxury good reserved for those who can afford it. But first a look at the (self-reported) amount
of time spent online by survey participants:
















Negro/Preto n=81 Pardo/Mestizo n=313 Branco n=390
chi2=46.073, p=0.000
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
As expected, the differences in internet consumption are far less dramatic than observed in the
Cape Town sample with half of black respondents, three out of five ‘mixed’ and three out of
four white respondents being online most days of the week. Accessibility to other forms of com-
munication is also much more equal than what one is used to in South Africa, as the following
graph shows.
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Cellphone Satellite TV Email Internet
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
Cellphones and personal email addresses are highly common among all survey participants. More
substantial differences prevail with regards to internet access and satellite TV at home, but both
on fairly high levels, especially when compared to the South African data (see Figure 7.9 on page
181). An index based on the four individual variables illustrates this.
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Preto/Negro n=80 Pardo/Mestizo n=314 Branco n=390
Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
As mentioned above: the differences in access to new media and communication take place on a
fairly high level, but they nonetheless exist, with twice as many white adolescents, proportionally,
having full access compared to ‘mixed’ and black kids. This privileged position of white respond-
ents translates into a statistically significant relationship between ‘white’ and access in an ordered
logit regression analysis.












Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008
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Given the inclusion of class and the school variable (both of which show strong and significant
results) in the regression, the strong effect of race may come as a surprise, as access (not usage)
really can be expected to be determined by socio-economic factors only. To some extent this is
arguably due to the strong correlation between the three independent variables, but it also refers
back to the findings for television and radio consumption at the beginning of the chapter if one
takes questions of locality into consideration. This leads to a further validation of the common
structures of difference hypothesis as discussed earlier and the realisation that media access is in
itself a form of privilege reserved to the better-offs and well-educated:
While lower-class Brazilian youth, in general, seek to maximize the uses of
television, the middle and upper classes have a broader potential choice. That
means, in practice, a greater opportunity to use other media, print and digital, to
cultivate social relations and develop a specific forms [sic] of knowledge, skills
and cultural capital. Poor young people in Brazil are thus disadvantaged,
deepening existing disparities that are, for example, created in parallel by unequal
educational opportunities. (Wildermuth 2008: 365)
Wildermuth’s link between class, education and media consumption is crucial as it reinforces the
point that the differences in media (and, consequently, popular culture) consumption is not just a
reflection of different tastes, but has real and significant consequences for sustaining social in-
equality in Brazil and elsewhere. Exposure to different types of media does not only lead to dif-
ferent sets of dispositions understood as a cultural capital on an ideal level, but in a time in which
the ability to process and filter information at an ever-increasing rate is a prerequisite for many
careers it has become a necessary and vital skill.
8.4 Discussion
The comparison of the Cape Town and Belo Horizonte datasets not only confirms the common
structures of difference but also further supports the arguments that a) the racialisation of class
distinction contributes to the reproduction of social inequality, and b) that the unequal distribu-
tion of cultural capital through the media, partly due to unequal access to the media, help to fur-
ther ‘normalise’ racialised class distinctions. The found similarities between the two research set-
tings, despite the fundamentally different discourses around race and nationhood found in both,
elevate the points made in chapters 6 and 7 to a universal level, in that it is possible to identify
shared experiences of a heavily mediated popular culture which, despite all appearances of being
‘open’ and indiscriminate, reinforces existing taste boundaries along race and class lines around
the globe. At the same time, this chapter has also shown that these shared experiences always
need to be contextualised and ‘made sense of’ within their local settings. Concretely, what this
means in this case, is not to superimpose one racial classification, with all its history and local
meaning, from one place onto another. For example, although it seems obvious at first sight, it
would be wrong to equate the social position, and associated taste patterns, of the colored popu-
lation in South African with that of so-called ‘mixed’ Brazilians, as one is the consequence of ra-
cial essentialism whereas the other originates in a tradition of cultural hybridity. With this sensit-
ivity toward locality in mind, what emerges as the most uniform common denominator is the
meaning of whiteness in the two locations. Apart from being the color code for the dominant
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class in both settings, which is not exactly a groundbreaking revelation given their shared coloni-
al past, whiteness is universally associated with a middle-class worldliness and openness, which
have been identified by some academics as cosmopolitanism and cultural omnivorousness. How-
ever, what is suggested instead, based on the empirical evidence from Cape Town and Brazil, is
that the position of privilege of whiteness translates into a highly selective awareness especially
of local trends and cultural flows. This selective awareness is hinted at by Paulo Simões (2006: 7)
in the introduction to a special issue of Latin American Perspectives on race and equality in Brazil:
[M]iscegenation in Brazil has resulted in an extremely complex set of categories
based on race, color, physical characteristics, wealth, and social rank. Yet such
statements by prominent Brazilian media figures as “Branco é quem tem
dinheiro” (A white is one with money) and “Eu sempre trabalhei como uma
negra” (I have always worked like a black woman) reveal that inequality is based
not entirely on Malthusian or Ricardian theories of wages or analyses of poverty
but on discrimination tied to both biology and class. In Brazil, a dark skin
continues to be associated with poverty and social inferiority. Unfortunately, the
categorization of social status based on one’s degree of “whiteness” and
economic class standing prevents persons of different classes and “races” from
joining to rectify the situation and causes people of the lighter-skinned higher
classes to dissociate themselves (culturally, politically, and physically) from the
most undervalued “black” classes.
As much as the dominant class, which is defined in socio-economic terms but has the cultural
markers of whiteness, appears to be tolerant, inclusive and worldly, it really distuingishes itself
from the dominated class through the disassociation from the reality of the dominated class
which has the cultural markers of blackness (or rather ‘non-whiteness’ in other contexts).
This disassociation is to a large degree the function of a deep-seated bias in the media sector in
terms of access as well as content: 
[T]he role played by the media today is equivalent to that played in the past by
religious organizations, educational institutions, and the arts. In other words, the
questionable use of images that focus on the otherness of nonwhites has a basis
in other images crystallized by different means that have, over time, caused
racism to seem quite natural. The absence of any collective indignation at this
stage of affairs results from our ideal of the Brazilian, created to satisfy the needs
of the dominant culture and those alone. (dos Santos and Silva 2006: 24)
The comparability between these insights and those gathered in South Africa is interpreted as in-
dication of the ‘common structures of difference’ that exist due to glocalisation. In other words:
although the appearance and quality of racialised hierarchies of privilege reflected in taste and
cultural preferences always differ depending on local contexts and histories, they share a com-
mon reference point in the link between whiteness and middle-class.




The roadmap for this thesis has taken the reader from relatively detailed and dense descriptions
of differences in taste and cultural preferences of South African youth to reasonably fluid ac-
counts of the role of media in (re-)creating these differences to fairly abstract comparisons
between South African and Brazilian youth culture. It is now the aim of this conclusion to
demonstrate the relevance of each of these themes for a better understanding of the possibilities
and limitations in the pursuit of an egalitarian and post-racial society.
On the most basic level the observations documented in this thesis provide at least partial an-
swers to some of the questions which, from time to time, tend to arise in public debates on the
state of the youth, the social responsibility of the media and the persistence of social inequality in
South Africa and elsewhere. For example, one of the hopes expressed in many readers’ letters,
opinion pieces and around dinner tables is that South Africa’s deeply-engrained racial divisions
will start to disintegrate almost naturally as an increasing number of schoolchildren attend deseg-
regated schools where they learn to live in harmony with complete disregard for old racial stereo-
types. Academic work in this regard is often less optimistic, not least because desegregation at
schools occurs only selectively, unevenly and sometimes with unintended effects, but still gives
credit to the notion that even if racial ‘othering’ is not disappearing altogether, its quality is chan-
ging away from outright essentialising, politically-motivated racism to a more fluid, ‘playful’ and
ultimately less discriminatory racial ‘banter’.
The findings presented in chapters 6 and 7 support this view at least partially: most participants
in the focus group discussions did not make any direct references to race when talking about dif-
ference unless they were prompted, and those who did usually made them in connection with
music and fashion while politics rarely entered the frame. But the findings go beyond these
merely descriptive accounts of more or less racialised forms of youth culture as they link them to
representations of class, and it is here, at the junction of class and race, where the divisive nature
of the seemingly harmless and playful racial banter becomes apparent. The first tenet of the argu-
ment made here is based on the recognition that there is an inherent hierarchy in the perception
of racialised forms of youth culture largely in line with class-centred analyses of taste and cultural
preferences inspired by Bourdieu. Of course, and it has been discussed in length in the literature
review (see page 48), the application of Bourdieu’s theoretical framework to the contemporary
South African context does not come without its own flaws and incongruities. Nonetheless,
some of its main elements are certainly discernible as embodied and objectified forms of cultural
capital (for example consumption patterns, fandom, clothing styles, music tastes as well as ways
of talking and even walking) which correlate with institutionalised cultural capital, i.e. schooling.
What this means is that the cultural preferences of white youth participating in the survey com-
monly prevailed at the most prestigious schools (measured in school fees) and non-white
learners at those schools distinguished themselves from their non-white peers at predominantly
coloured and black schools, respectively. This is not to say that they simply mimic their white
friends at those schools – the broad distinctions in taste and cultural preferences between the
three groups are still valid – but coloured learners at predominantly white schools (Northern/
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Atlantic) are more likely to be into American Rock and Pop, name writers or historical figures as
their idols and prefer surf brands for clothing. Similarly, black kids at those schools tend to have
a preference for American celebrities and music opposed to their peers in the townships. These
findings resonate with the relevant literature on desegrated schools, showing that non-white kids
at predominantly (or at least historically) white schools often struggle “to fit in” (Dolby 2001;
Dawson 2003; Battersby 2004; Soudien 2010), and it is not far-fetched to assume that this feeling
of being sidelined continues to hamper the affected children’s self-confidence and ultimately life
chances. 
The findings in chapter 6 also contradict an assumption associated with the significance of econ-
omic development for nation-building; a common belief that racial differences can be overcome
as South Africa’s middle-class continues to grow, absorbing old differentiators of class and race
in the process. In cultural sociology this assumption is mirrored in the concept of the cultural
omnivore – Peterson’s (1996) name for members of the middle- and upper-class, who show little
concern for old divisions between supposedly high- and lowbrow cultural activities. In many
ways the cultural omnivore thesis seems to hold true in the case of South African youth; if one
looks at the cultural consumption of the better-off students in the survey then one can indeed
detect a broad range of cultural preferences, spanning from admiring novelists to listening to
popular Rock and Pop music. If anything, there is a bias towards popular culture across the
entire sample, making it difficult to distinguish between so-called highbrow and lowbrow cultural
preferences, as one might expect in the context of contemporary South African youth. More
meaningful distinctions only start to reveal themselves once one looks past the old high- and
lowbrow divide and begins to differentiate in terms of genres, artists and localities: better-off re-
spondents, regardless of their race, generally have a higher preference for foreign (mostly Amer-
ican) idols and music than their poorer peers. Racial differences, however, further reinforce these
divisions as coloured and white respondents, regardless of their socio-economic backgrounds,
show higher preferences for cultural imports than their black peers. Accordingly, music taste is
broadly divided by race with coloured and white respondents showing a dislike for local House
and Kwaito. Using the same broad strokes, white respondents have a preference for Rock and
Pop, while coloured respondents are very much into Hip Hop. And even where the analogy
seems to fall apart, its basic logic remains. Freshlyground’s success (see page 132), for example,
can be easily portrayed as a prime example of cultural omnivorousness – the image of young
South Africans from all sorts of backgrounds dancing to a local, multi-racial Afropop band shar-
ing the stage with Shakira during the World Cup ceremony seems to defy all the divisions de-
scribed above. But details matter: most importantly, the appropriation of Freshlyground by
South Africa’s middle-class youth preceded its (purported) success among lower-class constitu-
encies, not the other way around, and its entire ‘packaging’ – the constellation of band members,
venues for performances, lyrics – is designed to make it accessible to (white) middle-class South
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Africans and alludes to a cosmopolitan middle-class taste (Balfour 2012).64
This idea of a cosmopolitan and omnivorous middle-class taste then becomes highly problemat-
ic, as it implies openness and tolerance in the presence of selectivity and exclusion:
[I]f agents at first offer labels and descriptions of their tastes that indicate breadth
and mix, and thus apparently omnivorousness, then, as has been argued here, this
is not because of novel experiences provided by global media or a drive to blend
disparate genres, but because perception focuses on that sector of the field of
musical production catering to one’s tastes, excluding all others as beyond the
pale. It truly is a mix, but only through a scheme of perception – a subjective
field of possibles, as I have called it elsewhere (Atkinson, 2010) – disposed to
attend to and discern the differences and similarities amongst products and
constructed genres that are, ultimately, similarly situated and consumed on the
basis of similar aesthetic orientations. This is, if you like, the phenomenology of
the short-range omnivorousness – and thus, I would add, not really
omnivorousness at all – discovered by Bennett et al. (2009). (Atkinson 2011: 184)
Of course language matters a great deal when it comes to selectivity, especially in South Africa,
yet it does not explain the different preferences for non-South African music, for example. In-
stead it is useful to look at the channeling and reception of cultural flows more generally. This
brings us to the second part of the thesis, which is about media consumption. The underlying as-
sumption here is that while schooling and family continue to be crucial for a child’s socialisation,
the media has acquired a far more important role than it used to when Bourdieu wrote Distinction
as it represents the primary channel for the sort of cultural flows that find their expressions in in-
dividuals’ tastes and cultural preferences described in chapter 6. Yet to talk about ‘the media’ as a
singular entity having some sort of homogeneous effect on youth’s taste patterns is misleading as
it obscures the multiplicity of the media and the unevenness of media access, which is to a large
extent determined by socio-economic factors. And because South Africa’s class structure is so
deeply racialised the media further amplifies the uneven distribution of cultural capital along ra-
cial lines, as described above. These links between media, taste and class are to be found in the
results of chapter 7, which show that black kids listen to radio far more often than white or col-
oured kids. White kids also watch significantly less television than their coloured and black
friends, and when they do, they more often than not tune into (subscription-based) satellite
channels broadcasting mostly foreign (American and British) content. In return, white kids spend
more time online as they usually have internet at home as well as an email account, confirming
notions of a digital divide going through South African society. Going beyond mere medium
types, which first and foremost are a function of socio-economic possibilities, further substanti-
ates the impression that South African youth’s racialised taste patterns are reflected in its media
consumption: Black respondents show a penchant for SABC 1, radio stations Umhlobo Wenene
64. A similar, albeit more complex, point can be made with regard to Die Antwoord’s success in recent years. Little
attention is being paid to Die Antwoord here as the group did not exist (at least not in its current reincarnation)
when the empirical research for this thesis took place. Please consult Claire Scott’s (2012) Die Antwoord and a
delegitimised South African whiteness: a potential counter-narrative? for a thorough discussion of Die Antwoord’s
meaning for white youth’s identity.
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(township schools), Bush Radio, Metro FM, Goodhope FM (city schools) and South African
music channel Channel O; coloured respondents for private TV station eTV, satellite TV, Good-
hope FM and Hip Hop channel MTV Base; and white respondents for satellite TV, 5FM and
European MTV as well as VH1.
Arguably, the relationship between taste and media consumption is not a one-way street and it is
rather mutually reinforcing: one listens to a certain radio station because it plays the music that
one likes and this in turn strengthens the preference for this particular type of music. Similarly,
using music preference variables as predictors for media consumption implies a false sense of
causality and admittedly goes against the grain of the basic argument that different levels of ac-
cess to certain media types and contents are partly responsible for the uneven distribution of cul-
tural capital. Nonetheless, chapter 7 achieves at the very least four things: First, it shows that me-
dia consumption is indeed partly determined by socio-economic conditions. Second, it confirms
the role of language in media fragmentation. Third, it establishes a homology between taste pat-
terns and media consumption. Finally, by linking the three previous axioms, it demonstrates that
South Africa’s extreme inequality and diversity causes uneven media access, which is at least par-
tially responsible for the uneven distribution, and reception, of cultural flows in a similar way as
early-age socialization at home and in school. By doing that it does not provide the final answer
to the question about the impact of the media on the continuance of divisions among youth in
terms of class and race, but it offers a solid reference point for further investigation of this
relationship.
If one acknowledges the particularity (extreme inequality and diversity) of the South African, and
especially the Capetonian, case, then the question arises to what extent the findings of this thesis
can be extrapolated to other settings. In the oursuit of an answer to this question the thesis
aimed to establish whether one can speak of common structures of difference in the cultural
preferences of youth in Cape Town and Belo Horizonte. The basic idea behind “common struc-
tures of difference”, a term borrowed from Kjeldgaard and Askegaard (2006), is that as much as
youth identities are shaped by local conditions, the dissemination of cultural influences via global
gateways (i.e. media) produces comparable youth ideologies around the world:
[T]he concept of youth and youth culture is always constructed in relation to
local sociocultural conditions. Youth in the Western highly industrialized world is
shaped by the social conditions of late modernity. In other cultural contexts,
youth means something very different, depending on the sociocultural historical
development and its relation to modernity. Nevertheless, these local youth
cultural projects are structured by the global ideology of youth encompassing
identity, stylized consumption, and cultural innovation. The global youth segment
therefore emerges as a transnational market ideology through the dialectical
process of glocalization. (Kjeldgaard and Askegaard 2006: 235)
Accordingly, the comparison of taste patterns and media consumption of schoolchildren in
South Africa and Brazil, two developing countries marked by inequality and diversity (yet very
different histories of race relations), promises to shed light on whether the insights gained in
chapters 6 and 7 are particular to South Africa only or provide some general understanding of
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the relationships between class, race and taste among youth.
Given the differences in race relations, and even basic understandings of race, between South
Africa and Brazil, it was questionable whether the search for racialised taste patterns would yield
any meaningful results at all. Nevertheless, even though the findings for schoolchildren in Belo
Horizonte are less pronounced than they are for Cape Town, they do support the earlier find-
ings; white respondents and generally respondents from private schools are significantly less
likely to have a Brazilian music star as an idol and more like to have chosen a foreign (mostly
American) writer, politician or film star compared to their non-white peers or those attending
public schools. White kids in Belo Horizonte also tend to listen to Rock, Sertaneja and MPB.
And with their counterparts in Cape Town they share a certain disregard for radio and television
in favour of online media. In short: even though the racial differences in taste and media con-
sumption are weaker in Belo Horizonte than in Cape Town, they are still discernible and follow
the same patterns as those in Cape Town.
At this point it seems appropriate to emphasise the limitations in the generalisation of the find-
ings presented so far. The most important one is that this thesis deals specifically with young
people of school-going age in South Africa and Brazil, and therefore its findings cannot simply
be assumed to be true outside that context. This is especially the case in terms of the thesis’ use-
fulness for making observations on class structure and distinction on a more general level. Class
in the context of youth needs special treatment and in return any claims made with regard to
class in this should not be interpreted as absolute truths about the actual class structure in South
Africa, Brazil or elsewhere. Similarly, any claims with regard to distinction, cultural capital and
habitus should be treated accordingly. For example, the lack of evidence for true cultural omni-
vores in this thesis does not mean that the omnivore hypothesis has been conclusively refuted
for the South African and Brazilian case. Instead what can be deducted from the findings is that
in the context of South African and Brazilian youth an overly optimistic conceptualisation of cul-
tural omnivores as fundamentally more tolerant of other forms of cultural preferences is not
supported by the empirical evidence. If the concept can be retained at all in this particular con-
text then in the sense that better-off children at the more expensive schools do have a wider
range of cultural preferences, yet they are also highly selective within that wider range, and, as a
consequence, cultural omnivorousness itself becomes a form of distinction. This is also one of
the observations made by Bennett et al (2009: 189) in their description of the British profession-
al-executive class:
They may now have wider tastes in addition, but command of consecrated
culture remains a token of distinction which probably has not yet ceased to
function as an effective form of cultural capital. They also express some tell-tale
dislikes of popular forms. So, because their preferences are disproportionally
within the realm of legitimate culture, it seems likely that their pluralism contains
the elements of distinction rather than being an expression of pure tolerance.
Another limiting aspect of the thesis is that it does not account for the entire range of cultural
preferences and, especially, activities open to young people in South Africa and Brazil. To a large
extent this shortcoming lies in the limited scope of the chosen research design. For example,
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there are certain practical, logistical and material constraints for how long and complex a self-ad-
ministered questionnaire for respondents of school-going age can be, thus limiting the number
of questions on cultural activities. There is also a certain limit to the actual length of the disserta-
tion itself, necessitating economical decisions about what to include in the presentation of
findings.
Despite these limitations there are a number of methodological and theoretical novelties in this
thesis that arguably balance its limitations. For one, it goes beyond the often rather discoursive
treatments of youth culture and racial identities and grounds its insights in a rich and in many
ways unique set of quantitative and qualitative data in the form of two surveys and a series of fo-
cus group interviews. The analysis of the quantitative data relies heavily on multiple regression
analysis, allowing for observations on the relative importance of the various demographic vari-
ables, most notably class and race, which goes beyond what purely descriptive statistical methods
can achieve. The qualitative data adds an element of triangulation and grounding in reality that is
sometimes lacking in purely quantitative accounts of class distinction. In terms of theory: the
thesis makes heavy use of Bourdieu’s conceptual toolbox but not without pointing out its limita-
tions in the study’s context, offering a number of enhancements to Bourdieu’s original theory: a
rethinking of lowbrow and highbrow in the form of acquired and mediated cultural capital and,
related to that, a re-evaluation of the role of the media in upholding class distinctions that con-
tinue to carry racial connotations, not only on a national but also on a global level in the forms
of common structures of difference. But arguably the most important addition was the focus on
race itself as it has been proven to be a very powerful instrument in explaining forms of distinc-
tion that would have been obscured by a purely class-based analysis of the cultural preferences of
South African and Brazilian youth. This is not to say that race substitutes class as the most im-
portant factor for distinction, but it adds to its explanatory power.
In order to illustrate this last point it helps to tell the story of Mbulelo and Kurt. Mbulelo lives in
one of the better-off parts of Langa, Cape Town’s oldest township, and Kurt lives in one of the
poorer parts of Bellville, a sprawling working-class suburb North of Cape Town. The two boys
have a lot in common: they are both 13 years old and have an intact family with parents who
care about them. Their parents are hard-working but money is tight – they can pay the rent for
the small brick and mortar houses the families live in and the boys never have to go to bed with
an empty stomach but there is no money for books, trips to the museum, theater or cinema, an
internet connection or DSTV. Kurt likes the music that is playing on his favourite radio channel
5FM, which is mostly American Rock and Pop, and he listens to some of his parents’ sokkie65 re-
cords. His idols are Nelson Mandela, singer of Maroon 5 Adam Levine and rugby player Jean de
Villiers. In his free time he likes to play rugby and watch American series and 7de Laan on eTV
and SABC 3. Mbulelo prefers to listen to Hip Hop and Kwaito on his favourite radio channel
MetroFM but he also likes the gospel music that his mother is playing every Sunday. His idols
are Nelson Mandela, rapper El Nino of Driemanskap, a local hip hop band, and soccer star Li-
65. Sokkie is a type of Afrikaans folk music.
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onel Messi. He watches mostly South African soap operas on SABC 1 and SABC 2 and likes to
play soccer with his friends after school.
At the start of grade 8, marking their first year in high school, a major event occurs in the boys’
lives. Their parents have been studying and earning qualifications via distance learning over the
years, finding new and much better-paid jobs in the city as a result. This enables the families to
move to a wealthier neighbourhood in the Southern Suburbs and even pay the school fees for
Leafy High, a relatively prestigious former Model C school. At the beginning both kids find it di-
fficult to fit in at their new school. Most of their new classmates come from middle-class famil-
ies. They talk about the restaurants they visit with their parents, the music videos and document-
aries they watch on DSTV and the holidays they have been on. They also seem to be on
Facebook and Twitter a lot, unlike Mbulelo and Kurt who are on Mxit which works fine on their
relatively cheap phones. Mbulelo and Darren slowly adapt to their situation – the fact that they
soon also get DSTV and internet at home and smarter phones helps – but overall Kurt has an
easier time adapting than Mbulelo; he is used to speaking English at school, the teachers are not
unlike the ones he had at primary school, the rules are also familiar and rugby plays a big role at
Leafy High, making him a popular figure among his peers. Mbulelo on the other hand struggles
with the language barrier, he finds it difficult to follow the teachers, often he feels uncomfortable
as the traditions of the school seem strange to him and he has difficulties finding friends he can
play soccer with after school. As a result Mbulelo continues to get slightly worse marks than
Kurt although both boys are smart and diligent students. But soon enough they begin to feel at
home at their new school as they make friends who share their hobbies and tastes in music and
clothing and they also develop new interests and hobbies, such as going to the weekly neigh-
bourhood markets, surfing, going to the movies and attending live music gigs. Over the years,
however, Kurt and especially Mbulelo are losing many of their old primary school friends as
their interests start to diverge – their old friends care little about the boys’ new interests and the
boys begin to care less about their old hobbies. Their music taste also changes as they are able to
watch music videos on DSTV and YouTube and download the latest records of the coolest
bands, some of them rather obscure and only familiar to the ones in the know. Mbulelo and
Kurt eventually start to hang out from time to time. They even swop a few MP3s and they like
some of the music the other one is listening to, but not enough to make a huge dent in the playl-
ist of the other one’s iPod. And when they start going out on weekends they often find them-
selves at different places as their other friends do not like the places the other one is usually
hanging out at. “Its not our vibe,” they like to say.
The highlight of their final school year is a two-week exchange programme with a private school
in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. They are fascinated by Brazilian culture and the hospitality of their
hosts. Mbulelo is surprised by the similarities between the Brazilian and South African hip hop
scene. Kurt is taken to a sertaneja concert, which reminds him a lot of a sokkie festival he once
visited with his parents.
After they finish matric Mbulelo and Kurt apply to study at one of Cape Town’s better universit-
ies. Both their applications are unsuccessful; in the case of Mbulelo, who never completely over-
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came his uneasiness with certain teachers and school traditions, the matric results were insuffi-
cient. Kurt, who had good but not great matric results, was told that his application did not
succeed in terms of the university’s new admission policy. Before sending out their applications
to other, less prestigious universities they visit a job fair. Kurt gets into a conversation with a
fund manager working for a large asset management firm. The manager likes Kurt and offers
him a six-month internship at his firm, which would help Kurt with the following year’s applica-
tion to his preferred university. Mbulelo on the other hand has a chat with the recruiter for a
well-know advertising school in Cape Town. It turned out that they have met before, at a hip
hop concert they both attended. Mbulelo becomes convinced that advertising is what he wants
to do for a living and goes home with the school’s application forms.
Of course the story of Mbulelo and Kurt is exaggerated and the lived experiences of many young
people comparable to them look very different in reality. But the purpose of using these
typecasts is to bring a point across which lies in the omission of a crucial signifier throughout the
entire story: race. Without race the story can be read simply as a story of “up-classing” – two
boys make the transition from a working-class to a middle-class background and end up making
choices that will help them secure their new position in the social order. And up-classing is in-
deed the main theme of the story. Adding race to the equation, however, we can see a crucial
subtext full of texture and meaning: the difficulties Mbulelo is facing at his new school as he is
confronted with notions of white privilege, the separation from old friends as he turns, in the
eyes of his old friends, into an ‘amabourgeois’ (Nkuna 2006) or a ‘Coconut’, a black person who
is perceived to act white, as described in Kopano Matlwa’s (2007) book of the same title. The
story shows the potential unifying effect of a shared middle-class background but it also shows
that within this shared class background, which sets Mbulelo and Kurt apart from their old
friends, race remains a potentially divisive force in the form of taste patterns. It further provides
an example of the possible consequences of the effect race has on the currency of cultural capital
on the labour market, where it plays into Mbulelo and Kurt’s decision-making and, ultimately,
their future.
It needs to be pointed out that this thesis does not provide evidence for significant assumptions
made in the story. It does not account for the academic performance of black youth at predom-
inantly white schools, nor for the consequences of racialised class dispositions on the labour
market. But it does help us to understand the interplay between class and race in young people’s
cultural preferences and improve our grasp of the role of the media and global cultural flows
within this dynamic: as much as cultural preferences – a liking for gangster rap, a penchant for
opera or a passion for soccer – are commonly understood as individualistic expressions, they are,
in fact, manifestations of a highly racialised, classist and, ultimately, unequal social hierarchy. One
of the most important institutions, alongside and partly replacing family and schooling, through
which notions of difference are being normalised, is the media where glocalisation and the freg-
mentation of channels create the appearance of an increasingly homogenic global consciousness
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ID Name School Gender Age Race Language Class
17 Tom Atlantic Male 17 White English Very High
24 Charlene Atlantic Female 17 Refuse English High
53 Susan Atlantic Female 16 White English Very High
61 Kerry Atlantic Female 17 White English Very High
69 Peter Atlantic Male 16 White English Very High
203 Clara Cape Flats Female 15 Coloured English High
221 Marieke Cape Flats Female 15 Coloured English Medium
232 Emile Cape Flats Male 15 Coloured English Low
233 Hendry Cape Flats Male 15 Coloured English Medium
238 Randall Cape Flats Male 15 Coloured English Medium
239 Craig Cape Flats Male 17 Coloured English Medium
240 Chelsea Cape Flats Female 16 Coloured English High
257 Melissa Cape Flats Female 17 Coloured English Medium
260 Cheslyn Cape Flats Male 16 Coloured English Low
291 Wendy Cape Flats Female 16 Coloured English Medium
302 Justin Cape Flats Male 15 Coloured English Medium
304 Ricardo Cape Flats Male 16 Coloured English Medium
307 Edwin Cape Flats Male 16 . Afrikaans Medium
308 Charney Cape Flats Female 15 Coloured English Medium
327 Daniel Cape Flats Male 16 Coloured English Medium
328 Abigail Cape Flats Female 16 Coloured English Medium
345 Gershwin Cape Flats Male 15 Coloured Afrikaans Medium
369 Vanessa Cape Flats Female 16 Coloured English Medium
371 Neil Cape Flats Male 15 Coloured Afrikaans Low
377 Marcel Cape Flats Male 15 Coloured Afrikaans Low
387 Caroline Cape Flats Female 17 Refuse Afrikaans Medium
392 Jocelyn Cape Flats Male 17 Refuse English Low
513 Dave S Suburbs Male 16 White English High
540 Terrence S Suburbs Male 16 Black Xhosa Very Low
554 Burton S Suburbs Male 15 Coloured English High
560 Megan S Suburbs Female 16 White English High
575 Eugene S Suburbs Male 15 Coloured English High
664 Cameron S Suburbs Male 15 White English High
753 Solomon Khayelitsha Male 17 Refuse Xhosa Very Low
236
776 Mcebisi Khayelitsha Female 16 Black . Very Low
801 Asandiswa Khayelitsha Female 16 Black Xhosa Very Low
809 Mfundo Khayelitsha Male 16 Refuse Xhosa Very Low
817 Simphiwe Khayelitsha Male 16 Black Xhosa Very Low
825 Wandile Khayelitsha Male 17 Refuse Xhosa Very Low
828 Thobani Khayelitsha Male 17 Black Xhosa Very Low
853 Zonke Khayelitsha Female 16 . English Very Low
861 Noxolo Khayelitsha Male 19 Black Xhosa Very Low
1050 Kwanele N Suburbs Male 16 Black . Very High
1059 Natasha N Suburbs Female 15 Coloured . Medium
1062 Lucy N Suburbs Female 18 White English Very High
1068 Danica N Suburbs Female 16 White English Very High
1071 Siyabonga N Suburbs Male . Black . Medium
1113 Adrianna N Suburbs Female 17 Coloured English High
1119 Catherine N Suburbs Female 17 White English Very High
1121 Dexter N Suburbs Male 16 White English Very High
1122 Michael N Suburbs Male 16 White English Very High
1221 Yolanda Macassar Female 19 Black Xhosa Very Low
1247 Amanda Macassar Female 16 . Xhosa Very Low
1298 Pamela Macassar Female 16 Black Xhosa Medium
1320 Vuseka Macassar Female 16 Black Xhosa Medium
1381 Sizwe Macassar Male 17 Black Xhosa Medium
1397 Unathi Macassar Female 15 Black Xhosa Very Low
1400 Masande Macassar Male 18 Black English Very Low
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Media Consumption and Identity of Youth in Cape Town
Information Sheet for Participants
Hello, I am Jan Schenk. I am a PhD student at the Centre for Social Science Re-
search at the University of Cape Town and conducting a study on the influence of
global media on youth identities. For this purpose I am collecting data on media con-
sumption among youth and certain aspects which are considered to be important in
the making of young people's selves, such as culture, ethnicity, language, social-
economic background, etc. The same research is being carried out in Cape Town
and Belo Horizonte, Brazil, in order to compare the similarities and differences of
young people's experiences with global media in two different locations.
Should you decide to participate in my study, you can do so in two ways:
(1) Survey: After everyone in the classroom has finished reading this informa-
tion sheet, I will distribute a survey questionnaire. The questionnaire consists
of a long list of questions about popular culture and identity. For example you
will be asked what music you like, what your favourite radio channel is, and
so on. If you do not like to take part in the survey, just return the empty
questionnaire.
(2) Group Interviews: In addition to the survey I am also conducting group in-
terviews at a later stage. The interviews will be done in groups of 4-6 people
of similar age and take between one and two hours. They will be conducted
either on the school premises or at a different location, in which case I will
either provide you with transport or compensate you for the the transport
costs. In these group sessions you will be asked to discuss similar topics as
in the survey, such as music, fashion, youth culture and so on. If you would
like to take part in one of the group interviews, please follow the instructions
on the first page of the questionnaire. Please note that you would have to fill
out the questionnaire in order to be allowed to take part in a focus group
interview.
If you decide to participate in one of the group interviews you will automatically stand
the chance of winning a new Apple iPod Nano 2GB. The winner will be chosen from
among all the participants of the group interviews. Please note again that you would
have to complete the questionnaire in order to be allowed to take part in a group
interview.
On the first page of the questionnaire you will be asked for your name. In case you
want to take part in one of the group interviews you will also be asked for a contact
number, so I have a possibility to contact you for the setting up of the interview meet-
ing. Please note that this personal information will only be accessible by myself and
that it will be deleted at the end of the study. In general all the information obtained
from you will be kept highly private and confidential. 
I would like to videotape the group interviews so that I can listen to and remember
what you have said, and think about it again afterwards. Again, these video record-
ings will only be accessible by myself and never be used in public without your expli-
cit consent.
For my final report, I would like to quote some of the things that have been said by
the various participants in my study, but your name will never be mentioned without
your consent!
Please understand that your participation to this study should be entirely vol-
untary. Declining to take part in the research will NOT affect you in any pos-
sible way! If you wish to participate but, at any given time, you do not want to
answer a certain question, or you decide you do not want to be part of the re-
search anymore, please just tell me so and we will respect your choice!
If anything is still unclear and you would like more information about this research,
please feel free to contact me on 021 650 2323 or 082 584 0465, and I will try to
answer your questions.
THANK YOU!
YOUTH CULTURE SURVEY 2007
QUESTIONNAIRE
Instructions:
On the following pages you will be asked to answer questions either by ticking boxes
or writing something down. You can tick boxes any way you like, for example by
making a cross (✗) or a check mark (✓). Sometimes you are allowed to give more
than one answer to a question, in which case you will a comment at the end of the
question.
Please note that this is not a test or exam and there are no wrong or right answers in
this questionnaire. Please just try to be honest in answering the questions. If you
have any questions before, during or after filling out the questionnaire, please do not
hesitate to ask me.
You have read the information sheet and you understand and agree to the following
terms:
(1) It is your free decision to take part in this survey and you do not expect or re-
ceive any advantages or disadvantages of any kind by taking part.
(2) You are free not to answer a question if you do not want to.
(3) The information I am giving on this sheet and in the questionnaire will be kept
confidential and private. My name will never be mentioned without my consent.
If you agree to the points above and you want to take part in the survey, please
provide with me with the name of your school, your class and your name. I need this
information so that I know how many students of each school and class have taken
part in the survey. We will delete your name after we have completed the study.
School:   Class:      
Name:
If you want to take part in one of the group interviews, please provide me with a con-
tact telephone number, where I can reach you, in order to organise a meeting with
you. I will keep the number confidential and delete it after the meeting. Please note
that you would have to complete the questionnaire before you can take part in an
interview.
Telephone Number:
If you do not have contact number but you want to take part in one of the group inter-
views, please tick the following box and I will try to contact you through the school.
 You do not have a contact number, but you want to take part in a group interview.
1. Are you male or female?
1 ⃞ Male
2 ⃞ Female
2. How old are you? (Years)
3. Where were you born? If you were born 
outside of South Africa please name the 
country where you were born. If you 
were born in South Africa, please name 
the (closest) city and the province where 
you were born.
4. How long have you been living in Cape 
Town? (Years)
5. What is the name of the suburb or district 
you are living in?
6. How do you get from your home to school
every morning? You can tick more than 





6.5 ⃞ Car (myself)
6.6 ⃞ Car (parent)
6.7 ⃞ Bicycle
6.8 ⃞ Other:
7. Which one of these languages would you 
describe as YOUR language – the 
language of your innermost thoughts? 




4 ⃞ Afrikaans    
5 ⃞ N Sotho / Pedi   
6 ⃞ Sesotho / Southern Sotho  
7 ⃞ Setswana / Tswana  
8 ⃞ Sindebele / Ndebele   
9 ⃞ Siswati / Swazi  
10 ⃞ Tsonga / Shangaan  
11 ⃞ Venda  
12 ⃞ Other South African, African 
language  
13 ⃞ Any other European language 
(French, German etc.)  
14 ⃞ Any Indian / Asian language 
(Hindi, Urdu etc.)  
15 ⃞ Other language
8. And which one would you describe as 
your PARENTS' language? You can tick 
more than one box if your parents speak 




8.4 ⃞ Afrikaans    
8.5 ⃞ N Sotho / Pedi   
8.6 ⃞ Sesotho / Southern Sotho  
8.7 ⃞ Setswana / Tswana  
8.8 ⃞ Sindebele / Ndebele   
8.9 ⃞ Siswati / Swazi  
8.10 ⃞ Tsonga / Shangaan  
8.11 ⃞ Venda  
8.12 ⃞ Other South African, African 
language  
8.13 ⃞ Any other European language 
(French, German etc.)  
8.14 ⃞ Any Indian / Asian language 
(Hindi, Urdu etc.)
8.15 ⃞ Other language
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9. In most households there is one or more 
persons who earn the living for the rest 
of the household. This person is referred 
to as the "breadwinner" in a household. 








9.7 ⃞ Other family member
9.8 ⃞ Someone else
9.99 ⃞ Don't know
10. What kind of employment does/do the 
breadwinner(s) in your household have?
10.1 ⃞ Regular pay job
10.2 ⃞ Work for several employers
10.3 ⃞ Odd jobs
10.4 ⃞ Work for self
10.5 ⃞ Work for family business
10.6 ⃞ Pensioner
10.7 ⃞ None, unemployed
10.99 ⃞ Don't know
11. What exactly is the job(s) or 
profession(s) of the breadwinner(s) in 
your household? Please write down the 
job title or a short description: 
(e.g. primary school teacher, cashier at 
supermarket, ...)
12. How many people stay at your 
residence?
13. How many rooms does your residence 
have? Please include bedrooms, living 
rooms, kitchens, lounges dining rooms 
as well as backyard shacks if they are 
part of the household. Exclude 
bathrooms, toilets and passages. 
14. What is the most often used source of 
drinking water in your residence?
1 ⃞ Tap inside house
2 ⃞ Tap in yard
3 ⃞ Tap outside yard (i.e. public)
4 ⃞ Other
99 ⃞ Don't know
15. Does your residence have a flush toilet?
1 ⃞ Yes
2 ⃞ No
99 ⃞ Don't know




99 ⃞ Don't know
17. How much time do you spend listening 
to the radio?
1 ⃞ Never or almost never
2 ⃞ Less than 30 minutes per day
3 ⃞ Between 30 and 60 minutes per 
day
4 ⃞ Between 1 and 2 hours per day
5 ⃞ More than 2 hours per day
99 ⃞ Don't know
18. How much time do you spend watching 
TV?
1 ⃞ Never or almost never
2 ⃞ Less than 30 minutes per day
3 ⃞ Between 30 and 60 minutes per 
day
4 ⃞ Between 1 and 2 hours per day
5 ⃞ More than 2 hours per day
99 ⃞ Don't know
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19. How often do you go the movies?
1 ⃞ Less than 4 times in a year
2 ⃞ About once or twice in 3 months
3 ⃞ About once a month
4 ⃞ More than once a month
99 ⃞ Don't know
20. Do you have a personal email address? 
1 ⃞ Yes
2 ⃞ No
99 ⃞ Don't know
21. How often do you read magazines?  
(e.g. YOU, Cosmopolitan, SL,...)
1 ⃞ Almost never or never
2 ⃞ About once a month
3 ⃞ At some days during a month
4 ⃞ Most days of a month
99 ⃞ Don't know
22. How often do you usually read 
newspapers? (e.g. Cape Times, Cape 
Argus, Die Burger,...)
1 ⃞ Almost never or never
2 ⃞ About once a week
3 ⃞ At some days during a week
4 ⃞ Almost daily or daily
99 ⃞ Don't know
23. Approximately how much money do you 
spend on cellphone usage per month?
1 ⃞ Less than R30
2 ⃞ R30-R100
3 ⃞ R100-R200
4 ⃞ More than R200
5 ⃞ I do not own a cellphone
99 ⃞ Don't know
24. How often do you surf in the internet?
1 ⃞ Never
2 ⃞ About one day per week
3 ⃞ About 2-4 days per week
4 ⃞ More than 4 days per week
99 ⃞ Don't know
25. Where do you have access to the 




25.3 ⃞ Internet Cafe
25.4 ⃞ Public institution (e.g. library, 
community centre)
25.5 ⃞ Friend’s place
25.6 ⃞ Family member’s place
25.7 ⃞ Other
25.8 ⃞ None
25.99 ⃞ Don't know
26. Which of these radio stations is your 
favourite one? Please tick only one box.
1 ⃞ Good Hope FM
2 ⃞ Umhlobo Wenene FM
3 ⃞ Kfm
4 ⃞ HEART
5 ⃞ 5 FM Music
6 ⃞ Metro fm
7 ⃞ Bush Radio
8 ⃞ Cape Talk
9 ⃞ None
99 ⃞ Don't know
27. Which of these TV channels do you 
spend the most time watching? Please 
tick only one box.
1 ⃞ SABC 1
2 ⃞ SABC 2




99 ⃞ Don't know
28. Which of these music channels is your 
favourite one? Please tick only one box.
1 ⃞ MTV
2 ⃞ MTV Base
3 ⃞ VH1
4 ⃞ MK 89
5 ⃞ Channel O
6 ⃞ None
99 ⃞ Don't know
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99 ⃞ Don't know
30. Below you see a long list of magazine 
and newspaper titles. Please tick only 
those titles, which you are reading on a 
regular basis.
30.1 ⃞ Cape Times
30.2 ⃞ Cape Argus
30.3 ⃞ Sowetan
30.4 ⃞ Die Burger
30.5 ⃞ Sunday Times
30.6 ⃞ Heat






30.13 ⃞ Jet Club




30.18 ⃞ Blunt Magazine
30.19 ⃞ Zig Zag
30.20 ⃞ Cosmopolitan
30.21 ⃞ True Love
30.22 ⃞ Marie Claire
30.23 ⃞ Elle
30.24 ⃞ Men's Health
30.25 ⃞ FHM
30.26 ⃞ Other:
31. Young people often see themselves as 
part of one or more youth cultures or 
‘tribes’, for example Hip Hop, Skater or 
Punk. What is your 'tribe'? Leave the box 
empty if you feel that you do not belong 
to a certain 'tribe'.
32. For some people being part of a certain 
youth culture has a great influence on 
the way they dress, talk and think, while 
for others it is less important. How much 
does your youth culture(s) affect you?
1 ⃞ Very important
2 ⃞ Quite important
3 ⃞ Neither important nor 
unimportant
4 ⃞ Not very important
5 ⃞ Not at all important
99 ⃞ Don't know
33. Below you see a list with different music 






33.5 ⃞ Guitar Rock (including                  




33.9 ⃞ Jazz and Blues
33.10 ⃞ Afrikaans Music
33.11 ⃞ African Music
33.12 ⃞ Reggae/Ska
33.13 ⃞ Classical Music
33.14 ⃞ Other:
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Listed below is a series of statements about South African media. Please indicate if you 
agree strongly, agree, disagree, disagree strongly or neither agree nor disagree with them 

















34. I prefer watching foreign TV channels on 
DSTV over local TV stations (SABC, eTV). ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
35. I prefer watching American TV-series 
over South African TV-series. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
36. I prefer watching American movies 
over South African movies. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
37. I prefer watching TV and movies in 
MY language (e.g. Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaans,...). ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
38. I prefer listening to American music 
over South African music. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
39. I prefer listening to radio stations which 
play more local than international music. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
40. I connect more with American music, TV and film 
than with South African music, TV and film. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
41. In dress South African youth are becoming 
increasingly like American youth. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
42. In attitude South African youth are becoming 
increasingly like American youth. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
43. Youth have more in common with each other 
than they do with their parents. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
44. Youth in South Africa have their very 
own style - African, not American. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
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45. In the space below please provide us with a list of your idols. It can include any local or 
international celebrity (for example a famous politician, writer, musician, television- or 
film star), who is important to you. You can write down up to five names. Please write 






46. Please write down your favourite brands. These can include any consumer brand you 
can identify with (for example clothing, technology or lifestyle brands). Again, you can 






47. Please write down your favourite sport clubs. These can include any club, local or 
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48. Below you can see a list with local and international musicians and music bands. 
Please tell us for each band or musician how much you like him/her/them by giving 
each of them a score between 1 and 5. If you do not know an artist or band, then please 
leave the respective box empty.
Ratings:
Empty = I don't know her/him/them
1 = It’s awful!
2 = I don’t like it very much.
3 = I don’t really like or dislike it.
4 = I like it.
5 = I love that stuff!
Artists/Bands Score Artists/Bands Score
50 Cent Kelly Clarkson
Beyonce Kelly Khumalo
Bloc Party Linkin Park
Bok van Blerk Mafikizolo
Bongo Maffin Mary J Blige
Brasse vannie Kaap Ntando
Danny K Pharell





Freshly Ground Springbok Nude Girls
Godessa The Beatles
Green Day The Black Eyed Peas
Gwen Stefani The Rudimentals
John Legend The White Stripes
Just Ginger Timbaland
Justin Timberlake Tumi
Kanye West Tupac Shakur
Karen (Pop Idol) Zola
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49. Now you are asked to rate TV-shows (soap operas and talk shows) using the same 
rating system as on the previous page. If you do not know a a certain show, then please 
leave the respective box empty.
Ratings:
Empty = I don't know her/him/them 
1 = it’s awful!
2 = I don’t like it very much.
3 = I don’t really like or dislike it.
4 = I like it.
5 = I love that stuff!
Show Score Show Score
7de Laan Passions
Backstage Rhythm City
Beverly Hills 90210 Scandal!
Days of our Lives Sopranos
Egoli: Place of Gold Talk with Tumi Makgabo
Friends The Bold and the Beautiful
Generations The Fresh Prince of Bel Air
Isidingo The Oprah Winfrey Show
Muvhango The Tyra Banks Show
Mzansi The Young and the Restless
50. Some people say they come from a certain culture. For example, someone might say "I 
am culturally Zulu" or "I am Muslim" or "I am a Hip-Hop fan". Please look at this list 
below and tick the option which best describes how you classify yourself culturally. 


























99 ⃞ Don't know
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51. When you think about race, how do you 







6 ⃞ I refuse to define myself in racial 
terms
7 ⃞ Other:
52. Which of these options best explains 
why you classified yourself in the way 
you did in the previous question?
1 ⃞ The previous (apartheid era) 
classifications
2 ⃞ Physical characteristics (such 
as skin colour)
3 ⃞ The way society or other people 
see me
4 ⃞ Heritage or family 
(grandparents, parents)
5 ⃞ Culture
6 ⃞ I refuse to define myself in racial 
terms
7 ⃞ Other:






6 ⃞ I refuse to define myself in racial 
terms
7 ⃞ Other:
54. What about race relations in South 
Africa today? Would you say they are 
better than they were 5 years ago, 
worse, or about the same now as then?
1 ⃞ Worse
2 ⃞ About the same
3 ⃞ Better
99 ⃞ Don't know
55. And what about in 5 years time? Do you 
think race relations in South Africa will 
be better than now, worse than now, or 
about the same as now?
1 ⃞ Worse
2 ⃞ About the same
3 ⃞ Better
99 ⃞ Don't know
56. What, in your opinion, is the most 
important influence for how you see 
yourself and others in racial terms? 
Please tick only one box.
1 ⃞ My family
2 ⃞ My friends
3 ⃞ Music
4 ⃞ TV/Radio
5 ⃞ The media
6 ⃞ Politicians




11 ⃞ I do not think about myself or 
others in racial terms
99 ⃞ Don't know
57. When or where do you have the most 
contact with members of other racial 
groups? Please tick only one box.
1 ⃞ At school
2 ⃞ While doing sports
3 ⃞ At church
4 ⃞ When I am going out at night
5 ⃞ While hanging out with my 
friends
6 ⃞ During work
7 ⃞ I do not have contact with other 
groups
99 ⃞ Don't know
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58. How often do you hang out with 





4 ⃞ All the time
99 ⃞ Don't know
59. How many of your friends are from other
racial groups than your own?
1 ⃞ None
2 ⃞ A few
3 ⃞ About half of my friends
4 ⃞ Most of my friends
99 ⃞ Don't know
60. How often do you visit your friends who 





4 ⃞ All the time
99 ⃞ Don't know
61. How often are you being visited at your 
home by your friends who are from other 




4 ⃞ All the time
99 ⃞ Don't know
62. How often do you text or phone your 





4 ⃞ All the time
99 ⃞ Don't know
63. Do you think that most people in South 
Africa would mind or not mind if one of 
their close relatives married someone of 
a different race or ethnic origin? 
1 ⃞ Most people would mind a lot
2 ⃞ Most people would mind a little
3 ⃞ Most people would not mind
99 ⃞ Don't know
64. Would you mind if one of your close 
relatives would marry a black/African 
person?
1 ⃞ I would not mind
2 ⃞ I would mind a little
3 ⃞ I would mind a lot
99 ⃞ Don't know
65. Would you mind if one of your close 
relatives would marry a coloured 
person?
1 ⃞ I would not mind
2 ⃞ I would mind a little
3 ⃞ I would mind a lot
99 ⃞ Don't know
66. Would you mind if one of your close 
relatives would marry a white person?
1 ⃞ I would not mind
2 ⃞ I would mind a little
3 ⃞ I would mind a lot
99 ⃞ Don't know
67. Would you mind dating a black/African 
person?
1 ⃞ I would not mind
2 ⃞ I would mind a little
3 ⃞ I would mind a lot
99 ⃞ Don't know
68. Would you mind dating a coloured 
person?
1 ⃞ I would not mind
2 ⃞ I would mind a little
3 ⃞ I would mind a lot
99 ⃞ Don't know
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69. Would you mind dating a white person?
1 ⃞ I would not mind
2 ⃞ I would mind a little
3 ⃞ I would mind a lot
99 ⃞ Don't know
70. If you had a choice, would you prefer to 
live in a neighbourhood with people of 
only your own race, or in a mixed 
neighbourhood?
1 ⃞ Own race only
2 ⃞ Mixed neighbourhood
99 ⃞ Don't know
71. People sometimes think of themselves 
as being in a class. Would you say that 
you are in the upper class, middle class, 
working class or lower class?
1 ⃞ Upper class
2 ⃞ Middle class
3 ⃞ Working class
4 ⃞ Lower class
5 ⃞ Other:
99 ⃞ Don't know
72. So far we have asked you a lot of questions about your race, culture and class. Now we
would like to know how you would like other people to see you. Do you want to be seen 
in racial, cultural or class terms? Please tell us by indicating which is the most 
important, the second most important and the least important to you. Please tick only 





72.1  Race ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
72.2  Culture ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
72.3  Class ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
72.99 Don't Know ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
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Listed below is a series of statements other people have made. Please indicate if you agree
strongly, agree, disagree, disagree strongly or neither agree nor disagree with them by tick-

















73. Race is being overemphasized in South Africa 
today. It was important in South Africa’s past 
but today people differentiate themselves 
mostly according to other criteria. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
74. South African sports teams should be selected 
ONLY by merit and ability – not by racial 
quotas. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
75. Access to higher education should be based 
ONLY on matric results – not on affirmative 
action. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
76. Access to employment should be based ONLY 
on skills – not on affirmative action. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
77. White people in SA are rich because they 
exploited black people in the past. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
78. With the same education and the same 
opportunities black people are as competent 
as white people. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
79. Anyone who was born in Africa, whether they 
are black, coloured or white, should be 
allowed to call themselves an “African”. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
80. It’s no use blaming the problems in South Africa 
on the past, we should all now pull together and 
start working to solve the country’s problems. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
81. If it wasn’t for white people SA would not 
be as developed as it is today. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
82. If it wasn’t for black people SA would not 
be as developed as it is today. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
83. I feel that people from my racial group are 
being discriminated against. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
84. People of all races were victims of 
apartheid. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞         
85. In the new South Africa we do not talk about 
race issues enough. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
86. People should realise we are South Africans 
and stop thinking of themselves as Xhosas, 
Afrikaner or Zulu etc. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
87. Black people in South Africa are different to 
black people in America. ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞
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89. Apart from special occasions such as 
weddings, funerals, baptisms and so on, 
how often nowadays do you attend 
services or meetings connected with 
your religion? 
1 ⃞ Once a week or more
2 ⃞ 2 or 3 times a month
3 ⃞ Once a month
4 ⃞ Several times a year
5 ⃞ Less frequently
6 ⃞ Never
99 ⃞ Don't know
90. Some people feel very strongly about 
their religious beliefs even if they don’t 
go to church or mosque. Other people 
say that their religious beliefs are not 
important to them. How important are 
your religious beliefs to you?
1 ⃞ Very important
2 ⃞ Quite important
3 ⃞ Neither important nor 
unimportant
4 ⃞ Not very important
5 ⃞ Not at all important
6 ⃞ I don’t have any religious beliefs
99 ⃞ Don't know
91. What sport(s) do you practice? You can 
tick all sports which you either practice 
regularly in your free time or as the 
member of a sports club. You can tick 
















Page 13 of 13
Survey Questionnaire and Informed Consent Sheet: Belo Horizonte
Appendix
255
Ficha de Informações para Participantes e Parentes
Olá, eu sou Jan Schenk. Eu sou um estudante do curso de doutorado em Sociologia 
na Universidade de Cidade do Cabo (África do Sul) e estou realizando um estudo 
sobre a influência da mídia global sobre as identidades juvenis. Para isto estou cole-
tando dados sobre o consumo de mídia entre os  jovens, além de outros aspectos 
que são considerados importantes neste processo, tais  como a cultura, etnia, língua, 
condição socio-económica, etc. A mesma pesquisa foi realizado na Cidade do Cabo 
e está sendo feita em Contagem e Belo Horizonte, para comparar as semelhanças e 
as diferenças das experiências dos jovens com a mídia global. 
Depois que todos os alunos na sala de aula terminarem de ler essa nota informativa, 
vamos distribuir os  questionários a vocês. Os questionários são compostos por uma 
longa lista de questões sobre cultura popular e identidade. Por exemplo, você será 
questionado sobre quais músicas gosta, qual é seu canal de rádio favorito, e assim 
por diante. Se você não quiser participar desta pesquisa, basta devolver o ques-
tionário vazio. No entanto, gostaríamos de reforçar que sua participação é muito im-
portante para nós.
Na primeira página do questionário solicitarei o seu nome. Observe que ele só será 
acessível a mim e que ao final do estudo ele será apagado.
Por favor, entenda que a sua participação neste estudo deverá ser totalmente 
voluntária. A desistência em participar, não irá afetá-lo de nenhuma maneira 
possível! Se você deseja participar, mas em determinado momento, não quiser 
responder a uma determinada questão, ou se você decidir que não quer par-
ticipar mais, por favor, diga-me isto e eu vou respeitar a sua escolha!
Se alguma coisa ainda está pouco clara e se você quiser mais informações sobre 
esta pesquisa, não hesite em contactar-me em 03191418008 ou pelo email 
(jcschenk@gmail.com), e vou tentar responder às suas perguntas.
 
OBRIGADO!
CULTURA DA JUVENTUDE - PESQUISA 2009
QUESTIONÁRIO
Instruções:
Nas páginas seguintes você será convidado a responder algumas perguntas,
marcando alternativas ou escrevendo por extenso. Você pode marcar as
alternativas do jeito que você quiser, fazendo um ! ou uma marca de verificação
("). Em algumas questões, você pode marcar mais de uma opção, casos em que
você vai encontrar um comentário perto das questões.
Por favor, lembre-se que este não é um teste ou um exame, e não existem
respostas certas ou erradas neste questionário. Por favor, basta ser honesto para
responder as perguntas seguintes.
Se você tiver alguma dúvida antes, durante ou após o preenchimento do
questionário, por favor, fique a vontade para perguntar ao professor ou a mim.
Você leu a ficha e você compreende e concorda com os seguintes termos: 
(1) É de sua livre decisão participar deste estudo e você não espera receber
quaisquer vantagens ou desvantagens, de qualquer natureza, participando.
(2) Você está livre para não responder a qualquer pergunta, se você não quiser.
(3) As informações que você está dando a esta ficha e ao questionário são
confidenciais e privadas. Seu nome jamais será mencionado sem o seu
consentimento.
Se você concorda com os pontos acima e quiser participar da pesquisa, forneça-me
o nome de sua escola, a sua turma e seu nome. Preciso destas informações para
que eu saiba quantos alunos de cada escola e turma participaram desta pesquisa.
Vou apagar o seu nome após a conclusão deste estudo.
Escola:   Turma:
Nome:      
1. Qual é o seu sexo?
1 ! Masculino
2 ! Feminino
2. Quantos anos você tem?
3. Em qual bairro você mora?
4. Quanto tempo você ouve rádio 
diariamente?
1 ! Nunca ou quase nunca
2 ! Menos do que 30 minutos 
por dia
3 ! Entre 30 e 60 minutos por 
dia
4 ! Entre 1 e 2 horas por dia
5 ! Mais do que 2 horas por dia
99 ! Não sei
5. Quanto tempo você assiste televisão 
diariamente?
1 ! Nunca ou quase nunca
2 ! Menos do que 30 minutos 
por dia
3 ! Entre 30 e 60 minutos por 
dia
4 ! Entre 1 e 2 horas por dia
5 ! Mais do que 2 horas por dia
99 ! Não sei
6. Com qual freqüência você vai ao cinema?
1 ! Nunca ou quase nunca
2 ! Cerca de uma vez por mês
3 ! Alguns dias por mês
4 ! A maior parte dos dias de 
um mês
99 ! Não sei
7. Com qual freqüência você lê revistas?
1 ! Nunca ou quase nunca
2 ! Cerca de uma vez por semana
3 ! Cerca de duas a quatro vezes 
por semana
4 ! Mais do que quatro vezes por 
semana
99 ! Não sei
8. Onde você tem acesso à internet? Você 
pode marcar mais de uma opção, se for 
necessário.
8.1 ! Em casa
8.2 ! Pelo telefone celular
8.3 ! Na escola
8.4 ! Lan House
8.5 ! Instituição pública (por 
exemplo: biblioteca, centro 
comunitário)
8.6 ! Casa de amigo
8.7 ! Casa de parente
8.8 ! Outro lugar
8.9 ! Não tenho accesso á 
internet
8.99 ! Não sei
9. Com qual freqüência você acessa a 
internet?
1 ! Nunca ou quase nunca
2 ! Cerca de uma vez por 
semana
3 ! Cerca de duas a quatro vezes 
por semana
4 ! Mais do que quatro vezes por 
semana
99 ! Não sei




99 ! Não sei




99 ! Não sei
12. Você tem o seu próprio telefone celular?
1 ! Sim
2 ! Não
99 ! Não sei
13. Quanto você gasta com telefone celular 
por mês (em Reais)? Você não precisa 
responder a esta pergunta se você não 
tiver um telefone celular.
14. Os jovens geralmente se vêem como 
parte de uma ou mais culturas ou tribos 
juvenis, como por exemplo Hip-Hop, 
Skatista ou Punk. Qual é a sua tribo?
15. Algumas pessoas que fazem parte de 
culturas juvenis, sofrem uma grande 
influência sobre o que elas vestem, 
como andam e como elas pensam. 
Quão importante a sua cultura juvenil é 
para você?
1 ! Muito importante
2 ! Pouco importante
3 ! Indiferente
4 ! Não muito importante
5 ! Nada importante
99 ! Não sei
16. Qual destas estações de rádio é a sua 
favorita? Por favor marque apenas uma 
opção.
1 ! Radio Oeste FM
2 ! Mix FM
3 ! 98 FM
4 ! Oi FM
5 ! 107 FM
6 ! Rádio Favela
7 ! Extra FM
8 ! Inconfidência FM
9 ! Rádio Itatiaia
10 ! Jovem Pan FM
11 ! Rádio Liberdade
12 ! BH FM
13 ! Nenhuma
99 ! Não sei
17. Qual destes canais de televisão é o seu 
favorito? Por favor marque apenas uma 
opção.
1 ! Rede Globo
2 ! Rede Record
3 ! Rede SBT
4 ! Rede Bandeirantes
5 ! TV Brasil
6 ! TV Cultura
7 ! Rede Minas
8 ! MixTV
9 ! MTV Brasil
10 ! Nenhum
99 ! Não sei
18. Abaixo você verá uma lista com 
diferentes estilos musicais. Por favor, 
marque o estilo que você prefere. Você 







18.7 ! Hip Hop/Rap/RnB









19. No espaço abaixo, por favor faça uma 
lista dos seus ídolos. Ela pode incluir 
qualquer celebridade internacional ou 
nacional que seja importante para você 
(Por exemplo, um político famoso, um 
escritor, um músico ou ator). Você pode 
escrever até cinco nomes. Por favor 







A lista abaixo contém uma série de afirmações. Por favor, indique (") se você concorda 
totalmente, concorda em parte, discorda em parte, discorda totalmente ou nem concorda 



















20. Prefiro assistir canais de tv estrangeiras, 
mais do que canais brasileiros. ! ! ! ! ! !
21. Eu prefiro assistir programmas de 
televisão americanos mais do que 
programmas brasileros. ! ! ! ! ! !
22. Eu prefiro ver filmes americanos mais 
do que filmes brasileiros. ! ! ! ! ! !
23. Eu prefiro ouvir música americana mais 
do que música brasileira. ! ! ! ! ! !
24. Eu prefiro ouvir estações de rádio que 
tocam mais música americana do que 
música brasileira. ! ! ! ! ! !
25. Eu prefiro músicas, tv e filmes americanos 
mais do que músicas, tv e filmes 
brasileiros. ! ! ! ! ! !
26. A moda dos jovens brasileiros está se 
tornando americana. ! ! ! ! ! !
27. A atitude dos jovens brasileiros está se 
tornando americana. ! ! ! ! ! !
28. Jovens brasileiros têm mais coisas em 
comum uns com os outros do que com 
os seus pais. ! ! ! ! ! !
29. A juventude no Brasil tem o seu próprio 
estilo; brasileiro, e não americano. ! ! ! ! ! !
30. Algumas pessoas dizem pertencer a uma certa cultura. Por exemplo, alguns dizem: 'Eu
sou evangélico" ou "Eu sou do Hip-Hop". Por favor, dentre a lista a seguir marque uma 























99 ! Não sei
31. A seguir, você poderá ver uma lista com músicos e grupos musicais internacionais e 
nacionais. Por favor, responda para cada músico ou grupo musical o quanto você gosta 
dele, dando a cada um uma nota entre 1 e 5. Se você não conhece não precisa dar 
nota.
Notas:
Em Branco = Eu não sei quem é.
1 = Ele/ela é horrível!
2 = Eu não gosto muito.
3 = Indifferente.
4 = Eu gosto dele(a).
5 = Eu adoro, é muito legal!
Artistas/Bandas Nota Artistas/Bandas Nota
2 Pac John Legend
50 Cent Jorge e Mateus
Akon Jota Quest
Amy Winehouse Justin Timberlake
Ana Carolina Kelly Clarkson
Beyonce Linkin Park
Black Eyed Peas Marcelo D2
Britney Spears Metallica
Caetano Veloso My Chemical Romance
Capital Inicial Nação Zumbi
César Menotti e Fabiano Ne-Yo
Chiclete com Banana NX Zero
Chris Brown O Rappa
Claudia Leitte Racionais MC's
DJ Marlboro Rappin' Hood





Green Day Tom Jobim
32. Agora, você irá classificar programas de tv (novelas e programas de auditório) usando 
o mesmo sistema da questão anterior. Se você não conhece um determinado 
programa, não precisa responder.
Notas:
Em Branco = Eu não sei quem é.
1 = Ele/ela é horrível!
2 = Eu não gosto muito.
3 = Indifferente.
4 = Eu gosto dele(a).
5 = Eu adoro, é muito legal!
Programa Nota Programa Nota
A Grande Familía Grey’s Anatomy
A Lei e O Crime Hannah Montana
As Visões da Raven Malhação
Betty Feia Maysa
Caminho das Índias Ó paí ó
Capitu Os Simpsons
Caras e Bocas Paraíso
Chamas da Vida Prison Break
CSI Revelação
Dicas de um Sedutor Senhora do Destino
Dr. Hollywood Toma Lá Dá Cá
Dr. House Três Irmãs
Eu, a Patroa e as Crianças Um Maluco no Pedaço
33. Quando lhe perguntam a sua raça, o 
quê você responde? 
34. Quando você se classificou na pergunta 
anterior, o que – desta seguinte lista – 
você levou em consideração em 
primeiro lugar?
1 ! Características físicas 
(cor da pele, cabelo, etc.)
2 ! Sua família (pais, avós)
3 ! Cultura
4 ! A forma como as pessoas o 
vêem
5 ! Recuso a definir-me racialmente
6 ! Você pensou em outra coisa:
35. Usando agora as opções nesta lista, 







6 ! Recuso a definir-me racialmente
99 ! Não sei
36. Quando falamos em raça ou na cor das 
pessoas é importante saber como as 
outras pessoas nos vêem. Desta lista, 







6 ! Recuso a definir-me racialmente
99 ! Não sei
37. Na sua opinião, o quê mais te influencia 
na forma como você se classifica e 
classifica os outros racialmente?
1 ! Minha familia
2 ! Meus amigos
3 ! Musica
4 ! Televisão/Rádio
5 ! A mídia




10 ! Não penso sobre mim ou outros 
em termos raciais.
99 ! Não sei
38. Você acha que a maioria das pessoas 
no Brasil ligariam ou não ligariam se um 
de seus parentes próximos (irmãos, 
filhos) casasse com alguém de outra 
raça? 
1 ! A maioria das pessoas ligaria 
muito 
2 ! A maioria das pessoas ligaria 
um pouco 
3 ! A maioria das pessoas não 
ligaria
99 ! Não sei
39. O que você pensaria se um de seus 
parentes próximos (irmãos, irmãs) se 
cassasse com uma pessoa negra?
1 ! Eu ligaria muito
2 ! Eu ligaria um pouco
3 ! Eu não ligaria
99 ! Não sei
40. O que você pensaria se um de seus 
parentes próximos (irmãos, irmãs) se 
cassasse com uma pessoa parda?
1 ! Eu ligaria muito
2 ! Eu ligaria um pouco
3 ! Eu não ligaria
99 ! Não sei
41. O que você pensaria se um de seus 
parentes próximos (irmãos, irmãs) se 
cassasse com uma pessoa branca?
1 ! Eu ligaria muito
2 ! Eu ligaria um pouco
3 ! Eu não ligaria
99 ! Não sei
42. O que você pensa de namorar uma 
pessoa negra?
1 ! Eu ligaria muito
2 ! Eu ligaria um pouco
3 ! Eu não ligaria
99 ! Não sei
43. O que você pensa de namorar uma 
pessoa parda?
1 ! Eu ligaria muito
2 ! Eu ligaria um pouco
3 ! Eu não ligaria
99 ! Não sei
44. O que você pensa de namorar uma 
pessoa branca?
1 ! Eu ligaria muito
2 ! Eu ligaria um pouco
3 ! Eu não ligaria
99 ! Não sei
45. Se você pudesse escolher, você 
preferiria morar em um bairro com 
pessoas somente da sua raça, ou em 
um bairro com pessoas de várias raças?
1 ! Somente da minha raça
2 ! Um bairro com pessoas de 
várias raças
99 ! Não sei
Abaixo está uma lista com uma série de afirmações que outras pessoas fazem. Por 
favor, indique se você concorda totalmente, concorda em parte, discorda em parte, 



















46. A discriminação racial não existe 
no Brasil. ! ! ! ! ! !
47. O acesso ao ensino superior deve 
basear-se apenas sobre os resultados 
do vestibular e não quotas raciais. ! ! ! ! ! !
48. O acesso ao emprego deve basear-se 
apenas nas competências e não em 
quotas raciais. ! ! ! ! ! !
49. Brancos no Brasil são mais ricos do que 
negros devido as injustiças históricas. ! ! ! ! ! !
50. Com a mesma educação e as mesmas 
oportunidades os negros são tão 
competentes como brancos. ! ! ! ! ! !
51. Se não fosse pelos brancos Brasil não 
seria tão desenvolvido como é hoje. ! ! ! ! ! !
52. Se não fosse pelos pretos Brasil não 
seria tão desenvolvido como é hoje. ! ! ! ! ! !
53. Eu sinto que as pessoas do meu grupo 
racial estão sendo discriminados. ! ! ! ! ! !      
54. No Brasil não falámos o suficiente sobre 
questões raciais. ! ! ! ! ! !








56. Para além das ocasiões especiais como 
casamentos, funerais, batizados e assim 
por diante, quantas vezes você assiste 
reuniões ou cultos de sua religião?
1 ! Uma vez por semana (ou mais)
2 ! 2 ou 3 vezes por mes
3 ! Uma vez por mes
4 ! Alguns vezes por anno
5 ! Com menos freqüéncia
6 ! Nunca
99 ! Não sei
57. Algumas pessoas se sentem muito 
religiosas, mesmo que não freqüentem a 
igreja. Outras pessoas dizem que suas 
crenças religiosas não são importantes 
para eles. Quão importante suas 
crenças religiosas são para você?
1 ! Muito importantes
2 ! Mais ou menos importantes
3 ! Nem importantes nem 
irrelevantes
4 ! Pouco importantes
5 ! Não tenho crenças religiosas
99 ! Não sei
